Medford v. State

10 Citing cases

  1. Flores v. State

    18 S.W.3d 796 (Tex. App. 2000)   Cited 42 times
    Holding that a claim of ineffective counsel does not stand where the record was silent with regard to counsel's strategies

    A defendant does not receive ineffective assistance of counsel simply because trial counsel advises the defendant to plead guilty under an expectation that the court will probate the sentence or impose a lighter sentence than is received. See Graves v. State, 803 S.W.2d 342, 345 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1990, pet. ref'd); Medford v. State, 766 S.W.2d 398, 401 (Tex.App.-Austin 1989, no pet.). A defendant's reliance on his attorney's professional opinion does not render a guilty plea involuntary.

  2. Chapman v. State

    NO. 01-14-00981-CR (Tex. App. Jun. 2, 2016)

    Such an erroneous belief is not adequate to show that Chapman was prejudiced. See Medford v. State, 766 S.W.2d 398, 401 (Tex. App.—Austin 1989, writ ref'd) (holding that erroneous statement by defense counsel that defendant may not receive jail time did not prejudice defendant because attorney did not "promise" probation); Rivera v. State, No. 14-01-00795-CR, 2002 WL 31426696, at *2 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Oct. 31, 2002, no pet.) (not designated for publication) (holding that defendant's motion for probation does not show prejudice because trial court properly admonished him on sentence range). Additionally, other parts of the record indicate that Chapman did not expect to receive community supervision.

  3. Brown v. State

    NO. 01-15-00042-CR (Tex. App. Dec. 1, 2015)   Cited 3 times

    For example, in Medford v. State, the defendant testified that her lawyer told her that she "would not go to jail, except possibly for three days." 766 S.W.2d 398, 401 (Tex. App.—Austin 1989, writ ref'd.). The Austin court categorized this statement by the defense attorney as the attorney's "opinion." Id.

  4. Mitchell v. State

    Nos. 13-10-00184-CR, 13-10-00185-CR (Tex. App. Jul. 7, 2011)   Cited 1 times

    s not functioning effectively as counsel; and (2) the deficient performance prejudiced the defense to such a degree that the defendant was deprived of a fair trial. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984); Rodriguez v. State, 899 S.W.2d 658, 665 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995). The record must affirmatively demonstrate the alleged ineffectiveness. Thompson v. State, 9 S.W.3d 808, 813 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999). Where the record does not do so, counsel is presumed effective. Id. A defendant's uncorroborated testimony to such deficiencies is not sufficient to establish ineffective assistance of counsel. Arreola v. State, 207 S.W.3d 387, 391 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, no pet.). Also, a defendant does not have a claim of involuntary plea or ineffective assistance of counsel simply because counsel gave his professional opinion, defendant relied on that opinion, and the opinion proved to be incorrect. Kirven v. State, 492 S.W.2d 468, 470 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973); see Medford v. State, 766 S.W.2d 398, 401 (Tex. App.-Austin 1989, no writ). In this case, Mitchell does not satisfy the strict Strickland test. Mitchell argues that his attorney was ineffective because he did not advise him of Texas Code of Criminal Procedure article 42.12 section 23(a) and (b), which provides that if community supervision is revoked after a hearing, the judge can dispose of the case as if no community supervision was ever fulfilled. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 42.12 § 23(a), (b) (West 2009). Except for Mitchell's uncorroborated testimony, nothing exists in the record indicating that his counsel did not do this research or advise him of this; thus, we assume that counsel's actions were within the broad range of acceptable assistance. See Arreola, 207 S.W.3d at 391; see also Flores v. State, 18 S.W.3d 796, 799-800 (Tex. App.-Austin 2000, no pet.) (holding that a claim of ineffective counsel does not stand where the record was silent with regard to counsel's strategies). Regardless, Mitchell cannot prove ineffective assistance of counsel

  5. Torres v. State

    No. 14-02-01116-CR (Tex. App. Feb. 12, 2004)

    Id.; Moreno, 90 S.W.3d at 889. The decision to grant or deny a motion for new trial is also reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Medford v. State, 766 S.W.2d 398, 399 (Tex.App.-Austin 1989, pet. ref'd). To establish an abuse of discretion, appellant must show that the trial court's ruling lies outside the "zone of reasonable disagreement."

  6. Charles v. State

    NOS. 14-01-01247-CR; 14-01-01248-CR 14-01-01249-CR (Tex. App. Jul. 3, 2003)

    d 760, 769 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2001, pet. ref'd). In this context, the harm prong is satisfied only upon proof that the defendant would not have pleaded guilty but for his counsel's ineffectiveness. Id. ( citing Rodriguez v. State, 899 S.W.2d 658, 666 (Tex.Crim.App. 1995)). To determine the voluntariness of appellant's guilty plea, we must examine the record as a whole. See Martinez v. State, 981 S.W.2d 195, 197 (Tex.Crim.App. 1998); Cantu v. State, 988 S.W.2d 481, 484 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1999, pet. ref'd). Further, the determination of whether a confession is voluntary must be based upon an examination of the totality of the circumstances surrounding its acquisition. Barney v. State, 698 S.W.2d 114, 120 (Tex.Crim.App. 1985). A defendant's reliance on his attorney's professional opinion does not render a guilty plea involuntary, nor do unsuccessful strategies. Graves v. State, 803 S.W.2d 342, 345 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1990, pet. ref'd); Medford v. State, 766 S.W.2d 398, 401 (Tex.App.-Austin 1989, pet. ref'd). According to appellant, the viable bases for suppression of his written statement were his intoxication, fatigue, youth and intellect, promises by the police, and various "other factors. The presence of these factors, contends appellant, renders erroneous his counsel's advice that there was no viable legal basis for suppression of the statement. However, to apply a standard requiring us to show but for counsel's erroneous advice appellant would not have pleaded guilty, this court must make a threshold determination that the advice was indeed erroneous. Thus, we begin by analyzing the factors invoked by appellant to determine whether appellant's counsel's advice, that there was no viable legal basis for suppression of the written statement, was erroneous. 1. Intoxication

  7. Delatorre v. State

    957 S.W.2d 145 (Tex. App. 1997)   Cited 35 times
    Holding written or oral waiver prevents defendant from appealing as long as waiver was made knowingly, intelligently, and with certainty as to what punishment would be assessed

    In points of error two through five, Delatorre contends he entered his plea involuntarily because the trial court failed to comply with article 26.13, which codifies the constitutional due process requirement that a plea must be made freely, knowingly, and voluntarily. See Tex. Code Crim.Proc.Ann. art. 26.13(b) (West 1989); Medford v. State, 766 S.W.2d 398, 400 (Tex.App. — Austin 1989, pet. ref'd). A defendant who enters a plea may always appeal the issue of voluntariness.

  8. Hernandez v. State

    799 S.W.2d 507 (Tex. App. 1991)   Cited 12 times
    Explaining that failure to object does not establish ineffective assistance of counsel if no proper objection could have been made

    Complaints of this sort which are unsupported by the record will not support allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel. See Passmore v. State, 617 S.W.2d 682, 685 (Tex.Crim.App. 1981); Hunnicutt v. State, 531 S.W.2d 618, 624 (Tex.Crim.App. 1976); see, e.g., Medford v. State, 766 S.W.2d 398, 400 (Tex.App. — Austin, 1989, pet. ref'd); Castillo v. State, 751 S.W.2d 521, 523 (Tex.App. — San Antonio 1988, no pet.); Henderson v. State, 704 S.W.2d 536, 537-38 (Tex.App. — Houston [14th Dist.] 1986, pet. ref'd). The record shows that appellant's counsel filed a motion for discovery. It also shows that appellant's attorney filed a motion for continuance because he had unsuccessfully tried numerous times to find and inspect the alleged victim's car.

  9. Graves v. State

    803 S.W.2d 342 (Tex. App. 1990)   Cited 34 times
    Concluding that counsel's recommendation to plead guilty on anticipation of a lesser sentence than received, does not render a plea unknowing or involuntary

    This court has found that defense counsel's unsuccessful strategy in advising an appellant to plead guilty, predicting a lesser sentence than that received, did not render the plea unknowing or involuntary. Enard v. State, 764 S.W.2d 574, 575 (Tex.App. — Houston [14th Dist.] 1989, no pet.); see also, West v. State, supra; Kirven v. State, 492 S.W.2d 468 (Tex.Crim.App. 1973). (The fact that appellant relied on his attorney's professional opinion does not make the plea involuntary; Medford v. State, 766 S.W.2d 398, 401 (Tex.App. — Austin 1989, pet. ref'd). Texas probation laws allow probation for most offenses, the chief exclusions being certain aggravated crimes and where the sentence is over ten years. Neither appellant's conviction for murder nor his use of a deadly weapon make him per se ineligible for probation.

  10. Mills v. State

    799 S.W.2d 447 (Tex. App. 1990)   Cited 6 times

    In a similar case, the Austin Court of Appeals has held that a lawyer's failure to inform a defendant of the minimum jail provision for driving while intoxicated did not render a plea involuntary where the defendant did not assert that she was promised total probation. Medford v. State, 766 S.W.2d 398, 400-402 (Tex.App. — Austin 1989, pet. ref'd). Despite appellant's counsel's complaints, this record does not show that appellant personally ever expected "total" probation.