Thus it goes to the question of damages once liability is established, not to the scope of duty in establishing liability in the first place. Rubano v. Koenen, 152 Conn. 134, 204 A.2d 407 (1964), Sears Roebuck Co. v. Daniels, 299 F.2d 154 (8th Cir. 1962) and Meeks v. Yancey, 43 Tenn. App. 667, 311 S.W.2d 329 (1957), are also cited by appellant. They too are concerned with the so-called "egg-shelled" plaintiff.
It is, of course, well settled in this jurisdiction that in personal injury suits the amount of damages is primarily for the determination of the jury, and that next to the jury, the most competent person to pass upon the amount representing fair compensation for personal injuries is the trial judge. See Crutcher v. Davenport, 55 Tenn. App. 413, 401 S.W.2d 786 (W.S. 1965); Crowe v. Provost, 52 Tenn. App. 397, 374 S.W.2d 645 (M.S. 1963); Meeks v. Yancey, 43 Tenn. App. 667, 311 S.W.2d 329 (W.S. 1957); Reeves v. Catignani, 157 Tenn. 173, 7 S.W.2d 38 (1928). We are of the opinion that the verdict of the jury in Mrs. Perry's case was not so grossly inadequate as to evince passion, prejudice, or unaccountable caprice on the part of the jury, or so inadequate as to shock the conscience of the court, in view of the numerous discrepancies and conflicting testimony embodied in this record.
At p. 311. Accord: Elrod v. Town of Franklin, 140 Tenn. 228, 204 S.W. 298 (1917); Silcox v. Smith County, 487 S.W.2d 652 (Tenn. App. 1972); Meeks v. Yancey, 43 Tenn. App. 667, 311 S.W.2d 329 (1957). It follows that Ford cannot be relieved from liability on the evidence a ruptured disc can occur spontaneously, especially since plaintiff's symptoms were experienced while he engaged in the specific activity capable of providing strain on his back sufficient to cause the injury. Moreover, the record establishes that plaintiff moved the material in a significantly different manner than he ordinarily would have.
] In the case sub judice the pre-existing disability of 20 per cent as rated by the physician cannot be said to be a "natural consequence" of the subsequent injury. Other reported cases of this Court include Meeks v. Yancey, 43 Tenn. App. 667, 311 S.W.2d 329 (1957), cited with approval in Holt v. McCann, 58 Tenn. App. 248, 429 S.W.2d 441 (1968), which involved a plaintiff who sustained injuries which aggravated a pre-existing, arthritic, degenerative disc condition. The trial court had charged the jury as follows:
There was evidence of previous injuries which would account for plaintiff's complaints. Defendant cites Meeks v. Yancey, 43 Tenn. App. 667, 311 S.W.2d 329 (1957), however said case was remanded for retrial because of an error in the charge in regard to pre-existing diseased condition. There was no appreciable damage to either of the vehicles in the collision.
The wrongdoer must pay for the damage to the person or property under the conditions in existence, and it is no defense that damage was more readily inflicted because of an unusual susceptibility to damage. See Holt v. McCann, 58 Tenn. App. 248, 429 S.W.2d 441 (1968); Meeks v. Yancey, 43 Tenn. App. 667, 311 S.W.2d 329 (1957); and authorities cited therein. There is no reason why prior injury or imperfection in property should affect the right to recovery any more than a similar condition of an injured person.
We think this was a correct statement of the controlling principle. Meeks v. Yancey, 43 Tenn. App. 667, 311 S.W.2d 329. We can not agree that the charge overemphasized plaintiff's physical condition.
This rule has been adopted and followed in Tennessee. Meeks v. Yancey, 43 Tenn. App. 667, 311 S.W.2d 329; McCandless v. Sammons, 50 Tenn. App. 413, 362 S.W.2d 259; Elrod v. Franklin, 140 Tenn. 228, 204 S.W. 298; Cobb v. Waddell, 51 Tenn. App. 458, 369 S.W.2d 743, 2 A.L.R. 3rd, 457. This being the law, it necessarily follows that if plaintiff's existing ten to fifteen percent disability did not prevent him from working, or reduce his earning capacity, but his earning capacity was reduced to a determinable extent by the injury negligently inflicted on him by defendants-in-error, then they would be liable in damages for the total loss of earning capacity resulting from their negligent act.
"Thus, if you should find that Jay Ison had already injured his back, when he first consulted Dr. McFall, or that he had a congenital weakness therein, neither of which was disabling, and if you should further find that the manipulations by Dr. McFall were the direct and proximate cause of the exciting or aggravating this condition, and causing the paralysis, and if you further find this to be actionable negligence on the part of Dr. McFall, as hereinbefore explained to you, then you will find in favor of the plaintiffs, and against the defendant." In our opinion this requested charge was consistent with the principles announced in Beech v. Hunter, 14 Tenn. App. 188, and other cases including Meeks v. Yancey, 43 Tenn. App. 667, 311 S.W.2d 329. It was not covered in the Court's original charge and we think His Honor the Trial Judge was in error in refusing to give such charge. Assignment of error No. IX is as follows:
Under these circumstances, we think the question of whether or not the recurrence of plaintiff's pelvic trouble was caused by the accident was a proper matter to be considered by the jury. Finks v. Gillum, 38 Tenn. App. 304, 273 S.W.2d 722; Meeks v. Yancey, 43 Tenn. App. 667, 311 S.W.2d 329. In the case of Finks v. Gillum, the question involved was whether or not plaintiff's miscarriage had been caused by an accident.