Opinion
No. 1 CA-IC 18-0021
01-24-2019
VALORIE MECKLENBURG, Petitioner, v. THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF ARIZONA, Respondent, GILBERT UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 41, Respondent Employer, THE ARIZONA SCHOOL ALLIANCE, Respondent Carrier.
COUNSEL Valorie Mecklenburg, Mesa Petitioner Industrial Commission of Arizona, Phoenix By Stacey Ann Rogan Counsel for Respondent ICA Jardine Baker Hickman & Houston PLLC, Phoenix By Stephen C. Baker Counsel for Respondent Employer and Respondent Carrier
NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION. UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.
Special Action - Industrial Commission
ICA Claim No. 20170-930583
Carrier Claim No. 2016003194A
The Honorable Gaetano J. Testini, Administrative Law Judge
AWARD AFFIRMED
COUNSEL
Valorie Mecklenburg, Mesa
Petitioner
Industrial Commission of Arizona, Phoenix
By Stacey Ann Rogan
Counsel for Respondent ICA
Jardine Baker Hickman & Houston PLLC, Phoenix
By Stephen C. Baker
Counsel for Respondent Employer and Respondent Carrier
MEMORANDUM DECISION
Judge Kent E. Cattani delivered the decision of the Court, in which Presiding Judge Jennifer B. Campbell and Judge Paul J. McMurdie joined.
CATTANI, Judge:
¶1 Valorie Mecklenburg seeks special action review of an Industrial Commission of Arizona award and decision upon review denying her workers' compensation claim. For reasons that follow, we affirm the award.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
¶2 Mecklenburg was a food service worker at Gilbert Unified School District, and her job required that she repeatedly bend over and push carts and racks of food. In late 2016, Mecklenburg began experiencing back pain, and it became progressively worse during the following months. Mecklenburg did not know what caused the pain, and she did not associate its onset with any specific triggering event or injury. In March 2017, she filed a workers' compensation claim for her back pain, which the insurance carrier denied, and she requested a hearing before an administrative law judge ("ALJ").
¶3 Prior to the hearing, the carrier sent Mecklenburg for a medical evaluation by Dr. Gary Dilla, a physician board certified in physical medicine as well as rehabilitation and pain medicine. Dr. Dilla evaluated Mecklenburg and reviewed her medical records, including an October 2017 lumbar MRI, and he determined that Mecklenburg had multilevel degenerative changes of the lumbar spine. Dr. Dilla ultimately concluded, however, that there was no objective evidence that the degeneration was causally connected to Mecklenburg's employment.
¶4 Dr. Dilla did not testify at the evidentiary hearing, but his report was admitted into evidence. Mecklenburg testified, but she did not identify a precipitating event that caused her injury, and she did not present other medical evidence.
¶5 After the close of evidence, the ALJ found that Mecklenburg had failed to show a causal connection between her work and her injury,
and thus that her claim was not compensable. Mecklenburg requested administrative review, and the ALJ affirmed the decision upon review.
¶6 Mecklenburg timely filed this statutory special action, and we have jurisdiction under Arizona Revised Statutes ("A.R.S.") §§ 12-120.21(A)(2), 23-951(A), and Rule 10 of the Arizona Rules of Procedure for Special Actions.
DISCUSSION
¶7 Mecklenburg first argues that the ALJ erred by finding that she failed to establish a compensable claim. We defer to the ALJ's factual findings but independently review the ALJ's legal conclusions. Young v. Indus. Comm'n, 204 Ariz. 267, 270, ¶ 14 (App. 2003).
¶8 For a workers' compensation claim to be compensable, the claimant must prove that her injury was causally connected to her employment. A.R.S. § 23-1021; Hypl v. Indus. Comm'n, 210 Ariz. 381, 383-84, ¶ 6 (App. 2005). When the cause of injury is not readily apparent to a layperson, the claimant must prove causation to a reasonable degree of medical probability through expert medical testimony. Hackworth v. Indus. Comm'n, 229 Ariz. 339, 343, ¶ 9 (App. 2012).
¶9 Here, the cause of Mecklenburg's injury was not readily apparent to a layperson, and she failed to prove that the injury was work related. Although given multiple opportunities to present medical evidence to show the cause of her injury, Mecklenburg did not do so. Moreover, the carrier presented Dr. Dilla's medical report showing that there was no objective evidence of a causal connection between Mecklenburg's injury and her employment. Given the absence of controverting medical testimony, Mecklenburg has not established that the ALJ erred by accepting Dr. Dilla's conclusion. See Hopkins v. Indus. Comm'n, 176 Ariz. 173, 177 (App. 1993). Accordingly, the record supports the ALJ's finding that Mecklenburg's injury was not compensable.
¶10 Mecklenburg further argues that her employer and the insurance carrier engaged in "unfair claim practice/delay of time," which she bases on Dr. Dilla's failure to craft a treatment plan for her and the delay between the evaluation and the report. But as Dr. Dilla had explained to Mecklenburg, his role was that of an evaluator, not a treating physician. See A.R.S. § 23-1026(A). Dr. Dilla's evaluation did not create a physician-patient relationship, and he had no duty to provide Mecklenburg with a treatment plan or otherwise facilitate her treatment. See Hafner v. Beck, 185 Ariz. 389, 391-92 (App. 1995).
¶11 To the extent Mecklenburg argues that her employer engaged in unfair claim practices, she waived this issue by failing to raise it with the Industrial Commission as required under A.R.S. § 23-930(A). Moreover, to the extent Mecklenburg now asserts that her employer retaliated against her for filing a workers' compensation claim, such an assertion is beyond the scope of workers' compensation proceedings and must be raised as a separate cause of action under the Arizona Employment Protection Act. See A.R.S. § 23-1501(A)(3)(c)(iii).
¶12 Finally, Mecklenburg argues that her employer was negligent by failing to protect its employees. But workers' compensation is a no-fault system. See A.R.S. § 23-1021; see also Aitken v. Indus. Comm'n, 183 Ariz. 387, 393 (1995) ("[I]n the context of efficiently and expeditiously providing compensation to injured workers, which is what the system is designed to do, fault remains no consideration."). Thus, this issue has no bearing on Mecklenburg's workers' compensation claim.
CONCLUSION
¶13 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm.