Opinion
No. SA-02-CA-1155-RF
July 10, 2003
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTIONS TO TRANSFER VENUE
Before the Court are Defendant Les Brownlee's Motion for Change of Venue, filed on May 20, 2003 and Defendant James H. Butler's Motion for Change of Venue, filed on June 4, 2003 (collectively, "Motions to Transfer Venue"). After due consideration of the arguments of the parties and of applicable law, the Court is of the opinion that the Motions to Transfer Venue should be GRANTED.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Plaintiff filed this action pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. His Complaint alleges harassment, retaliation, and discrimination on the basis of Plaintiff s national origin. Plaintiff is employed as a Supervisory General Engineer by the United States Department of the Army at Fort Hood, Texas. He alleges that he has been denied promotions and been treated differently from other employees by his supervisors.
42 U.S.C. § 2000(e)et seq.
See Pl.'s Orig. Compl. (Dec. 6, 2002).
On May 20, 2002, Defendant Les Brownlee, Acting Secretary of the Department of the Army, filed a Motion to Change Venue, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a), contemporaneously with his Answer to the Complaint. In his Motion, Defendant sought to transfer the case to the Waco Division of the Western District of Texas for the convenience of parties and witnesses, and in the interests of justice. On June 4, 2003, the other Defendant in this case, James H. Butler, filed his Motion to Change Venue, on identical grounds as Defendant Brownlee. Plaintiff filed his Response to the Motions to Transfer Venue on June 18, 2003, and Defendants filed a Reply on June 24, 2003.
DISCUSSION
I. Propriety of Venue in Waco Division of Western District of Texas 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) provides that "[f]or the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice, a district court may transfer any civil action to any other district or division where it might have been brought." "The first issue that a district court must address in ruling on a motion to transfer under § 1404(a) is the question of whether the judicial district to which transfer is sought qualifies under the applicable venue statutes as a judicial district where the civil action `might have been brought.'"
In re: Horseshoe Entm't, 305 F.3d 354, 357 (5th Cir. 2002).
Venue in this case is governed by both the general venue statutory provisions, as well as the special venue provision for Title VII cases. Section 1391(e) allows for venue "in any judicial district in which (1) a defendant in the action resides, (2) a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred, . . . or (3) the plaintiff resides. . . ." The special venue provision allows for venue "in any judicial district in the State in which the unlawful employment practice is alleged to have been committed, in the judicial district in which the employment records relevant to such practice are maintained and administered, or in the judicial district in which the aggrieved person would have worked but for the alleged unlawful employment practice. . . ."
Defendants in this case seek to transfer venue to the Waco Division of the Western District of Texas. There is no dispute apparent from the record that the alleged employment actions of which Plaintiff complains occurred in Ft. Hood, Texas, which is within the Waco Division. There also appears to be no dispute that the relevant employment records are maintained and administered in Ft. Hood. Thus, the Court concludes that, for purposes of § 1404(a), this action "might have been brought" in the Waco Division. The Court now proceeds to the issue of whether transfer to that division is proper.
II. Balancing of Interest Factors
In determining whether a transfer of venue serves the convenience of parties and witnesses, as well as the interests of justice, the Court considers a number of factors. The "private interest factors" include: (1) Plaintiff's choice of forum; (2) the convenience of parties and of key witnesses; (3) the availability of compulsory process for the attendance of unwilling witnesses; (4) the cost of obtaining the attendance of unwilling witnesses; (5) the accessibility and location of sources of proof; (6) the relative congestion of the courts' dockets; (7) relation of the community in which courts and the jurors are required to serve to the occurrence giving rise to the suit; and (8) the time, cost, and ease with which the trial can be conducted, and all other practical considerations relative to the trial. The Court should also consider "public interest factors," such as: (1) the administrative difficulties caused by court congestion; (2) the local interest in adjudicating local disputes; (3) the unfairness of burdening citizens in an unrelated forum with jury duty; and (4) the avoidance of unnecessary problems in conflict of laws. A. Private interest factors
Fletcher v. Southern Pac. Transp. Co., 648 F. Supp. 1400, 1401 (E.D. Tex. 1986) (citations omitted). Although the court also listed "location of counsel" as a factor, the Fifth Circuit declared this factor "irrelevant and improper for consideration" in In re: Horseshoe Entm't, 305 F.3d at 358.
Robertson v. Kiamichi R. Co., L.L.C., 42 F. Supp.2d 651, 655 (E.D. Tex. 1999).
In weighing the private interest factors, the Court notes the absence of any stated connection with San Antonio in this case. Plaintiff's Complaint is based entirely on employment decisions by Defendants, all of which occurred at the Ft. Hood facility in the Waco Division.
The convenience of parties and witnesses is "[p]robably the most important factor in passing on a motion to transfer under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). . . ." The record establishes that both Defendants reside within the Waco Division. The record similarly suggests that any relevant witnesses would reside at the same location. There is no suggestion in the record that any party or witness resides within the San Antonio Division. Thus, these factors favor transfer to the Waco Division.
Fletcher, 648 F. Supp. at 1401-02.
Similarly, since Plaintiff's claim arises out of an employment relationship with the Department of the Army at Ft. Hood, the Court accepts Defendants' contention that all relevant records are located within the Waco Division. Finally, the fact that all operative facts occurred within the Waco Division suggests that the San Antonio community bears little, if any, relation to Plaintiff's suit. Thus, these factors also weigh in favor of transfer to the Waco Division.
See Def. Butler's Mot. for Change of Venue, Ex. 2 ("Declaration of Captain M. Turner Pope") at 1 ¶ 2.
The availability of process and cost of obtaining unwilling witnesses do not appear to be strong factors in this case. There is nothing in the record to suggest that any relevant witnesses are not subject to jurisdiction in this division or that they are unwilling or unable to travel to San Antonio. The Court assigns little weight to Defendants' unsupported contention that "[i]t would be prohibitively expensive to bring defense witnesses to San Antonio if trial were conducted in the San Antonio Division." Also, the Court is without authoritative information regarding the relative congestion of the courts. Thus, these two factors would weigh in favor of retaining Plaintiff's selected forum if it is otherwise proper. The Court now discusses that factor.
Def. Brownlee's Mot. for Change of Venue at 5 ¶ Ill.C.ii.b.
In reviewing Defendants' Motions to Transfer Venue, the Court must consider that San Antonio is Plaintiff's chosen forum in this case. While Plaintiff's decision is entitled to deference, however, "in and of itself it is neither conclusive nor determinative." "[T]o be considered at all, the plaintiff's choice of forum must be one which is permitted under the relevant statute. . . ." Thus, the Court must determine whether San Antonio is a permissible forum for Plaintiff's suit.
In re: Horseshoe Entm't, 305 F.3d at 359.
Id.
Plaintiff provides no indication, either in his Complaint or his Response to Defendants' Motions to Transfer Venue, as to why he filed his Complaint in this division. As discussed above, none of the parties reside within this division, and none of the relevant events or records are in any way connected to San Antonio. Plaintiff apparently relies on 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3) in asserting that "Plaintiff may bring this action in any federal district court in the state in which the alleged violations occurred." However, the Fifth Circuit has expressly rejected this reading of the special venue statute, finding it "completely inconsistent with the pattern and practice in the general venue statute and in other special venue statutes where venue is set on a judicial district basis depending upon the existence of facts or occurrences within that particular judicial district." The court held that "[f]ixing venue on a state-wide basis would create a field day for forum shopping by plaintiffs."
Pl.'s Compl. at 2 ¶ 7.
In re: Horseshoe Entm't, 305 F.3d at 359.
Id.
The Fifth Circuit further held that "the special venue factors clearly indicate that Congress thought employment discrimination controversies should be litigated in judicial districts that had direct and immediate connection with the parties, the events and the evidence bearing on their controversy." All three of the special venue factors-location of employment practice, location of records, and place of employment-are satisfied by the Waco Division. Moreover, the only general venue factor which is not satisfied by the Waco Division-Plaintiff's residence-is satisfied by the Austin Division, not the San Antonio Division. Thus, no factor is satisfied by the San Antonio Division. The relevant factors therefore strongly favor transferring this case to the Waco Division.
Id.
It is notable that Plaintiff does not directly contest any of Defendants' factual assertions in his Response to Defendants' Motions to Transfer Venue. Rather, Plaintiff only conclusorily avers that Defendants have offered insufficient proof in support of their claims. This contention is belied by the undisputed evidence that all Defendants, relevant documents, and underlying acts exist or occurred in Ft. Hood in the Waco Division. Although Plaintiff seems to reject Defendants' assertion that his only connection to San Antonio is the location of his counsel, he offers no evidence of any other connection to this division. As the Fifth Circuit has noted, the location of counsel is "irrelevant and improper for consideration in determining the question of transfer of venue."
Id. at 358.
While stopping short of accepting Defendants' suggestion that litigation in San Antonio would be prohibitively inconvenient and burdensome, the Court finds that San Antonio is not a proper forum for this case. The private interest factors favor transferring this case to the Waco Division, as venue is proper in that division and there is no evidence that a transfer would create any delay or prejudice to the parties.
B. Public interest factors
The Court finds that the public interest factors also weigh in favor of a transfer to the Waco Division. Since all relevant facts, documents, and witnesses are connected to Ft. Hood, the Court finds that the Waco Division has a strong interest in adjudicating this local dispute. Moreover, the Court finds it unfair to burden the San Antonio community with jury duty for a case more appropriately adjudicated in the Waco Division. The Court finds administrative difficulties and conflict of laws to be insignificant factors in this case. Nevertheless, the public interest factors, like the private interest factors, favor transferring the case to the Waco Division of the Western District of Texas.
CONCLUSION
Plaintiff has not established any basis for asserting venue in the San Antonio Division of the Western District of Texas. By contrast, Defendants have sufficiently established that venue is both proper and more appropriate in the Waco Division.It is therefore ORDERED that Defendant Brownlee's Motion for Change of Venue is GRANTED.
It is ORDERED that Defendant Butler's Motion for Change of Venue is GRANTED.
It is ORDERED that this case is TRANSFERRED to the Waco Division of the Western District of Texas.