Opinion
Civil Action 20 Civ. 797 (VEC) (SLC)
01-12-2022
ZAHIRAH MEDINA, Plaintiff, v. THE CITY OF NEW YORK, GORDON'S AUTO SALES, LLC, New York City Police Department Officer CHRISTOPHER WINTERMUTE Shield No. 3805, and Police Officers JOHN DOES 1, 2, 3, etc. the name John Doe being fictitious as the true names of said officers are currently not known, all of whom are sued in their individual capacities, Defendants.
THE HONORABLE VALERIE E. CAPRONI, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
SARAH L. CAVE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
In this action, Plaintiff Zaharia Medina (“Ms. Medina”) brought claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and New York state law against Defendants City of New York (the “City”), Police Officer Christopher Wintermute (“Officer Wintermute”) (the City and Officer Wintermute together, the “City Defendants”) and Gordon's Auto Sales, LLC (“Gordon's”) in connection with her August 3, 2018 arrest for third degree criminal possession of a forged instrument (the “Arrest”). (See generally ECF No. 1).
The District Court dismissed all claims against the City Defendants, leaving Gordon's as the only defendant. (ECF No. 53). See Medina v. City of New York, No. 20 Civ. 797 (VEC), 2021 WL 1700323 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 29, 2021) (“Medina I”). Gordon's failed to answer the complaint or otherwise appear in this action. The Clerk of Court entered a Certificate of Default against Gordon's and, after issuing an order to show cause to which Gordon's did not respond and holding a telephonic hearing at which it did not appear, the Honorable Valerie E. Caproni entered a default judgment against Gordon's. (ECF Nos. 46, 50, 52; Minute entry Jan. 15, 2021). The District Court referred the matter to the undersigned for a damages inquest (ECF No. 62), and Ms. Medina filed a notice of motion (ECF No. 59), proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law in support of the motion for inquest (ECF No. 61 (the “Motion”), and supporting documents including her counsel's declaration, accompanied by: (i) Ms. Medina's declaration (the “Declaration”); (ii) the Bill of Sale from Gordon's; (iii) a notarized letter provided by Gordon's (the “Statement”); (iv) and documentation concerning Ms. Medina's costs. (ECF Nos. 60; 60-1-60-4 (the Declaration and Statement together, the “Damages Submission”)).
Following review of the Motion and the entire record, I respectfully recommend that the District Court award Ms. Medina total damages of: $56,081.65, comprised of: (i) $38,880.00 in compensatory damages; (ii) $10,000.00 for emotional distress; (iii) $5,938.10 in lost wages; and (iv) costs in the amount of $1,263.55, as well as post-judgment interest pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1961.
I. BACKGROUND
Given the default by Gordon's, the Court accepts as true all well-pleaded factual allegations in the complaint, except as to damages. See City of New York v. Mickalis Pawn Shop, LLC, 645 F.3d 114, 137 (2d Cir. 2011) (“It is an ‘ancient common law axiom' that a defendant who defaults thereby admits all ‘well-pleaded' factual allegations contained in the complaint.”) (quoting Vermont Teddy Bear Co. v. 1-800 Beargram Co., 373 F.3d 241, 246 (2d Cir. 2004)); Whitehead v. Mix Unit, LLC, No. 17 Civ. 9476 (VSB) (JLC), 2019 WL 384446, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 31, 2019) (“In light of [defendant's] default, the Court accepts as true all well-pleaded factual allegations included in [plaintiff's] complaint, except as to damages.”), adopted by 2019 WL 1746007 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 18, 2019).
A. Factual Background
1. Facts drawn from the Complaint & Medina I
This factual background is drawn from the Complaint as well as Medina I, 2021 WL 1700323, at *1-2.
In July 2018, Ms. Medina purchased a car from Gordon's. Medina I, 2021 WL 1700323, at *1. Ms. Medina was a New Jersey resident and Gordon's operated in Queens but was incorporated in Georgia. (ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 7-8, 17). Gordon's provided Ms. Medina ten-day temporary Georgia license plates. Medina I, 2021 WL 1700323, at *1. Ms. Medina “had no reason to believe there were any errors or discrepancies in the [license] plates, registration, and VIN number.” (ECF No. 1 ¶ 20). On August 3, 2018, Ms. Medina was seated in her car when two NYPD officers approached her and requested her license and registration. Medina I, 2021 WL 1700323, at *1. Officer Wintermute stated that the Vehicle Identification Number (“VIN”) on the car “did not match the VIN on the registration [Ms. Medina] had provided.” Id. Ms. Medina was surprised and began to call Gordon's, but officers directed her to exit the car, and then arrested her and transported her to the 32d Precinct. Id. Ms. Medina was later transported to Central Booking, where she remained until the following afternoon. Id. Ms. Medina was charged criminally with four counts of third-degree criminal possession of a forged instrument. Id.; N.Y.P.L. § 170.20.
A “VIN is a 17-digit number that uniquely identifies each vehicle and is required by law to be printed on each vehicle in multiple locations.” United States v. Wallace, 937 F.3d 130, 134 (2d Cir. 2019) (citing 49 C.F.R. § 565.13).
“A person is guilty of criminal possession of a forged instrument in the third degree when, with knowledge that it is forged and with intent to defraud, deceive or injure another, he utters or possesses a forged instrument.” N.Y.P.L. § 170.20. This charge is a class A misdemeanor. Id.
Ms. Medina appeared in court four times on charges stemming from the Arrest. Medina, 2021 WL 1700323, at *1. On October 30, 2018, the last court date, Ms. Medina “produced a notarized statement from [Gordon's] stating that the incorrect VIN on the registration was due to an error by [Gordon's].” Id.; see ECF No. 60-3. All charges against Ms. Medina were then dismissed. Medina, 2021 WL 1700323, at *1.
Ms. Medina alleges that as a result of the Arrest, she was suspended from her job and failed a pre-hire background investigation conducted by a prospective employer. Medina, 2021 WL 1700323, at *2.
2. The Damages Submission
In her Declaration, Ms. Medina states that following the Arrest, she was in custody from 8:00 pm on August 3, 2018 until approximately 3:00 pm on August 4, 2018. (ECF No. 60-1 ¶ 17). Ms. Medina did not sleep while in custody, and she was “interrogated” by a police officer for approximately one hour. (Id. ¶¶ 15, 17).
Ms. Medina states that when she reported for work at the Newark Airport on August 6, 2018, she was denied entry when her employer's security system flagged that she had been arrested. (ECF No. 60-1 ¶ 19). She was embarrassed and humiliated because this occurred in front of her colleagues. (Id.) Ultimately, Ms. Medina missed eight weeks of work, totaling approximately $4,600 in lost wages. (Id. ¶ 25). Ms. Medina's start date at another position, Community Access, was delayed by approximately one month when she could not pass a background check as a result of the Arrest. (Id. ¶¶ 26-27). Consequently, she lost an additional $2,386 in wages at a biweekly rate of pay of $1,193. (Id. ¶ 27). Ms. Medina fears driving in New York as a result of the Arrest. (Id. ¶ 18).
In the Statement, Lloyd Gordon, the owner of Gordon's, stated in part, “the [VIN] was the . . . incorrect number placed on your temporary tag. This mistake was due to inadvertently using the wrong title from several [Hondas] purchased. I apologize for this mistake and will send the correct temporary tag with the correct number.” (ECF No. 60-3 at 2).
B. Procedural Background
Ms. Medina commenced this action on January 29, 2020 by filing the Complaint against Defendants City of New York, Officer Wintermute, unknown police officers and Gordon's. (ECF No. 1). On April 27, 2020, Ms. Medina requested a 60-day extension of the deadline to serve Gordon's, which was granted. (ECF Nos. 19-20). On June 22, 2020, Ms. Medina filed proof of service reflecting service on Gordon's on June 18, 2020. (ECF No. 21).
On October 9, 2020 the City Defendants filed a motion to dismiss all claims under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c). (ECF No. 30).
On November 5, 2020, Judge Caproni issued an order noting that Gordon's failed to appear, answer, or otherwise respond to the Complaint and directed Ms. Medina to apply for a default judgment against Gordon's by December 7, 2020. (ECF No. 39). On November 25, 2020, the Clerk of the Court issued a Certificate of Default as to Gordon's. (ECF No. 46). On December 4, 2020, the District Court issued an order to show cause directing Gordon's or its attorneys to appear and demonstrate “why an Order should not be issued entering a Judgment by Default . . . [against it], pursuant to Rule 55(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.” (ECF No. 50 (the “OTSC”)). Gordon's did not respond to the OTSC or appear at the hearing on January 15, 2021; accordingly, Judge Caproni entered a default judgment against Gordon's and ordered a damages inquest. (ECF No. 52; ECF Minute Entry Jan. 15, 2021).
On April 29, 2021, Judge Caproni issued Medina I, granting the City Defendants' motion for judgment on the pleadings and directing Ms. Medina to move for an inquest to determine the damages owed by Gordon's. 2021 WL 1700323, at *6. After several extensions, (ECF Nos. 55, 57), on June 18, 2021, Ms. Medina filed the Motion and the Damages Submission. (ECF Nos. 60-61).
On June 20, 2021, Judge Caproni entered an amended order of reference, referring the damages inquest to the undersigned. (ECF No. 62).
On September 10, 2021, the Court entered an order noting that Ms. Medina requested $6,986 in lost wages but “d[id] not provide any supporting documentation (for example, pay stubs or tax forms) to substantiate her alleged damages.” (ECF No. 63). The Court directed Ms. Medina to submit additional documentation by September 24, 2021, to the extent she continued to seek damages for lost wages. (Id.) Ms. Medina did not submit any additional documentation.
On October 21, 2021, the Court directed Gordon's to respond to Ms. Medina's Damages Submission by November 19, 2021. (ECF No. 64). The Court warned that failure to respond or to contact the Court to request an in-court hearing would result in the Court issuing a Report and Recommendation concerning damages based on Ms. Medina's submission alone and without an in-court hearing. (Id.) (citing Transatlantic Marine Claims Agency, Inc. v. Ace Shipping Corp., 109 F.3d 105, 111 (2d Cir. 1997)). Gordon's did not respond or contact the Court.
II.DISCUSSION
A. Default Judgment and Liability
A default judgment entered on well-pleaded allegations in a complaint establishes a defendant's liability. See Greyhound Exhibitgroup, Inc. v. E.L.U.L. Realty Corp., 973 F.2d 155, 158 (2d Cir. 1992). A defendant's default is deemed “a concession of all well-pleaded allegations of liability, ” but it is not deemed an admission of damages. Rovio Ent., Ltd. v. Allstar Vending, Inc., 97 F.Supp.3d 536, 545 (S.D.N.Y. 2015). “The district court must instead conduct an inquiry in order to ascertain the amount of damages with reasonable certainty.” Am. Jewish Comm. v. Berman, No. 15 Civ. 5983 (LAK) (JLC), 2016 WL 3365313, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. June 15, 2016) (quoting Credit Lyonnais Sec. (USA), Inc. v. Alcantara, 183 F.3d 151, 155 (2d Cir. 1999)), adopted by 2016 WL 4532201 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 29, 2016).
A plaintiff “bears the burden of establishing her entitlement to recovery and thus must substantiate her claim with evidence to prove the extent of damages.” Dunn v. Advanced Credit Recovery Inc., No. 11 Civ. 4023 (PAE) (JLC), 2012 WL 676350, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 1, 2012). The evidence the plaintiff submits must be admissible. Poulos v. City of New York, No. 14 Civ. 3023 (LTS) (BCM), 2018 WL 3750508, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. July 13, 2018), adopted by 2018 WL 3745661 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 6, 2018); see House v. Kent Worldwide Mach. Works, Inc., 359 Fed.Appx. 206, 207 (2d Cir. 2010) (summary order) (“damages must be based on admissible evidence”). The plaintiff must demonstrate that the compensation it seeks “relate[s] to the damages that naturally flow from the injuries pleaded.” Am. Jewish Comm., 2016 WL 3365313, at *3 (quoting Greyhound, 973 F.2d at 159).
Where the damages are “not susceptible to simple mathematical calculation, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55(b)(2) gives courts discretion to determine whether an evidentiary hearing is necessary or whether to rely on detailed affidavits or documentary evidence.” Am. Jewish Comm., 2016 WL 3365313, at *4 (internal citation omitted). If the documents the plaintiff has submitted provide a “sufficient basis from which to evaluate the fairness of” the requested damages, the court need not conduct an evidentiary hearing. Fustock v. ContiCommodity Servs. Inc., 873 F.2d 38, 40 (2d Cir. 1989); see Transatlantic, 109 F.3d at 111 (holding that court may determine appropriate damages based on affidavits and documentary evidence “as long as [the court has] ensured that there [is] a basis for the damages specified in the default judgment”) (internal citation omitted).
1. Subject Matter Jurisdiction
The Court has subject matter jurisdiction over Ms. Medina's negligence claim against Gordon's, notwithstanding that her claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 were dismissed in Medina I. In bringing her lawsuit, Ms. Medina premised subject matter jurisdiction on federal question jurisdiction for the § 1983 claim and supplemental jurisdiction for the state law claims. (ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 3-4). While “federal question jurisdiction dissipated” here when Ms. Medina's federal claims were dismissed, the Court may find jurisdiction on the basis of diversity, which has existed at all times. See Wright v. Musanti, 887 F.3d 577, 584-86 (2d Cir. 2018) (rejecting a challenge to the court's jurisdiction over state law claims, where federal claims were previously dismissed, after the court “found that there was an adequate basis upon which to exercise diversity jurisdiction, in essence deeming the jurisdictional basis of the complaint constructively amended”); see also Philan Ins. Ltd. v. Frank B. Hall & Co., 786 F.Supp. 345, 384 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (“Although Plaintiff[] specifically pled jurisdiction based only on 28 U.S.C. § 1331, [the] Court may take notice of the existence of diversity jurisdiction as based on the allegations in the complaint.”).
The Court therefore finds that there is subject matter jurisdiction over this case under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). Federal district courts have original jurisdiction “of all civil actions where the matter in controversy exceeds . . . $75,000 . . . and is between . . . citizens of different states[.]” 28 U.S.C. 1332(a). Ms. Medina alleges that Gordon's was incorporated and had a principal place of business in Georgia, and she was at all relevant times a New Jersey resident. (ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 78). Plaintiff's Motion requests damages of $158,264.05 plus post-judgment interest (ECF No. 61 at 16), and accordingly the Court determines that both the amount in controversy and full diversity requirements are established. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a).
2. Negligence
Ms. Medina asserts only a single claim of negligence, under New York state law against Gordon's. (ECF No. 61 at 5; ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 87-94). Ms. Medina's claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 are not asserted against Gordon's, (see id.) nor would the facts in her complaint support any such claims. See Levy v. Alfano, 47 F.Supp.2d 488, 491-92 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (deeming it “well settled” that private citizens not acting under color of state law may not be sued under Section 1983, and can only be “rope[d] in” if they “conspired with State officials . . . or [] there was either State compulsion or sufficient State involvement in the actions of the private person.”).
While Gordon's default equates to a concession of liability as to the allegations in the complaint, the Court still must look to the complaint to determine whether Ms. Medina's allegations are prima facie sufficient to demonstrate liability. See Taizhou Zhongneng Imp. & Exp. Co. v. Koutsobinas, 509 Fed.Appx. 54, 56 (2d Cir. 2013) (explaining that the liability of defaulting defendants depends on whether “allegations are sufficient to state a cause of action”); Lenard v. Design Studio, 889 F.Supp.2d 518, 528 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (“Without a response from Defendants, this Court must first determine whether the allegations in Plaintiff's Complaint are sufficiently pleaded to establish Defendants' liability.”). The Court will therefore first assess whether Ms. Medina has properly established the elements of her claim against Gordon's.
The elements of a negligence claim under New York law are: “(1) the existence of a duty on [the] defendant's part as to the plaintiff; (2) a breach of this duty; and (3) injury to the plaintiff as a result thereof.” Alfaro v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 210 F.3d 111, 114 (2d Cir. 2000) (quoting Akins v. Glens Falls City Sch. Dist., 53 N.Y.2d 325, 333 (1981)). Determining whether there was a duty, and the scope of that duty “involve[s] a consideration not only of the wrongfulness of the defendant's action or inaction, ” as well as “an examination of [the] plaintiff's reasonable expectations of the care owed him [or her] by others.” Turcotte v. Fell, 68 N.Y.2d 432, 437 (1986).
“To make a prima facie showing of proximate cause, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the defendant's negligence was a ‘substantial cause' of the events creating the injury.” Wax NJ-2, LLC v. JFB Constr. & Dev., 111 F.Supp.3d 434, 457 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) (quoting Maheshwari v. City of New York, 2 N.Y.3d 288, 296 (2004)). Said differently, the plaintiff “must show that it was reasonably foreseeable that the damages incurred would follow from the wrongful act.” Seiden v. Baker Tilly H.K. Ltd., No. 17 Civ. 2583 (LTS), 2019 WL 1316471, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 22, 2019). A third party's intervening act may sever proximate cause “if such an act is ‘extraordinary under the circumstances,' rather than a foreseeable consequence of the defendant's negligence.” Wax NJ-2, 111 F.Supp.3d at 457 (quoting Maheshwari, 2 N.Y.3d at 295).
Ms. Medina argues that she has sufficiently pled her negligence claim because Gordon's had a duty to provide her with “accurate documentation to prove her legitimate ownership of the vehicle” and that failure to provide accurate documentation “put [her] at the foreseeable risk of enforcement action and proximately caused her arrest.” (ECF No. 61 at 10-11; see ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 90-92). She alleges that because the City Defendants' actions - arresting her - were foreseeable, Gordon's is liable for the consequences. (ECF No. 61 at 11-15).
The Court finds that Ms. Medina has adequately pled a negligence claim against Gordon's for its failure to furnish accurate VIN documentation when it sold her car, which resulted in the Arrest for possession of a forged instrument. First, Gordon's duty to Ms. Medina to provide accurate documentation, and breach of that duty, are evident from its Statement, in which Gordon's owner acknowledged and “apologize[d] for the mistake” in providing the “incorrect number” on the VIN recorded on her car's temporary tag. (ECF No. 60-3 at 2).
Second, Ms. Medina has pled an adequate causal connection between Gordon's actions and her Arrest because it is an “entirely foreseeable . . . fact of life” that “once a police officer determines that an automobile has an altered or otherwise improper VIN plate, ” he or she may question, detain or arrest the car's possessor. Horstein v. General Motors Corp., 391 F.Supp. 1274, 1277 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (denying defendant's motion for judgment on the pleadings or alternatively for summary judgment); cf. Medina I, 2021 WL 1700323 at *3-4 (collecting cases holding there was probable cause to arrest for possession of a forged instrument notwithstanding Ms. Medina's assertion that she was unaware of her car's VIN irregularities).
The basic facts in Horstein are strikingly similar to those alleged by Ms. Medina. One of the plaintiffs in that case was arrested and charged with possession of stolen property after police conducted a routine check and determined the VIN did not match the car. 391 F.Supp. at 1276.Plaintiff was taken into custody and remained incarcerated overnight, and the car was detained for over three months and badly damaged. Id. Plaintiffs sued the manufacturer for negligence, and the defendant contended that its alleged negligence did not proximately cause plaintiffs' injuries. Id. at 1276-77. The court rejected this argument and held, to the contrary, that “a jury could properly conclude that impoundment, arrest and even damage to the car were reasonably foreseeable consequences of defendant's alleged negligent failure to affix the correct VIN plate to plaintiff's car.” Id. at 1277. Under the same reasoning, the Court concludes that Ms. Medina has adequately pled the elements of a negligence claim against Gordon's and that she is entitled to recover for her injuries proximately caused by Gordon's negligence, which here include the damages stemming from the Arrest. See id.
In Horstein, two plaintiffs owned the car, but only one was arrested. 391 F.Supp. at 1276.
B. Damages
1. Evidentiary basis
The Court now turns to the question whether Ms. Medina has provided sufficient evidence to support her claimed damages. Transatlantic, 109 F.3d at 111; Bleecker v. Zetian Sys., Inc., 12 Civ. 2151 (DLC), 2013 WL 5951162, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 1, 2013). Because, as discussed supra, § II.A.2, Ms. Medina's damages include the Arrest, time in custody, resulting emotional damages, and lost wages, the Court looks to Section 1983 actions, which address these categories of damages. In Section 1983 actions, the “cardinal principle of damages in Anglo-American law” applies, providing for “compensation for the injury caused to plaintiff by defendant's breach of duty.” Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 254-55 (1978) (internal citation omitted). In a Section 1983 action seeking damages for a violation of constitutional rights, “the level of damages is ordinarily determined according to principles derived from the common law of torts.” Memphis Cmty. Sch. Dist. v. Stachura, 477 U.S. 299, 306 (1986); Poulos, 2018 WL 3750508, at *3. The damages in Section 1983 actions, then, are primarily compensatory, intended “to compensate persons for injuries that are caused by the deprivation of constitutional rights.” Carey, 435 U.S. at 254; see Bermudez v. City of New York, No. 11 Civ. 750 (LAP), 2014 WL 11274759, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 25, 2014) (“Section 1983 civil actions rely on the same analysis as state common law tort actions and serve the same primary goal of compensation.”). “The measure of damages for pain and suffering or emotional distress is the fair and reasonable compensation to be fixed by the trier of fact in the light of all the evidence in the case.” Sulkowska v. City of New York, 129 F.Supp.2d 274, 308 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
Neither Section 1983 nor case law applying it “provide a precise formula by which pain and suffering and emotional distress may be properly measured and reduced to monetary value.” Mathie v. Fries, 935 F.Supp. 1284, 1304-05 (E.D.N.Y. 1996), aff'd 121 F.3d 808 (2d Cir. 1997). The Court may instead consult analogous cases involving similar injuries. See Ismail v. Cohen, 899 F.2d 183, 186 (2d Cir. 1990); Cartright v. Lodge, No. 15 Civ. 9939 (KMW) (RLE), 2017 WL 1194241, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 30, 2017).
Ms. Medina has submitted the Motion, supported by the Damages Submission, which includes her Declaration and documentary evidence. (ECF Nos. 60, 60-1 - 60-4, 61). Ms. Medina's Declaration is admissible to demonstrate her damages. See Maldonado v. La Nueva Rampa, Inc., No. 10 Civ. 8195 (LLS) (JLC), 2012 WL 1669341, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. May 14, 2012); Poulos, 2018 WL 3750508, at *4. The Court finds that Ms. Medina has met her evidentiary burden and that a hearing is unnecessary because her Damages Submission constitutes a “sufficient basis from which to evaluate the fairness” of her damages request. Fustok, 873 F.2d at 40. Based on Ms. Medina's written submissions, the Court will analyze her request for compensatory damages as well as costs.
2. Compensatory damages
Under Second Circuit precedent, “damages recoverable for loss of liberty for the period spent in a wrongful confinement are separable from damages recoverable for such injuries as physical harm, embarrassment, or emotional suffering[.]” Kerman v. City of New York, 374 F.3d 93, 125 (2d Cir. 2004). Accordingly, the Court will separately analyze Ms. Medina's damages with respect to her time in custody and emotional distress.
a. Loss of liberty - time in custody
For her time in custody, Ms. Medina suggests a compensatory damages award of either $50,000 to $100,000 (ECF No. 61 at 12 (“Courts have consistently held that a victim of such deprivation of liberty [18 hours] can and should be awarded compensatory damages in the range of $50,000-$100,000.”)), or $100,000 to $200,000. Id. at 14 (“Plaintiff respectfully submits that damages within the lower end of a range of $100,000-$200,000 would be appropriate.”). Ms. Medina has provided the Court with several citations in support of her requested award. See Id. at 12-14 (citing Martinez v. Port Auth. of N.Y. and N.J., No. 01 Civ. 721 (PKC), 2005 WL 2143333, at *17-21 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 2, 2005) (upholding $160,000 award for approximately 19 hours in detention for plaintiff acquitted on lewdness charges, and remitting emotional distress verdict); Gardner v. Federated Dep't Stores, Inc., 907 F.2d 1348 (2d Cir. 1990) (remitting $150,000 jury award to $50,000 for loss of liberty for approximately eight hours in custody, and separately approving other awards for pain and suffering); Kerman, 374 F.3d at 125-26 (collecting cases where “even absent . . . other injuries, an award of several thousand dollars may be appropriate simply for several hours' loss of liberty”); Martinez v. Gayson, No. 95-CV-3788 (ILG), 1998 WL 564385, at *6 (E.D.N.Y. June 30, 1998) (remitting $310,000 jury award to $160,000 where plaintiff was verbally abused, knocked to the ground and held in custody for five hours); Abdell v. City of New York, No. 05 Civ. 8453 (RJS), 2014 WL 3858319, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 5, 2014) (citing to Robinson v. Holder, No. 07 Civ. 5992 (DLC) (HBP), 2008 WL 2875291, *8 (S.D.N.Y. July 22, 2008), in which the court concluded that an average hourly award for loss of liberty was $6,416)).
Having reviewed the Motion, the Damages Submission, and the cases Ms. Medina cites, the Court finds that even the low end of her requested award of compensatory damages falls outside the range of reasonableness. In addition to exacerbating circumstances in her cited cases, many of those cases involved awards on remittitur. See Martinez v. Port Auth. of N.Y. and N.J., 2005 WL 2143333, at *21-22; Gardner, 907 F.2d 1348; Martinez v. Gayson, 1998 WL 564385, at *6. These cases are therefore not particularly helpful for the Court in determining Ms. Medina's damages, because “damages awarded on inquest are typically lower than damages awarded by juries or by courts on remittitur . . . because when a court determines that remittitur is appropriate, it remits the jury's award to the maximum award that would not be excessive.” Francis v. City of New York, No. 15 Civ. 7997 (VSB) (KHP), 2019 WL 8918743, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 12, 2019) (internal citation omitted); see Jackson v. Tellado, No. 11-CV-3028 (PKC) (SMG), 2018 WL 4043150, at *6 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 24, 2018) (describing the Court's task on a motion for remittitur as “ascertaining] the highest award within the jury's discretion”) (citing Earl v. Bouchard Transp. Co., 917 F.2d 1320, 1330 (2d Cir. 1990)).
Ms. Medina's injuries include having spent approximately 18 hours in custody. (ECF No. 61 at 12); see Medina I, 2021 WL 1700323, at *1 n.3. She does not allege that she was physically harmed or that there were any aggravating facts beyond the time that she spent in custody, and accordingly, with respect to compensatory damages for time in custody, an award on the low end of the range awarded by courts is appropriate. The Court finds that, after accounting for inflation, as the Court must, approximately $2,160.00 per hour in custody is appropriate. Francis, 2019 WL 8918743, at *7-8 (awarding $2,000 per hour of detention on inquest for plaintiff confined for 13.5 hours alleging that defendants supplied false information causing him to be arrested); cf. Lovitch v. Lovitch, No. 11 Civ. 2536 (ER) (LMS), 2015 WL 1047807, at *8-9 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 10, 2015) (awarding $10,000 in compensatory damages for relatively brief custody, coupled with the fact that plaintiff did not suffer physical harm or public embarrassment in the course of arrest and detention).
See Allam v. Meyers, 906 F.Supp.2d 274, 289 n.9 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (relying on the Bureau of Labor Statistics' Inflation Calculator to estimate present-day compensatory damage awards); U.S. BUR. OF LAB. STAT., CPI Inflation Calculator, https://www.bls.gov/data/inflation calculator.htm (calculating the most recent buying power of $2,000, measured from November 2019) (last visited Jan. 11, 2022).
Accordingly, the Court respectfully recommends an award of $38,880.00 in compensatory damages for Ms. Medina's time in custody.
$2,160.00 * 18 hours in custody.
b. Emotional distress
Ms. Medina seeks an award of $50,000 to $100,000 for emotional distress damages. (ECF No. 61 at 14). Ms. Medina described feeling “belittled” while in custody, “[feeling] like a criminal, ” and not sleeping. (ECF No. 60-1 ¶¶ 14, 16, 17). As a result of the Arrest, she now fears driving in New York. (Id. ¶ 18). Ms. Medina also described feeling embarrassed and humiliated when, following the Arrest, she was denied entry at work in front of her colleagues. (Id. ¶ 19). Ms. Medina does not allege that she required any psychiatric or other medical treatment as a result of the Arrest, nor does the Damages Submission include any such evidence. Ms. Medina concedes that these emotional distress damages are “garden variety.” (ECF No. 61 at 14).
Both New York courts and the Second Circuit differentiate between “garden variety” emotional distress and more serious claims. See Francis, 2019 WL 8918743, *8 (collecting cases). In cases with garden variety emotional distress, “the evidence of mental anguish suffered is generally limited to the testimony of the plaintiff, is described in vague or conclusory terms, without presenting evidence of the duration, severity or consequences of the condition, and there is minimal or no evidence of medical treatment.” Lovitch, 2015 WL 1047807, at * 11 n.10 (quoting Fowler v. New York Transit Auth., No. 96 Civ. 6796 (JGK), 2001 WL 83228, at *13 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 31, 2001)). Although garden variety emotional distress claims “generally merit $30,000 to $125,000 awards . . . [w]here a plaintiff offers only sparse evidence of emotional distress . . . courts have reduced such awards to as little as $10,000.” MacMillan v. Millennium Broadway Hotel, 873 F.Supp.2d 546, 561-62 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (citation omitted and collecting cases).
The Court has no doubt that the Arrest was an unpleasant, disruptive, and distressing experience for Ms. Medina, and does not minimize the severity of her unexpected arrest though no criminal culpability of her own. Ms. Medina's emotional distress allegations are, however, garden variety, as she acknowledges, and because she has offered scant evidence of emotional distress, the Court concludes that she has proved “no more than minimal damages.” Francis, 2019 WL 8918743, at *9. Accordingly, the Court recommends an award of $10,000.00 for her emotional distress claims. See id. at *8-9 (recommending an award of $10,000 for emotional distress where plaintiff alleged with minimal elaboration embarrassment, sleeplessness, paranoia, and a loss of security but did not seek mental health treatment).
c. Lost wages
Ms. Medina also seeks $6,986.00 in lost wages, for “approximately three months” of lost wages. (ECF No. 61 at 15). Ms. Medina's Declaration states that she lost approximately eight weeks of work at Newark Airport, amounting to $4,600 at a bi-weekly pay of “approximately $1,150, ” and her start date at Community Access was “delayed by approximately one month, which amounted to $2,386 in lost wages at [her] bi-weekly pay rate of $1,193.” (ECF No. 60-1 ¶¶ 20, 25, 27).
Ms. Medina's Declaration is admissible to demonstrate her damages, see Maldonado, 2012 WL 1669341, at *2; Poulos, 2018 WL 3750508, at *4, and lost wages resulting from an arrest are compensable damages. See Johnson v. City of New York, No. 15-CV-5873 (ENV) (VMS), 2019 WL 4279572, at *4-6 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 2, 2019) (awarding $9,300 in lost income after plaintiff's arrest and criminal proceedings caused him to miss paid teaching opportunities and a real estate deal), adopted by 2019 WL 4279030 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 10, 2019); but see Knox v. County of Putnam, No. 10 Civ. 1671 (ER), 2014 WL 7330851, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 23, 2014) (awarding no compensatory economic damages where plaintiffs failed to present any evidence concerning lost income, the value of lost business opportunities and the value or equity in a lost property).
The Court recommends that Ms. Medina's lost wages be reduced by 15% because her Motion and Declaration provide only estimates of her time away from work and salary, but do not include the exact number of days of work she missed or her precise salary. (See ECF No. 601 ¶ 20 (“As a result of my arrest, I was unable to return to my employment at Newark Airport for approximately eight weeks.”); ¶ 21 (“My bi-weekly pay at Newark Airport was approximately $1,150.”); ¶ 27 (“My employment at Community Access was delayed by approximately one month[.]”) (emphasis added)). Ms. Medina also has not provided the Court with any documents, such as pay stubs or tax documents to support her request for lost wages. (See ECF No. 60-1-604). The Court specifically directed her to provide such supporting documentation “to substantiate her alleged damages” (ECF No. 63), but she did not do so.
Accordingly, the Court respectfully recommends that Ms. Medina be awarded lost wages in the amount of $5,938.10, which is 85% of her requested amount of $6,986.
d. Post-judgment interest
Finally, Ms. Medina seeks post-judgment interest from the date of the default judgment on January 15, 2021. (ECF No. 61 at 15) (citing ECF No. 52). Post-judgment interest is governed by federal law. Ventarola v. Narvaez, No. 7:18 Civ. 3231 (PMH) (BCM), 2021 WL 1536540, at *14 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 16, 2021) (citing Cappiello v. ICD Publ'ns, Inc., 720 F.3d 109, 112 (2d Cir. 2013), adopted by 2021 WL 839454 (S.D.N.Y. March 5, 2021). Accordingly, the Court recommends that Medina be granted post-judgment interest at the statutory rate set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1961 from the date of judgment - January 15, 2021 - until the date of Gordon's payment.
C. Costs
Ms. Medina seeks reimbursement of $1,278.05 in costs for the following expenses: (1) $400.00 in filing fees; (2) $37.10 for postage; (3) $614.45 for online legal research; and $226.50 for service of process. (ECF No. 61 at 15-16; see ECF No. 60-4 at 2-16).
A plaintiff's request for costs must “be supported by appropriate documentation.” Dixon v. Correction Officer Agbai, No. 15 Civ. 850 (AT) (AJP), 2016 WL 3702749, at *19 (S.D.N.Y. July 8, 2016). The Court finds that Ms. Medina has substantiated her requested costs (except for a minor mathematical error) in the amount of $1,263.55 with contemporaneous documentation showing that her counsel paid the amounts for which she is now seeking reimbursement. See Sanchez v. Jyp Foods Inc., No. 16 Civ. 4472 (JLC), 2018 WL 4502008, at *17 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 20, 2018) (noting that adequate substantiation is required for an award of costs); Raymond James & Assocs., Inc. v. Vanguard Funding, LLC, No. 17 Civ. 3327 (VSB) (SDA), 2018 WL 8758763, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 16, 2018) (awarding documented expenses for, inter alia, filing and service of process fees); Tatum v. City of New York, No. 06 Civ. 4290 (PGG) (GWG), 2010 WL 334975, at *13 (awarding costs including filing fees, process server fees, subpoena fees, local travel, and printing fees to prevailing Section 1983 plaintiff).
Ms. Medina's requested costs for the filing fee, online legal research and service of process are all substantiated by contemporaneous invoices and receipts. (See ECF No. 60-4). There is a computational error in the requested $37.10 for postage. Ms. Medina has submitted three receipts for certified mailings on June 17, 2020 to Lloyd Gordon and Gordon's. (ECF No. 60-4 at 5-6). Two certified mail receipts, for $11.30 each, bear tracking numbers ending -1266 and -1259. (ECF No. 60-4 at 5). A third postal receipt itemizes the total bill, $22.60, and lists both mail receipts, identifying them by tracking number. (ECF No. 60-4 at 6). Accordingly, the Court infers that $22.60 is the total expended on postage, rather than $37.10 requested by Medina.
The Court may also take judicial notice of the filing fees reflected on the docket as support for an award of those costs. See Whitehead, 2019 WL 384446, at *6 (taking judicial notice of $400 filing fee and awarding costs in that amount); BWP Media USA Inc. v. Uropa Media, Inc., No. 13 Civ. 7871 (JSR) (JCF), 2014 WL 2011775, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. May 16, 2014) (same).
Accordingly, I respectfully recommend an award of costs in the amount of $1,263.55.
III.CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, I respectfully recommend that Ms. Medina be awarded damages against Gordon's in the amount of $56,081.65, comprised of: (i) $38,880.00 in compensatory damages for time in custody; (ii) $10,000.00 for emotional distress; (iii) $5,938.10 in lost wages; and (iv) costs in the amount of $1,263.55, as well as post-judgment interest pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1961. NOTICE OF PROCEDURE FOR FILING OBJECTIONS TO THIS REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
The parties shall have fourteen (14) days (including weekends and holidays) from service of this Report and Recommendation to file written objections pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Rule 72(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See also Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a), (d) (adding three additional days when service is made under Fed.R.Civ.P. 5(b)(2)(C), (D) or (F)). A party may respond to another party's objections within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy. Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b)(2). Such objections, and any response to objections, shall be filed with the Clerk of the Court. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a), (d), 72(b). Any requests for an extension of time for filing objections must be addressed to Judge Caproni.
FAILURE TO OBJECT WITHIN FOURTEEN (14) DAYS WILL RESULT IN A WAIVER OF OBJECTIONS AND WILL PRECLUDE APPELLATE REVIEW. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a), (d), 72(b); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985).