The plaintiff seeks recovery for damages arising out of the alleged sexual abuse committed against her by Brother Kuhl when she was a minor. In her complaint, the plaintiff alleged that Brother Kuhl began sexually abusing her in 1972 or 1973 but that she did not recall that molestation until 1995. Relying on this court's decision in M.E.H. v. L.H., 283 Ill. App.3d 241 (1996), aff'd, 177 Ill.2d 207 (1997), the trial court dismissed the plaintiff's complaint as barred by the statute of limitations. On appeal, the plaintiff argues that (1) her action was timely filed under section 13-202.2 of the Code of Civil Procedure (the Code) ( 735 ILCS 5/13-202.2 (West 1996)); (2) M.E.H. is factually distinguishable from the instant case; and (3) alternatively, we should change or modify our opinion in M.E.H. so as to allow her action to proceed.

Defendants filed motions to dismiss Ferrer's complaint pursuant to section 2-619(a)(5) of the Code of Civil Procedure (Code) ( 735 ILCS 5/2-619(a)(5) (West 1996)). Defendants argued that the statute of limitations expired on September 18, 1986, when Ferrer reached the age of 20. Relying on our decision in M.E.H. v. L.H., 283 Ill. App.3d 241 (1996), aff'd, 177 Ill.2d 207 (1997), defendants maintained that the discovery rule does not apply in childhood sexual abuse cases and does not operate to toll the statute of limitations. In response to defendants' motions, Ferrer distinguished M.E.H. on the ground that, unlike in M.E.H., the statute of repose in her case had not expired.

The purpose of a section 2-619 motion is to allow for the disposition of questions of law and easily proved fact issues at the outset of the case. See, e.g., Zedella v. Gibson, 165 Ill.2d 181, 185 (1995); M.E.H. v. L.H., 283 Ill. App.3d 241, 245 (1996). Unlike a motion with respect to the pleadings brought under section 2-615 ( Illinois Graphics Co. v. Nickum, 159 Ill.2d 469, 484 (1994) (section 2-615 motion attacks only the legal sufficiency of the complaint and deals exclusively with defects appearing on the face of the complaint)), a trial court ruling on a section 2-619 motion may consider the "pleadings, depositions, and affidavits" ( Zedella, 165 Ill.2d at 185).

The trial court granted the defendants' motions, concluding that the plaintiff's action was untimely. The trial court relied on the appellate court's opinion in M.E.H. v. L.H., 283 Ill. App.3d 241 (1996), aff'd on other grounds, 177 Ill.2d 207 (1997), which had characterized occurrences of child sexual abuse, for purposes of the statute of limitations, as sudden, traumatic events that triggered the running of the limitations period once the victim of the abuse attained majority. The plaintiff appealed.

We will not hold plaintiff to a more stringent standard and force her to prove the existence of a "legal disability" in order to be able to proceed when, both at the time she filed her cause of action and at the present time, it was and is unnecessary for a plaintiff to establish a "legal disability" in order to proceed. Defendants cite the case of M.E.H. v. L.H., 283 Ill. App.3d 241, 669 N.E.2d 1228 (1996), in support of their position that the 1994 amendment, which repealed the 12-year statute of repose, does not apply retroactively to revive a plaintiff's cause of action. In M.E.H., the plaintiffs were 44 and 45 years of age when they filed their tort action against their parents on October 14, 1994.

The circuit court of Ogle County determined that the statute of repose did bar the plaintiffs' action and granted the defendants' motion to dismiss under section 2-619(a)(5) of the Code of Civil Procedure ( 735 ILCS 5/2-619(a)(5) (West 1994)). The appellate court affirmed. 283 Ill. App.3d 241. We allowed the plaintiffs' petition for leave to appeal (155 Ill.2d R. 315) and now affirm.

Therefore, we deem the issue waived and do not address it. See, e.g., M..E.H. v. L.H., 283 Ill.App.3d 241, 245 (1996); McKenna v. Board of Trustees of the University of Illinois, 90 Ill.App.3d 992, 997 n. 3 (1980). ¶ 23 Finally, the trial court granted the defendants' motion to strike paragraphs 4 through 6 of Joal Kjarsgaard's affidavit.

Golla v. General Motors Corp., 167 Ill.2d 353, 362 (1995). "An injury is traumatic if it is immediate and caused by an external force or violence." M.E.H. v. L.H., 283 Ill.App.3d 241, 251 (1996). Thus, the limitations period begins to run even if the plaintiff does not know that the misconduct was actionable.

The Illinois Constitution, however, prohibits the legislature from arbitrarily eliminating a cause of action unless it is a reasonable exercise of the legislature's police power in providing for general welfare. M.E.H. v. L.H., 283 Ill.App.3d 241, 249, 218 Ill.Dec. 702, 669 N.E.2d 1228 (1996). We cannot state that the Evanston city council reasonably exercised its police power in arbitrarily eliminating plaintiff's cause of action here. We, therefore, turn to the substance of the case.

"[A] defendant's right to assert a statutory time bar as a defense to a cause of action, `after the statute has run, is a vested right.'" M.E.H. v. L.H., 283 Ill. App. 3d 241, 247, 669 N.E.2d 1228, 1232 (1996), quoting Blodgett, 155 Ill. at 447, 40 N.E. at 1026. In attempting to invoke that rule, Gibbney states as follows: