Such a duty can arise under three distinct circumstances. Those are where "the contracting party ‘launche[s] a force or instrument of harm,’ where the plaintiff suffers injury as a result of reasonable reliance on the defendant's continued performance of [the] contractual obligation, [and] ‘where the contracting party has entirely displaced the other party's duty to maintain the premises safely’ " (Megaro v. Pfizer, Inc., 116 A.D.3d 427, 984 N.Y.S.2d 297 [1st Dept.2014], quoting Espinal v. Melville Snow Contrs., 98 N.Y.2d 136, 140, 746 N.Y.S.2d 120, 773 N.E.2d 485 [2002] ). The estate's arguments on appeal implicate only the first and third predicates for liability. They mention the second circumstance, but state that it was Berkowitz, not plaintiff, who relied on the contract between Kamin and Prudential. Again, it is the injured person whose reliance is necessary (id. ).
Such a duty can arise under three distinct circumstances. Those are where “the contracting party ‘launche[s] a force or instrument of harm,’ where the plaintiff suffers injury as a result of reasonable reliance on the defendant's continued performance of [the] contractual obligation, [and] ‘where the contracting party has entirely displaced the other party's duty to maintain the premises safely’ ” (Megaro v. Pfizer, Inc., 116 A.D.3d 427, 984 N.Y.S.2d 297 1st Dept.2014, quoting Espinal v. Melville Snow Contrs., 98 N.Y.2d 136, 140, 746 N.Y.S.2d 120, 773 N.E.2d 485 2002 ). The estate's arguments on appeal implicate only the first and third predicates for liability.
[However,] under some circumstances, a party who enters into a contract thereby assumes a duty of care to certain persons outside the contract" (Espinal v Melville Snow Contrs., 98 NY2d 136, 138-139 [2002]; see also Church v Callanan Indus., 99 NY2d 104, 111 [2002]). Those circumstances are "(1) where the contracting party, in failing to exercise reasonable care in the performance of his duties, 'launche[s] a force or instrument of harm';(2) where the plaintiff detrimentally relies on the continued performance of the contracting party's duties and (3) where the contracting party has entirely displaced the other party's duty to maintain the premises safely" (Espinal, 98 NY2d at 140 [internal citations omitted]; see also Church, 99 NY2d at 111-112; Megaro v Pfizer, Inc., 116 AD3d 427 [1st Dept 2014]). "As part of its prima facie showing, a contracting defendant is only required to negate the applicability of those Espinal exceptions that were expressly pleaded by the plaintiff or expressly set forth in the plaintiff's bill of particulars" (Glover v John Tyler Enters., Inc., 123 AD3d 882, 882 [2d Dept 2014]; see also Diaz v Port Auth. of NY & NJ, 120 AD3d 611, 612 [2d Dept 2014]).
[However,] under some circumstances, a party who enters into a contract thereby assumes a duty of care to certain persons outside the contract" (Espinal v Melville Snow Contrs., 98 NY2d 136, 138-139 [2002]; see also Church v Callanan Indus., 99 NY2d 104, 111 [2002]). Those circumstances are "(1) where the contracting party, in failing to exercise reasonable care in the performance of his duties, 'launche[s] a force or instrument of harm';(2) where the plaintiff detrimentally relies on the continued performance of the contracting party's duties and (3) where the contracting party has entirely displaced the other party's duty to maintain the premises safely" (Espinal, 98 NY2d at 140 [internal citations omitted]; see also Church, 99 NY2d at 111-112; Megaro v Pfizer, Inc., 116 AD3d 427 [1st Dept 2014]).
[However,] under some circumstances, a party who enters into a contract thereby assumes a duty of care to certain persons outside the contract" (Espinal v Melville Snow Contrs., 98 NY2d 136, 138-139 [2002]; seealso Church v Callanan Indus., 99 NY2d 104, 111 [2002]). Those circumstances are "(1) where the contracting party, in failing to exercise reasonable care in the performance of his duties, 'launche[s] a force or instrument of harm';(2) where the plaintiff detrimentally relies on the continued performance of the contracting party's duties and (3) where the contracting party has entirely displaced the other party's duty to maintain the premises safely" (Espinal, 98 NY2d at 140 [internal citations omitted]; seealso Church, 99 NY2d at 111-112; Megaro v Pfizer, Inc., 116 AD3d 427 [1st Dept 2014]). "As part of its prima facie showing, a contracting defendant is only required to negate the applicability of those Espinal exceptions that were expressly pleaded by the plaintiff or expressly set forth in the plaintiff's bill of particulars" (Glover v John Tyler Enters., Inc., 123 AD3d 882, 882 [2d Dept 2014]; see also Diaz v Port Auth. of NY & NJ, 120 AD3d 611, 612 [2d Dept 2014]).
One who contracts with an owner of real property may be liable in tort to third parties if "the contracting party has entirely displaced the other party's duty to maintain the premises safely" (Church ex rel. Smith vCallanan Indus., 99 NY2d 104, 112 [2002], quoting Espinal v Melville Snow Contrs., 98 NY2d 136, 141 [2002]; Powell v HIS Contractors, Inc., 75 AD3d 463, 464 [1st Dept 2010]), and the contractual undertaking must be "comprehensive and exclusive" (Megaro v Pfizer, Inc., 116 AD3d 427, 427 [1st Dept 2014]; Cahn v Ward Trucking, Inc., 101 AD3d 458, 459 [1st Dept 2012]). III. CRAFT'S MOTION