Opinion
Civil Action 19-cv-00154-CMA-KLM
12-15-2020
HUNTER MELNICK, Plaintiff, v. RICK RAEMISCH, KAYLA JOHNSTON, DEAN GONZALES, SUSAN WHITE, JEFF GEIST, CHAMOIS FANELLIS-ARMENTROUT, JOE WHITE, JOE THISTLEWOOD, NICOLE JIMENEZ, OMER GARCIA, SARA PHELPS, BRANDON MATHEWS, JANE DOE, unknown primary therapist, SHEILA, BRYCE GILMORE, TAMMIS JAHN, KARLENE KELSCH, WATERS, and AURORA MENTAL HEALTH CENTRE, Defendants.
RECOMMENDATION OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Kristen L. Mix United States Magistrate Judge
This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff's Motion for Stay and Status [#73] (the “Motion for Stay”) and Plaintiff's Motion for Status [#76]. The Motions have been referred to the undersigned for disposition. [#74, #77].
The Motion for Stay [#73] requests that the case be stayed for 90 days because of the COVID-19 pandemic and the lack of law library access. The Motion for Status [#76] adds that Plaintiff has extremely limited vision due to not having contact lenses, and that he is unable to pursue any legal action at this time. Plaintiff requests a stay of the case until he receives new contact lenses. Id.
In light of the pandemic and the other circumstances discussed in the Motions [#74, #76], it appears that Plaintiff's prosecution of this case is untenable at this time. Moreover, it is unclear when, or even if, Plaintiff may be able to resume the ability to pursue this action. Entry of a stay may be thus be proper. See Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681, 706-07 (1997) (“The District Court has broad power to stay proceedings as an incident to its power to control its own docket . . . . ‘[e]specially in cases of extraordinary public moment, [a party] may be required to submit to delay not immoderate in extent and not oppressive in its consequences if the public welfare or convenience will thereby be promoted.'”) (citation omitted); Landis v. N. Am. Co., 299 U.S. 248, 254-55 (1936) (“[T]he power to stay proceedings is incidental to the power in every court to control the disposition of the causes on its docket with economy of time and effort for itself, for counsel, and for litigants.”).
Rather than stay this case indefinitely, however, the Court recommends that the case be administratively closed pursuant to D.C.COLO.LCivR 41.2, subject to reopening for good cause. See Quinn v. CGR, 828 F.2d 1463, 1465 and n. 2 (10th Cir. 1987) (construing administrative closure as the practical equivalent of a stay). Good cause to reopen this case will be found to exist when Plaintiff can demonstrate that he is able to fully prosecute this case and comply with deadlines. The Court notes that neither a final pretrial conference date nor a trial date have yet been set. As a result, any temporary closure of the case will not interfere with dates already set aside on the District Judge's calendar, and will prevent this case from getting stale on the Court's docket.
Based on the foregoing, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that this case be ADMINISTRATIVELY CLOSED pursuant to D.C.COLO.LCivR 41.2, subject to reopening for good cause.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 72, the parties shall have fourteen (14) days after service of this Recommendation to serve and file any written objections in order to obtain reconsideration by the District Judge to whom this case is assigned. A party's failure to serve and file specific, written objections waives de novo review of the Recommendation by the District Judge, Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 147-48 (1985), and also waives appellate review of both factual and legal questions. Makin v. Colo. Dep't of Corr., 183 F.3d 1205, 1210 (10th Cir. 1999); Talley v. Hesse, 91 F.3d 1411, 1412-13 (10th Cir. 1996). A party's objections to this Recommendation must be both timely and specific to preserve an issue for de novo review by the District Court or for appellate review. United States v. One Parcel of Real Prop., 73 F.3d 1057, 1060 (10th Cir. 1996).