Opinion
3-13-0272
03-13-2014
MEDICAL CONSULTANTS, LTD., an Illinois Corporation, and DR. LESLIE LINDBERG, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. IROQUOIS MEMORIAL HOSPITAL, a Corporation, STEPHEN O. LEURCK, DR. MOHAMMED RAZVI, SUSAN FREED, and ASSOCIATED RADIOLOGISTS OF JOLIET, SC., a Corporation, Defendants-Appellees.
NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and may not be cited as precedent by any party except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
Appeal from the Circuit Court
of the 21st Judicial Circuit,
Iroquois County, Illinois,
Appeal No. 3-13-0272
Circuit No. 08-L-33
Honorable
Adrienne W. Albrecht,
Judge, Presiding.
JUSTICE delivered the judgment of the court.
Presiding Justice Lytton and Justice Carter concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶ 1 Held: The trial court erroneously dismissed plaintiffs' two-count state court complaint for being filed beyond the one-year extended statute of limitations. Specifically, count I was filed within six months of the federal court's dismissal of the complaint which included the same claim. In addition, count II was filed approximately four months after the federal court denied plaintiff's Rule 59(e) motion, in a second federal lawsuit, requesting the court to reconsider its previous ruling awarding summary judgment in favor of defendants on the federal claims. ¶ 2 The state court action in the case at bar (Lindberg III) was preceded by two federal lawsuits, Lindberg I and Lindberg II. On December 23, 2008, plaintiffs, Dr. Lindberg and Medical Consultants Ltd., filed a two-count complaint, in the circuit court of Iroquois County, which included one count (count II) refiled from Lindberg I, and one count (count I) refiled from Lindberg II. ¶ 3 In Lindberg I, the federal court granted summary judgment in favor of defendants on the federal claims, and dismissed the remaining counts, based solely on state law, on December 18, 2007. After the federal court's order dismissing Lindberg I, plaintiff filed a federal Rule 59(e) motion, on January 2, 2008, requesting the federal court to reconsider its December 18, 2007 ruling. On August 25, 2008, the federal court denied plaintiffs' motion to reconsider. Plaintiff appealed the denial of his motion to reconsider, and during the pendency of that appeal, refiled a state claim, originally asserted in Lindberg I, by initiating Lindberg III, the instant action, in state court on December 23, 2008. ¶ 4 In a separate case, Lindberg II, the federal court involuntarily dismissed plaintiffs' amended complaint, which included federal and state law claims, on June 16, 2008. Plaintiffs did not appeal the dismissal of Lindberg II, but refiled the state claim, originally asserted in Lindberg II, by incorporating the claim in the state court action, Lindberg III, on December 23, 2008. ¶ 5 At the heart of this appeal with respect to Lindberg III, initiated in the circuit court of Iroquois County, is the circuit court's "Memorandum of Decision" dated March 20, 2013. This order denied plaintiffs' section 2-1203 motion to vacate (735 ILCS 5/2-1203 (West 2012)) the dismissal order in Lindberg III. In the decision, the court clarified the reason for its earlier dismissal, finding Lindberg III had not been filed within the one-year extended statute of limitations set out in section 13-217 of the Code of Civil Procedure (the Code) (725 ILCS 13-217 (West 2008)). We reverse the circuit court's ruling with respect to the statute of limitations and remand the matter for further proceedings.
¶ 6 FACTS
¶ 7 Lindberg I
¶ 8 On May 30, 2006, plaintiff, Dr. Leslie Lindberg, individually, filed a complaint in federal court, in case No. 2:06-cv-02106 (Lindberg I), against multiple defendants, including Iroquois Memorial Hospital (the Hospital), Stephen Leurck, Dr. Mohammed Razvi, and Susan Freed. On October 16, 2006, plaintiff filed a ten-count amended complaint, including one count (count X) for injunctive relief against the Hospital. The first three counts of the amended complaint alleged violations of the Federal Wire Tap Act (18 U.S.C. §§ 2511, 2520) against: (I) Freed and the Hospital, (II) Leurck and the Hospital, and (III) the hospital trustees, including Razvi, and the Hospital. Counts IV through VI of the amended complaint alleged violations of the Illinois eavesdropping statute (720 ILCS 5/14-1 et seq.) against: (IV) Freed and the Hospital, (V) Leurck and the Hospital, and (VI) the hospital trustees, including Razvi, and the Hospital. The remaining three counts of the amended complaint alleged one count each of tortious interference with business relations against Leurck and Freed (count VII), intrusion upon seclusion against all defendants (count VIII) and public disclosure of private facts against Freed, Leurck, and the Hospital (count IX), all based on Illinois law. ¶ 9 On December 18, 2007, the federal court granted summary judgment in favor of defendants, with respect to the three counts alleging federal wire tap violations and, in declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction, dismissed the remaining state claims. Thereafter, on January 2, 2008, plaintiff filed a motion pursuant to Rule 59(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e) (eff. Dec. 1, 2007)), requesting the federal court to reconsider its decision granting summary judgment on the federal claims. On August 25, 2008, the federal court denied plaintiff's motion to reconsider and plaintiff appealed. ¶ 10 The federal appeals court issued a decision, on September 13, 2010, reversing the district court's decision granting summary judgment on count I in favor of two defendants, Freed and the Hospital. However, the federal appeals court affirmed the district court's decision granting summary judgment on the federal claims set out in counts II and III in favor of Leurck and the hospital trustees (including Razvi). Count I, which alleged Freed and the Hospital acted together in violation of the federal wire tap laws, was scheduled for a trial on October 22, 2012. Shortly before this trial date, on October 19, 2012, Lindberg voluntarily dismissed his lawsuit, consisting of this single remaining federal claim, with prejudice.
Plaintiff's motion to reconsider did not request the federal court to revisit its decision dismissing the claims alleging violations of Illinois law.
¶ 11 Lindberg II
¶ 12 In a separate federal action, in case No. 2:07-cv-02083 (Lindberg II), on September 19, 2007, plaintiffs Dr. Lindberg and Medical Consultants, Ltd., filed a four-count amended complaint against the Hospital, Leurck, Razvi, and an additional defendant not named in Lindberg I, Associated Radiologists of Joliet (ARJ). The plaintiffs' amended complaint included three counts alleging violations of federal antitrust law against all defendants, and one count of tortious interference with business relations in violation of Illinois law (count IV) against all defendants jointly. ¶ 13 On June 16, 2008, the federal court dismissed, with prejudice, the three counts of plaintiffs' amended complaint alleging violations of federal antitrust law against all defendants. The court also dismissed without prejudice, count IV, alleging tortious interference with business relations in violation of Illinois law pending against all defendants.
¶ 14 Lindberg III (State Court Case)
¶ 15 On December 23, 2008, plaintiffs, Dr. Lindberg and Medical Consultants Ltd., filed a two-count complaint, in the instant case (Lindberg III), in the circuit court of Iroquois County. ¶ 16 As previously alleged in Lindberg II, count I of Lindberg III alleged Leurck, Razvi, and the Hospital tortiously interfered with plaintiffs' business relationships and also requested "injunctive relief to include ARJ." As previously alleged in Lindberg I, count II of Lindberg III, alleged Leurck, Freed, and the Hospital violated the Illinois eavesdropping statute (720 ILCS 5/14-2(a)(3) (West 2008)). ¶ 17 On April 6, 2009, defendants Leurck, Razvi, Freed, and the Hospital filed a joint motion to dismiss plaintiffs' complaint pursuant to section 2-619.1 of the Code (735 ILCS 5/2-619.1 (West 2008)). With respect to count I of Lindberg III, defendants argued count I should be dismissed based on the principles of judicial nonreview and for failure to state a cause of action, but defendants did not assert this count violated the applicable statute of limitations. ¶ 18 With respect to count II of Lindberg III, defendants argued count II was not filed within one year of the federal dismissal on December 17, 2008, and therefore, was time-barred by section 13-217 of the Code (735 ILCS 5/13-217 (West 2008)). Defendants also argued count II of Lindberg III should be dismissed based on the principles of res judicata and due to the failure to state a cause of action. Plaintiffs did not file a written response to defendants' April 6, 2009, section 2-619.1 motion to dismiss. ¶ 19 On November 15, 2010, the trial court heard arguments from both sides on defendants' April 6, 2009, joint section 2-619.1 motion to dismiss the complaint and plaintiffs' motion to stay the state court proceedings filed on November 12, 2010. The court did not announce its ruling on either motion, but continued the matter to January 12, 2011. ¶ 20 Purportedly based on comments the court made during the November 15, 2010 hearing, each defendant individually filed another motion to dismiss plaintiffs' complaint on December 6, 2010. The Hospital's combined motion to dismiss, filed pursuant to section 2-615 and section 2-619 of the Code (735 ILCS 5/2-615 (West 2010); 735 ILCS 5/2-619 (West 2010)), again asserted count I of Lindberg III should be dismissed for failure to state a cause of action and based on the principle of judicial nonreview. The Hospital's motion again argued count II of Lindberg III should be dismissed because count II was filed beyond the one-year extension of the statute of limitations and, in addition, alleged vicarious liability did not apply to the cause of action. The Hospital's motion to dismiss did not argue count I of Lindberg III should be dismissed for being filed outside the statute of limitations. ¶ 21 Defendant Leurck's individual combined motion to dismiss, filed pursuant to section 2-615 and section 2-619 of the Code (735 ILCS 5/2-615 (West 2010); 735 ILCS 5/2-619 (West 2010)), similarly asserted count I of Lindberg III should be dismissed for failure to state a cause of action and based on the principle of judicial nonreview. Defendant Leurck's individual motion to dismiss alleged count II of Lindberg III should be dismissed for being filed beyond the one-year statute of limitations provided by section 13-217 of the Code. In addition, Leurck's individual motion to dismiss alleged count II of Lindberg III should also be dismissed based on the federal appellate court's ruling that Leurck could not be held liable on this claim. Defendant Leurck's motion to dismiss did not argue count I of Lindberg III should be dismissed for being filed outside the statute of limitations. ¶ 22 Defendant Razvi's individual motion to dismiss, filed pursuant to section 2-615 of the Code (735 ILCS 5/2-615 (West 2010)), asserted count I of Lindberg III, the only count directed against him, should be dismissed for failure to state a cause of action and based on the principle of judicial nonreview. Razvi did not argue count I of Lindberg III should be dismissed for being time-barred. ¶ 23 Defendant Freed's individual motion to dismiss, count II of Lindberg III, the only count directed against her, filed pursuant to section 2-615 and section 2-619 of the Code (735 ILCS 5/2-615 (West 2010); 735 ILCS 5/2-619 (West 2010)), sought dismissal of this count for being filed outside the statute of limitations provided by section 13-217. ¶ 24 On January 12, 2011, the parties appeared before the trial court and presented their arguments on these separate and individual motions to dismiss. The court again took the matters under advisement for nearly two years, without first announcing a decision on the pending joint section 2-619.1 motion to dismiss argued on November 15, 2010. ¶ 25 Finally, the court announced its ruling on the motions argued on January 12, 2011, by minute entry dated November 1, 2012. The court's minute entry reads as follows: "This case comes on for decision on motion [sic] to dismiss after the case has been previously stayed pending the outcome of pending proceedings in Federal Court. The Court having considered all relevant factors, finds that the motion [sic] to dismiss should be allowed and that the case be dismissed." ¶ 26 Thereafter, on November 13, 2012, the trial court entered a written order stating: "Cause coming to be heard on the motions of the defendants, Iroquois Memorial Hospital, Mohammed Razvi, Susan Freed and Stephen Leurck, to dismiss, the court, having heard the arguments of counsel, reviewed the record, and being fully advised in the premises, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the motions be and the same are hereby allowed. Complaint dismissed, with prejudice." ¶ 27 On December 12, 2012, plaintiffs filed a "Motion to Vacate Judgment and Alternatively for Leave to File an Amended Complaint" pursuant to section 2-1203 of the Code (735 ILCS 5/2-1203 (West 2012)). The plaintiffs' motion to vacate argued the trial court did not state which motions to dismiss were granted, the basis for the dismissal, and failed to specify any errors with respect to the insufficiency of the complaint filed by plaintiffs. Plaintiffs also argued their December 23, 2008, complaint in Lindberg III stated causes of action and was timely filed in state court. ¶ 28 On March 20, 2013, the trial court entered a "Memorandum of Decision" denying plaintiffs' motion to vacate, after clarifying her ruling was based on a finding that the statute of limitations issue was dispositive. The court's order explained since the limitations issue was dispositive, the court did not consider the merits of the other grounds for dismissal raised in defendants' motions. ¶ 29 Finding the instant case to be "closely analogous" to Wade v. Byles, 295 Ill. App. 3d 545 (1998), which held that "plaintiffs who file an appeal from the dismissal of their cases in U.S. District Court do not enjoy an extension of the one year [statute of limitations]," the trial court denied plaintiffs' section 2-1203 motion to vacate the court's previous ruling dismissing Lindberg III. The trial court maintained its decision that the "re-filed claims in the Plaintiff[s'] complaint were dismissed as being filed outside of the extension of the statute of limitations of Section 13-217 of the Code of Civil Procedure." ¶ 30 Plaintiffs appeal the trial court's denial of its section 2-1203 motion to vacate the court's previous ruling on the individual motions to dismiss filed by defendants.
This claim was previously alleged as count IV in Lindberg II.
It appears count II of plaintiff's state court complaint is a hybrid of the three separate counts, namely, counts IV, V, and VI of Lindberg I, involving the Illinois eavesdropping statute. Plaintiffs' complaint in the instant case acknowledges count II of Lindberg III originated from the complaint in Lindberg I.
Defendant ARJ did not join in the combined motion to dismiss.
On June 12, 2009, pursuant to a motion filed by plaintiffs that same date, the circuit court stayed the state court proceedings pending the resolution of the federal appeal in Lindberg I. Shortly after the September 13, 2010, decision issued by the federal court of appeals in Lindberg I, defendants scheduled their pending section 2-619.1 motion to dismiss the state court complaint for a hearing on November 15, 2010.
On November 12, 2010, plaintiffs filed a motion requesting a continuance and further stay of the state court proceedings. Plaintiffs' request for further stay asserted that the federal court of appeals' partial reversal of summary judgment on the federal claims in Lindberg I "presumably" operated to automatically reinstate the state law claims raised in the second amended complaint.
The record on appeal does not contain a transcript of either of the hearings on the motions to dismiss. The docket entry reflects the parties argued the motions on this date.
It appears the court's action was triggered by a letter from defendants' attorney dated October 25, 2012, advising the court that plaintiff dismissed his federal wire tap claim, in Lindberg I, with prejudice on October 19, 2012. In this letter, defense counsel requested the trial court to issue its decision on the "pending motions" and counsel directed a copy of the correspondence to plaintiffs' attorney.
Plaintiffs argued the filing of the Rule 59(e) motion to reconsider the summary judgment ruling in Lindberg I tolled the date of dismissal for purposes of the extended statute of limitation under Illinois law.
The record does not reflect the trial court conducted a hearing on the motion to vacate.
According to the trial court's order, the court "previously delayed ruling on the substantive issues in this case because of the pendency of litigation in Federal District Court involving the same transactions and occurrences."
¶ 31 ANALYSIS
¶ 32 On appeal, plaintiffs contend the trial court erred by dismissing Lindberg III after finding the one-year extended statute of limitations expired just days before plaintiffs filed the complaint in Lindberg III. Defendants contend plaintiffs forfeited this argument and all others by failing to file a written, responsive pleading to defendants' individual motions to dismiss the complaint filed on December 6, 2010. Alternatively, forfeiture aside, defendants respond the trial court properly dismissed plaintiffs' complaint as being filed outside the period permitted for refiling by section 13-217 of the Code.
Plaintiffs further assert the 2008 complaint (1) properly stated causes of action for tortious interference with business relations and eavesdropping, (2) the tortious interference cause of action is not barred by the principle of judicial nonreview, and (3) the Illinois eavesdropping cause of action is not barred by res judicata.
¶ 33 Waiver
¶ 34 We first address defendants' contention that plaintiffs waived review of the statute of limitation arguments now raised in this appeal by failing to file a responsive pleading with respect to defendants' individual motions to dismiss filed on December 6, 2010. ¶ 35 In this case, all named defendants' jointly filed a single section 2-619.1 motion to dismiss on April 6, 2009. The court heard arguments from both parties and took the matter under advisement on November 15, 2010, but did not issue a ruling on the joint motion. Instead, the court allowed defendants to file additional individual motions to dismiss on December 6, 2010, apparently without objection from plaintiffs. The trial court heard arguments on January 12, 2011, from all parties on the individual motions to dismiss. ¶ 36 Contrary to defendants' position, a responsive pleading is not required with respect to a motion to dismiss and a party may simply personally appear to argue the motion before the court. See People ex rel. Director of Corrections v. Edwards, 349 Ill. App. 3d 383, 389 (the court noted the absence of a written response to a motion to dismiss is of no import, since the docket entry indicated both parties were present and arguments were heard on the motions to dismiss.) In this case, plaintiffs argued both the jointly filed motion to dismiss, and the individual motions to dismiss, before the court on separate dates. Here, the trial court did not grant the motions to dismiss by default. Rather, the court heard arguments from the parties, including plaintiffs, before taking the motions under advisement. The record does not reveal defendants objected to allowing plaintiffs to verbally state their position on the motions to dismiss during arguments before the court. We conclude plaintiffs have not waived their objections to each motion to dismiss since the trial court permitted them to argue their position before the court during both the first hearing on November 15, 2010, and the subsequent hearing held before the court on January 12, 2011.
To date, the trial court has not issued a ruling on this joint motion.
¶ 37 Statute of Limitations
¶ 38 In this case, plaintiffs challenge the circuit court's "Memorandum of Decision" dated March 20, 2013, denying plaintiffs' section 2-1203 motion to vacate the previous dismissal order. Plaintiffs assert the trial court erred by refusing to allow their motion to vacate the ruling dismissing both count I and count II of Lindberg III, after finding both counts were time-barred. On appeal, plaintiffs argue each count of Lindberg III was timely with regard to the respective dates of dismissal in Lindberg I and Lindberg II, the federal actions. ¶ 39 Conversely, defendants contend the date of dismissal in Lindberg I, December 18, 2007, controls the outcome of this appeal. Defendants submit the December 23, 2008 complaint in Lindberg III was not filed within one year of the federal court's dismissal of Lindberg I on December 18, 2007. Defendants do not address the procedural significance of plaintiffs' Rule 59(e) motion to reconsider filed on January 2, 2008 and decided by the federal court, in Lindberg I, on August 25, 2008.
¶ 40 Standard of Review
¶ 41 This court reviews the denial of a motion to vacate filed pursuant to section 2-1203 of the Code for an abuse of discretion. Regas v. Associated Radiologists, Ltd., 230 Ill. App. 3d 959, 967 (1992); Jacobo v. Vandervere, 401 Ill. App. 3d 712, 715 (2010). When ruling on a section 2-619 motion to dismiss, a trial court must interpret all pleadings and supporting documents in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Wackrow v. Niemi, 231 Ill. 2d 418, 422 (2008). Section 13-217 provides that when an "action is dismissed by a United States District Court for lack of jurisdiction," the plaintiff "may commence a new action within one year or within the remaining period of limitation, whichever is greater after *** the action is dismissed by a United States District Court for lack of jurisdiction." 735 ILCS 5/13-217 (West 2008).
Defendants raise the statute of limitations issue pursuant to section 2-619 in their individual motions to dismiss.
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¶ 42 Dismissal of Count I of Lindberg III
¶ 43 Interestingly, the detailed procedural history set out in the statement of facts above, clearly reveals that neither defendants' joint motion to dismiss filed on April 6, 2009, nor the subsequently filed individual motions to dismiss, requested the trial court to decide whether count I of Lindberg III, was untimely based on section 13-217 of the Code. Specifically, defendants requested the circuit court to dismiss count I of Lindberg III on grounds related to the failure to state a cause of action and the doctrine of judicial nonreview. ¶ 44 However, the trial court's decision issued on March 20, 2013, explained the court dismissed plaintiffs' December 23, 2008 complaint in Lindberg III, including count I, due to a violation of section 13-217's extended statute of limitations, which defendants did not assert as a basis for dismissal of count I of Lindberg III. Thus, we conclude the court should have reconsidered its ruling with respect to count I of Lindberg III and allowed the section 2-1203 motion to vacate the dismissal of count I of Lindberg III on this basis. ¶ 45 Additionally, it is clear from the record count I of Lindberg III, filed on December 23, 2008, mirrors count IV from Lindberg II, which the federal court dismissed on June 16, 2008. Simple mathematics reveals count I of Lindberg III, was filed just six months after the federal court's dismissal of count IV (and all other counts) of Lindberg II. Lindberg III was filed six months later and, consequently, was timely with respect to the one-year extended statute of limitations at issue in this appeal. Since the trial court erred by finding count I time-barred, we reverse the court's order denying plaintiffs' section 2-1203 motion to vacate the dismissal of count I of Lindberg III. ¶ 46 However, the trial court's March 20, 2013 decision makes it clear to this court that the trial court did not consider or address the other reasons for dismissal raised in the pleadings with respect to count I, specifically, (1) failure to state a cause of action, and; (2) the applicability of the doctrine of judicial nonreview. Rather than addressing those issues for the first time on appeal, as argued in the parties' briefs, we remand the matter to the trial court to consider and rule on those other issues raised in the motions to dismiss with respect to count I of Lindberg III.
¶ 47 Dismissal of Count II of Lindberg III
¶ 48 The analysis with respect to the timeliness of count II of Lindberg III is not quite as straightforward as the dismissal of count I of Lindberg III, discussed above. As previously stated, count II of Lindberg III mirrors the claims previously filed in Lindberg I. The federal court dismissed these state court claims in Lindberg I, alleging violations of the Illinois eavesdropping statute, for lack of federal jurisdiction, after allowing defendants' summary judgment motion on December 18, 2007. ¶ 49 The procedural history detailed in the statement of facts of this decision reveals that on January 2, 2008, plaintiff filed a Rule 59(e) motion to reconsider the federal court's ruling of December 18, 2007 allowing summary judgment on the federal claims. The federal court denied the motion to reconsider on August 25, 2008, triggering a federal appeal. However, plaintiff filed Lindberg III just four months after the court denied the Rule 59(e) motion to reconsider on August 25, 2008. ¶ 50 In the instant case, the trial court relied on Wade v. Byles, 295 Ill. App. 3d 545 (1998), finding the facts of that case to be "closely analogous" to the facts in the case at bar. However, we conclude Wade is distinguishable. In Wade, the federal district court granted defendants' motion for summary judgment on the federal claim and dismissed the state law claims for lack of jurisdiction. Id. at 546. Unlike plaintiffs in this case, the plaintiff in Wade did not first request the federal court to reconsider its ruling, but simply appealed the decision, and then refiled in state court more than one year after the federal court originally dismissed the federal case. Id. The state appellate court in Wade affirmed the trial court's dismissal based on section 13-217 of the Code (725 ILCS 5/13-217 (West 2008)), concluding that the federal action was no longer pending, "appeal or not." Id. at 546-47. ¶ 51 Based on Wade, we agree plaintiff's federal appeal in Lindberg I, which was pending at the time plaintiffs filed their December 23, 2008 complaint in Lindberg III, the instant case, did not operate to toll the date of dismissal of Lindberg I in federal court. Yet, the circuit court, in this case, did not focus on the fact that plaintiff's Rule 59(e) motion to reconsider in federal court may have operated to keep the matter pending in federal court until August 25, 2008, when the federal court denied the motion and the appellate process began as plaintiffs now contend. ¶ 52 In the case at bar, plaintiffs rely on Bowers v. Village of Valentine, 204 Ill. App. 3d 135 (1990), and argue the Rule 59(e) motion to reconsider, filed in federal court after the dismissal of Lindberg I, operated to toll the effective date of dismissal until the date the federal court decided the motion to reconsider on August 25, 2008. We agree this case is persuasive. ¶ 53 In Bowers, the state court dismissed plaintiff's state court complaint for want of prosecution, and defendant filed a motion to vacate the court's order. Id. at 136. The trial court ultimately denied plaintiff's motion to vacate, and plaintiff refiled his complaint pursuant to section 13-217 of the Code. Id. The appellate court held that the time period for refiling a complaint specified by section 13-217 did not begin to run until the court denied the plaintiff's posttrial motion to vacate, and therefore, the filing of the new complaint was timely in that case. Id. at 138. ¶ 54 Furthermore, Illinois case law provides that the time for refiling an action under section 13-217 is analogous to the time for filing a notice of appeal pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 303, which provides a notice of appeal must be filed within 30 days after the entry of an order which disposes of the first pending posttrial motion. Wilson v. Evanston Hospital, 276 Ill. App. 3d 885, 887 (1995); Ill. S. Ct. R. 303 (eff. June 4, 2008). Similarly, Rule 4(a)(4)(iv) of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure provides that if a party timely files, in the district court, a Rule 59 motion to reconsider, as in the case at bar, the time for an appeal runs for all parties from the entry of the order disposing of the last such remaining motion. Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(4)(iv) (eff. Dec. 1, 2011). ¶ 55 Based on this record, we conclude the trial court, in this case, incorrectly relied on Wade, which involved a pending appeal after a dismissal in federal court. Here, plaintiff's Rule 59(e) motion to reconsider, not the appeal that followed the denial of that motion, in Lindberg I, tolled the date for the one-year extended statute of limitations for refiling of those claims in state court to August 25, 2008, the date the federal court denied plaintiff's first posttrial motion. As a result, the filing of the complaint in state court, with respect to count II, on December 23, 2008, was timely. Consequently, we reverse the trial court's dismissal of count II of Lindberg III, after concluding plaintiff timely filed Lindberg III within the extended one-year time period provided by section 13-217 of the Code. ¶ 56 However, as mentioned above, the trial court did not address the other reasons for dismissal raised in defendants' individual motions to dismiss with respect to count II, namely, vicarious liability and the impact of the federal court's ruling on liability in the state court case. Rather than addressing those issues for the first time on appeal, as argued by the parties on appeal, we remand the matter to the trial court to consider and rule on the other issues raised in defendants' individual section 2-615 and section 2-619 motions to dismiss with respect to count II of Lindberg III. For the reasons set forth above, we conclude the trial court abused its discretion by denying plaintiffs' section 2-1203 motion to vacate, and reverse the trial court's ruling at this time. We remand the matter for the trial court to rule on the other grounds raised in defendants' individual section 2-615 and section 2-619 motions to dismiss.
¶ 57 CONCLUSION
¶ 58 For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the circuit court of Iroquois County is reversed and the matter is remanded to the trial court to rule on the other grounds raised in defendants' motions to dismiss. 17 ¶ 59 Reversed and remanded.