Opinion
Civil Action No. 98-WY-1264-CB
May 30, 2002
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
This case arises out of a June 10, 1996 incident in which Plaintiff Ernest Medina was shot by officers of the Colorado Springs Police Department. Plaintiff brought suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging that Officer Michael Cram and Officer Ralph Bruning used excessive force in violation of Plaintiff's Fourth Amendment rights. Plaintiff claims that Chief Kramer and the City of Colorado Springs are liable under § 1983 for maintaining policies that foster the excessive use of force and for failing to adequately train police officers. The case is now before the Court on two separately filed motions for summary judgment: 1) Defendants Colorado Springs and Chief of Police Loren Kramer's Second Motion for Summary Judgment; and 2) Defendant Ralph Bruning's Second Motion for Summary Judgment. After reading the briefs and being fully advised of the premises, the Court FINDS and ORDERS as follows:
Background
Factual
The following facts are undisputed. On June 10, 1996, a bail bondsman went to Plaintiff Ernest Medina's residence to take Plaintiff into custody for a bail violation. When Plaintiff saw the bondsman, he put his hand behind his back and said that he had a gun. The bondsman retreated and called police. Officers Cram, Bruning and others responded to the scene. Plaintiff refused to leave the house and began ingesting cocaine and rum. Plaintiff spoke to the police and several other people on the phone. Plaintiff asked a friend to bring him a syringe so that he could "get high" and a gun so that he could "make a break." In one phone conversation, Bruning tried to convince Plaintiff to leave peacefully, but Plaintiff refused and said that he had a gun. During this time, Plaintiff had suicidal thoughts and cut his left wrist with a knife.
Plaintiff eventually left the house with a cup in his left hand and a staple gun concealed with a towel in his right hand. He intended the staple gun to represent a weapon. Officers ordered Plaintiff to stop, but Plaintiff continued walking toward the street. The officers attempted to stop Plaintiff with nonlethal beanbag rounds. This was ineffective, so officers released an attack dog. The dog bit Plaintiff and released him, and returned to the officers. At this time, Officer Cram was following Plaintiff and intended to knock him to the ground. As Cram was communicating his plan to his fellow officers, the attack dog was released again, and Plaintiff dropped to the ground, exposing the staple gun. Officers believed Plaintiff possessed a real gun. Plaintiff turned to the left as he dropped to the ground and Cram believed that he and the other officers were in the line of fire. Cram shot Plaintiff in the stomach with three automatic rounds from eight to ten feet away. Officer Bruning also fired two shots into Plaintiff's middle section from approximately ten to twelve feet away. Plaintiff was taken to the hospital where he received care and survived the shooting.
Procedural
Plaintiff brought suit in district court pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging that Officers Cram and Bruning used excessive force in violation of his Fourth Amendment rights. Plaintiff also sued the city of Colorado Springs and the Chief of Police for Colorado Springs under § 1983 alleging that the city maintains policies that foster excessive use of force, that they failed to adequately train and supervise their police officers, that they failed to enforce laws, and that they issued and permitted vague, confusing and contradictory policies and customs regarding the use of force.
Defendants filed motions for summary judgment on April 12, 1999. This Court denied the officers' motions for summary judgment on March 20, 2000 and concluded that genuine issues of material fact remained regarding whether the officers' actions were objectively reasonable under the circumstances.
Defendants Cram and Bruning appealed the denial of summary judgment to the Tenth Circuit. While the case was pending, Officer Bruning died of pancreatic cancer. His appeal was dismissed. On June 12, 2001, the Tenth Circuit found that Plaintiff had failed to satisfy his burden of overcoming the officers' assertion of qualified immunity, that the Plaintiff did not make a showing that a genuine issue of material fact remained, and that Plaintiff did not show that the officers violated his Fourth Amendment rights, as the officers' response was reasonable under the circumstances. Cram won his appeal and this Court entered judgment in favor of Cram against Plaintiff on remand. Therefore, this Order will not address Plaintiff's claims against Cram.
Trial on the case was stayed on April 28, 2000, pending the Officers' appeal. This case is now before the court on Defendants Bruning, Kramer, and the City's Second Motions for Summary Judgment.
Discussion
Qualified Immunity Standard
Actions for damages provide an important remedy for individuals injured by the abuse of authority by governmental officials. However, such actions have the potential to subject officials to costly and harassing litigation and inhibit officials in performing their official duties. Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 638 (1987); Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 814 (1982). Courts recognize the affirmative defense of qualified immunity to balance these competing interests. Qualified immunity protects "all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law." Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986). The United States Supreme Court emphasized the broad protection provided by the qualified immunity defense, explaining that it gives officials "a right, not merely to avoid `standing trial,' but also to avoid the burdens of `such pretrial matters as discovery.'" Behrens v. Pelletier, 516 U.S. 299, 308 (1996) (quoting Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985)). "Consequently, courts should resolve the "purely legal question" of whether the qualified immunity defense is available Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226, 232 (1991), `at the earliest possible stage in litigation.'" Albright v. Rodriguez, 51 F.3d 1531, 1534 (10th Cir. 1995) (quoting Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 227 (1991)).
Summary judgment motions in qualified immunity cases are evaluated differently than general summary judgment motions due to the underlying purposes of qualified immunity. Nelson v. McMullen, 207 F.3d 1202, 1205-06 (10th Cir. 2000). After a defendant asserts a qualified immunity defense, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to satisfy a two-part test. Scull v. New Mexico, 236 F.3d 588, 595 (10th Cir. 2000); Adkins v. Rodriguez, 59 F.3d 1034, 1036 (10th Cir. 1995). A court must determine whether the plaintiff has satisfied a "heavy two-part burden." Albright, 51 F.3d at 1534. The plaintiff must first establish "that the defendant's actions violated a constitutional or statutory right." Albright, 51 F.3d at 1534; see also Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 609 (1999) (the court must first decide whether the plaintiff has alleged a deprivation of a constitutional right). If the plaintiff establishes a violation of a constitutional or statutory right, he must then demonstrate that the right at issue was clearly established at the time of the defendant's unlawful conduct. Albright, 51 F.3d at 1534. In determining whether the right was "clearly established," the court must assess the objective legal reasonableness of the action at the time of the alleged violation and ask whether "the right [was] sufficiently clear that a reasonable officer would understand that what he is doing violates that right." Wilson, 526 U.S. at 615 (citations omitted).
The two-step analysis "is designed to `spare a defendant not only unwarranted liability, but unwarranted demands customarily imposed upon those defending a long drawn-out lawsuit.'" Wilson, 526 U.S. at 609 (quoting Siegert, 500 U.S. at 232). If the plaintiff does not satisfy either part of the two-part inquiry, the court must grant qualified immunity to the defendants. Albright, 51 F.3d at 1535. If the plaintiff successfully establishes the violation of a clearly established right, the burden shifts to the defendant, who must prove "`that there are no genuine issues of material fact and that he or she is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.'" Id. (quoting Hinton v. City of Elwood, 997 F.2d 774, 779 (10th Cir. 1993)). Although a court reviews the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, Nelson, 207 F.3d at 1205, the record must clearly demonstrate the plaintiff has satisfied his heavy two-part burden; otherwise, the defendants are entitled to qualified immunity. Medina v. Cram, 252 F.3d 1124, 1128 (10th Cir. 2001).
I. Officer Bruning
Plaintiff claims that the officers acted unreasonably in creating the need to use excessive force. Claims that law enforcement officers used excessive force are analyzed under the Fourth Amendment's "objective reasonableness" standard. See Graham v. Conner, 490 U.S. 386, 388 (1989). In addition to considering whether the officers reasonably believed they were in danger at the time they used force, courts have considered "`whether [the officers'] own reckless or deliberate conduct during the seizure unreasonably created the need to use such force.'" Allen v. Muskogee, 119 F.3d 837, 840 (10th Cir. 1997) (quoting Sevier v. City of Lawrence, 60 F.3d 695, 699 (10th Cir. 1995)). An officer's conduct before the suspect threatens force is therefore relevant provided it is "immediately connected" to the seizure and the threat of force. Id.; Romero v. Board of County Commissioners, 60 F.3d 702, 705 n. 5 (10th Cir. 1995); see also Bella v. Chamberlain, 24 F.3d 1251, 1256 (10th Cir. 1994) ("Obviously, events immediately connected with the actual seizure are taken into account in determining whether the seizure is reasonable."). This approach is simply a specific application of the "totality of the circumstances" approach inherent in the Fourth Amendment's reasonableness standard. Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1985). In order to constitute excessive force, the conduct arguably creating the need for force must be immediately connected with the seizure and must rise to the level of recklessness, rather than negligence. Medina v. Cram, 252 F.3d 1124 (10th Cir. 2001).
Although the reasonableness test under the Fourth Amendment is not capable of precise definition or mechanical application, Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 559 (1979), its proper application requires careful attention to the facts and circumstances of each particular case, including the severity of the crime at issue, whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others, and whether he is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight. Graham, 490 U.S. at 396; Garner, 471 U.S. 8-9 (1985) (the question is "whether the totality of the circumstances justifie[s] a particular sort of . . . seizure"). "The reasonableness of a particular use of force must be judged from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight." Graham, 490 U.S. at 396; See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. at 20-22. A reasonableness inquiry must allow for the fact that police officers are often forced to make split-second judgments — in circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving — about the amount of force that is necessary in a particular situation. Graham, 490 U.S. at 397. As in other Fourth Amendment contexts, however, the "reasonableness" inquiry in an excessive force case is an objective one: the question is whether the officers' actions are "objectively reasonable" in light of the facts and circumstances confronting them, without regard to their underlying intent or motivation. See Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, 137-39 (1978); see also Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. at 21 (in analyzing the reasonableness of a particular search or seizure, "it is imperative that the facts be judged against an objective standard").
In the case at bar, Officer Bruning's actions were objectively reasonable under the circumstances. The officers were faced with a suspect who had communicated to them that he was armed, was coming toward them with what appeared to be a weapon, and who was under the influence of drugs. Under these circumstances, the officers on the scene thought that they were in danger and merely acted to protect themselves. Such a decision, made in an instant, under extreme circumstances is objectively reasonable, and Officer Bruning is entitled to qualified immunity from Plaintiff's claims. Therefore, Bruning's Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED and Plaintiff's claims are hereby DISMISSED with prejudice.
In its decision in this case, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals found the actions of Officer Cram to be objectively reasonable. See Medina v. Cram, 252 F.3d 1124 (10th Cir. 2001). It is uncertain that the Court also made a decision on the actions of Officer Bruning, as he was not officially a party to the suit due to his death prior to the decision of the case. However, as Officer Bruning was faced with the exact same situation as Officer Cram, and reacted almost identically, it would be ridiculous to find that he is not entitled to qualified immunity as well.
II. Chief Kramer and the City of Colorado Springs
Plaintiff alleges that Kramer and the City maintained policies and customs that tolerated the use of excessive force by law enforcement officers, and that Kramer and the City failed to adequately train its officers to prevent the use of excessive force. Two separate issues must be analyzed when a § 1983 claim is asserted against a municipality: 1) whether plaintiff's harm was caused by a constitutional violation; and 2) if so, whether the city is responsible for that violation. Collins v. City of Harker Heights, Tex., 503 U.S. 115, 120 (1992). In the case at bar, Plaintiff cannot satisfy the first prong of the Collins test. "A claim of inadequate training, supervision, and policies under § 1983 cannot be made out against a supervisory authority absent a finding of a constitutional violation by the person supervised." Webber v. Mefford, 43 F.3d 1340, 1344-45 (10th Cir. 1994); Hinton v. City of Elwood, Kansas, 997 F.2d 774, 782 (10th Cir. 1993). "If a person has suffered no constitutional injury at the hands of the individual police officer, the fact that the departmental regulations might have authorized the use of constitutionally excessive force is quite beside the point." City of Los Angeles v. Heller, 475 U.S. 796, 799 (1986). Thus, even if it could be said that Colorado Springs' policies, training, and supervision were unconstitutional, the City cannot be held liable where, as here, the officers did not commit a constitutional violation. Trigalet v. City of Tulsa, Oklahoma, 239 F.3d 1150, (10th Cir. 2001); Board of County Commissioners of Bryan County, Oklahoma v. Brown, 520 U.S. 1283 (1997) (requirement that plaintiff show direct causal link between municipal action and deprivation of federal rights in order to hold municipality liable under § 1983). A suit against a city official in his official capacity is no different from a suit against the City itself. Thompson v. City of Lawrence, Kansas, 58 F.3d 1511, 1517 (10th Cir. 1995); Will v. Michigan Department of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989). Thus, the rationale which defeated the claim against the City also defeats the claim against Kramer. See Hinton, 997 F.2d at 783. As the actions of Officers Cram and Bruning cannot be said to have violated Plaintiff's constitutional rights, Plaintiff's claims against Chief Kramer and the City of Colorado Springs must also be dismissed. Therefore, Defendants Kramer and the City's Motions for Summary Judgment are GRANTED, and Plaintiff's claims against those Defendants are hereby DISMISSED with prejudice.
Conclusion
Defendant Bruning is entitled to qualified immunity from Plaintiff's claims, and Defendant Bruning's Second Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED. As neither officer has been found to have violated Plaintiff's constitutional rights, Chief Kramer and the City's Second Motions for Summary Judgment must be GRANTED and Plaintiff's claims against Kramer and the City are hereby DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.