In the two cases where this court has addressed the issue, we upheld both district courts' findings of significant impairment on the basis that substantial competent evidence supported their determinations. See Medling v. Wecoe Credit Union, 234 Kan. 852, 859, 678 P.2d 1115 (1984); Prairie State Bank v. Hoefgen, 245 Kan. 236, 248, 777 P.2d 811 (1989). In other words, each district court determined that the creditor had met its burden of proof on the issue.

What is a commercially reasonable sale under either the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) or the Uniform Consumer Credit Code (UCCC) is a question of fact to be determined by the trier of the facts. Medling v. Wecoe Credit Union, 234 Kan. 852, Syl. ¶ 6, 678 P.2d 1115 (1984). The standard required is that the secured party act in good faith and in a commercially reasonable manner.

Consequently, as the UCCC does not define what is a commercially reasonable disposition of repossessed collateral in a consumer credit transaction, courts may refer to UCC decisions in determining what is a commercially reasonable disposition of collateral." Medling v. Wecoe Credit Union, 234 Kan. 852, 863, 678 P.2d 1115 (1984).         The net result is that, while this is a case controlled by the UCCC, our principal references from this point forward will be the UCC and cases decided under that code.

See 342 Bankr. at 350 ("The parties agree that it is not likely that a Kansas court would find `significant impairment' under the circumstances of this case where Debtors are current on their payments, have stated their intent to remain current notwithstanding the filing of the bankruptcy proceeding, and there is no evidence that the secured party is not adequately secured."). In that context, both parties cite to the same three cases: Green, 277 Kan. 148; Prairie State Bank v. Hoefgen, 245 Kan. 236, 777 P.2d 811 (1989); Medling v. Wecoe Credit Union, 234 Kan. 852, 678 P.2d 1115 (1984). In Medling, the district court permitted the repossession of a secured vehicle upon which payments were current, based principally upon the debtor's false or inconsistent statements to the creditor and the debtor's failure to meet with the creditor after agreeing to do so.

"13. Mrs. Hoefgen's poor health and their unwillingness to operate the flower shop themselves." The only Kansas case interpreting K.S.A. 16a-5-109(2) is Medling v. Wecoe Credit Union, 234 Kan. 852, 678 P.2d 1115 (1984). In Medling, the credit union had repossessed Medling's car because of significant impairment.

We have found no cases that squarely deal with the question whether failure to maintain automobile insurance is a significant impairment of collateral to permit repossession.          The parties have cited the cases of Prairie State Bank v. Hoefgen, 245 Kan. 236, 777 P.2d 811 (1989), and Medling v. Wecoe Credit Union, 234 Kan. 852, 678 P.2d 1115 (1984). The courts in both cases found significant impairment of collateral.

" 231 Kan. at 91. See Medling v. Wecoe Credit Union, 234 Kan. 852, 863, 678 P.2d 1115 (1984) (applying rule to determination of commercial reasonableness under the UCCC); Kelley v. Commercial National Bank, 235 Kan. 45, 51, 678 P.2d 620 (1984). In the "Promissory Note, Disclosure Statement Security Agreement," the bank and Cada agreed that the loan would be governed by the UCCC.

K.S.A. 16a-5-109 (1995).Johnson County Auto Credit, Inc. v. Green, 277 Kan. 148, 83 P.3d 152 (2004); Prairie State Bank v. Hoefgen, 245 Kan. 236, 777 P.2d 811 (1989); Medling v. Wecoe Credit Union, 234 Kan. 852, 678 P.2d 1115 (1984). Because in this case the Debtor is current in his payments, Creditor could foreclose upon expiration of the stay only if the prospect of performance or realization of the collateral is "significantly impaired."

As a commercial entity, Centennial Park was in a better position than a consumer would have been in a similar situation. Cf. Medling v. Wecoe Credit Union, 234 Kan. 852, 678 P.2d 1115 (1984) (“It cannot be denied that the more sophisticated debtor is in a better position to grapple fairly with the creditor....”). Indeed, as a commercial entity, Centennial Park could have negotiated terms more favorable to it.

Bank of Dover v. Shipley, supra, at 826. See also Kelly v. Commercial National Bank, 235 Kan. 45, 50-51, 678 P.2d 620 (1984); Medling v. Wecoe Credit Union, 234 Kan. 852, 861-62, 678 P.2d 1115 (1984); Westgate State Bank v. Clark, 231 Kan. 81, 90, 642 P.2d 961 (1982). Ark. Code Ann. Sect. 4-9-504(3), in pertinent part, read identical to Sect. 400.9-504(3), to wit: "Unless collateral is perishable or threatens to decline speedily in value or is of a type customarily sold on a recognized market, reasonable notification of the time and place of any public sale or reasonable notification of the time after which any private sale or other intended disposition is to be made shall be sent by the secured party to the debtor . . . ."