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Medina v. Geo Group, Inc

United States District Court for the District of Colorado
Oct 5, 2017
2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 205466 (D. Colo. 2017)

Opinion

Civil Action No. 17-cv-00269-CMA-GPG

October 5, 2017, Decided. October 5, 2017, Filed

For Bernardo Medina, Plaintiff: Andrew Rooney Richmond, Richmond Law Firm, LLC, Crested Butte, CO.

For GEO Group, Inc., The, Defendant: Ann Baumgartner Smith, Vaughan & DeMuro-Colorado Springs, Colorado Springs, CO.


ORDER AFFIRMING AND ADOPTING THE AUGUST 23, 2017 RECOMMENDATION OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

The Court referred Defendant's motion to dismiss to United States Magistrate Judge Gordon P. Gallagher on April 25, 2017 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 72(b). (Doc. # 15.) Magistrate Judge Gallagher recommended on August 23, 2017 that this Court grant Defendant's motion to dismiss all claims. (Doc. # 25.) Plaintiff timely filed an objection to Magistrate Judge Gallagher's Recommendation on September 7, 2017. (Doc. # 26.) Defendant timely filed a response to Plaintiff's objection on September 21, 2017. (Doc. # 27.)

When a magistrate judge issues a recommendation on a dispositive manner, Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 72(b)(3) requires that the district judge "determine de novo any part of the magistrate judge's [recommended] disposition that has been properly objected to." In conducting its review, "[t]he district judge may accept, reject, or modify the recommended disposition; receive further evidence; or return the matter to the magistrate judge with instructions." Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3).

The Court has conducted a de novo review of this matter, including reviewing all relevant pleadings, the Recommendation, Plaintiff's objection thereto, and Defendant's response. Based on this de novo review, the Court concludes that Magistrate Judge Gallagher's Recommendation is correct.

I. BACKGROUND

A. FACTS

Plaintiff is a United States citizen. (Doc. # 1.) Federal Immigration and Customs Enforcement ("ICE") officers arrested and detained Plaintiff "without warrant, probable cause, or reasonable suspicion" on January 27, 2015. ( Id.)

Petitioner submitted his Warrant for Alien Arrest as an exhibit to his response to Defendant's motion to dismiss. (Doc. # 23.) Petitioner nonetheless claims that his arrest was a warrantless arrest, relying on El Badrawi v. Department of Homeland Security, 579 F. Supp. 2d 249, 275-76 (D. Conn. 2008). (Doc. # 26.) In El Badrawi, the plaintiff was arrested pursuant to a duly-issued immigration warrant, but the court treated his arrest as warrantless because the immigration warrant was signed by an executive official "intimately involved" with the investigation, not by a neutral magistrate. 579 F. Supp. 2d at 276.

Defendant operates an immigration detention facility in Aurora, Colorado under contract with ICE. ( Id.) After two days in other detention facilities in Colorado, Plaintiff was detained at Defendant's detention facility for "approximately a day" on January 29, 2015. ( Id.) There, Plaintiff "insisted to multiple employees of Defendant's facility" that he was an American citizen and was mistakenly being held. ( Id.) On January 30, 2015, employees determined that Plaintiff was erroneously being detained and "aggressively questioned" Plaintiff as to why he had not told them he had American citizenship. ( Id.) Employees "accused Plaintiff of lying to them," "threatened" him with "some type of vague prosecution," and then sent him "out the door." ( Id.) Employees did not allow Plaintiff to make a telephone call and released him in an unfamiliar city with only a few dollars. ( Id.)

B. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Plaintiff brought a tort action against Defendant on January 27, 2017, claiming: (1) negligence; (2) false imprisonment; (3) intentional infliction of emotional distress; and (4) assault and battery. ( Id.)

Defendant moved to dismiss all claims. (Doc. # 14.) Defendant first argued that, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), each of Plaintiff's four claims failed to state a claim for relief. Defendant also asserted that Plaintiff's second and third claims, for false imprisonment and assault and battery, were barred by the statute of limitations. ( Id.) In response, Plaintiff argued that his causes of action for negligence and intentional infliction of emotional distress stated claims on which relief could be granted. (Doc. # 23.) Plaintiff conceded that his claims for false imprisonment and assault and battery were time-barred. ( Id.)

Magistrate Judge Gallagher recommended that this Court grant Defendant's motion to dismiss all four claims. (Doc. # 24.) Plaintiff's objection and Defendant's response followed.

II. DISCUSSION

The Court first analyzes whether Plaintiff failed to state claims as to negligence and intentional infliction of emotional distress. It then briefly turns to the statute of limitations for Plaintiff's false imprisonment and assault and battery claims.

A. STANDARD OF REVIEW

The Court may dismiss a complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 12(b)(6). To withstand a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual allegations, taken as true, "to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 167 L. Ed. 2d 929 (2007). "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 173 L. Ed. 2d 868 (2009).

Two principles underlie this standard. First, the rule that a court must accept as true all factual allegations in a complaint is "inapplicable to legal conclusions." Id. "Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice." Id. Second, "only a complaint that states a plausible claim for relief survives a motion to dismiss." Id. In contrast, "where the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct," a complaint fails to show entitlement to relief. Id.; see also Khalik v. United Air Lines, 671 F.3d 1188, 1190-91 (10th Cir. 2012).

B. NEGLIGENCE

In order to recover for negligence in Colorado, a plaintiff must show a legal duty of care on the defendant's part, breach of that duty, injury to the plaintiff, and a causal relationship between the breach and the injury. Gerrity Oil & Gas Corp. v. Magness, 946 P.2d 913, 929 (Colo. 1996). The initial determination of whether the defendant owes a duty to the plaintiff is a question of law for the court. Davenport v. Cmty. Corr., 962 P.2d 963, 966 (Colo. 1998). "A negligence claim will fail if it is predicated on circumstances for which the law imposes no duty of care upon the defendant." HealthONE v. Rodriguez, 50 P.3d 879, 888 (Colo. 2002).

Magistrate Judge Gallagher concluded that Plaintiff did not demonstrate that Defendant had owed Plaintiff a duty. (Doc. # 25.) Magistrate Judge Gallagher first considered Dry v. United States, 235 F.3d 1249 (10th Cir. 2000). (Doc. # 25.) In Dry, Tenth Circuit held that "absent any objectively apparent 'lack of a basis for a detention which should arouse suspicion, a jailer cannot be expected to assume the mantle of a magistrate to determine the probable cause for an arrest.'" Id. at 1259 (internal citations omitted). Magistrate Judge Gallagher noted that "outside the bounds of immigration law," "the average jailer is likely presented, undoubtedly on a regular basis, with arguments and pleas . . . to the effect that the incarcerated individual is being unfairly held [or] that they are the wrong person." (Doc. # 25.) He thus reasoned that especially when an arrest "is accompanied by official documentation presented in the regular course of business, the existence of a false arrest would have to be plainly obvious before the jailer would have a duty." ( Id.)

Magistrate Judge Gallagher then turned to Sanchez-Penunuri v. Longshore, 7 F. Supp. 3d 1136 (D. Colo. 2013), to consider the specific context of an immigration detention. (Doc. # 25.) There, this Court held, as an issue of first impression in the Tenth Circuit, "that the immediate custodian rule does not apply in the immigration detention context," at least in a habeas proceeding. Sanchez-Penunuri, 7 F. Supp. 3d at 1141. This Court explained that "apart from an immigration judge, the ICE District Director is the only official who appears authorized by regulation to make custody decisions for immigration detainees" and that "no regulation identif[ies] the warden of an immigration detention facility as the person with authority to release a detainee." Id. at 1145. Magistrate Judge Gallaher reasoned that the attenuation between a detention facility's employees and an immigration judge or the ICE District Direction "ma[de] it harder for Plaintiff to establish the existence of a duty" in the instant case. (Doc. # 25.)

Finally, Magistrate Judge Gallagher analyzed Plaintiff's Warrant for Alien Arrest for "its effect on a potential recipient, the jailer [Defendant]." ( Id.) He concluded that Plaintiff had not demonstrated that Defendant owed a duty" to Plaintiff and that therefore, "Defendant cannot have negligently breached a duty which did not exist." ( Id.)

Plaintiff argues that Magistrate Judge Gallagher erred in holding that Defendant did not owe him a duty for several reasons. (Doc. # 26.) First, Plaintiff cites County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 56, 111 S. Ct. 1661, 114 L. Ed. 2d 49 (1991), for the proposition that a person arrested without a warrant has a constitutional right to have a judicial officer determine probable cause. ( Id.) Plaintiff argues that Defendant therefore had a duty to see that Plaintiff—allegedly arrested without a warrant—was "promptly . . . brought before a neutral magistrate for a judicial determination of probable cause." ( Id., quoting McLaughlin, 500 U.S. at 53). Plaintiff asserts that Defendant "failed in the clearly defined duty held to exist by [ McLaughlin]." ( Id.)

Second, Plaintiff alternatively asserts that it was "plainly obvious" to Defendant that Plaintiff's arrest and detention were mistaken and that Defendant thus had a duty. ( Id.) Plaintiff argues that his claims to Defendant's employees that he was American citizen were "uncommon, easily ascertainable, and would give a reasonable jailer a belief that something was obviously wrong with the arrest." ( Id.)

Plaintiff next argues that Defendant voluntarily assumed a duty in its code of conduct, which stated that Defendant's employees "must respect and obey" applicable laws, and in its contract with ICE, which required Defendant to comply with the Constitution and all applicable laws. ( Id.)

This Court has carefully reviewed de novo applicable case law and considered Plaintiff's objections. First, the Court finds that Magistrate Judge Gallagher's thorough and comprehensive analyses of Dry and Sanchez-Penunuri are sound. Plaintiff's reliance on McLaughlin is unpersuasive. McLaughlin did not concern immigration-related arrest and detention, and the arrests at issue were warrantless arrests. 500 U.S. at 47-48. In contrast, though Plaintiff contends his arrest was warrantless, there was a warrant for arrest of an alien in his case. The Plaintiff himself submitted this warrant as an exhibit to his response to Defendant's motion to dismiss. (Doc. # 23.)

Plaintiff's alternative arguments are also without merit. Second, as to whether Plaintiff's protests to Defendant's employees were sufficient to trigger a duty, this Court agrees with Magistrate Judge Gallagher's assessment that Plaintiff's detention was not plainly erroneous to Defendant. Finally, this Court is not persuaded that Defendant voluntarily assumed a duty by virtue of its code of conduct and its contract with ICE. These materials only reference a general obligation to follow the law.

Based on the foregoing reasons, this Court affirms Magistrate Judge Gallagher's determination that Plaintiff failed to demonstrate Defendant owed him a duty and that Plaintiff therefore failed to state a claim for negligence.

C. INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS

Under Colorado law, the elements of the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress, also known as the tort of outrageous conduct, see Han Ye Lee v. Colorado Times, Inc., 222 P.3d 957, 966 (Colo. App. 2009) (Dailey, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), are that the defendant engaged in extreme and outrageous conduct, that the defendant intended to cause the plaintiff severe emotional distress, and that the plaintiff incurred severe emotional distress caused by the defendant's conduct, Culpepper v. Pearl Street Bldg., Inc. 877 P.2d 877, 882 (Colo. 1994) (internal citations omitted).

"Outrageous conduct" is conduct that is "so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in civilized society." Id.; see also Rugg v. McCarty, 173 Colo. 170, 476 P.2d 753, 756 (Colo. 1970) (internal citations omitted). In short, the level of outrageousness required for conduct to create liability for intentional infliction of emotional distress is "extremely high." Coors Brewing Co. v. Floyd, 978 P.2d 663, 666 (Colo. 1999). "Although the question of whether conduct is outrageous is generally one of fact to be determined by a jury, it is first the responsibility of a court to determine whether reasonable persons could differ on the question." Culpepper, 877 P.2d at 883.

In the instant case, Magistrate Judge Gallagher concluded that Plaintiff had not set forth conduct "which[,] as a matter of law, [rose] to the level necessary to state a claim for relief" for intentional infliction of emotional distress. (Doc. # 25.) Magistrate Judge Gallagher considered Plaintiff's argument that the outrageous conduct was Defendant's act of "unlawfully imprisoning . . . Plaintiff in an immigration detention center, where Plaintiff consistently insisted that he is a citizen." (Doc. # 25, quoting Doc. # 1). "[K]eeping in mind Defendant's lawful business is the operation of a detention facility," Magistrate Judge Gallagher found that Plaintiff did not "set forth sufficient facts to show that Defendant engaged in extreme and outrageous conduct." (Doc. # 25.) He also determined that Plaintiff did not allege sufficient facts "to show that . . . Defendant engaged in any conduct recklessly or with the intent of causing [Plaintiff] severe emotional distress." ( Id.)

Plaintiff argues that Magistrate Judge Gallagher erred by "overstepping the bound of what may be considered in a motion to dismiss." (Doc. # 26.) Plaintiff contends that Magistrate Judge Gallagher ignored the statement in Coors, 978 P.2d at 665-66, that "the question of whether conduct is outrageous is generally one of fact to be determined by a jury." ( Id.) According to Plaintiff, Magistrate Judge Gallagher should have made only an initial determination whether reasonable persons could differ on whether Defendant's alleged conduct was outrageous. ( Id.)

This Court has carefully reviewed de novo case law and analyzed Plaintiff's objections. Petitioner is correct that the question of whether conduct is outrageous is generally a factual question for the jury, see Coors, 978 P.2d at 665-66, but Plaintiff fails to grant that "[b]efore permitting a plaintiff to present a claim for outrageous conduct . . ., the trial court must initially rule on the threshold issue of whether the plaintiff's allegations of outrageous conduct are sufficiently outrageous as a matter of law," see id. at 665. In this court's view, Magistrate Judge Gallagher correctly ruled on this threshold issue that, "as a matter of law," Plaintiff's factual allegations are not sufficiently outrageous. See (Doc. # 25). Magistrate Judge Gallagher implicitly considered whether reasonable persons could differ on the question and reasonably decided they could not. See ( id.)

Based on the foregoing reasons, this Court affirms Magistrate Judge Gallagher's determination that Plaintiff failed to demonstrate Defendant's conduct was sufficiently outrageous as a matter of law and that Plaintiff therefore failed to state a claim for outrageous conduct sufficient to show entitlement to relief.

Pursuant to Colorado law, the statute of limitations for an assault, battery, or false imprisonment claim is one year after the cause of action. Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-80-103(1)(a). A statute of limitations defense should usually be raised in the answer to the complaint, rather than in a motion to dismiss. See C.R.C.P. 8(c); Davis v. Bonebrake, 135 Colo. 506, 313 P.2d 982, 986 (Colo. 1957). However, "the defense may be considered upon a motion to dismiss when the bare allegations of the complaint reveal that the action was not brought within the required statutory period." CAMAS Colorado, Inc. v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs, 36 P.3d 135, 139 (Colo. App. 2001).

In this case, Magistrate Judge Gallagher concluded that Plaintiff's claims for false imprisonment and assault and battery were time-barred and should be dismissed. (Doc. # 25.) He noted that the cause of action—Defendant's detention of Plaintiff—"accrued on or around January 27, 2015" and that Plaintiff filed his complaint two years later, on January 27, 2017, "thus outside the one year time frame." ( Id.) Magistrate Judge Gallagher also observed that Plaintiff conceded this point in his response to Defendant's motion to dismiss. ( Id.) See also (Doc. # 23). Magistrate Judge Gallagher therefore recommended that this Court dismiss Plaintiff's claims for false and imprisonment and assault and battery. (Doc. # 25.) Plaintiff does not object to this recommendation. See generally (Doc. # 26.)

This Court has carefully reviewed all parties' filings. It finds that Magistrate Judge Gallagher's statute of limitations analysis is correct.

III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, it is hereby ORDERED that Plaintiff's objection (Doc. # 26) is OVERRULED. It is FURTHER ORDERED that the recommendation of United States Magistrate Judge Gallagher (Doc. # 25) that Defendant's motion to dismiss all claims be GRANTED is AFFIRMED and ADOPTED as an order of this Court.

DATED: October 5, 2017

BY THE COURT:

/s/ Christine M. Arguello

CHRISTINE M. ARGUELLO

United States District Judge


Summaries of

Medina v. Geo Group, Inc

United States District Court for the District of Colorado
Oct 5, 2017
2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 205466 (D. Colo. 2017)
Case details for

Medina v. Geo Group, Inc

Case Details

Full title:BERNARDO MEDINA, Plaintiff, v. THE GEO GROUP, INC., Defendant

Court:United States District Court for the District of Colorado

Date published: Oct 5, 2017

Citations

2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 205466 (D. Colo. 2017)