Montana Environmental Information Center v. Department of Environmental Quality

36 Citing cases

  1. Mont. Envtl. Info. Ctr. & Sierra Club v. Mont. Dep't of Envtl. Quality

    2025 MT 3 (Mont. 2025)

    Federal standards tell the people of Montana little or nothing about any potential impact of the GHG emissions of the LGS specifically, and do not satisfy "MEPA's role" in fulfilling "the strongest environmental protection provision found in any state constitution." Park Cnty. Env't Council, ¶¶ 61, 65 (citing Mont. Env't Info. Ctr. v. Mont. Dep't Env't Quality, 1999 MT 248, ¶ 66, 296 Mont. 207, 988 P.2d 1236). An environmental review "assist[s] the legislature in determining whether laws are adequate to address impacts to Montana's environment and . . . inform[s] the public and public officials of potential impacts resulting from decisions made by state agencies."

  2. Frederick v. Allegheny Twp. Zoning Hearing Bd.

    196 A.3d 677 (Pa. Cmmw. Ct. 2018)   Cited 19 times   2 Legal Analyses
    In Frederick, 196 A.3d at 684-85, township residents appealed a zoning hearing board's denial of their substantive validity challenge to an ordinance that allowed oil and gas operations in all zoning districts.

    Conceptually, the ERA is designed to be proactive rather than reactive, and may be "invoked to provide anticipatory and preventative protection against unreasonable degradation of natural resources." Robinson Township , 83 A.3d at 953 (citing and parenthetically describing Montana Environmental Information Center v. Department of Environmental Quality , 296 Mont. 207, 988 P.2d 1236, 1249 (1999) ( MEIC ) ). Under this standard, the Landowners' ERA claim is cognizable and worthy of relief, "even absent a demonstration that public health is threatened or that current [ ] quality standards are affected to such an extent that a significant impact has been had" on the environment. MEIC , 988 P.2d at 1249.

  3. Buhmann v. State

    348 Mont. 205 (Mont. 2008)   Cited 14 times
    Determining that the Montana Constitution did not provide enhanced rights for regulatory takings due to the absence of any language in Article II, § 29 that specifically addressed regulatory takings

    This means that each of the Article II rights is a significant component of liberty, the alleged infringement of which triggers the highest level of scrutiny and, thus, the highest level of protection by the courts. Walker, ¶ 74; Wadsworth, 275 Mont. at 302, 911 P.2d at 1174; see also e.g. State v. Mount, 2003 MT 275, ¶ 98, 317 Mont. 481, ¶ 98, 78 P.3d 829, ¶ 98; Mont. Environmental Info. Center v. Dept. of Environmental Quality, 1999 MT 248, ¶ 64, 296 Mont. 207, ¶ 64, 988 P.2d 1236, ¶ 64. For the reasons discussed earlier in Part II-B, our analysis under Article II, Section 29 does not involve "scrutiny" of the governmental action, except insofar as the requirement of a "public use" has been raised.

  4. Michael v. PPL Montana, LLC.

    185 P.3d 330 (Mont. 2008)   Cited 6 times
    Refusing to address constitutional issues "in a relative vacuum"

    ¶ 13 Facial challenges, unlike as applied challenges, do not depend on the facts of a particular case. See e.g. MEIC v. Dept. of Environmental Quality, 1999 MT 248, ¶ 80, 296 Mont. 207, ¶ 80, 988 P.2d 1236, ¶ 80; Associated Press, Inc. v. Department of Revenue, 2000 MT 160, ¶ 27-28, 300 Mont. 233, ¶ 27-28, 4 P.3d 5, ¶ 27-28; Roosevelt v. Montana Dept. of Revenue, 1999 MT 30, ¶ 51-52, 293 Mont. 240, ¶ 51-52, 975 P.2d 295, ¶ 51-52. Having agreed to resolve the facial challenges presented, it is my view that we should do so without further delay.

  5. Sunburst Sch. Dist. No. 2 v. Texaco

    338 Mont. 259 (Mont. 2007)   Cited 94 times   1 Legal Analyses
    Holding that the recent adoption of Restatement Torts, 2d, § 929 to allow for the recovery of restoration damages meant that the district court had "erred in instructing the jury on the constitutional tort theory where ... adequate remedies exist[ed] under statutory or common law"

    Art. II, Sect. 3, Mont. Const. The right to a clean and healthful environment constitutes a fundamental right. MEIC v. Dept. of Environmental Quality, 1999 MT 248, ¶ 63, 296 Mont. 207, ¶ 63, 988 P.2d 1236, ¶ 63. Texaco argues, however, that Article II, Section 3, cannot support a private cause of action for monetary damages as it is not "self-executing."

  6. Kellogg v. Dearborn Information Services, LLC

    328 Mont. 83 (Mont. 2005)   Cited 5 times

    ¶ 22 "[I]n order to be fundamental, a right must be found within Montana's Declaration of Rights or be a right `without which other constitutionally guaranteed rights would have little meaning.'" MEIC v. Dept. of Environmental Quality, 1999 MT 248, ¶ 56, 296 Mont. 207, ¶ 56, 988 P.2d 1236, ¶ 56 (citing In the Matter of C.H. (1984), 210 Mont. 184, 201, 683 P.2d 931, 940). Found within the Declaration of Rights, the right of property is a fundamental one, dictating that the standard of review applied to governmental action affecting this interest is "the most stringent standard, strict scrutiny." MEIC, ¶ 60 (citing Wadsworth v. State (1996), 275 Mont. 287, 302, 911 P.2d 1165, 1174).

  7. Kottel v. State

    312 Mont. 387 (Mont. 2002)   Cited 19 times
    Applying the presumption in construing the word "general" in the Montana Constitution

    Under Butte Community Union v. Lewis (1986), 219 Mont. 426, 434, 712 P.2d 1309, 1314, we held that if "constitutionally significant interests are implicated by governmental classification," there must a balancing of the rights infringed and the governmental interest. Further, in Montana Envtl. Info. Ctr. v. Department of Envtl. Quality, 1999 MT 248, ¶ 57, 296 Mont. 207, ¶ 57, 988 P.2d 1236, ¶ 57, we held that a constitutionally significant interest is implicated when a right is not in the Declaration of Rights in Article II, but is referred to in the Constitution. The Taxpayers cite Roosevelt in support of their argument that constitutionally significant interests are implied by Article VIII, Sections 1 and 3.

  8. Kloss v. Edward D. Jones Co.

    310 Mont. 123 (Mont. 2002)   Cited 41 times
    In Kloss we concluded that a standardized investment form, drafted by the broker and presented to the investor with no opportunity to negotiate the terms, constituted a contract of adhesion that excluded the investor from the securities market unless she accepted the agreement to arbitrate.

    ¶ 60 This Court has stated repeatedly that a right is fundamental under Montana's Constitution if the right is either found in the Declaration of Rights or is a right without which other constitutionally guaranteed rights would have little meaning. State v. Bird, 2001 MT 2, ¶ 25, 308 Mont. 75, ¶ 25, 43 P.3d 266, ¶ 25 (right to be present for all court proceedings); In re Mental Health of K.G.F., 2001 MT 140, ¶ 30, 306 Mont. 1, ¶ 30, 29 P.3d 485, ¶ 30 (right to effective assistance of counsel for involuntary commitment proceedings); Armstrong v. State, 1999 MT 261, ¶ 34, 296 Mont. 361, ¶ 34, 989 P.2d 364, ¶ 34 (right to privacy); and MEIC v. Dept. of Environmental Quality, 1999 MT 248, ¶ 56, 296 Mont. 207, ¶ 56, 988 P.2d 1236, ¶ 56 (right to a clean and healthful environment); State v. Clark, 1998 MT 221, ¶ 22, 290 Mont. 479, ¶ 22, 964 P.2d 766, ¶ 22 (right to confront and examine accusers); State v. Weaver, 1998 MT 167, ¶ 26, 290 Mont. 58, ¶ 26, 964 P.2d 713, ¶ 26 (right to a unanimous verdict); Wadsworth, 275 Mont. at 299, 911 P.2d at 1172 (right to pursue employment); Matter of C.H. (1984), 210 Mont. 184, 201, 683 P.2d 931, 940 (right to physical liberty). We could never have enforced the fundamental rights litigated in these and in other cases where fundamental rights were at issue had access to the courts been denied in the first instance. Indeed, without access to the courts, these other fundamental rights would have had no real existence; they would have been merely aspirations without substance.

  9. Hagener v. Wallace

    309 Mont. 473 (Mont. 2002)   Cited 14 times

    They reflect the theory underlying environmental protection that being proactive rather than reactive is necessary to ensure that future generations enjoy both a healthy environment and the wildlife it supports. See generally MEIC v. Dept. of Environmental Quality, 1999 MT 248, ¶ 77, 296 Mont. 207, ¶ 77, 988 P.2d 1236, ¶ 77. ¶ 34 FWP had a statutory basis for jurisdiction over the Wallaces as licensees, and the Wallaces failed to comply with statutory limitations pertaining to the disposal of their game farm elk.

  10. State v. Whitehorn

    309 Mont. 63 (Mont. 2002)   Cited 25 times
    Discussing Finley formulation of common law plain error doctrine

    State v. Clark, 1998 MT 221, ¶ 22, 290 Mont. 479, ¶ 22, 964 P.2d 766, ¶ 22 (citing Wadsworth v. State (1996), 275 Mont. 287, 299, 911 P.2d 1165, 1171-72). See also, Armstrong v. State, 1999 MT 261, ¶ 34, 296 Mont. 361, ¶ 34, 989 P.2d 364, ¶ 34; and MEIC v. Dept. of Environmental Quality, 1999 MT 248, ¶ 56, 296 Mont. 207, ¶ 56, 988 P.2d 1236, ¶ 56. ¶ 41 We now return to the current status of our case law in this area.