To satisfy this burden, the record must permit the reviewing court to determine that there is a reasonable probability that, but for the deficient performance, the result of the proceeding would have been different, i.e., the parent's parental rights to her child would not have been terminated. In re M.S., 115 S.W.3d at 549-50; see also Medellin v. Tex. Dep't ofFamily & Protective Servs., No. 03-11-00558-CV, 2012 WL 4466511, at *5 (Tex. App.—Austin Sept. 26, 2012, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (father must show "reasonable probability that his parental rights would not have been terminated"). In this context, "[a] reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome."
To show prejudice, the parent must show there is reasonable probability that, but for counsel's error, the result of the proceeding would have been different. In re M.S., 115 S.W.3d at 550; see also Medellin v. Tex. Dep't of Family & Protective Servs., No. 03-11-00558-CV, 2012 WL 4466511, at *5 (Tex. App.—Austin Sept. 26, 2012, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (explaining that establishing prejudice requires showing "reasonable probability that [parent's] rights would not have been terminated" absent trial counsel's deficient performance). A presumption of prejudice may be warranted where there has been actual or constructive denial of counsel.
To show prejudice, the parent must show there is reasonable probability that, but for counsel's error, the result of the proceeding would have been different. In re M.S., 115 S.W.3d at 550; see also Medellin v. Tex. Dep't of Family & Protective Servs., No. 03-11-00558-CV, 2012 WL 4466511, at *5 (Tex. App.-Austin Sept. 26, 2012, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (to establish prejudice, father must show "reasonable probability that his parental rights would not have been terminated" absent trial counsel's deficient performance). "A 'reasonable probability' is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome of the proceeding."
Assuming without deciding a business record affidavit would have been insufficient, there is no indication that the Department would not have provided adequate foundation in another way, for instance by asking Felix if the video accurately represented what it was purported to depict. See Medellin v. Texas Dep't of Family & Protective Servs., No. 03-11-00558-CV, 2012 WL 4466511, at *6 (Tex. App.—Austin Sept. 26, 2012, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (citing Darnell, 2012 WL 626318, at *3). In fact, Felix testified extensively about the footage during the de novo trial, and at no time did he suggest that the footage was not an accurate depiction.
To show prejudice, the parent must show there is reasonable probability that, but for counsel's error, the result of the proceeding would have been different. In re M.S., 115 S.W.3d at 550; see also Medellin v. Tex. Dep't of Family & Protective Servs., No. 03-11-00558-CV, 2012 WL 4466511, at *5 (Tex. App.—Austin Sept. 26, 2012, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (to establish prejudice, father must show "reasonable probability that his parental rights would not have been terminated" absent trial counsel's deficient performance). "A 'reasonable probability' is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome of the proceeding."
In addition to showing trial counsel's deficient performance, reviewing courts must determine whether there is a reasonable probability that, but for the deficient performance, the result of the proceeding would have been different, i.e., a party's parental rights would not have been terminated. In re M.S., 115 S.W.3d at 550; see also Medellin v. Tex. Dep't of Family & Protective Servs., No. 03-11-00558-CV, 2012 WL 4466511, at *5 (Tex. App.—Austin Sept. 26, 2012, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (father must show "reasonable probability that his parental rights would not have been terminated"). In this context, "[a] reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome."
Thus, she, on average, has been convicted of a criminal offense approximately once every seventeen months for the past twenty-four years. Cf. Medellin v. Tex. Dep't of Family & Protective Servs., No. 03-11-00558-CV, 2012 WL 4466511, at *7 (Tex. App.—Austin Sept. 26, 2012, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (parent's "criminal history as a whole show[ed] that, for nearly twenty years, [he] ha[d] been convicted of a criminal offense once every two years, on average"). Although not all of T.T.'s convictions were for serious offenses, the series of convictions, taken in connection with her narcotics use, are relevant to whether T.T. engaged in a course of conduct that endangered the physical and emotional well-being of the four children.
Not all offenses listed in subsection (L) require bodily injury. See C.H. v. Dep't. of Family & Protective Servs., Nos. 01–11–00385–CV, 01–11–00454–CV, 01–11–00455–CV, 2012 WL 586972, at *4–5 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] Feb. 23, 2012, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (listing offenses covered by subsection (L)). We conclude demonstrating “serious injury” to a child under subsection (L) does not require a showing of “serious bodily injury” as defined in the Penal Code. See Medellin v. Tex. Dep't. of Family & Protective Servs., No. 03–11–00558–CV, 2012 WL 4466511, at *5 n. 5 (Tex.App.-Austin Sept. 26, 2012, no pet.) (mem. op.); C.H., 2012 WL 586972, at *5. When, as here, a term is not defined in a statute, we apply its ordinary meaning.
We conclude demonstrating "serious injury" to a child under subsection (L) does not require a showing of "serious bodily injury" as defined in the Penal Code. See Medellin v. Tex. Dep't of Family & Protective Servs., No. 03-11-00558-CV, 2012 WL 4466511, at *5 n.5 (Tex. App.—Austin Sept. 26, 2012, no pet.) (mem. op.); C.H., 2012 WL 586972, at *5. When, as here, a term is not defined in a statute, we apply its ordinary meaning.