Opinion
Civil 4:23-CV-1240
10-30-2023
FRISCO MEEKS, Plaintiff, v. JOHN DOE, et al., Defendants.
MARIANI JUDGE
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Daryl F. Bloom United States Magistrate Judge
I. Factual Background
The pro se prisoner-plaintiff, Frisco Meeks, filed a complaint on July 27, 2023, asserting claims against 40 defendants-medical personnel at Robert Packer Hospital in Bradford County, Pennsylvania, Pennsylvania and New York State Police troopers, and local police officers in Bradford County-pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Pennsylvania state law. (Doc. 1). Along with his complaint, Meeks filed a motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis (Doc. 2). This motion was granted, and the complaint was deemed filed pending a preliminary screening review by the magistrate judge. (Doc. 6). The case was then reassigned to the undersigned.
Meeks' complaint alleges that on July 25, 2020, he presented to the emergency room at Robert Packer Hospital with a gunshot wound to the chest and a laceration on his left hand. (Doc. 1 at 14). He was taken to the trauma department, cleaned, and bandaged. (Id. at 14-15). While he was treated, he alleges that an officer with the Sayre Borough Police Department, Nikki Hoffman, began to question him about who shot him and where the shooting occurred. (Id. at 15). After he received further treatment from several medical personnel, he contends that Officer Hoffman took his phone without permission, began to search through the phone, and informed Meeks that he was not being detained or under arrest. (Id.).
Meeks subsequently refused all further medical treatment and requested discharge papers against medical advice. (Doc. 1 at 16-19). He contends that he was held against his will by hospital staff, as well as officers from the Sayre Borough Police Department, the Pennsylvania State Police, and the New York State Police. (Id.). The complaint alleges that during this time, he was refused his cell phone and personal property and was questioned by multiple law enforcement officers about a home invasion in New York. (Id. at 17-18). Ultimately, Meeks was discharged from Robert Packer Hospital on July 26, 2020, taken into custody by the Bradford County Sheriff's Department, and detained at the Bradford County detention center until July 29, 2020. (Id. at 19).
Based on these averments, Meeks sued 20 individuals from Robert Packer Hospital; five officers from the Sayre Borough Police Department; one individual from the Tioga County Sheriff's Department; ten officers or investigators with the New York State Police; and four officers with the Pennsylvania State Police. (Doc. 1). Meeks asserts constitutional claims under § 1983, alleging that these defendants violated his Fourth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights, as well as state law claims of intentional infliction of emotional distress and negligence. (Id.). He also appears to assert medical malpractice claims, as well as violations of Pennsylvania's public safety laws. (Id.). After a screening review, we recommend that this complaint be dismissed.
II. Discussion
A. Screening of Pro Se Complaints - Standard of Review
We have a statutory obligation to preliminarily review pro se complaints brought by plaintiffs given leave to proceed in forma pauperis. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). We review such complaints to determine whether there are frivolous or malicious claims, or if the complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Id. This statutory preliminary screening mirrors review under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides for dismissal of a complaint for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6).
With respect to this legal benchmark, under federal pleading standards a plaintiff is required to set forth a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). In determining whether a complaint states a claim for relief under this pleading standard, a court must accept the factual allegations in the complaint as true, Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007), and accept “all reasonable inferences that can be drawn from them after construing them in the light most favorable to the nonmovant.” Jordan v. Fox, Rothschild, O'Brien & Frankel, 20 F.3d 1250, 1261 (3d Cir. 1994). However, a court is not required to accept legal conclusions or “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action.” Id.; see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (“Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice”).
As the Third Circuit Court of Appeals has aptly summarized:
[A]fter Iqbal, when presented with a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, district courts should conduct a two-part analysis. First, the factual and legal elements of a claim should be separated. The District Court must accept all of the complaint's well-pleaded facts as true, but may disregard any legal conclusions. Id. Second, a District Court must then determine whether the facts alleged in the complaint are sufficient to show that the plaintiff has a “plausible claim for relief.” Id. at 1950. In other words, a complaint must do more than allege the plaintiff's entitlement to relief. A complaint has to “show” such an entitlement with its facts. See PMeeksips, 515 F.3d at 234-35. As the Supreme Court instructed in Iqbal, “[w]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged-but it has not ‘show[n]'-‘that the pleader is entitled to relief.' ” Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949. This “plausibility” determination will be “a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Id.Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210-11 (3d Cir. 2009).
Generally, when considering a motion to dismiss, a court relies on the complaint and its attached exhibits, as well as matters of public record. Sands v. McCormick, 502 F.3d 263, 268 (3d Cir. 2007). A court can also consider “undisputedly authentic document[s] that a defendant attached as an exhibit to a motion to dismiss if the plaintiff's claims are based on the [attached] documents.” Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. White Consol. Indus., 998 F.2d 1192, 1196 (3d Cir. 1993). Additionally, if the complaint relies on the contents of a document not physically attached to the complaint but whose authenticity is not in dispute, the court may consider such document in its determination. See Pryor v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 288 F.3d 548, 560 (3d Cir. 2002). However, the court may not rely on any other part of the record when deciding a motion to dismiss. Jordan, 20 F.3d at 1261.
Finally, when reviewing a pro se complaint, we are reminded that such complaints are to be construed liberally, “so ‘as to do substantial justice.'” Alston v. Parker, 363 F.3d 229, 234 (3d Cir. 2004) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(f)). We must apply the relevant law even if the pro se plaintiff does not mention it by name. Dluhos v. Strasberg, 321 F.3d 365, 369 (3d Cir. 2003) (citing Higgins v. Beyer, 293 F.3d 683, 688 (3d Cir. 2002)).
B. This Complaint Fails to State a Claim Upon Which Relief May Be Granted.
Meeks' complaint is fundamentally flawed in at least one significant way. Meeks' § 1983 claims are plainly barred by the two-year statute of limitations. Additionally, to the extent Meeks is asserting state law claims against these defendants, the court should decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over this state law claim. Accordingly, we recommend that this complaint be dismissed with prejudice.
1. Meeks' § 1983 Claims are Time-Barred.
The statute of limitations for § 1983 claims mirror the state's statute of limitations for personal injury claims. Kach v. Hose, 589 F.3d 626, 639 (3d Cir. 2009). In Pennsylvania, this limitations period is two years from the date the cause of action accrued. See 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 5524. A cause of action accrues “when the plaintiff knew or should have known of the injury upon which [his] action is based.” Sameric Corp. of Del., Inc. v. City of Phila., 142 F.3d 582, 599 (3d Cir. 1998).
Meeks' complaint asserts that the incidents underlying his claims occurred on July 25 and July 26, 2020, when he was treated and held at Robert Parker Hospital. However, Meeks did not file the instant complaint until July 27, 2023, three years after the limitations period began to run. Accordingly, Meeks' federal constitutional claims are plainly time-barred by the two-year statute of limitations and should be dismissed with prejudice.
2. The Court Should Decline to Exercise Supplemental Jurisdiction Over any State Law Claims.
Finally, to the extent Meeks is asserting state law claims against any of these defendants, because we have concluded that the plaintiff's federal claims fail as a matter of law, this court should decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over these state law claims. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3) (“The district courts may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a claim under subsection (a) if- ... the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction.”); United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966). We note for the plaintiff, however, that this would not hinder his ability to bring this claim in the proper state court if he chooses to do so within the timeframe prescribed by law.
While we recognize that Meeks is a pro se litigant and generally would be entitled to an opportunity to amend his complaint, see Fletcher-Hardee Corp. v. Pote Concrete Contractors, 482 F.3d 247, 253 (3d Cir. 2007); Alston v. Parker, 363 F.3d 229, 235 (3d Cir. 2004), in our view this complaint is fundamentally flawed in several ways that cannot be cured by amendment. Accordingly, we recommend that Meeks' complaint be dismissed with prejudice.
III. Recommendation
Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, IT IS RECOMMENDED that the complaint be dismissed with prejudice.
The parties are further placed on notice that pursuant to Local Rule 72.3:
Any party may object to a magistrate judge's proposed findings, recommendations or report addressing a motion or matter described in 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(B) or making a recommendation for the disposition of a prisoner case or a habeas corpus petition within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy thereof. Such party shall file with the clerk of court, and serve on the magistrate judge and all parties, written objections which shall specifically identify the portions of the proposed findings, recommendations or report to which objection is made and the basis for such objections. The briefing requirements set forth in Local Rule 72.2 shall apply. A judge shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made and may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge. The judge, however, need conduct a new hearing only in his or her discretion or where required by law, and may consider the record developed before the magistrate judge, making his or her own determination on the basis of that record. The judge may also receive further evidence, recall witnesses or recommit the matter to the magistrate judge with instructions.