Summary
In Mejia v. Holt Public Schools, No. 5:01-CV-116, 2002 WL 1492205, at *1, *4 (W.D. Mich. 2002), a district court concluded that school authorities could ban a father from school grounds indefinitely because he masturbated in his car parked in the school parking lot while waiting to pick up his child at an elementary school.
Summary of this case from Worthley v. Sch. Comm. of GloucesterOpinion
Case No. 5:01-CV-116
March 12, 2002
David J. Anderson, FOR PLAINTIFF(S)
James S. Jamo, FOR DEFENDANT(S)
OPINION
Plaintiffs, Alexander and Patricia Mejia (the "Mejias"), have sued Defendants, Holt Public Schools ("HPS"), Thomas Davis ("Davis"), the Superintendent of HPS, and Scott Szpara ("Szpara"), the Assistant Superintendent of HPS, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 1985, and 1986 alleging that Defendants violated the Mejias' federal civil rights by banning Alexander Mejia from coming onto HPS school property or attending any school function. Now before the Court is Defendants' motion for summary judgment. Although they did not file a formal motion, the Mejias have requested in their brief that the Court grant summary judgment in their favor. For the reasons set forth below, the Court will grant Defendants' motion for summary judgment and dismiss the case.
I. Facts
During the 2000-01 school year, the Mejias' son attended Midway Elementary School, which is part of the HPS. On October 3, 2000, Alexander Mejia parked his car in the parking lot adjacent to the playground at Midway Elementary School and waited to pick up his son from school. While he was waiting, another parent parked her car next to Mr. Mejia's car. The parent claims that after she parked, she observed that Mr. Mejia's pants were unzipped and a short time later saw him remove his penis and begin to masturbate. The parent reported the incident to the school and the Ingham County Sheriff's Department. In the police interview conducted the following day, Mr. Mejias stated that he could not remember whether or not he had fondled himself or masturbated. (10/4/00 Rep. at 2, Defs.' Br. Supp. Ex. A.) On October 6, 2000, Mr. Mejia was arrested and charged with indecent exposure based upon an investigation conducted by a deputy sheriff.
On November 22, 2000, following a jury trial, Mr. Mejia was acquitted of the criminal charge. The next day, Patricia Mejia contacted the school principal, David Rumminger, to notify him of Mr. Mejia's acquittal and to make arrangements for Mr. Mejia to begin coming to school again to pick up their son at the end of the school day. Mr. Rumminger agreed to meet with the Mejias on November 29, 2000, to discuss the situation. The scheduled meeting did not occur. Prior to the meeting, Mr. Rumminger contacted the Mejias and informed them that Davis, the Superintendent, was conducting his own investigation and had ordered Mr. Rumminger not to discuss the matter with the Mejias. On December 5, 2000, Mr. Mejia was personally served with a letter from Davis notifying him that he was no longer allowed on HPS property and would not be permitted to attend any school function. The letter also informed Mr. Mejia that he would be prosecuted for trespassing if he attempted to come onto HPS property. Mrs. Mejia attempted, both personally and through an attorney, to have Davis reconsider his decision. When those attempts failed, the Mejias filed this claim.
II. Standard of Review
Summary judgment is appropriate if there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56. Material facts are facts which are defined by substantive law and are necessary to apply the law. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2510 (1986). A dispute is genuine if a reasonable jury could return judgment for the non-moving party. Id.
The court must draw all inferences in a light most favorable to the non-moving party, but may grant summary judgment when "the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party." Agristor Financial Corp. v. Van Sickle, 967 F.2d 233, 236 (6th Cir. 1992) (quoting Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 1356 (1986)).
III. Discussion
The Mejias allege in this case that Defendants violated their substantive and procedural due process rights by barring Mr. Mejia from coming onto school property. Specifically, the Mejias contend that Defendants violated their fundamental right to participate in the education of their child, which they claim is a part of a parent's established fundamental right to "participate in the care, custody and control" of his or her minor children as set forth by the United States Supreme Court in Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 120 S.Ct. 2054 (2000). In addition, the Mejias contend that Defendants violated their right to procedural due process by banning Mr. Mejia from school property without affording him notice and a hearing. The Mejias concede that HPS is entitled to dismissal because they cannot establish that Davis and Szpara acted pursuant to an official policy or custom of HPS. (Pls.' Br. Opp'n at 15.) Defendants contend that Davis and Szpara are entitled to summary judgment on the grounds of qualified immunity because the Mejias do not have a fundamental right to participate in the education of their child and, even if they have such a right, it was not clearly established at the time Davis issued his December 5, 2000, letter.
The Mejias also make reference to an equal protection violation in paragraph 46 of their complaint. Because they do not address that claim in their response brief, the Court deems any such claim abandoned. In any event, assuming the Mejias are in a protected class, they have not alleged that they were treated differently than similarly situated non-members. McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 292-93, 107 S.Ct. 1756, 1767 (1987).
Qualified immunity shields "[g]overnment officials performing discretionary functions" from liability for civil damages "as long as their conduct `does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.'"Poe v. Haydon, 853 F.2d 418, 423 (6th Cir. 1988) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 2738 (1982)). A court determining whether an official is entitled to qualified immunity employs a two-step inquiry. Hardy v. Jefferson Cmty. Coll., 260 F.3d 671, 677 (6th Cir. 2001); Guest v. Leis, 255 F.3d 325, 332 (6th Cir. 2001). First, the court must determine whether the plaintiff has demonstrated the violation of a constitutionally protected right. Hardy, 260 F.3d at 677. Second, if the court concludes that the plaintiff has demonstrated the violation of such a right, it must determine "`whether the right is so "clearly established" that a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that right.'" Id. (quoting Brennan v. Township of Northville, 78 F.3d 1152, 1154 (6th Cir. 1996)).
To be clearly established, "the law must be clear in regard to the official's particular actions in the particular situation." Long v. Norris, 929 F.2d 1111, 1114 (6th Cir. 1991). "The contours of the right must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing" violates federal law. Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640, 107 S.Ct. 3034, 3039 (1987). While replication of the official's specific conduct is not required to overcome qualified immunity, "`pre-existing law must dictate, that is, truly compel (not just suggest or allow or raise a question about), the conclusion for every like-situated, reasonable government agent that what defendant is doing violates federal law in the circumstances.'" Saylor v. Bd. of Educ., 118 F.3d 507, 515 (6th Cir. 1997) (quoting Lassiter v. Ala. A M Univ., 28 F.3d 1146, 1150 (11th Cir. 1994) (en banc)). In the Sixth Circuit, courts look first to decisions of the Supreme Court, then to decisions of the Sixth Circuit and other courts within the Sixth Circuit, and finally to decisions of other circuits. See Gardenhire v. Schubert, 205 F.3d 303, 311 (6th Cir. 2000).
Substantive Due Process
1. Violation of a Constitutionally Protected Right
The Mejias contend that Defendants violated their rights under the substantive due process component of the Fourteenth Amendment. The substantive due process component is not concerned with whether procedures were followed, but rather "bar[s] certain government actions regardless of the fairness of the procedures used to implement them."Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 331, 106 S.Ct. 662, 665 (1986). Substantive due process encompasses, in addition to those rights expressly set forth in the Bill of Rights, "fundamental rights implicit in the concept of ordered liberty, and deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition[s]." Kallstrom v. City of Columbus, 136 F.3d 1055, 1060 (6th Cir. 1998). The list of fundamental rights includes: "the rights to marry, to have children, to direct the education and upbringing of one's children, to marital privacy, to use contraception, to bodily integrity, to terminate one's pregnancy, and possibly the right to refuse unwanted lifesaving medical treatment." Seal v. Morgan, 229 F.3d 567, 574 (6th Cir. 2000).
In support of their motion, Defendants cite two cases for the proposition that a school's act of ejecting or barring a parent from school property does not implicate a fundamental constitutional right. In Frost v. Hawkins County Board of Education, 851 F.2d 822 (6th Cir. 1988), a parent opposed to her daughter being taught from textbooks approved by the school board was initially permitted by the school and the school board to remove her daughter from class while the class was being taught from the textbooks and give her daughter a reading lesson during that time from a textbook selected by the parent. Subsequently, the school board changed its policy to require that all students use the textbooks approved by the board. Despite receiving notification of the policy change from the school principal and a warning that her practice was in violation of school board policy, the plaintiff attempted to continue her practice of removing her daughter. The plaintiff was arrested when she refused to leave the school premises after being instructed to do so by the police chief. The plaintiff filed suit alleging that the defendants violated her constitutional rights by restraining the expression of her ideas on the advisability of using the new textbooks, denying her the physical custody of her daughter without due process, and suppressing her right to speak symbolically. The Sixth Circuit held that the plaintiff's rights were not violated because the plaintiff was put on notice that she would no longer be permitted to pull her daughter out of class, but despite that knowledge and the option of sending her daughter to a private school, the plaintiff chose to send her daughter back to the school and continue her disruptive practices. Id. at 827. In Ryans v. Gresham, 6 F. Supp.2d 595 (E.D.Tex. 1998), the plaintiff, who was present on school property to observe her son in his classroom, was arrested for trespassing after refusing an order to leave the school premises. The plaintiff alleged that the defendants violated her First Amendment rights and her right to direct her child's education under the Fourteenth Amendment. The court rejected both claims. With respect to the substantive due process claim, the court stated, "An exhaustive review of the case law pertaining to the constitutional right of parents to direct the education of their children discloses no holding even remotely suggesting that this guarantee includes a right to access to the classes in which one's child participates." Id. at 601 (footnote omitted). The court concluded that the constitution did not protect the rights asserted by the plaintiff. Id. at 602.
Defendants also cite Brackens v. Ennis Independent School District, No. Civ. A. 3:97-CV-2502H, 1998 WL 892307 (N.D.Tex. Dec. 15, 1998), as support for their argument that the Mejias do not have a fundamental right to go onto school property. While the facts inBrackens are analogous to those in this case in that the plaintiffs were escorted from the school premises and informed that they could be arrested for trespassing if they went onto school property, the plaintiffs' claims were for racial discrimination, not violation of a right to come onto school property. Therefore, Brackens does not address the issue in this case.
The Court has also found two cases which shed some light on the issue of whether a parent has a constitutional right to go onto public school property. In Lovern v. Edwards, 190 F.3d 648 (4th Cir. 1999), the superintendent of the school district in which the plaintiff's son was enrolled barred the plaintiff from the school's property due to verbal abuse and threatening behavior by the plaintiff towards school officials. The plaintiff alleged that the superintendent violated the plaintiff's constitutional rights of free speech, "right to petition," and "parental rights." The court concluded that the plaintiff's claims against the superintendent were "plainly insubstantial and entirely frivolous."Id. at 656. The court observed:
School officials have the authority to control students and school personnel on school property, and also have the authority and responsibility for assuring that parents and third parties conduct themselves appropriately while on school property. While the specific contours of the authority and responsibility of school officials are defined by state law, such officials should never be intimidated into compromising the safety of those who utilize school property.Id. at 655 (citations omitted). In Henley v. Octorara Area School District, 701 F. Supp. 545 (E.D.Pa. 1988), the plaintiff, along with several others who were students at a high school, committed several criminal acts of vandalism and property destruction in the community and against the high school. The school district banned the plaintiff, who was neither a student nor a parent of a student, from coming onto school property. The court rejected the plaintiff's claim that such a ban violated his constitutional rights. The court reasoned that the plaintiff had no greater right than other members of the public to go onto school property and school authorities were entitled to impose reasonable restrictions upon non-students from going on the school grounds. Id. at 551. The court stated that "the school authorities had the right to exclude [the plaintiff] from coming onto the school property, considering that [the plaintiff] had engaged in criminal activities involving school students including a criminal conspiracy with Octorara Area High School students." Id.
The cases cited above establish that a school may ban a person, including a parent, from going onto school property in order to preserve order in the educational process or to protect students from potential harm without violating any fundamental right to go onto or access school property. In the instant case, Davis had a reasonable basis for banning Mr. Mejia from school property because of his alleged behavior on school grounds. It is irrelevant that Mr. Mejia was ultimately acquitted of the indecent exposure charge. Based upon an interview of the parent who observed Mr. Mejia and Mr. Mejia's statement in the police report, Davis had reason to believe that Mr. Mejia engaged in improper behavior on school grounds. In making his determination, Davis was bound neither by the jury's verdict or by the jury's assessment of the parent-witness' credibility.
The Mejias contend that the cases cited by Defendants are irrelevant because Plaintiffs are not claiming that a parent has a right to be present on school property for improper purposes or for no legitimate purpose at all. In fact, they concede that such a right does not exist. Instead, they assert that they are claiming a violation of Mr. Mejias' right to participate in the education of his child, which is part of the right to control the education of one's child identified by the Supreme Court in Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 120 S.Ct. 2054 (2000). At issue in Troxel was a Washington state statute which permitted any person to petition the court for visitation rights with a child. In that case, the Troxels petitioned to receive visitation with their granddaughters. The Court held that the statute was unconstitutional because it infringed on the fundamental right of parents to make decisions concerning the care, custody, and control of their children. Id. at 66-67, 120 S.Ct. at 2060-61. In discussing this right, the Court described it as "perhaps the oldest of the fundamental liberty interests recognized by this Court." Id. at 65, 120 S.Ct. at 2060. The Court also observed, citing Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 43 S.Ct. 625 (1923), and Pierce v. Society of the Sisters of the Holy Names of Jesus and Mary, 268 U.S. 510, 45 S.Ct. 571 (1925), that it has held that a parent's right to direct the care, custody, and control of his or her child includes the right to direct and control the education of the child. Id.
The Mejias contend that their right to direct and control the education of their child mentioned in Troxel includes the right to participate in their child's education by, for example, being present at parent-teacher conferences at school. Thus, according to the Mejias, Davis impinged on this right by banning Mr. Mejia from the school property. This argument, however, is based upon a strained reading of Troxel. While Troxel does mention that parents have the right to direct and control the education of their children (albeit the case does not, itself, involve the education of a child), nothing in that decision suggests that it includes the right to go onto school property, even if doing so is necessary to participate in the child's education. In Meyer, the Court held unconstitutional a state statute prohibiting teaching in foreign languages to children who had not completed the eighth grade. The Court held that the statute infringed both the teacher's right to engage in his occupation of teaching as well as the parents' right to control their children's education by choosing their teacher. Id. at 400-01, 43 S.Ct. at 627. In Pierce, the Court held that an Oregon statute which required all children between the ages of 8 and 16 years to attend a public school was invalid because it "unreasonably interfere[d] with the liberty of parents and guardians to direct the upbringing and education of children under their control." Id. at 534-35, 45 S.Ct. at 573. The Court reasoned that because parents are entrusted with the care and upbringing of their children, including the right to make decisions regarding education, the state could not foreclose parents from sending their children to private schools which otherwise comply with state law.Id. at 535, 45 S.Ct. at 573.
Meyer and Pierce establish the right of parents to direct and control the education of their children by making the decision about where their children will be educated. Those cases, however, do not extend or create a right of parents to go onto school property for purposes of participating in the child's education. The right of a parent to direct his child's education is "limited in scope." Swanson v. Guthrie Indep. Sch. Dist., 135 F.3d 694, 699 (10th Cir. 1998) (observing that "[f]ederal courts . . . have held that parents have no right to exempt their children from certain reading programs the parents found objectionable, or from a school's community-service requirement, or from an assembly program that included sexually explicit topics"). The Mejias have not cited any case supporting their argument that they have a fundamental right to participate in their child's education by being present on school property, and, given the Supreme Court's restraint in delineating the scope of parents' fundamental rights with respect to education, see Seal, 229 F.3d at 575, this Court declines to hold that parents have a fundamental right to participate in their children's education through physical access to school property, teachers, or administrators. Furthermore, as a practical matter, physical exclusion from school property does not preclude a parent from communicating with his child's teachers or school authorities about issues involving the child, nor does it hinder a parent's ability to make informed decisions relating to the child's education because there are always alternate channels of communication available, such as communication through a spouse (in this case Mrs. Mejia), telephone, e-mail, or notes to the teacher or administrators. It is probably true that the educational experience will be less enriching for both parent and child if the parent is barred from coming onto school property to attend or participate in the child's school-related activities or sporting events. Those concerns, however, do not raise a constitutional issue.
2. Clearly Established
Even if the right asserted by the Mejias were constitutionally valid, there is no case from any court making the contours of such a right clear enough to put reasonable school officials on notice at the time Davis sent the December 5, 2000, letter to Mr. Mejia that banning a parent from school property for a valid reason would violate the constitutional rights of the parent. As discussed above, Meyer and Pierce, the cases the Mejias rely on as support for the claimed substantive due process right to participate in their child's education by coming onto school property confirm no more than a parent's right to make choices regarding the general nature of one's child's education, for example, public or parochial — not the right to go onto school property or to direct, for example, how a particular class must be taught or graded. Nothing in those cases even arguably suggests to reasonable school officials that the right claimed by the Mejias is within the confines of the rights established in those cases. Thus, the right was not clearly established.
The Mejias argue that their attorney's April 2, 2001, letter to Davis was sufficient to put Davis on notice that he was violating their constitutional rights were being violated. The letter did not cite any case from the Supreme Court, the Sixth Circuit, or any other circuit establishing such a right. Advocates letters do not clearly establish constitutional rights. Therefore, the letter could not have put Davis on notice of a constitutional violation.
Procedural Due Process
The Mejias also claim that Defendants violated their procedural due process rights by depriving them of their fundamental liberty interest in being able to participate in the education of their child without notice and a hearing. Because this claim is premised upon the Mejias' claim that they have a fundamental right to participate in the education of their child by being present on school property, Defendants are entitled to summary judgment based upon the Court's determination that the constitution does not afford the Mejias the substantive due process right they claim. Furthermore, the lack of any case law clearly establishing the alleged right also means that the Mejias did not have a clearly established due process right.
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, Defendants' motion for summary judgment will be granted and the case will be dismissed.
In their brief in support of their motion, Defendants request that the Court award them their attorney fees. While an award of attorney fees may be made to prevailing defendants under 42 U.S.C. § 1988, Defendants should file a separate motion and brief explaining why they believe they are entitled to fees in this case. The Court notes, however, that while attorney fees are generally awarded to prevailing plaintiffs in civil rights cases, they are awarded to prevailing defendants only when the claim is frivolous or without foundation, even if the claim is not brought in subjective bad faith. York v. Ferris State Univ., 36 F. Supp.2d 976, 980 (W.D.Mich. 1998) (quoting Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412, 421, 98 S.Ct. 694, 700 (1978)).
An Order consistent with this Opinion will be entered.
ORDER
In accordance with the Opinion filed on this date,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment (docket no. 15) is GRANTED.
This case is closed.