Medoff v. State Bar of Cal.

8 Citing cases

  1. McComb v. Commission on Judicial Performance

    19 Cal. 3d Spec. Trib. Supp. 1 (Cal. 1977)   Cited 20 times

    blic from persons unfit to practice law ( In re Vaughan (1922) 189 Cal. 491, 495-496 [ 209 P. 353, 24 A.L.R. 858]; In re Rothrock (1940) 16 Cal.2d 449, 454 [ 106 P.2d 907, 131 A.L.R. 226]; Best v. State Bar (1962) 57 Cal.2d 633, 637 [ 21 Cal.Rptr. 589, 371 P.2d 325]; Zitny v. State Bar (1966) 64 Cal.2d 787, 790-791 [ 51 Cal.Rptr. 825, 415 P.2d 521], fn. 1; Black v. State Bar (1972) 7 Cal.3d 676, 686 [ 103 Cal.Rptr. 288, 499 P.2d 968]; Emslie v. State Bar, supra, 11 Cal.3d, p. 225; Wong v. State Bar (1975) 15 Cal.3d 528, 531 [ 125 Cal.Rptr. 482, 542 P.2d 642]; Segretti v. State Bar (1976) 15 Cal.3d 878, 886 [ 126 Cal.Rptr. 793, 544 P.2d 929]). Thus, an attorney who is the subject of a State Bar disciplinary proceeding does not have a right to a jury trial ( Johnson v. State Bar (1935) 4 Cal.2d 744, 758 [ 52 P.2d 928]; In reWharton (1896) 114 Cal. 367, 370 [ 46 P. 172]), and the standard of proof is clear and convincing evidence sufficient to sustain a charge to a reasonable certainty ( Medoff v. State Bar (1969) 71 Cal.2d 535, 550 [ 78 Cal.Rptr. 696, 455 P.2d 800]). Petitioner contends he was denied his constitutional right to a trial by jury (U.S. Const., art. III, § 2, cl. 3, and Amends.

  2. Geiler v. Commission on Judicial Qualifications

    10 Cal.3d 270 (Cal. 1973)   Cited 108 times
    Referring to court employees with obscenities

    (Cf. Medoff v. State Bar (1969) 71 Cal.2d 535, 550 [ 78 Cal.Rptr. 696, 455 P.2d 800].)

  3. In re Fahey

    8 Cal.3d 842 (Cal. 1973)   Cited 53 times

    (10) The fact that respondent testified before the committee gives special weight to its acceptance of his credibility. ( Medoff v. State Bar (1969) 71 Cal.2d 535, 546 [ 78 Cal.Rptr. 696, 455 P.2d 800].) The disciplinary board, which did not see or hear respondent testify, made findings of fact that differ only in minor details from those of the administrative committee.

  4. Bernstein v. State Bar

    6 Cal.3d 909 (Cal. 1972)   Cited 36 times

    ( Trusty v. State Bar (1940) 16 Cal.2d 550, 551-552 [ 107 P.2d 10]; Bruns v. State Bar (1941) 18 Cal.2d 667, 668 [ 117 P.2d 327].) (4) Although we give great weight to the local committee's findings that resolve conflicts in the testimony ( Medoff v. State Bar (1969) 71 Cal.2d 535, 546 [ 78 Cal.Rptr. 696, 455 P.2d 800]; Zitny v. State Bar (1966) 64 Cal.2d 787, 790 [ 51 Cal.Rptr. 825, 415 P.2d 521]), both the board and this court reach an independent judgment on the record before it. (Bus.

  5. Benson v. State Bar

    5 Cal.3d 382 (Cal. 1971)   Cited 20 times

    (Cf. Medoff v. State Bar, 71 Cal.2d 535, 546 [3] [ 78 Cal.Rptr. 696, 455 P.2d 800].)

  6. Barreiro v. State Bar

    2 Cal.3d 912 (Cal. 1970)   Cited 29 times
    In Barreiro v. State Bar (1970) 2 Cal.3d 912 [ 88 Cal.Rptr. 192, 471 P.2d 992], for example, we observed that "Knowingly giving false testimony on a material factual issue is a serious breach of basic standards of honesty as well as a violation of an attorney's oath of office and his duties as an attorney.

    Under such circumstances this court is ordinarily reluctant to reverse the committee's decision. ( Medoff v. State Bar (1969) 71 Cal.2d 535, 546 [ 78 Cal.Rptr. 696, 455 P.2d 800].) (1b) The situation presented here is most unusual.

  7. Charlton v. F.T.C.

    543 F.2d 903 (D.C. Cir. 1976)   Cited 26 times
    In Charlton v. FTC, 543 F.2d 903 (D.C. Cir. 1976), the court addressed an issue similar to the one before us and held that "substantial evidence" is not the proper burden of proof in a disciplinary proceeding before an agency.

    See also Dorsey v. Kingsland, supra note 18, 84 U.S.App.D.C. at 265-266, 173 F.2d at 406-407. For example, "clear preponderance" of the evidence, In re Hertz, 139 Minn. 504, 166 N.W. 397, 408 (1918); State v. Gudmundsen, 145 Neb. 324, 16 N.W.2d 474, 476 (1944); In re Little, 40 Wash.2d 421, 244 P.2d 255, 260 (1953); In re Hendricks, 155 W.Va. 516, 185 S.E.2d 336, 342 (1971); "clear and convincing evidence" Medoff v. State Bar of California, 71 Cal.2d 535, 78 Cal.Rptr. 696, 455 P.2d 800, 810 (1969); Bar Assoc. of Baltimore City v. Marshall, 269 Md. 510, 307 A.2d 677, 681 (1973); State Board v. Dodge, 93 Minn. 160, 100 N.W. 684, 689 (1904); In re Otterness, 181 Minn. 254, 232 N.W. 318, 319, 73 A.L.R. 1319 (1930); In re Martin, 67 N.Mex. 276, 354 P.2d 995, 998 (1960); "clearly established" and similar expressions, Bodisco v. State Bar of California, 58 Cal.2d 495, 24 Cal.Rptr. 835, 374 P.2d 803, 805 (1962); Gordon v. Clinkscales, 215 Ga. 843, 114 S.E.2d 15, 21 (1960); People v. Kerker, 315 Ill. 572, 146 N.E. 439 (1925); In re Lemisch, 321 Pa. 110, 184 A. 72, 74 (1936).Hurst v. Bar Rules Comm., 202 Ark. 1101, 155 S.W.2d 697, 701 (1941); In re Trask, 46 Hawaii 404, 380 P.2d 751, 755-756 (1963); In re Posler, 390 Mich. 581, 213 N.W.2d 133 (1973); In re Krehel, 419 Pa. 86, 213 A.2d 375, 376-377 (1965); In re Wright, 131 Vt. 473, 310 A.2d 1, 9-10 (1973).

  8. Mills Land Water Co. v. Golden West Refining Co.

    186 Cal.App.3d 116 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986)   Cited 41 times
    Describing the problem as an "insoluble dilemma"

    To establish a "flexible" rule permitting ex parte communication absent a court order would seriously undercut the ability of corporate counsel to represent their client. (See Mitton v. State Bar (1969) 71 Cal.2d 525, 534 [ 78 Cal.Rptr. 696, 455 P.2d 800].) Because on this record we cannot conclude privileged information was divulged, we here emphasize the potential.