Opinion
20-70390
02-24-2022
RIGOBERTO MEJIA-CHAY, Petitioner, v. MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney General, Respondent.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals Agency No. A208-573-243
Before: FERNANDEZ, TASHIMA, and FRIEDLAND, Circuit Judges.
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
Rigoberto Mejia-Chay, a native and citizen of Guatemala, petitions pro se for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals' ("BIA") order dismissing his appeal from an immigration judge's ("IJ") decision denying his application for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture ("CAT"). We have jurisdiction under 8U.S.C. § 1252. We review for substantial evidence the agency's factual findings, applying the standards governing adverse credibility determinations under the REAL ID Act. Shrestha v. Holder, 590 F.3d 1034, 1039-40 (9th Cir. 2010). We deny the petition for review.
Substantial evidence supports the adverse credibility determination based on inconsistencies as to whether Mejia-Chay spoke to his attackers when robbed, the reason Mejia-Chay entered the United States and whether he fears future harm, and the number of employees at his business, and based on a lack of corroborating evidence. See Shrestha, 590 F.3d. at 1048 (adverse credibility determination reasonable under "the totality of circumstances"). Mejia-Chay's explanations do not compel a contrary conclusion. See Lata v. INS, 204 F.3d 1241, 1245 (9th Cir. 2000). Substantial evidence also supports the agency's determination that Mejia-Chay did not present corroborative evidence that would otherwise establish his eligibility for relief. See Garcia v. Holder, 749 F.3d 785, 791 (9th Cir. 2014) (applicant's documentary evidence was insufficient to independently support claim). Thus, in the absence of credible testimony, in this case, Mejia-Chay's asylum and withholding of removal claims fail. See Farah v. Ashcroft, 348 F.3d 1153, 1156 (9th Cir. 2003).
Substantial evidence supports the denial of Mejia-Chay's CAT claim because it was based on the same evidence found not credible, and he does not point to any other record evidence that compels the conclusion that it is more likely than not he would be tortured by or with the consent or acquiescence of the government if returned to Guatemala. See Shrestha, 590 F.3d at 1048-49.
Mejia-Chay does not raise, and therefore waives, any challenge to the BIA's determination that the record does not support his claim that the IJ showed a pattern of prejudice. See Lopez-Vasquez v. Holder, 706 F.3d 1072, 1079-80 (9th Cir. 2013) (issues not specifically raised and argued in a party's opening brief are waived).
The temporary stay of removal remains in place until issuance of the mandate.
PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED.