If, on the other hand, the proceeding before the Supreme Court is an administrative review, the appellant may not invoke the equitable jurisdiction of the court until it has exhausted the administrative remedies provided by the statute; until those remedies are exhausted, it cannot ordinarily be said that there is no adequate relief at law. Mellon Co. v. McCafferty, 239 U.S. 134, 36 S. Ct. 94, 60 L. Ed. 181; Gilchrist v. Interborough Rapid Transit Co., 279 U.S. 159, 208, 49 S. Ct. 282, 73 L. Ed. 652; Henderson Water Co. v. Corporation Comm., 269 U.S. 278, 46 S. Ct. 112, 70 L. Ed. 273. An examination of the statute discloses that the intent of the Legislature was to provide for an administrative rather than a judicial review by the Supreme Court of Oklahoma. That court takes the case upon the transcript of the proceedings before the Board; its function is an examination and review of the transcript.

Having neglected to avail itself of the remedies provided by the state law (St. Cal. 1915, p. 160, §§ 66, 67) for the correction of the alleged wrongful orders complained of, it follows that the bill filed herein is without equity. Mellon Co. v. McCafferty, 239 U.S. 134, 136, 36 S. Ct. 94, 60 L. Ed. 181. Plaintiff's application for an injunction is therefore denied, and defendant's motion to dismiss the bill is granted.

The board of review there mentioned was the final administrative board clothed with jurisdiction to review, modify, increase, or decrease the assessment complained of. In Mellon Co. v. McCafferty, 239 U.S. 134, 36 S. Ct. 94, 60 L. Ed. 181, the court merely adhered to the recognized rule that if the plaintiff has ample, efficient administrative remedies under the state law, the failure to resort to them will bar his right to relief in the federal court. The opinion is grounded upon the proposition that in view of the fact that the administrative remedies were not first exhausted the court is without jurisdiction to grant relief.

Lastly, it may be conceded that the present cases have reached their justiciable stage in the sense that the complainants have exhausted all remedies given by statute before administrative tribunals. Whether the right of appeal to the court of common pleas be considered as administrative in its nature, so as to bring the present actions within the doctrine of Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 211 U.S. 210, 29 S. Ct. 67, 53 L. Ed. 150, Singer Sewing Machine Co. v. Benedict, 229 U.S. 481, 33 S. Ct. 942, 57 L. Ed. 1288, Mellon Co. v. McCafferty, 239 U.S. 134, 36 S. Ct. 94, 60 L. Ed. 181, and Keokuk Hamilton Bridge Co. v. Salm, 258 U.S. 122, 125, 42 S. Ct. 207, 66 L. Ed. 496, or constitutes provision for additional judicial remedy, is immaterial, and a decision of the question is unnecessary if, upon other grounds and for other reasons and in another distinct sense, the present actions have not reached their justiciable stage. Where a complainant has not exhausted the remedies provided before administrative tribunals, and the case is therefore said not to have reached its justiciable stage, relief is denied on the ground of lack of general equity jurisdiction because of the presumption of adequate remedy at law, viz., the appeal to the administrative tribunal.

of section 7 was but another step in the policy of the state to require all complaints by taxpayers to be settled without resort to the courts, except where expressly authorized, until after the tax, is paid and to pursue the remedy provided by statute, which will interfere to the least extent with the enforcement of the revenue laws of the state. Such a remedy as is provided by section 7 was said in the Sneed Case, supra, to be adequate and speedy, and in many other cases where provision has been made under the laws of this state affording an aggrieved taxpayer a remedy whereby he may have corrected errors in assessments or equalization of his property such remedy so afforded has been held to be adequate and to justify a denial of the right of the taxpayer to appeal to equity for an injuunction restraining the collection of the tax complained of. Williams v. Garfield Ex. Bank, 38 Okla. 539, 134 P. 863; Board of Commissioners v. Tinklepaugh, 49 Okla. 440, 152 P. 1119, and cases cited; Mellon Co. v. McCafferty, 239 U.S. 134, 36 Sup. Ct. 94, 60 L.Ed. 181."

ment of section 7 was but another step in the policy of the state to require all complaints by taxpayers to be settled without resort to the courts, except where expressly authorized, until after the tax is paid, and to pursue the remedy provided by statute which will interfere to the least extent with the enforcement of the revenue laws of the state. Such a remedy as is provided by section 7 was said in the Sneed Case, supra, to be adequate and speedy, and in many other cases, where provision has been made under the laws of this state affording an aggrieved taxpayer a remedy whereby he may have corrected errors in assessments or equalization of his property, such remedy so afforded has been held to be adequate, and to justify a denial of the right of the taxpayer to appeal to equity for an injunction restraining the collection of the tax complained of:" Williams v. Garfield Ex. Bank, 38 Okla. 539, 124 P. 862; Board of Com'rs v. Tinklepaugh, 49 Okla. 440, 152 P. 1119, and cases cited; Mellon Co. v. McCafferty, 239 U.S. 134, 36 Sup. Ct. 94, 60 L.Ed. 181. In said opinion of Justice Hardy it is further said:

Of the cases above cited, the case of Mellon Co. v. McCafferty was appealed to the Supreme Court of the United States, where the judgment of this court was affirmed. 239 U.S. 134, 36 Sup. Ct. 94, 60 L.Ed. 181. In that case it was contended that the state statute deprived the taxpayer of his property without due process of law, but this contention was denied both by this court as to the state law and by the Supreme Court as to the federal law.

ctment of section 7 was but another step in the policy of the state to require all complaints by taxpayers to be settled without resort to the courts, except where expressly authorized, until after the tax is paid and to pursue the remedy provided by statute, which will interfere to the least extent with the enforcement of the revenue laws of the state. Such a remedy as is provided by section 7 was said in the Sneed Case, supra, to be adequate and speedy, and in many other cases where provision has been made under the laws of this state affording an aggrieved taxpayer a remedy whereby he may have corrected errors in assessments or equalization of his property such remedy so afforded has been held to be adequate and to justify a denial of the right of the taxpayer to appeal to equity for an injunction restraining the collection of the tax complained of. Williams v. Garfield Ex. Bank, 38 Okla. 539, 134 P. 863; Board of Com'rs. v. Tinklepaugh, 49 Okla. 440, 152 P. 1119, and cases cited; Mellon Co. v. McCafferty, 239 U.S. 134, 36 Sup. Ct. 94, 60 L.Ed. 181. The Legislature may prescribe the form of remedy to be pursued in such cases, and may change the same, provided that the aggrieved taxpayer is left an effectual remedy or one is provided for him, which is all that is necessary, and when such remedy is provided same is exclusive. Tennessee v. Sneed, supra; Shelton v. Platt, 139 U.S. 591, 11 Sup. Ct. 646, 35 L.Ed. 273.

The constitutionality of the legislation in question is sustained by the following decisions: Hopper v. Oklahoma County, 43 Okla. 288, 143 P. 4, L. R. A. 1915B, 875; Thompson et al. v. Brady et al., 42 Okla. 807, 143 P. 6; McClellan v. Ficklen, 54 Okla. 745, 154 P. 660. Neither does such legislation violate the Constitution of the United States, nor deprive the plaintiff of any of its rights guaranteed by that instrument. Mellon Co. v. McCafferty, 239 U.S. 134, 36 Sup. Ct. 94, 60 L. Ed. 181; Stanley v. Board of Supervisors, supra. But it is not of the action of the assessor or of the township board in equalizing the property of plaintiff with other property of like character in the township, or of the county board of equalization in equalizing the various townships of the county, that complaint is made. The sole question presented is that the action of the State Board of Equalization in directing the assessed valuation of the kind and class to which plaintiff's property belonged should be increased in Oklahoma county had the effect of placing a valuation upon plaintiff's property in excess of its fair cash value.