Opinion
2013 CA 2178
09-19-2014
MICHAEL MEAUX v. CARTER CONSTRUCTION COMPANY
Lawrence Blake Jones Stephen F. Armbruster New Orleans, Louisiana Counsel for Plaintiff/Appellant Michael Meaux Kathleen P. Rice Patrick J. McShane Lara N. DiCristina New Orleans, Louisiana Counsel for Defendant/Appellee Carter Construction Company, Inc.
NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION On Appeal from the Nineteenth Judicial District Court In and for the Parish of East Baton Rouge State of Louisiana
No. C569298
Honorable Kay Bates, Judge Presiding Lawrence Blake Jones
Stephen F. Armbruster
New Orleans, Louisiana
Counsel for Plaintiff/Appellant
Michael Meaux
Kathleen P. Rice
Patrick J. McShane
Lara N. DiCristina
New Orleans, Louisiana
Counsel for Defendant/Appellee
Carter Construction Company, Inc.
BEFORE: WHIPPLE, C.J., McCLENDON, AND HIGGINBOTHAM, J J.
McCLENDON, J.
In this maritime personal injury action, a seaman appeals a trial court judgment following a trial on the merits that dismissed, with prejudice, his claims against his employer. For the following reasons, we affirm.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On March 6, 2007, Michael Meaux was employed by Carter Construction Company, Inc. ("Carter") as a crew member working aboard the "M/V Betty Sue," a crane barge, and an anchor barge, on a project involving a dredging operation in the navigable waters of this state. Cory Ducote, a fellow crew member, fell into the water when he was attempting to cross the anchor barge to the crane barge. Mr. Meaux alleges that, in the process of trying to rescue his fellow crewman, he lost his footing and fell backwards onto the steel deck of the anchor barge and injured himself. On July 28, 2008, Mr. Meaux filed suit and named Carter as the sole defendant, asserting claims under the Jones Act (46 U.S.C.A. § 30104), general maritime law, and LSA-C.C. art. 2315. Mr. Meaux alleged that he "was in no manner negligent" and that Carter and/or its agents were solely responsible for his injuries.
Following a three day trial, the trial court took the matter under advisement. On September 28, 2012, the trial court issued written reasons for judgment, finding that Mr. Meaux had not proven that Carter's negligence caused his accident. The trial court further found that even if it were to conclude that Carter was negligent, Mr. Meaux had not proven that the accident caused injuries to his back and neck. In its reasons for judgment, the trial court questioned the credibility of Mr. Meaux's statements, noting:
During the course of the trial, the Court became aware that the plaintiff, Michael Meaux, had been dishonest and/or deceitful with the investigator assigned to the accident, Mac Lipscomb, his treating physicians, his fiance and others involved in this matter. The Court finds that Mr. Meaux's credibility has been seriously called into question regarding the events of March 6, 2007.The trial court subsequently signed a judgment dismissing Mr. Meaux's claims with prejudice.
Mr. Meaux timely filed a motion for new trial. The trial court denied Mr. Meaux's motion, again specifically noting in its judgment that Mr. Meaux was not credible. Mr. Meaux has appealed, assigning the following as error:
1. The trial court was clearly wrong in finding that plaintiff did not prove defendant's negligence was a cause of his maritime accident.
2. The trial court was clearly wrong for failing to find that unseaworthiness was a cause of plaintiff's maritime accident and resultant injuries.
3. The trial court was clearly wrong in finding that plaintiff's maritime work accident did not cause him to suffer new injuries or aggravate ... pre-existing ones, thereby causing his subsequent need for neck and back surgeries.
4. The trial court was clearly wrong in finding that defendant did not have a legal obligation to provide "cure," i.e. to pay the costs of medical treatment for injuries incurred by a stipulated Jones Act seaman aboard his employer's vessel.
DISCUSSION
The Jones Act allows an injured seaman to bring a negligence suit against his employer. 46 U.S.C.A. § 30104. The employer's potential liability extends to all personal injuries arising during the course of the seaman's employment, but proof of negligence is essential to recovery. Such negligence may arise in many ways including the failure to use reasonable care to provide a seaman with a safe place to work, the existence of a dangerous condition on or about the vessel, or any other breach of the duty of care. Foster v. Destin Trading Corp., 96-0803 (La. 5/30/97), 700 So.2d 199, 208 (on rehearing). The seaman bears the evidentiary burden of proving that a breach of the duty owed by the employer was a cause of his injuries. Id. A vessel owner also has an absolute duty to furnish a seaworthy vessel, meaning a vessel and equipment reasonably suited for its intended purpose. Vendetto v. Sonat Offshore Drilling Co., 97-3103 (La. 1/20/99), 725 So.2d 474, 481, cert. denied, 527 U.S. 1023, 119 S.Ct. 2369, 144 L.Ed.2d 773 (1999), Foster, 700 So.2d at 209. A breach of that duty gives rise to a claim for general damages. Vendetto, 725 So.2d at 481. In order for a plaintiff to recover on an unseaworthiness claim he must not only prove that the vessel was unseaworthy, but he must also show that the unseaworthy condition was the proximate (that is the direct and substantial) cause of his injury. Alverez v. J. Ray McDermott & Co., Inc., 674 F.2d 1037, 1043 (5th Cir. 1982).
In a Jones Act case, the court should determine the negligence of the employer according to the standard of a reasonable employer under like circumstances, and should determine the contributory negligence of the seaman according to the standard of a reasonable seamen under like circumstances. Vendetto, 725 So.2d at 479. However, a seaman need only present "slight evidence" that his employer's negligence caused his injuries in order to reach the jury or to be sustained upon appellate review. Foster, 700 So.2d at 208. Though the burden of proving negligence and causation in a Jones Act case is a light one, the mere occurrence of an injury does not presuppose negligence. Marvin v. Central Gulf Lines, Inc., 554 F.2d 1295, 1299 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1035, 98 S.Ct. 769, 54 L.Ed.2d 782 (1978).
In general maritime and Jones Act cases, Louisiana appellate courts apply the manifest error-clearly wrong standard of review to findings of fact. Coutee v. Global Marine Drilling Co., 05-0756 (La. 2/22/06), 924 So.2d 112, 116. The manifest error-clearly wrong standard also applies to the trial court's factual determination of a vessel's seaworthiness. See Vendetto, 725 So.2d at 481. When findings are based on determinations regarding the credibility of witnesses, the manifest error-clearly wrong standard demands great deference to the trier of fact's findings; for only the factfinder can be aware of the variations in demeanor and tone of voice that bear so heavily on the listener's understanding and belief in what is said. Rosell v. ESCO, 549 So.2d 840, 844 (La. 1989). Where there are two permissible views of the evidence, the fact finder's choice between them cannot be manifestly erroneous or clearly wrong. Coutee, 924 So.2d at 116.
Mr. Meaux contends that he presented sufficient evidence to prove that Carter breached a duty and that the breach was a cause of his injuries. Mr. Meaux asserts that Mr. Ducote slipped either because there was oil on the deck of the crane barge or because Mr. Ducote tried to jump from one barge to the other before they were properly aligned. Mr. Meaux asserts that in either event—by having oil on the crane barge's deck or by having an untrained or unfit crew—the vessel was unseaworthy and Carter was negligent. Mr. Meaux contends that such negligence directly led to his fall and resulting injuries when he attempted to rescue Mr. Ducote. Mr. Meaux avers that a seaman who is injured while trying to save someone's life is given the benefit of the doubt under a principle known as the "rescue doctrine." See Sanford Bros. Boats, Inc. v. Vidrine, 412 F.2d 958, 966 (5th Cir. 1969). Accordingly, Mr. Meaux concludes that the trial court manifestly erred in finding that defendant's negligence was not a cause of his maritime accident.
Following our review of the record, we cannot conclude that the trial court was clearly wrong in failing to assess Carter with any fault. See Caravalho v. Dual Drilling Services, Inc., 93-560 (La.App. 3rd Cir. 2/2/94), 631 So.2d 725, 729, writ denied, 94-0878 (La. 5/13/94), 637 So.2d 1074 ("The trial judge presiding over the proceeding concluded that plaintiffs testimony was not credible, and we are loathe to upset his conclusions from a cold transcript. A finding of liability [based on seaworthiness and negligence under the Jones Act] by a trial court is a finding of fact which a reviewing court may not disturb unless the record evidence does not furnish a sufficient basis for that finding, or the finding is clearly wrong.") We note, as did the trial court, that "Mr. Meaux believe[d] that Mr. Ducote had hit his head when he fell rendering him unconscious and in need of immediate assistance." The trial court, however, found the explanation of how Mr. Ducote fell was "best described and most accurately relayed to the Court by Don Ray Jackson, dredge captain on the vessel the day of the accident, who was present and also assisted Mr. Ducote after he fell into the water."
The trial court noted that Mr. Jackson testified that Mr. Ducote, in the process of stepping from the anchor barge to the crane barge, slipped and fell in the water. Mr. Jackson did not mention "oil" or that Mr. Ducote "slipped on oil" when he recounted how Mr. Ducote fell in the water. Keith Marks, a superintendent for Carter, testified that the accident report reflected that Mr. Ducote slipped on the anchor barge. Mr. Marks indicated that there would not have been any oil or hydraulic fluid located on the anchor barge. Although both Mr. Meaux and Mr. Ducote indicated that Mr. Ducote slipped on oil, in light of the foregoing testimony, we cannot conclude that the trial court's finding that oil did not cause Mr. Ducote's fall was manifestly erroneous.
Contrarily, Mr. Meaux testified that Mr. Ducote slipped on the crane barge.
The trial court also relied on Mr. Jackson's testimony and found that "Mr. Ducote had a life jacket on and was floating in the water when he and Mr. Meaux arrived to help him up." Mr. Jackson "stated more than one time in his deposition that Mr. Ducote was not unconscious when they were pulling him up from the water but was helping to pull himself up as well." Mr. Jackson also testified that at the time of Mr. Meaux's fall, Mr. Ducote was already safely aboard the barge, and Mr. Meaux "just went to back up away from [Mr. Ducote] ... and the back of [Mr. Meaux's] legs hit that brace that hold up that A-frame. That's what caused him to fall over backwards ... on the barge."
Prior to trial, Mr. Meaux claimed that Mr. Ducote grabbed his legs causing him to fall. At trial, however, the trial court noted that Mr. Meaux seemed unsure of whether Mr. Ducote actually grabbed his legs and shifted his account of what happened.
Additionally, we note that Mr. Marks indicated that the frame and brace were painted safety yellow, and they are normal appurtenances of the barge. Mr. Marks indicated "that there is no way [Mr. Meaux] could have lifted something and just tripped backwards. He had to walk 10-foot [sic] before he backed up over something." Considering the foregoing, we cannot conclude that the trial court was manifestly erroneous in finding that Mr. Meaux caused his own fall by walking backwards on the anchor barge and that Carter bore no responsibility for his accident. Assignments of error numbers one and two are without merit.
In light of our ruling on assignment of error numbers one and two, we pretermit discussion of assignment of error number three, except to the extent necessary to discuss assignment of error number four.
Even though we find no manifest error in the trial court's conclusion that Carter was not negligent, we must review whether Mr. Meaux's back and neck injuries occurred or manifested themselves while he was servicing Carter's vessel to determine if Mr. Meaux is entitled to "cure." Cure is an obligation imposed upon a shipowner to provide for a seaman who becomes ill or injured during his service to the ship. Boudreaux v. U.S., 280 F.3d 461, 468 (5th Cir. 2002). The duty to provide cure encompasses not only the obligation to reimburse medical expenses actually incurred, but also to ensure that the seaman receives the proper treatment and care. Id. The obligation is independent of tort law, and the shipowner's duty to pay is not affected by the injured seaman's own negligence. Id. The obligation to pay cure applies to any injury or illness which occurs or manifests itself while the seaman is in the service of the vessel. The injury or illness need not result from or be caused by the seaman's employment. Calmar S. S. Corp. v. Taylor, 303 U.S. 525, 527-30, 58 S.Ct. 651, 653-54, 82 L.Ed. 993 (1938). Moreover, ambiguities or doubts in the application of the law of cure should be resolved in favor of the seaman. Gaspard v. Taylor Diving and Salvage Co., Inc., 649 F.2d 372, n.2 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied 455 U.S. 907, 102 S.Ct. 1252, 71 LEd.2d 445 (1982). Determination of cure is a factual issue, and therefore is reviewed under the manifest error-clearly wrong standard. See Simmons v. Hope Contractors, Inc., 517 So.2d 333, 339 (La.App. 1st Cir. 1987), writ denied, 518 So.2d 510 (La. 1988).
Mr. Meaux does not seek review of the trial court's denial of maintenance.
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In assignment of error number four, Mr. Meaux contends that the trial court was clearly wrong for not awarding "cure." Mr. Meaux asserts that based on the testimony of Mr. Jackson and the opinions of the treating physicians, the court should have held that Mr. Meaux's injuries occurred while in service to his vessel. At a minimum, Mr. Meaux contends that it has been established that he aggravated pre-existing injuries or conditions following his fall on the vessel such that Carter is responsible for cure.
The trial court found that Mr. Meaux's buttocks made the initial contact when he fell. The trial court noted that immediately following the incident, "Mr. Jackson remembered Mr. Meaux primarily complaining of buttocks pain and he, Mr. Jackson, advised another man on the barge, named Bill, to make a report and take Mr. Meaux to the doctor as [Mr. Meaux] was complaining of discomfort in his buttocks." Although Dr. Keith Mack, Mr. Meaux's primary physician, and Dr. John Cobb, Mr. Meaux's orthopedic surgeon, indicated that Mr. Meaux's back and neck injuries were related to his fall, the trial court noted that the physicans' findings were based on inaccurate medical history presented by Mr. Meaux. Specifically, Mr. Meaux informed both physicians, and testified at trial, that he had never sustained an injury to his neck or back prior to the 2007 barge incident. However, the trial court noted that Mr. Meaux had two prior motor vehicle accidents in 2004 and reported neck and back problems after those incidents. The trial court also noted that Mr. Meaux was injured coming down from a cell phone tower in 2003 and that he treated with Dr. Samuel Okole for complaints of neck and back pain. The trial court concluded that Mr. Meaux had not given his treating physicians "all the information ... regarding his prior history in order to make an accurate and informed decision about causation."
Specifically, Mr. Meaux testified that following the 2003 tower incident, he treated with Dr. Okole only for issues related to his ankle. However, Dr. Okole's records reflected that Mr. Meaux was in constant neck pain and complaining of lower back pain with radiculopathy. Mr. Meaux indicated that he does not know why Dr. Okole had written that in his chart, but stated that he never read what the doctor had written. Mr. Meaux acknowledged that he stopped seeing Dr. Okole in June 2006 because "he told me to stop coming," and I did not have the money to pay him.
Mr. Meaux also acknowledged that he hired an attorney to represent him following an automobile accident in 2004. A settlement letter sent by Mr. Meaux's attorney indicated that Mr. Meaux was experiencing pain in his neck and lower back, among other areas, with the pain in his back being the worst. Mr. Meaux indicated that he had only spoken to his attorney once, however, and had "never said none of that."
Further, intake booking records introduced into evidence reflects that Mr. Meaux presented consistent complaints of back pain to prison officials from 2003 through 2005. An October 25, 2005 entry reflects that Mr. Meaux indicated that he had "three ruptured discs." However, Mr. Meaux testified that he had never been diagnosed with ruptured discs and admitted he consistently lied to prison officials about back pain because he wanted to be considered a "code 7" so that he could sleep on the bottom bunk.
We note that Dr. Douglas Bernard, an orthopedic surgeon who performed an independent medical exam on Mr. Meaux, testified that Mr. Meaux's statements cannot be relied upon to reach a medical causation opinion, given Mr. Meaux's history and inconsistencies to various physicians about his neck and back pain. Dr. Bernard utilized a holistic approach to develop a medical causation opinion—the clinical examination studies, the patient's history, and the diagnostic studies. Dr. Bernard indicated that a review of the three components revealed alarming concerns or "red flags" about the legitimacy of Mr. Meaux's medical picture. For example, after inconsistent findings from a straight leg raising test administered to Mr. Meaux, Dr. Bernhard noted:
And I got kind of curious. I said, well, if [Mr. Meaux is] going to do this, let me try the arms. So I took his left arm and I raise it up -while he's lying down, I raised his arm up, and he had no complaints at all. And I took the other arm, and I raised it up, and I just got it up a little ways, and he wouldn't let me go any higher complaining of severe pain. And that is absolutely, totally unanatomic and unphysiologic. There's just no reason for that at all.Dr. Bernhard indicated that in thirty years of practice, it was the first time he had ever seen a positive arm raising. Taking into account all relevant factors, Dr. Bernard opined that there was "[n]o evidence of an injury other than a minor slip and fall."
We recognize that a seaman's right to cure, in cases involving pre-existing medical conditions, turn upon the question of whether the pre-existing condition was aggravated or reactivated during the service. The trial court noted that the treating physicians' opinions, in linking Mr. Meaux's neck and back injuries and/or any exacerbation of those injuries to the incident, were primarily based on the inaccurate and incomplete history provided by Mr. Meaux. Although Mr. Meaux remained steadfast at trial and in his statements to his treating physicians that he had never experienced any prior neck or back pain, there is ample evidence in the record to suggest otherwise. In light of the foregoing, coupled with the testimony of Dr. Bernard, we find no manifest error in the trial court's denial of cure insofar as there is a reasonable basis in the record to conclude that Mr. Meaux's neck and back injuries did not occur or manifest themselves while he was servicing Carter's vessel. Therefore, we find no merit to assignment of error number four.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed. Costs of this appeal are assessed to the appellant, Michael Meaux.
AFFIRMED.