Opinion
No. COA15-777
04-05-2016
MAYRA A. MEJIA, Plaintiff, v. LOUIS D. BOWMAN, Individually and as a member of the High Point, North Carolina, Police Department; and J.A. JAMERSON and C.D. LOGGINS, Individually and as members of the Guilford County Sheriff's Department; B.J. BARNES, Sheriff of Guilford County; and THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT EXCESS LIABILITY FUND, INC., Defendants.
Smith, James, Rowlett & Cohen, LLP, by Norman B. Smith, for Plaintiff. Smith Moore Leatherwood LLP, by Lisa W. Arthur, Bruce P. Ashley, and Patrick M. Kane, for Defendant Louis D. Bowman.
An unpublished opinion of the North Carolina Court of Appeals does not constitute controlling legal authority. Citation is disfavored, but may be permitted in accordance with the provisions of Rule 30(e)(3) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure. Guilford County, No. 14 CVS 5163 Appeal by Plaintiff from Order and Judgment entered 2 March 2015 by Judge A. Robinson Hassell in Guilford County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 2 December 2015. Smith, James, Rowlett & Cohen, LLP, by Norman B. Smith, for Plaintiff. Smith Moore Leatherwood LLP, by Lisa W. Arthur, Bruce P. Ashley, and Patrick M. Kane, for Defendant Louis D. Bowman. STEPHENS, Judge.
Plaintiff Mayra A. Mejia appeals from the trial court's Order and Judgment granting Defendant Louis D. Bowman's motion for directed verdict against Mejia's claims for assault and battery, false imprisonment and false arrest, and malicious prosecution. We hold that the trial court erred in concluding that, when taken in the light most favorable to Mejia, the evidence in the record was insufficient as a matter of law to support a verdict in her favor, and we consequently reverse the court's Order and Judgment.
Factual Background and Procedural History
On 14 September 2012, Officer Louis D. Bowman of the High Point Police Department ("HPPD") arrested Mayra A. Mejia outside her home on Rindle Drive in High Point for the misdemeanor offense of disorderly conduct following a dispute with her neighborhood homeowners association. Thereafter, Bowman transported Mejia to the High Point Detention Center, where she appeared before a magistrate who concluded there was probable cause for her arrest based on Bowman's sworn testimony that Mejia
had violated the law by making utterances, gestures, and using abusive language intended and plainly likely to provoke immediate retaliation and thereby cause a breach of the peace, by repeatedly honking at the [neighborhood's] residents, extending her middle finger in a rude gesture toward others, and telling the officer to kiss her ass twice.Bond was set at $100.00, which Mejia's family posted several hours later to secure her release. The charge against Mejia was ultimately dismissed by the Guilford County District Attorney's office on 20 September 2013.
On 28 April 2014, Mejia filed a complaint against Bowman in his official and individual capacities in Guilford County Superior Court alleging claims of assault and battery, false imprisonment and false arrest, and malicious prosecution. Specifically, the complaint alleged that Bowman "displayed force against [Mejia] and threatened her" while effectuating her arrest; that Bowman used force to illegally restrain Mejia against her will; and that Bowman acted with malice in causing a criminal proceeding to be initiated against Mejia without probable cause. Mejia further alleged that Bowman's conduct resulted in a deprivation of her liberty and caused her to suffer physical pain, anxiety and depression, embarrassment, and injury to her reputation. As relief, Mejia sought actual damages in excess of $10,000.00, attorney fees, and punitive damages.
Mejia also raised claims in her complaint against Guilford County Sheriff B.J. Barnes and two Guilford County Sheriff's officers in their official and individual capacities who Mejia alleged beat and kicked her repeatedly after she was taken into custody. Mejia's claims against these defendants, all of which were dismissed either by directed verdict or by judgment following a jury verdict against Mejia, are not at issue in this appeal.
In his answer filed on 30 June 2014, Bowman acknowledged putting handcuffs on Mejia to effectuate her arrest but denied "using force against [Mejia] beyond the minimum amount of restraint reasonably necessary in the proper discharge of his duties" and contended that the arrest had been supported by probable cause and that any injuries Mejia sustained resulted from her own unreasonable conduct. Bowman also raised the affirmative defenses of governmental immunity and public official immunity, and moved to dismiss Mejia's complaint pursuant to N.C.R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). That same day, Bowman filed a motion to dismiss Mejia's complaint against him in his official capacity on the basis of governmental immunity. On 6 August 2014, by consent of the parties, the trial court granted Bowman's motion to dismiss Mejia's official capacity claims with prejudice.
On 9 December 2014, Bowman filed a motion for summary judgment on Mejia's remaining claims against him in his individual capacity. Specifically, Bowman contended that there was no evidence that he had lacked probable cause to arrest Mejia, that he had acted with excessive force in doing so, or that the information he had provided to the magistrate who found probable cause for Mejia's arrest had been deliberately falsified or evidenced reckless disregard for the truth. In the alternative, Bowman argued that because there was no evidence that he had acted with malice toward Mejia, her claims should be barred by public official immunity. In support of this motion, Bowman offered a brief affidavit explaining his actions and a copy of Mejia's arrest report; excerpts from the transcript of Mejia's deposition testimony showing she had been seeking psychiatric treatment for anger management problems arising out of disputes with her neighbors and the homeowners association for nearly a year prior to her arrest; and a copy of a misdemeanor criminal summons issued to Mejia for communicating threats against a member of the homeowners association the day before her arrest. In opposition to Bowman's motion, Mejia submitted an affidavit of her own in which she repeatedly accused Bowman of lying, denied engaging in any conduct that could justify her arrest for disorderly conduct or any other criminal offense, and further contended that based on her inquiries, "[HPPD] never arrests people for disorderly conduct, but rather gives them tickets with a court date at which they are to appear," and that "[i]t is unheard of for policemen in High Point, based on all of my information, to arrest people, handcuff them, have bond set for them, and have them placed in jail, when they are charged simply with disorderly conduct." Mejia also provided an affidavit from her husband, who alleged that he had been present at the time of his wife's arrest and had warned Bowman that she suffered from scoliosis and was in pain as a result of being handcuffed and put in the back of a police car, but that Bowman did nothing to relieve his wife's pain and instead made a threatening statement. On 9 January 2015, the trial court denied Bowman's motion for summary judgment.
The matter came on for a jury trial on 18 February 2015 in Guilford County Superior Court. At trial, Mejia, who is a native of the Dominican Republic and was 60 years old at the time of her arrest, testified she had a history of conflict with her neighborhood's homeowners association over reported violations of its rules that she insisted she had never committed, and that she had previously received a letter from the association's attorney, signed by a member of its board of directors named John Black, threatening to take her house away if she did not fix those violations. According to Mejia's testimony, on 14 September 2012, she was at home preparing for a garage sale when Black approached her, threatened again to take her house away, then raised his finger to his neck to make a throat-slashing gesture and told her to go back to her home country. Mejia testified further that she called 911 immediately in response to this threat; that Bowman responded to her home shortly thereafter; that she explained to Bowman what had happened; that after listening to her explanation, Bowman left her house and she remained there, then Bowman returned 10 minutes later; that upon his return, Bowman told her that he had spoken to Black, who had accused Mejia of stealing a yard sign for the upcoming neighborhood yard sale; and that Bowman told her if she returned the yard sign, there would be no further problems.
Mejia testified that when she denied having taken any yard signs, Bowman got back in his patrol car and drove away, at which point Mejia decided to drive around the neighborhood with three of her Yorkshire terriers to see what was going on. Mejia testified that she drove at or below the posted 25-mile-per-hour speed limit, honked her car's horn one time because there were children playing in the street, then passed Black's residence, where she saw three police cars parked in the driveway. Mejia explained that she then returned home without incident, but that as she was trying to get her dogs out of her car, Bowman approached her from behind, told her she was under arrest, placed her in handcuffs, and asked her to get into the back of his patrol car. Mejia testified further that she suffers from scoliosis and that as a result of her condition, the experience of sitting handcuffed in Bowman's patrol car was especially painful. Mejia acknowledged that she never communicated this to Bowman, and also testified that she remained polite throughout her encounter with Bowman and never cursed or made offensive gestures at him or any of her neighbors. Mejia also testified that as she drove around her neighborhood that afternoon, she never exceeded the speed limit or honked her horn aggressively, and that no police cars ever put on their blue lights or sirens or attempted to pull her vehicle over. On cross-examination, Mejia admitted that the only time Bowman ever touched her was when he was putting on her handcuffs, that she had previously sought treatment for anger management issues related to her ongoing disputes with the neighborhood homeowners association, and that the day before her arrest she was involved in a heated dispute with her neighborhood's community manager.
At the conclusion of her testimony, Mejia rested her case in chief, at which point Bowman's counsel made a motion pursuant to N.C.R. Civ. P. 50(a) for directed verdict in his favor. The trial court denied this motion and Bowman took the stand to testify on his own behalf. Bowman testified that he had worked for HPPD for 26 years, during which time he estimated he had made at least 100 arrests for disorderly conduct. Bowman explained that, although he typically attempts to defuse such situations without resorting to making an arrest, arrests for disorderly conduct are fairly common "[b]ecause disorderly conduct is an immediate situation, and without taking action, it could escalate into something worse. So it's usually taken in as a custody arrest as opposed to any other type of arrest." Bowman also noted that while in some cases it might be permissible to simply issue a citation, when the individuals involved are in the midst of a heated dispute that police are unable to de-escalate, "issuing a citation [would not] defuse the situation. It would basically be just giving them a piece of paper with a court date, but it wouldn't cause the parties to back off and cool off for a while."
When asked to describe the events that resulted in Mejia's arrest, Bowman testified that on 14 September 2012, he arrived at Mejia's home at approximately 5:15 p.m. in response to her 911 call; that Mejia seemed "upset and rather agitated" but he did not recall her identifying the person who allegedly threatened her or any specific threat made against her; and that when Mejia explained the situation arose from a dispute with the homeowners association, he advised her that it sounded like a civil, rather than criminal, matter and that she might need to speak to an attorney. After entering notes to the same effect in his call log, Bowman went back on patrol for twenty to thirty minutes until he received a call from dispatch to respond to a different residence in Mejia's neighborhood, based on a report that a female neighbor "stole [the resident's] yard sale sign and several others from the neighborhood." When Bowman arrived at the residence, the owner, John Black, explained that he suspected Mejia in the yard sale sign thefts but did not have any witnesses or other proof that the signs had, in fact, been stolen. Bowman testified that at that point, he returned to Mejia's home and explained the allegations Black had made against her. Mejia remained agitated and upset but denied having taken any signs, so Bowman went back to speak again with Black, who advised him that Mejia "had done some instances earlier in the neighborhood, driving through, honking her horn, prior to that incident." During this conversation, Bowman advised Black that because there was no proof Mejia had taken any signs, there was no way to pursue the matter any further, and urged him to calm down. However, as Bowman testified, "While I was speaking with Mr. Black, [Mejia] came driving by in her vehicle. She was basically, what I would say, laying on the horn and driving at a speed that I would consider excessive for that neighborhood." Specifically, Bowman estimated Mejia honked her horn "three to at least five [times] in very long blasts" and was traveling at a speed of around 40 to 45 miles per hour. In light of this conduct, Bowman decided "to conduct a traffic stop on [Mejia's] vehicle in order to speak to her and try to calm her down." Bowman called into dispatch to advise he would be conducting a traffic stop, but Mejia refused to pull over even after he activated his patrol car's blue lights. According to Bowman's testimony, he followed Mejia for nearly a mile as she continued to speed around the neighborhood honking her horn. At one point, Bowman noticed that a neighbor standing in his yard watching them "was animatedly pointing at [Mejia's] vehicle as it was going by, trying to indicate to me, 'Yeah, that's her.'" Later, Bowman followed Mejia's vehicle into a cul-de-sac, where she turned around and then extended her middle finger at him as she drove past his patrol car.
Bowman testified that at that point, "I could have arrested [Mejia] for failure to stop for my equipment, probably could have arrested her for careless and reckless driving, considering the situation, but I wanted to speak with her one more time and try to calm her down." When Mejia eventually arrived back at her own driveway and parked her car, Bowman "went up to her, met her at her vehicle, tried to explain to her that she needed to stop this behavior." When Mejia responded by yelling and cursing at him, Bowman determined "[b]ased on her conduct and the way she was attempting to cause a disturbance throughout the neighborhood, I felt this met the elements for disorderly conduct, decided not to charge her with the traffic charges, but just to arrest her for disorderly conduct." Bowman informed Mejia that she was under arrest, then placed her hands behind her back, put her in handcuffs, and asked her to have a seat in the back of his patrol car. Bowman testified that although he had seen Mejia's husband come outside the residence, he had no recollection of speaking with Mejia's husband, and that Mejia continued to verbally abuse him as they drove to the magistrate's office, where Bowman gave sworn testimony as to what had happened. Once the magistrate had determined there was probable cause for the arrest, set bond, and set a court date, Bowman escorted Mejia to the High Point Detention Center, removed her handcuffs, and left her in custody to return to patrol. On cross-examination, when Mejia's counsel pressed Bowman on which specific subsection of the offense prohibited under section 14-288.4 of our General Statutes his client had violated, Bowman identified subsection (2), which prohibits "[m]ak[ing] or us[ing] any utterance, gesture, display, or abusive language which is intended and plainly likely to provoke violent retaliation and thereby cause a breach of the peace." N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-288.4(2) (2015). Bowman testified further that he had a good-faith belief that probable cause existed for Mejia's arrest.
To corroborate his version of events, in addition to his call logs and arrest report, Bowman introduced testimony from Mejia's neighbor, Black, who acknowledged there was a history of ongoing disputes between Mejia and the neighborhood homeowners association. Black testified that around 5:00 p.m. on 14 September 2012, he was putting up yard signs for the upcoming neighborhood yard sale when he saw Mejia remove a sign. Black testified further that he confronted Mejia, who seemed aggravated and refused to return the sign, which led to a verbal confrontation during which Mejia stated she believed Americans were stupid and Black replied, "Well, if you don't like America and you don't like the American people, why don't you go back to your own country." However, Black denied having made any threats or throat-slashing gestures toward Mejia. According to Black, a short while after their confrontation, he saw Mejia drive through the neighborhood "at a relatively fast rate of speed honking her horn," which prompted him to call HPPD. When Officer Bowman responded to his residence, Mejia again sped by in her car, honking the horn aggressively, at which point Bowman returned to his patrol car, activated his blue lights, and began to pursue her.
Bowman also offered testimony from HPPD Officer Brian Hilliard, who testified that he had overheard Bowman's communications with dispatch and responded to the scene to assist as back-up; that he observed Bowman attempting to calm Mejia down in her driveway as she repeatedly told him, "Go to hell. You can kiss my ass"; that Mejia appeared to be highly agitated but Bowman acted as a "complete professional" during the encounter and "tried everything he could not to arrest her"; that Bowman followed HPPD policy in effectuating the arrest and did not use any force in doing so; and that there were no other witnesses present during the arrest. Hilliard testified further that as Bowman was arresting Mejia, all three of Mejia's Yorkshire terriers jumped out of her vehicle and began running around the yard. Hilliard explained that he was able to grab two of the dogs but one ran off into the woods, so he knocked on a door inside the home's open garage until Mejia's husband came outside, at which point Hilliard explained the situation, offered to help catch the third dog, and then spent 10 to 15 additional minutes searching for it in the woods. Bowman also introduced into evidence statistics compiled by HPPD showing that in 2012, HPPD officers made 522 arrests for disorderly conduct and related offenses while issuing only 39 citations for the same.
Although Hilliard testified that he left Mejia's home before the missing dog was located, Mejia's son subsequently testified that he finally found the Yorkshire terrier safe in the woods behind the home at approximately one o'clock the following morning.
On rebuttal, Mejia presented testimony from her husband, who testified that he had been present outside when Mejia was arrested; that he had asked Bowman, "Sir, why [are] you arresting my wife? She's physically disabled. She's in bad pain. She's in the doctor's care. She needs to have some medication"; and that Bowman never replied until just before driving away when he informed him that, "You better learn[] to control your wife because if she walk[s] around . . . John Black['s] house again, I [will] come back and I [will] arrest her and you and . . . press criminal charges." On cross-examination, Mejia's husband testified that he did not agree with prior testimony from Bowman and Hilliard that he was inside when his wife was arrested and never spoke to Bowman afterward. However, Mejia's husband acknowledged that the only time Bowman touched his wife was when placing her in handcuffs, and he also confirmed that Hilliard had helped him search for his wife's Yorkshire terrier after Bowman drove away.
At the close of all the evidence, Officer Bowman renewed his motion for directed verdict, arguing that because Mejia had failed to produce any evidence that he had acted with malice in effectuating her arrest, her claims were barred by the doctrine of public official immunity. Mejia's counsel countered that the testimony from Mejia and her husband showed that Bowman had arrested his client without probable cause, that Mejia's and her husband's testimony constituted sufficient evidence that Bowman had acted maliciously and in a way that he knew was outside the scope of his duty and prejudicial or injurious to Mejia, and that the credibility of conflicting testimony should be a matter for the jury's determination. The trial court ultimately concluded, "based upon the issue of the public official immunity, that there has been insufficient evidence established from which a jury could conclude [that Mejia satisfied] the standard as articulated by our Courts to show malice" and consequently granted Bowman's motion for directed verdict. The court entered its Order and Judgment reflecting this determination and dismissing Mejia's claims against Bowman on 2 March 2015. Mejia gave notice of appeal to this Court on 19 March 2015.
Analysis
Mejia argues that the trial court erred in granting Officer Bowman's motion for directed verdict. We agree.
"The standard of review of directed verdict is whether the evidence, taken in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, is sufficient as a matter of law to be submitted to the jury." Davis v. Dennis Lilly Co., 330 N.C. 314, 322, 411 S.E.2d 133, 138 (1991) (citation omitted).
In determining the sufficiency of the evidence to withstand a motion for a directed verdict, all of the evidence which supports the non-movant's claim must be taken as true and considered in the light most favorable to the non-movant,
giving the non-movant the benefit of every reasonable inference which may legitimately be drawn therefrom and resolving contradictions, conflicts, and inconsistencies in the non-movant's favor.Turner v. Duke Univ., 325 N.C. 152, 158, 381 S.E.2d 706, 710 (1989) (citation omitted). Moreover, it is well established that "[a] verdict may not be directed when the facts are in dispute, and the credibility of testimony is for the jury, not the trial judge." Population Planning Assocs., Inc. v. Mews, 65 N.C. App. 96, 99, 308 S.E.2d 739, 741 (1983) (citation omitted).
Here, the trial court granted Bowman's motion for directed verdict against Mejia's claims against him in his individual capacity based on its determination that there was insufficient evidence of malice to overcome Bowman's claim of public official immunity, which is "a derivative form of governmental immunity which precludes suits against public officials in their individual capacities." Wilcox v. City of Asheville, 222 N.C. App. 285, 288, 730 S.E.2d 226, 230 (2012) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted), appeal dismissed and disc. review denied, 366 N.C. 574, 738 S.E.2d 363 (2013). "As long as a public officer lawfully exercises the judgment and discretion with which he is invested by virtue of his office, keeps within the scope of his official authority, and acts without malice or corruption, he is protected from liability." Id. (citation omitted). "Thus, a public official is immune from suit unless the challenged action was (1) outside the scope of official authority, (2) done with malice, or (3) corrupt." Id. (citation omitted).
Given the arguments of the parties, the only relevant exception to public official immunity here is malice. Perhaps the most commonly cited definition of malice in this context comes from our Supreme Court's decision in In re Grad v. Kasaa, which explains that "[a] defendant acts with malice when he wantonly does that which a man of reasonable intelligence would know to be contrary to his duty and which he intends to be prejudicial or injurious to another." 312 N.C. 310, 313, 321 S.E.2d 888, 890 (1984) (citation omitted). Otherwise stated, "elementally, a malicious act is an act (1) done wantonly, (2) contrary to [his] duty, and (3) intended to be injurious to another." Wilcox, 222 N.C. App. at 289, 730 S.E.2d at 230 (citation omitted).
This Court has previously recognized that, where appropriate, evidence of a defendant's constructive intent may be used to satisfy this third element. See id. at 289, 730 S.E.2d at 231 ("[C]onstructive intent to injure exists where the actor's conduct is so reckless or manifestly indifferent to the consequences, where the safety of life or limb is involved, as to justify a finding of willfulness and wantonness equivalent in spirit to an actual intent.") (citation, internal quotation marks, and certain brackets omitted). Nevertheless, a plaintiff alleging malicious acts or intentional torts by a police officer or other governmental official faces a high bar because
[i]t is well settled that absent evidence to the contrary, it will always be presumed that public officials will discharge
their duties in good faith and exercise their powers in accord with the spirit and purpose of the law. This presumption places a heavy burden on the party challenging the validity of public officials' actions to overcome this presumption by competent and substantial evidence. Moreover, evidence offered to meet or rebut the presumption of good faith must be sufficient by virtue of its reasonableness, not by mere supposition. It must be factual, not hypothetical; supported by fact, not by surmise.Strickland v. Hedrick, 194 N.C. App. 1, 10-11, 669 S.E.2d 61, 68 (2008) (citations, internal quotation marks, and certain brackets omitted).
In the present case, Mejia brought claims against Bowman for malicious prosecution, false arrest and false imprisonment, and assault and battery. An element common to each of these claims—and determinative to our analysis here—is a lack of probable cause. For example, false imprisonment "has been defined as the illegal restraint of a person against [her] will. A restraint is illegal if it is unlawful or not consented to. Specifically, a warrantless arrest without probable cause lacks legal authority and is therefore unlawful." Moore v. Evans, 124 N.C. App. 35, 42, 476 S.E.2d 415, 421 (1996) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). Moreover, "[a] technical assault is always committed with false imprisonment. False arrest is a form of false imprisonment." Fowler v. Valencourt, 334 N.C. 345, 348, 435 S.E.2d 530, 532 (1993) (citations omitted). As for malicious prosecution, in order to prevail in her claim, a plaintiff "must establish four elements to support a malicious prosecution claim: (1) [the] defendant initiated the earlier proceeding; (2) malice on the part of [the] defendant in doing so; (3) lack of probable cause for the initiation of the earlier proceeding; and (4) termination of the earlier proceeding in favor of the plaintiff." Best v. Duke Univ., 337 N.C. 742, 749, 448 S.E.2d 506, 510 (citation omitted), reh'g denied, 338 N.C. 525, 452 S.E.2d 807 (1994).
Turning first to Mejia's claim for malicious prosecution, it is undisputed that by arresting Mejia for the misdemeanor offense of disorderly conduct, Bowman initiated a criminal proceeding against her. It is also undisputed that, by virtue of the district attorney's office's subsequent decision to dismiss the charge against Mejia, this criminal proceeding terminated in her favor. Further, it is well established that in the context of a claim for malicious prosecution, for purposes of satisfying the malice element of the plaintiff's prima facie case, "malice may be inferred from [the] want of probable cause." Cook v. Lanier, 267 N.C. 166, 170, 147 S.E.2d 910, 914 (1966). Therefore, the success of Mejia's claim for malicious prosecution depends upon whether she presented sufficient evidence at trial to establish that her arrest was made without probable cause.
We note here an important distinction between the present facts and a recent line of cases in which this Court has rejected arguments by plaintiffs in malicious prosecution actions regarding the existence of probable cause. See, e.g., Beeson v. Palombo, 220 N.C. App. 274, 727 S.E.2d 343, disc. review denied, 366 N.C. 389, 732 S.E.2d 352 (2012) and Craft v. City of New Bern, ___ N.C. App. ___, 750 S.E.2d 919 (2013) (unpublished), available at 2013 WL 5231927. In Beeson and Palombo, the respective plaintiffs contended that the defendant police officers lacked probable cause in procuring warrants for their arrests. Beeson, 220 N.C. App. at 277, 727 S.E.2d at 346; Craft, 2013 WL 5231927 at *3. In both those cases, despite subsequent discrepancies between the information the defendant police officers initially provided to the magistrates and the undisputed facts underlying the arrests, we held that the proper analysis for determining whether probable cause existed to support the arrests, and thus defeat the actions for malicious prosecution, was "whether the evidence viewed as a whole provided a sufficient basis for the magistrate's finding at the time the arrest warrant was issued, and whether the evidence presented to the magistrate was based upon deliberate falsehood or reckless disregard for the truth." Beeson, 220 N.C. App. at 283, 727 S.E.2d at 349 (citations, internal quotation marks, and ellipsis omitted); see also Craft, 2013 WL 5231927 at *4 (quoting Beeson). In both cases, we ultimately found sufficient bases for probable cause to justify the arrests, based on our conclusions that the defendant police officers had obtained their respective warrants while acting in reasonable reliance on information gathered from confidential informants or trustworthy third-party witnesses, and the fact that the plaintiffs had offered no evidence that the evidence presented to the magistrates to show probable cause for their arrests "was based upon deliberate falsehood or reckless disregard for the truth." Beeson, 220 N.C. App. at 285, 727 S.E.2d at 350-51; Craft, 2013 WL 5231927 at *5. The present case presents a very different scenario because, as noted infra, the basic facts underlying Mejia's arrest are hotly contested and, unlike in Beeson and Craft, the only bases to support Bowman's determination that probable cause existed to arrest Mejia are Bowman's own observations.
"The test for whether probable cause exists is an objective one—whether the facts and circumstances, known at the time, were such as to induce a reasonable police officer to arrest, imprison, and/or prosecute another." Moore, 124 N.C. App. at 43, 476 S.E.2d at 422 (citation omitted; emphasis in original); see also Best, 337 N.C. at 750, 448 S.E.2d at 510 ("Where the claim is one for malicious prosecution, probable cause has been properly defined as the existence of such facts and circumstances, known to the defendant at the time, as would induce a reasonable [person] to commence a prosecution.") (citations, internal quotation marks, certain brackets, and ellipsis omitted). "The existence or nonexistence of probable cause is a mixed question of law and fact. If the facts are admitted or established it is a question of law for the court. Conversely, when the facts are in dispute the question of probable cause is one of fact for the jury." Moore, 124 N.C. App. at 43, 476 S.E.2d at 422 (citations omitted); see also Marlowe v. Piner, 119 N.C. App. 125, 129, 458 S.E.2d 220, 223 (1995) ("In this case, the material facts surrounding the incident are in dispute, and therefore the existence or nonexistence of probable cause is for the jury to determine.").
Our review of the record demonstrates that the facts underlying the existence of probable cause for Mejia's arrest for disorderly conduct are in dispute. To be sure, the evidence introduced at trial included extensive testimony from Bowman on direct and cross-examination about the circumstances leading up to Mejia's arrest, as well as documentary evidence and testimony from several witnesses who observed portions of what happened on 14 September 2012 that appeared to broadly corroborate Bowman's version of events. However, the evidence also included conflicting testimony from Mejia—namely, that she never stole any yard sale signs, never operated her car at an excessive rate of speed, never honked her horn aggressively, never refused to stop her vehicle for Bowman's patrol car which never activated its blue lights, and never made any obscene gestures or profane comments to anyone, nor did anything else that would amount to probable cause to arrest her for disorderly conduct. Indeed, Mejia's testimony, when taken in the light most favorable to Mejia and resolving any conflicts in her favor, see Turner, 325 N.C. at 158, 381 S.E.2d at 710, places in dispute not only the underlying fact of whether probable cause existed for Mejia's arrest but also the veracity of the allegations Bowman swore to the magistrate after arresting her. We are therefore compelled to conclude that in this case, the issue of whether probable cause existed was a question of fact for the jury's resolution, rather than a question of law that the trial court could dispose of on a motion for directed verdict. See, e.g., Moore, 124 N.C. App. at 43, 476 S.E.2d at 422; Marlowe, 119 N.C. App. at 129, 458 S.E.2d at 223.
In light of this determination, we conclude that Mejia's testimony, if believed by the jurors, would constitute sufficient evidence from which a reasonable juror could conclude that Bowman arrested Mejia without probable cause, and would thereby support a verdict in Mejia's favor on her claim for malicious prosecution. See Best, 337 N.C. at 749-50, 448 S.E.2d at 510. Such testimony would also support verdicts in Mejia's favor on her remaining claims for false arrest and false imprisonment, and for assault and battery, insofar as the lack of probable cause for her arrest would render Bowman's restraint of her illegal. See Fowler, 334 N.C. at 348, 435 S.E.2d at 532; Moore, 124 N.C. App. at 42, 476 S.E.2d at 421.
Bowman contends that even assuming arguendo Mejia introduced sufficient evidence to satisfy the essential elements of each of her claims, the trial court's order must be affirmed because Mejia failed to provide any evidence that Bowman acted maliciously or with any intent to injure Mejia. Specifically, Bowman argues that the only evidence to support Mejia's claims is her own "self-serving testimony," which Bowman insists this Court held in Strickland, supra, is legally insufficient to overcome the presumption of good faith with which public officers are presumed to act. This argument is unavailing. In Strickland, we reversed the trial court's order denying summary judgment to three defendant police officers on the basis of governmental immunity against the plaintiffs' action for, inter alia, malicious prosecution. 194 N.C. App. at 8-9, 669 S.E.2d at 66-67. In so holding, we observed that the plaintiffs' deposition testimony "largely corroborated" the affidavits and deposition testimony from the defendant police officers regarding the underlying facts at issue in the matter, and we specifically rejected the plaintiffs' argument that the defendant police officers' "self-serving testimony" could not be used to establish a lack of malice or corrupt motive for purposes of governmental immunity. Id. at 14, 669 S.E.2d at 69-70. As we explained, "[the p]laintiffs cite no authority for the proposition that a party may not rely on his sworn testimony regarding an issue" to support a motion for summary judgment and we concluded, given the lack of any evidence the defendant police officers had acted with malice, that the defendant police officers were entitled to summary judgment, in part because their testimony "bolstered the presumption of good faith" with which public officials are presumed to discharge their duties. Id.
We note here that despite Bowman's claims to the contrary, Strickland did not purport to hold that a party's testimony at trial can be disregarded as insufficient evidence of malice to withstand an officer's claim of immunity merely because such testimony could be characterized as "self-serving." Moreover, although Strickland was decided at the summary judgment stage based on the lack of any disputes as to the underlying material facts or evidence of malice, here, by contrast, the parties presented conflicting testimony at trial in support of wildly divergent characterizations of the facts at issue, thereby leaving those facts—including whether probable cause existed for Bowman to arrest Mejia and whether his sworn testimony to the magistrate thereafter was truthful—in dispute. Bowman argues that, in light of testimony introduced at trial from Officer Hilliard and Mejia's neighbor, Black, that tends to corroborate Bowman's own testimony, as well as other evidence that tends to cast doubt on Mejia's credibility as a witness, something more was required, like a proverbial smoking gun, to establish malice. But to accept this argument would require this Court to engage in precisely the sort of credibility determination that our case law and Rules of Civil Procedure prohibit when considering a motion for directed verdict. See, e.g., Population Planning Assocs., Inc., 65 N.C. App. at 99, 308 S.E.2d at 741 ("A verdict may not be directed when the facts are in dispute, and the credibility of the testimony is for the jury, not the trial judge."). Equally problematic for Bowman's argument is the fact that it is difficult to discern how, if believed by the jurors, Mejia's testimony would not be sufficient to establish that he acted with malice, insofar as she claims that Bowman arrested her for no reason whatsoever and then lied to a magistrate to justify his improper and illegal conduct after the fact. Surely, such testimony—essentially, that Bowman swore falsely to a magistrate after arresting a woman who never cursed, sped, honked, failed to stop for his blue lights, made obscene gestures, or did anything else remotely illegal—tends to show that Bowman intentionally acted contrary to his duty to protect and serve the public as an officer of the law in a way that any reasonable person would intuitively understand to be prejudicial to Mejia's legal rights irrespective of whether Bowman's actions proved physically injurious to her person.
Bowman also attempts to rely on our decision in Marlowe, supra, in which we recognized that a police officer's negligent or mistaken belief that probable cause existed to effectuate an arrest is insufficient to establish malice. The plaintiffs in Marlowe brought suit for false arrest and false imprisonment after the defendant police officer followed an intoxicated and mentally unstable individual into a private residence, which resulted in a confrontation during which the plaintiffs allegedly shoved the officer, who subsequently arrested them for assault on an officer. 119 N.C. App. at 126-27, 458 S.E.2d at 221-22. We held that the trial court did not err in granting summary judgment to the officer in his individual capacity on the basis of public official immunity because although the parties offered conflicting accounts on ancillary facts such as whether the plaintiffs actually intended to shove the officer and how much force they used in doing so, the plaintiffs "made no forecast of evidence which would tend to show that [the] defendant intended his actions to be prejudicial or injurious to them," given that "[a]t most, [the] plaintiffs' evidence tends to show that [the] defendant negligently believed he had probable cause to arrest [the] plaintiffs." Id. at 128, 458 S.E.2d at 223 (emphasis in original).
Marlowe illustrates how in close cases, we typically afford wide berth to mistaken and even negligent determinations by police officers as to whether probable cause to effectuate an arrest existed. But the record before us presents no such scenario. Mejia's argument here is not simply that Bowman was merely mistaken or negligent about whether probable cause existed to arrest her based on a mutually admitted series of underlying factual events. This might well be the case if, for example, Mejia had admitted in her testimony to cursing at Bowman and was only disputing whether such conduct satisfied the elements for the offense prohibited under section 14-288.4(2) of our General Statutes because the law presumes that as a police officer, Bowman will not retaliate violently and thereby cause a breach of the peace at the mere utterance of foul language. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-288.4(2). Instead, Mejia presented evidence at trial, in the form of her own testimony, that Bowman arrested her for no reason and then lied to a magistrate. We therefore conclude that Marlowe is inapposite to the present facts.
Consequently, we hold that the trial court erred in granting Bowman's motion for directed verdict. To be clear: the decision we reach herein should in no way be interpreted as a condemnation of or finding of malice against Officer Bowman, or as any indication that we find Mejia's testimony credible. We reach our decision based solely on our case law and the Rules of Civil Procedure, which make clear that, in this procedural posture, such determinations are strictly the province of the jury. Accordingly, the trial court's Order and Judgment is
REVERSED.
Judges HUNTER, JR., and INMAN concur.
Report per Rule 30(e).