Mediterranean, Inc. v. City of Bloomington

Full title: The MEDITERRANEAN, INC., Respondent, v. The CITY OF BLOOMINGTON et al.…

Court: Supreme Court of Minnesota

Date published: Dec 5, 1980

299 N.W.2d 742 (Minn. 1980)

Opinion

No. 50943.

December 5, 1980.

Appeal from the District Court, Hennepin County, Diana E. Murphy, J.

David R. Ornstein, Bloomington, for appellants.

Wayne D. Tritbough, Richard J. Sundberg, Minneapolis, for respondent.

Considered and decided by the court en banc without oral argument.

YETKA, Justice.

The defendants, City of Bloomington and John Pidgeon, appeal from the judgment entered in the Hennepin County District Court directing the refund of liquor license fees in the amount of $3,900 paid by the plaintiff, The Mediterranean, Inc. We reverse.

The plaintiff, intending to construct and operate a restaurant in Bloomington, applied for and obtained an on-sale intoxicating liquor license in April 1968. The requisite license fees were paid, and a renewal of the license was thereafter sought and granted, but the restaurant project was abandoned when the plaintiff experienced construction difficulties. The license as renewed expired on June 30, 1970. Thereafter, the plaintiff commenced this action to obtain a full refund of the license fees paid for the period from December 10, 1968, to June 30, 1970, in the aggregate amount of $3,900.

Characterizing the fees paid during that period as an "overpayment," the district court relied upon the refund authorization of the Bloomington City Code § 125.09 (1968), a provision generally applicable to licenses and permits issued by the city.

Our examination of the subject provisions of the city code indicates that the Bloomington City Council, in drafting a separate chapter of its code devoted to liquor licensing and further, in enumerating therein the grounds entitling an applicant to a refund, intended that the more specific provisions of the liquor licensing chapter were to control in a situation such as presented here. Section 158.07(2) contains the sole criteria upon which an applicant could seek a refund. As the plaintiff was unable to establish entitlement to a refund pursuant to § 158.07(2), the decision of the district court relying upon the more general authority must be reversed.

Reversed.