Opinion
E079882
10-16-2023
In re the Marriage of ALONSO CONCEVIDA MEDINA and MARIA CONCEPCION GUZMAN VALDEZ. v. MARIA CONCEPCION GUZMAN VALDEZ, Appellant. ALONSO CONCEVIDA MEDINA, Respondent,
Anastacio De La Cruz; La Quinta Law Group and Timothy L. Ewanyshyn, for Appellant. No appearance for Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County No. FLIN2102914. Mickie E. Reed, Temporary Judge. (Pursuant to Cal. Const., art. VI, § 21.) Affirmed.
Anastacio De La Cruz; La Quinta Law Group and Timothy L. Ewanyshyn, for Appellant.
No appearance for Respondent.
OPINION
CODRINGTON J.
I.
INTRODUCTION
Appellant Maria Concepcion Guzman Valdez appeals the family court's "status only" judgment of dissolution of her marriage with her ex-husband, Respondent Alonso Concevida Medina. She contends the family court erred by entering the judgment before she and Medina had complied with Family Code section 2100's financial disclosure requirements. We affirm.
All further statutory references are to the Family Code.
II.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Medina petitioned to divorce Valdez in November 2021. Not long after, Medina requested that the family court enter a default and judgment of dissolution. The court did so but later vacated the judgment at Valdez's request. When doing so, the court explained it would enter a "status only" judgment, which would dissolve the parties' marriage while reserving jurisdiction over the remaining issues. The court thus ordered Valdez to file a response to Medina's petition for jurisdiction. Days after she did so, the family court entered a "status only" judgment dissolving the parties' marriage. Valdez timely appealed from that judgment.
III.
DISCUSSION
Valdez argues the family court prejudicially erred by entering the status-only judgment before she or Medina had filed or served their preliminary declarations of disclosure as required by section 2104, subdivision (a). We find no prejudicial error.
Valdez is correct that the parties had to file and serve preliminary declarations of disclosure under section 2104, subdivision (a), outlining their assets and liabilities. (§ 2104, subd. (c).) Valdez also correctly observes that section 2107, subdivision (d) states that "if a court enters a judgment when the parties have failed to comply with all disclosure requirements of this chapter, the court shall set aside the judgment," unless certain circumstances not present here exist. Valdez thus contends that this provision requires the family court to vacate a judgment when the parties have failed to comply with all of the disclosure requirements.
But section 2107, subdivision (d) must be read in context with section 2122, which governs motions to set aside a family court judgment. (In re Marriage of Steiner & Hosseini (2004) 117 Cal.App.4th 519, 528 (Steiner) ["Statutory schemes must also be read as a whole, harmonizing their provisions."].) Section 2122 provides that a party's failure to comply with disclosure requirements, including section 2104's requirements, is a basis to vacate a judgment. (§ 2122, subd. (f).) To vacate a judgment on that ground, however, the party who wants the judgment vacated must, at a minimum, move to do so. (See § 2122, subd. (f) ["An action or motion based on failure to comply with the disclosure requirements shall be brought within one year after the date on which the complaining party either discovered, or should have discovered, the failure to comply."]; In re Marriage of Dellaria & Blickman-Dellaria (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 196, 205 ["nondisclosure is a legitimate basis for vacating a judgment only if the moving party shows that he or she was prejudiced by the nondisclosure"]; see also § 2107, subd. (e) ["Upon the motion to set aside judgment, the court may order the parties to provide the preliminary and final declarations of disclosure that were exchanged between them."].)
If Valdez thought the family court improperly entered the status-only judgment because the parties had not complied with the disclosure requirements, it was incumbent on her to file a motion to vacate the judgment. Section 2107, subdivision (d) logically cannot come into play absent a finding that a party did not comply with the disclosure requirements. The parties would have to litigate the issue in some way before the family court would be required to vacate a judgment under section 2107, subdivision (d).
But Valdez never moved to vacate the judgment and instead appealed it. We are not aware of, and Valdez does not cite, any authority that suggests the family court had an obligation to sua sponte vacate the judgment. Because Valdez did not move to vacate the judgment, section 2107, subdivision (d)'s mandate that a family court must vacate a judgment if the judgment was entered "when the parties have failed to comply with all disclosure requirements" was never triggered. We therefore discern no error in the court's entry of the status-only judgment.
Even if the family court erred by entering the judgment, any error was harmless. (See Steiner, supra, 117 Cal.App.4th at p. 528 [holding appellant seeking to reverse judgment for respondent's failure to comply with Family Code disclosure requirements must show nondisclosure was prejudicial, despite section 2107, subdivision (d)'s provision that "[t]he failure to comply with the disclosure requirements does not constitute harmless error"].) Valdez offers two reasons why the family court's entry of the status, but neither is persuasive.
First, Valdez suggests that the status-only judgment prejudiced her because Medina "failed to list multiple assets in his disclosure of assets." Even if Valdez is right that Medina did not sufficiently disclose his assets, Valdez fails to explain how the status-only judgment-which decided only the parties' marital status-prejudiced her given that all remaining issues, including the division of the parties' assets, remain to be litigated. (See Steiner, supra, 117 Cal.App.4th at pp. 525-528.) We thus fail to see how the entry of the status-only judgment purportedly before Medina disclosed his assets to Valdez prejudiced her in any way.
Second, Valdez suggests that the status-only judgment dissolving the parties' marriage might jeopardize her immigration process. Valdez provides no explanation for her position beyond stating that, as Medina recognized, she "thinks that this divorce will affect her immigration process....'" This vague, speculative concern is insufficient to show prejudice. (See People v. Gonzales (2012) 54 Cal.4th 1234, 1254 ["speculative and peripheral consideration" insufficient to establish prejudice].)
In short, because Valdez did not move to vacate the status-only judgment and its entry did not prejudice her, Valdez has failed to show the family court prejudicially erred. We therefore affirm the judgment.
IV.
DISPOSITION
The family court's status-only judgment is affirmed. Respondent may recover his costs on appeal.
We concur: RAMIREZ P. J. McKINSTER J.