Opinion
Criminal Case Number: 5:11-cr-00021-MBS
04-06-2017
Juan Medina-Martinez, Movant, v. United States of America, Respondent.
OPINION AND ORDER
Movant Juan Medina-Martinez ("Movant") is a federal inmate currently housed at FCI-Oakdale in Oakdale, Louisiana. On October 20, 2014, Movant, proceeding pro se, filed a motion under 28 U.S.C § 2255 to vacate, set aside, or correct sentence. ECF No. 360. On December 1, 2014, Respondent United States of America ("Respondent") moved for summary judgment. ECF No. 368.
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On December 23, 2010, the Houston, Texas, Drug Enforcement Agency ("DEA") office contacted the Columbia, South Carolina, DEA office, informing agents that a burgundy Chevrolet Trailblazer transporting cocaine would be traveling to a house in the Columbia area. ECF No. 223 at ¶ 17. Columbia DEA agents, in corroboration with a task force from the Lexington County, South Carolina, Sheriff's Office, set up surveillance at the house to which the vehicle was traveling in Swansea, South Carolina. Id. at ¶ 18. After a short stay at the Swansea residence, the Trailblazer traveled to another residence at 311 Bub Shumpert Road, Pelion, South Carolina (the "Shumpert Road residence"). Id. A red Chevrolet Z-71 departed the Shumpert Road residence after Movant and several co-defendants remained there for a short period of time. Id. at ¶ 19. Agents conducted a DMV records search on the Z-71, and discovered that the Z-71 was registered to co-Defendant Manuel Soto-Gonzales ("Defendant Soto-Gonzales"). Id. Officers executed a traffic stop of the Z-71 because the vehicle had a headlight missing. Id. In the course of the traffic stop, the arresting officer discovered over three kilograms of cocaine. ECF No. 320 at 13. Movant was not in the Z-71 but Defendant Soto-Gonzales implicated Movant in the drug trafficking conspiracy. See id. at 13-14.
On December 24, 2010, DEA agents and Lexington County task force officers executed a search warrant on the Shumpert Road residence. ECF No 223-17, ¶ 21. The agents and officers discovered firearms and indicia of drug trafficking, including fifteen kilogram wrappers that traffickers use to package cocaine. ECF No. 320 at 13. On that basis, agents concluded that fifteen kilograms of cocaine had therefore been distributed or disseminated from the residence. Id. at 14. In interviews conducted on April 12, 2011, and January 11, 2012, Defendant Soto-Gonzales explained that Movant left the Shumpert Road residence on December 23, 2010, to deliver cocaine to an unknown customer, which is why he was not present at the traffic stop. ECF No. 242 at ¶ 25. Defendant Soto-Gonzales stated that he had been trafficking cocaine from Texas to South Carolina for a lengthy time and Movant served as a runner and frequent seller of cocaine for him. ECF No. 242 at ¶ 25. According to Defendant Soto-Gonzales, Movant "did everything" for him, including weighing, packaging, and transporting cocaine. Id. at ¶ 26. Defendant Soto-Gonzales estimated Movant made seven trips to South Carolina and moved approximately six kilograms of cocaine on each trip. Id. at ¶ 25.
Defendant Soto-Gonzales also stated that the Shumpert Road residence was a stash house and drugs and drug sale proceeds were previously stored in another house Defendant Soto-Gonzales owned in Richland County, South Carolina. Id. at ¶ 27. Movant's name appeared on the Shumpert Road residence lease because Defendant Soto-Gonzales asked Movant to rent the Shumpert Road residence in Movant's name. Id. at ¶ 26. Defendant Soto-Gonzales indicated that Movant lived in the Shumpert Road residence. Id. Defendant Soto-Gonzales stated that the two seized firearms were in the home for protection from robbery as the prior stash house was burglarized and the burglars took approximately $46,000. Id. at ¶ 27. Defendant Soto-Gonzales stated Movant purchased one of the firearms from a cocaine customer. ECF No. 320 at 15. Lastly, Defendant Soto-Gonzales stated that he had seen Movant asleep in the Shumpert residence holding the guns and on another occasion observed shell casings outside of the residence. Id.
On March 16, 2011, a grand jury returned a superseding indictment against Movant and his co-defendants. ECF No. 97. The government charged Movant with five counts: Count One: conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute five kilograms or more of cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 841(b)(1)(A), 846; Count Two: possessing with the intent to distribute five-hundred grams or more of cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 841(b)(1)(B), and 18 U.S.C. § 2; Count Three: being an alien illegally and unlawfully in the United States, and a co-participant in jointly undertaken criminal activity, knowingly possessing firearms having been shipped and transported in interstate commerce, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2, 922(g)(5)(A), 924(a)(2), 924(e); Count Four: possessing firearms in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2, 924(c); Count Five: using and maintaining a place for the purpose of unlawfully storing, distributing, and using a controlled substance, to wit: cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 856 (a)(1), 856(a)(2), and 18 U.S.C. § 2. Id. Movant entered a plea of not guilty on September 23, 2011. ECF No. 174. On February 2, 2012, Movant pleaded guilty to Counts One and Four pursuant to a written plea agreement. ECF No. 282. A Spanish language interpreter was present at the pleading. Id. at 3. Movant indicated that he understood what was happening, and answered all questions that the court presented to him. ECF No. 320 at 2. Movant did not disagree with the facts of the case. Id. at 17.
Movant indicated that he understood the terms of his plea agreement. He agreed to the summary of the agreement that the government provided for the court. He indicated that he was pleading guilty "by (his) own free will and accord." ECF No. 320 at 12.
Movant agreed with the facts, but contended that he "did not distribute" on December 23, 2010. The government responded that this factual detail did not matter for the purpose of the plea, as Movant was still party to a conspiracy. Movant agreed. ECF No. 320 at 17.
The court held a sentencing hearing on July 30, 2012. ECF No. 289. The court sentenced Movant to a term of 204 months, consisting of 144 months as to Count One and 60 months as to Count Four, to run consecutively. Id. The court also imposed a supervised release period of five years as to each Count One and Count Four, to run concurrently, with standard and special conditions, including surrender to a duly-authorized immigration official for deportation consideration, and, if deported, no re-entry into the United States without permission of the Attorney General or the Secretary of Homeland Security. Id. The court entered a judgment against Movant on July 31, 2012, and Counts Two, Three, and Five were dismissed upon the government's motion. Id.
On November 19, 2012, Movant filed an untimely Notice of Appeal. ECF No. 255. Respondent moved to dismiss as untimely and barred by the appeal waiver in the plea agreement. The Fourth Circuit dismissed the appeal on October 21, 2013, as untimely. ECF No. 346. Movant timely filed his § 2255 motion on October 20, 2014. ECF No. 360.
Movant asserts the following grounds for relief:
GROUND ONE: Movant contents that he received ineffective assistance of counsel because (1) His counsel negotiated a plea agreement despite the lack of evidence for the charges he faced; (2) Guilty plea was unknowing and involuntary because counsel did not properly investigate the basis for the conspiracy and firearm charge and counsel did not properly advise him regarding the guilty plea
and the elements of the offenses; (3) counsel failed to argue that under the 'corroboration requirement' movant's two convictions cannot stand.ECF No. 360.
GROUND TWO: Movant received ineffective assistance of counsel for not challenging the hearsay of Manual Soto-Gonzales [Movant's co-defendant] and for allowing the government to use the codefendant's hearsay as proof of convicting Medina.
GROUND THREE: Sixth Amendment violation due to ineffective assistance of counsel, when defense counsel failed to object to prosecutorial misconduct.
On December 1, 2014, the government filed a motion for summary judgment. ECF No. 368. The court issued an order, pursuant to Roseboro v. Garrison, 528 F.2d 309 (4th Cir. 1975), on December 1, 2014, advising Movant of the summary judgment procedure and the possible consequences if he failed to respond adequately. ECF No. 369. Movant failed to respond to the motion for summary judgment.
On September 1, 2016, Movant's sentence was reduced pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) and retroactive United States Sentencing Guideline Amendment 782, effective November 1, 2014. ECF No. 392. Movant's sentence was reduced from a term of 204 months, consisting of 144 months as to Count One and 60 months as to Count Four, to run consecutively, to a term of 195 months, consisting of 135 months as to Count One and 60 months as to Count Four, to run consecutively. Id.
II. DISCUSSION
Under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 56(a), a court shall award summary judgment if there is no dispute as to a material fact and the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The party seeking summary judgment bears the initial burden of coming forward and demonstrating an absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). Once the moving party has met its burden, the nonmoving party must affirmatively demonstrate that there is a genuine issue of material fact for trial. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). The court should grant summary judgment if a party fails to "establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial." Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 322. The facts and any inferences drawn from the facts should be viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655 (1962).
For a successful § 2255 petition, a movant must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the "sentence was imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States, or that the court was without jurisdiction to impose such sentence, or that the sentence was in excess of the maximum authorized by law, or is otherwise subject to collateral attack." 28 U.S.C. § 2255(a). If a movant is successful in demonstrating the above, the court shall vacate the judgment, and either discharge the movant, resentence the movant, or grant the movant a new trial. Id. § 2255(b). Generally, a hearing is required; however, the court may dismiss the petition without holding a hearing. See 28 U.S.C § 2255(b) (stating a hearing is not required on a § 2255 motion if the record conclusively shows that the movant is entitled to no relief).
To prove ineffective assistance of counsel, Movant must show that counsel's performance was deficient and that Movant was prejudiced by the deficiency. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). First, Movant must show that the attorney's performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. Id. at 688. Movant must also demonstrate that "but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different." See id. at 694. Strickland requires Movant to "identify the acts or omissions of counsel that are alleged not to have been the result of reasonable professional judgment." Id. at 690. The court then must "determine whether, in light of all the circumstances, the identified acts or omissions were outside the wide range of professionally competent assistance." Id. Even if counsel's performance is outside the wide range of professional assistance, an attorney's error will not warrant setting aside the conviction if the error had no effect on the judgment. Id. at 694. In Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 58-59 (1985), the Supreme Court held that, in order to prove ineffective assistance of counsel subsequent to a guilty plea, a Movant must show that (1) counsel's errors were below a standard of reasonable competence, and (2) but for those errors, the Movant would not have pleaded guilty but would have proceeded to trial.
A. Ground One- Issues Regarding Movant's Guilty Plea
Movant asserts that he did not enter into his plea knowingly, intelligently, or voluntarily. "[A] guilty plea is constitutionally valid if it represents a voluntary and intelligent choice among the alternative choices of action open to the defendant." United States v. Roberts, 426 F. App'x 195, 196 (4th Cir. 2011) (quoting United States v. Moussaoui, 491 F.3d 263, 278 (4th Cir. 2010)) (internal quotation marks omitted). Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure Rule 11 lists several questions judges must ask in order to determine the validity of pleas, including if the plea resulted from force, a threat of force, or promises by anyone that a plea would change a sentence. Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b)(2). There is a general presumption that if the plea is indeed valid, the plea is binding and final. United States v. Lambey, 974 F.2d 1389, 1394 (4th Cir. 1992); see also Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(5)(e). Here, the court engaged in a lengthy Rule 11 exchange with Movant. The court found that the plea was being given freely and voluntarily and that the plea was supported by an independent basis in fact. ECF No. 320 at 18. Accordingly, Movant's guilty plea is presumed binding and final.
Therefore, the court must determine whether Movant's new claims regarding ineffective assistance of counsel are sufficient to overcome his prior assertions at the Rule 11 hearing. As a defendant's responses are made under oath, without prompting from counsel, courts often hold that statements made in later § 2255 motions that contradict sworn testimony at a plea hearing are "palpably incredible and patently frivolous or false," absent extraordinary circumstances. United States v. Lemaster, 403 F.3d 216, 220 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Crawford v. United States, 519 F.2d 347, 350 (4th Cir. 1975)). If allegations made after the plea are unsupported by specific facts, there is further credence to the argument that the later statements are invalid. Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 73-75 (1977).
1. Waiver of Appellate Rights
Movant first contends that he would not have entered his guilty plea had he known that he was waiving his rights to an appeal. ECF No. 360-1 at 10. In the Fourth Circuit, a waiver of appeal rights is valid if it was "the result of a knowing and intelligent decision to forgo the right to appeal." United States v. Attar, 38 F.3d 727, 731 (4th Cir. 1994). In determining whether the waiver is "knowing and intelligent," the court considers the "particular facts and circumstances surrounding [the waiver], including the background, experience, and conduct of the accused." Id. (citing United States v. Davis, 954 F.2d 182, 186 (4th Cir. 1992)). Here, Movant was explicitly told twice that he was waiving his right to appeal. First, at Movant's hearing changing his plea to guilty, Respondent summarized that "[i]n paragraph 15 there is an appellate waiver. He agrees to waive his right of direct appeal if he receives a sentence of less than life imprisonment." ECF 320 at 8. Respondent further explained that there was a significant mandatory minimum if Movant was found guilty at trial; therefore, the appellate waiver was justified. Id. The court then asked whether Movant understood the terms of the plea agreement, which Movant answered in the affirmative. The court asked whether Movant agreed with the summary of the plea agreement, which Movant answered in the affirmative. Lastly, the court asked Movant whether he had any questions about the agreement, which he answered in the negative. Second, at the sentencing hearing, the government stated:
I would note, and I hope [Movant] hears me and understands this, I have recently had a rash of defendants, who despite the fact that they waive their right to appeal in a plea agreement, nonetheless try to file appeals to the Fourth Circuit. I believe there are a numbers of jailhouse lawyers who advise them to do so, and that's often not in their best interest. [Movant] needs to understand that if he files such a motion, A, I will move to dismiss it, but, B, I will treat it as a breach, and any chance for a Rule 35 that he may have is gone.ECF No. 289 at 12. The court asked Movant "[d]o you understand what the government's position is?" Id. Movant answered in the affirmative. Id. Accordingly, the court finds that Movant's contention that he did not understand he was waiving his appellate rights and accordingly would not have pleaded guilty is without merit. Therefore, the court finds that Movant does not meet the second prong of Hill.
2. Translation Into Spanish
Movant next argues that he unknowingly accepted his plea because his counsel did not properly advise him about the guilty plea, and because his attorney did not translate his plea agreement into Spanish. ECF No. 360-1 at 12-13. Movant's allegations again contradict the record of the court. Before accepting Movant's plea, the court thoroughly questioned Movant with the aid of an interpreter. ECF No. 282 at 3. The court informed Movant, through the interpreter, that if he did not understand the questions presented, he had additional time in which he could speak with his lawyer. Id. at 7. In response to the court's questions, Movant answered that he was "completely satisfied" with his lawyer's service, he did not need any more time to speak with her, and that his lawyer had done everything "she could or should have done to prepare" for the hearing. Id. at 15-16. The court also asked Movant if he "had heard [his] attorney advise [the court] that she has explained [to Movant] the charge against [him]." ECF No. 320 at 2. Movant replied in the affirmative. Id. Movant also agreed with the government's personal observations that Movant and Movant's attorney communicated in Spanish. Id. at 8. The court read the indictment, and informed the Movant of what the government would have to prove at trial beyond a reasonable doubt in order to sustain a conviction, and Movant indicated that he understood. Id. at 5. The government then, in detail, described the plea agreement in which Movant had entered. Id. at 19. Movant asserted that he "under[stood] the terms of [the] plea agreement." Id. at 9. The government proceeded to summarize the facts in the case, which included information Defendant Soto-Gonzales provided. Id. at 13-16. The court asked if Movant "agreed with the facts," and he replied that he did, except Movant disagreed that he was at the Shumpert Road house on December 23, 2010. Id. at 17. As this was an issue with finding Movant guilty of Count Four, conspiracy to distribute, the court asked Movant if there was "any question that [Movant was] involved in a conspiracy to distribute five kilograms or more of cocaine." Id. at 17. Movant replied "no." Id. at 18. After confirming he was part of the conspiracy, Movant pled guilty and signed his plea. Id. at 18. Accordingly, Movant's contention that he failed to understand the plea agreement and the elements of the charged crimes is without merit.
Respondent's motion for summary judgment references an affidavit signed by defense counsel which stated "not only did she translated the plea agreement into Spanish, she also translated discovery into Spanish." ECF No. 368-1 at 7. However, Respondent failed to attach the affidavit.
3. Failure to Investigate Conspiracy and Gun Charges
Lastly, Movant contends that counsel was ineffective as she failed to properly investigate the conspiracy and gun charges. ECF No. 360-1 at 20-22. However, Movant did not object at the plea hearing to the factual summary of the charges. Indeed, the court questioned Movant about his specific involvement with the conspiracy and possession of guns and he admitted to both.
THE COURT: So with regard to the factual recitation, there is an issue with regard to whether or not the defendant agrees that he was in the house on the 23rd and he left the house to go to distribute cocaine. With that clarification, is there any question that he has been involved in a conspiracy to distribute 5 kilograms or more of cocaine.ECF No. 320 at 17
DEFENDANT: No.
THE COURT: And is there any question with regard to whether or not he possessed firearms in furtherance of the drug trafficking activity?Id. at 18. Movant's current statements are at odds with what Movant stated under oath at the change of plea hearing. The court finds that Movant fails to demonstrate that counsel's performance was not within the reasonable range, nor does Movant show that it would have affected the outcome.
DEFENDANT: No.
In summary, the basis of Movant's first ground for relief are directly contradicted by statements made under oath in open court. There are no extraordinary circumstances here, and based on the record it is clear that Movant was satisfied with his counsel's performance and understood the proceedings against him, including the waiver of appellate rights. Therefore, Movant's first ground for relief is without merit and is dismissed.
B. Ground Two - Failure to Assert Hearsay Objections
Movant contends that his counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the government's introduction of hearsay evidence from Defendant Soto-Gonzales. ECF No. 360-1 at 15-22. Additionally, Movant asserts that Defendant Soto-Gonzales's testimony was false and Defendant Soto-Gonzales's statements are untrustworthy because he was a drug addict at the time of his questioning. Id. A court may only deem an attorney's failure to object to be deficient if such failure prejudiced the defendant. See United States v. Jones, 114 F. Supp. 3d 310, 322 (D.S.C. 2015). At the plea hearing, Movant agreed with the facts the government presented in open court. ECF No. 320 at 17. The government's facts included the allegedly false facts that Defendant Soto-Gonzales provided. Id. at 15Therefore, counsel cannot be faulted for not objecting to facts based on personal knowledge that Movant, at the time of his plea, contended were true. Additionally, Movant fails to provide evidence that the facts Defendant Soto-Gonzales provided were indeed false. Movant's claim is without merit, and is dismissed.
Movant bases this information on sworn statement Co-Defendant Rigoberto Gonzales-Gutierrez made on October 14, 2014. ECF No. 360-4. In an affidavit, Defendant Gonzales-Gutierrez swears that Defendant Soto-Gonzales "[was] a drug addict" and "fooled" Movant into participating in the drug conspiracy. Id. --------
C. Ground Three - Prosecutorial Misconduct
Movant contends that trial counsel was ineffective for not objecting to the government's "presentation of false evidence" and solicitation of false testimony from Defendant Soto-Gonzales. ECF No. 360-1 at 13-22. Movant provides no factual information to support his allegations, stating only that prosecutors will "quite often" lie to courts about witnesses, and that the American judiciary system blindly follows the information prosecutors present the court. ECF No. 360-1 at 17-19. Further, Movant argues that witnesses, such as Defendant Soto-Gonzales, lie in order to get lighter sentences. Id. However, as stated above, Movant agreed with the facts the government presented in open court at Movant's guilty plea hearing. ECF No. 320 at 17. Because Movant agreed with the facts, counsel had no basis to object to misconduct. Movant has not provided the court with a specific instance in his case that indicates prosecutorial misconduct. Thus, the court finds that counsel's performance was not deficient. Ground Three is without merit.
III. CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, Respondent's motion for summary judgment is GRANTED, Movant's motion to vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence pursuant to § 2255 is denied, and the motion is dismissed without an evidentiary hearing.
CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY
A certificate of appealability may issue only if the applicant has made a substantial showing of denial of a constitutional right. 28 U.S.C §2253(c). A prisoner satisfies this standard by demonstrating that reasonable jurists would find this court's assessment of his constitutional claims debatable or wrong and that any dispositive procedural ruling by the district court is likewise debatable. See Miller-el v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 336 (2003); Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000); Rose v. Lee 252 F.3d 676, 683 (4th Cir. 2001). In this matter, the legal standard for the issuance of a certificate of appealability has not been met. Therefore, the court denies a certificate of appealability.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
s/ Margaret B. Seymour
The Honorable Margaret B. Seymour
Senior United States District Court Judge
Columbia, South Carolina
April 6, 2017