Opinion
CIVIL NO. 03-1050 (PG)
January 28, 2004
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Above petitioner was ordered back on August 19, 2003, and July 31, 2003, submit supplementary materials, such as sentencing and/or trial court opinions, dire appeal of his state conviction and/or filing of certiorari before the state Highest Court that would establish he has exhausted his state remedies for each of his federal claim Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 102 S.Ct. 1198, 1201-1202, 1203 (1982); Picard Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 275, 92 S.Ct. 509, 512 (1971). No action, request, or extension was ever requested by petitioner.
The record also shows, as the petitioner was already apprised by this Magistra no compliance with the timeliness of the filing of this post-conviction petition, since at first glance the conviction dates back to the year 1992 for three charges of first-degree murder. There are grounds to consider that the petition would fall within the t restrictions for the filing of this federal petition under the Anti-Terrorism and Effect Death Penalty Act, (AEDPA). Pub.L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996). AEDPA contains a statute of limitations of one year within which a person in cu; pursuant to a judgment of the state court may apply for federal habeas. For prisoners whose state convictions became final prior to AEDPA, the limitation is one year running from the AEDPA's effective date, that is, April 24, 1996. G v. Duval, 183 F.3d 8, 9 (1st Cir. 1999); see also Lattimore v. Dubois, 311 F.3d 46 (1st Cir. 2002). This one-year period is subject to both statutory and equitable which petitioner has not prompted. Because the record fails to show any a compliance with the orders previously issued, and petitioner was already made aware that he was required to establish the timeliness of his petition, this serves as additional grounds for dismissal.
"The authority of a federal trial court to dismiss a plaintiff's action with prejudice because of his failure to prosecute cannot seriously be doubted." Link v. Wabash, 370 U.S. 626, 629, 82 S.Ct. 1386 (1962). This power, which is of "ancient origin," Id. at 630, is a necessary component of the authority and responsibility of the district courts to establish orderly processes and manage their calendars. Young v. Gordon, 330 F.3d 76, 81 (1st Cir. 2003). The inherent power of trial courts to dismiss cases for want of prosecution or disregard of judicial orders is reinforced and augmented by Rule 41(b). See Id.; HMG Prop. Investors, Inc. v. Parque Indus. Rio Canas, Inc., 847 F.2d 908, 916 (1st Cir. 1988). Chamorro v. Puerto Rican Cars, Inc., 304 F.3d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 2002).
In light of petitioner's failure to prosecute, reasonable grounds to consider the petition being time barred, and failure to comply with the orders of the Court, the petition should BE DISMISSED.
The petitioner has ten (10) days to file any objections to this report and recommendation. Failure to file same within the specified time waives the right to appeal this order. Henley Drilling-Co. v. McGee, 36 F.3d 143, 150-151 (1st Cir. 1994); United States v. Valencia, 792 F.2d 4 (1st Cir. 1986). See Paterson-Leitch Co., v. Mass. Mun. Wholesale Elec. Co., 840 F.2d 985, 991 (1st Cir. 1988)("Systemic efficiencies would be frustrated and the magistrate's role reduced to that a mere dress rehearser if a party were allowed to feint and weave at the initial hearing, and save its knockout punch for the second round").
IT IS SO ORDERED.