¶ 12 Rule 12(b)(1) "permits the trial court to hold an evidentiary hearing to resolve any factual dispute upon which the existence of jurisdiction may turn." Medina v. State , 35 P.3d 443, 452 (Colo. 2001). Here, however, in its motion to dismiss, the University did not challenge any facts Galef alleged.
We review a trial court decision based on statutory interpretation de novo. Medina v. State, 35 P.3d 443, 452 (Colo.2001). III.
The CGIA bars actions in tort against public entities, subject to certain provisions waiving immunity. Medina v. State, 35 P.3d 443, 453 (Colo. 2001). We broadly construe these provisions waiving immunity in the interest of compensating victims of governmental negligence, but construe the exceptions to these waivers strictly because the ultimate effect of the exceptions is to grant immunity.
§ 30-20-401(4), 9 C.R.S. (2001). Because the General Assembly has defined both "sanitation district" and "sewerage facilities" to encompass drainage of raw sewage as well as storm and surface waters, we hold that the term "sanitation facility" encompasses this broad range of functions as well. A broad interpretation of the waiver provisions of the CGIA is appropriate because the CGIA is in derogation of the common law. Medina v. State, 35 P.3d 443, 453 (Colo. 2001). To the extent that our pre-CGIA decision in Cerise, 153 Colo. 31, 384 P.2d 462, discussed supra, is relevant, see Comment, The Colorado Governmental Immunity Act: A Judicial Challenge and the Legislative Response, 43 U. Colo. L. Rev. 449, 461 (1972) (suggesting that the "sanitation facility" waiver provision may be a codification of the common-law exception of public water and sanitation facilities from immunity), our interpretation here is consistent with that opinion.
¶ 12 We will uphold the factual determinations of the district court unless those determinations are clearly erroneous. Medina v. State, 35 P.3d 443, 452 (Colo. 2001). Once the questions of fact are resolved, we review questions of governmental immunity de novo.
Therefore, this court looks to other sources to interpret the meaning of the word. In Medina v. State, 35 P.3d 443 (Colo. 2001), the Colorado Supreme Court considered what "maintain" meant in the context of a public highway. Specifically, the court considered whether the State was engaged in maintaining or designing a highway, where the CGIA waived sovereign immunity only as to a failure to maintain.
However, "[n]egligent failure to warn" does not "trigger[ ] a waiver of immunity under the CGIA." Medina v. State, 35 P.3d 443, 449 (Colo. 2001). ¶28 Of course, in examining the totality of the circumstances shown by the undisputed facts in a different case, there certainly could be instances where a two-and-a-half-inch sidewalk deviation would constitute a dangerous condition.
¶ 11 Whether a governmental entity waives immunity under the CGIA is an issue of subject matter jurisdiction resolved under C.R.C.P. 12(b)(1). Medina v. State, 35 P.3d 443, 451–52 (Colo.2001). Where the facts are undisputed, as they are here, appellate review is de novo.
¶ 11 Whether a governmental entity waives immunity under the CGIA is an issue of subject matter jurisdiction resolved under C.R.C.P. 12(b)(1). Medina v. State, 35 P.3d 443, 451–52 (Colo.2001). Where the facts are undisputed, as they are here, appellate review is de novo.
¶20 Because CGIA derogates the common law, courts must strictly construe provisions that grant immunity, broadly construe the provisions that waive immunity, and strictly construe exceptions to waivers in favor of compensating victims. See Medina v. State , 35 P.3d 443, 453 (Colo. 2001) ; see also Dempsey v. Denver Police Dep’t , 2015 COA 67, ¶ 21, 353 P.3d 928. ¶21 Section 13-21-202 (the wrongful death statute) provides: