Opinion
2015-03302 2015-03305
10-28-2015
Susan L. Meekins, respondent, v. Turner Towers Tenants Corp., et al., appellants.
Gallo Vitucci Klar, LLP, New York, N.Y. (Chad E. Sjoquist of counsel), for appellants. Vernon & Ginsburg, LLP, New York, N.Y. (Darryl M. Vernon and Desir Djinsad of counsel), and Susan L. Meekins, New York, N.Y., respondent pro se for respondent (one brief filed).
ROBERT J. MILLER
COLLEEN D. DUFFY
HECTOR D. LASALLE, JJ. (Index No. 501052/14)
Gallo Vitucci Klar, LLP, New York, N.Y. (Chad E. Sjoquist of counsel), for appellants.
Vernon & Ginsburg, LLP, New York, N.Y. (Darryl M. Vernon and Desir Djinsad of counsel), and Susan L. Meekins, New York, N.Y., respondent pro se for respondent (one brief filed).
DECISION & ORDER
In an action, inter alia, to recover damages for breach of a proprietary lease, the defendants appeal from (1) an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Baynes, J.), dated February 4, 2015, which granted the plaintiff's motion pursuant to CPLR 3215 for leave to enter a default judgment against them, and (2) an order of the same court also dated February 4, 2015, which denied their cross motion pursuant to CPLR 3012(d) to compel the plaintiff to accept their late answer.
ORDERED that the orders are reversed, on the facts and in the exercise of discretion, with one bill of costs to the defendants, the plaintiff's motion pursuant to CPLR 3215 for leave to enter a default judgment against the defendants is denied, and the cross motion of the defendants pursuant to CPLR 3012(d) to compel the plaintiff to accept their late answer is granted.
Within 17 days after the time to answer had expired, the defendants served their answer, which was rejected by the plaintiff. Since the plaintiff was not prejudiced by the short delay in the service of an answer, and in light of the lack of willfulness on the part of the defendants, a reasonable excuse for their default, the existence of a potentially meritorious defense, and the public policy favoring the resolution of cases on the merits, the Supreme Court improvidently exercised its discretion in granting that branch of the plaintiff's motion which was for leave to enter a judgment against the defendants upon their failure to answer, and in denying the defendants' cross motion to compel the plaintiff to accept their late answer (see CPLR 2004, 3012[d]; Hutchinson v New York City Health & Hosps. Corp., 118 AD3d 945; EHS Quickstops Corp. v GRJH, Inc., 112 AD3d 577; Darlind Constr., Inc., v Prism Solar Tech., Inc., 109 AD3d 783; Covaci v Whitestone Constr. Corp., 78 AD3d 1108; Sitigus Foods Corp. v 72-02 N. Blvd. Realty Corp., 293 AD2d 597; Buderwitz v Cunningham, 101 AD2d 821).
DILLON, J.P., MILLER, DUFFY and LASALLE, JJ., concur.
ENTER:
Aprilanne Agostino
Clerk of the Court