Opinion
No. 594 C.D. 2014
01-06-2015
The Meadows at Lehigh Valley, L.P., Appellant v. County of Northampton Revenue Appeals Board and Bethlehem Area School District and County of Northampton
BEFORE: HONORABLE DAN PELLEGRINI, President Judge HONORABLE P. KEVIN BROBSON, Judge HONORABLE JAMES GARDNER COLINS, Senior Judge
OPINION NOT REPORTED
MEMORANDUM OPINION BY PRESIDENT JUDGE PELLEGRINI
The Meadows at Lehigh Valley, L.P. (Taxpayer) appeals an order of the Court of Common Pleas of Northampton County (trial court) granting Bethlehem Area School District (School District) and County of Northampton's (County) motion in limine to preclude Taxpayer from introducing evidence of base-year valuation at trial. Because we conclude that we do not have jurisdiction, we quash the appeal.
I.
Taxpayer owns three parcels of real property situated in Northampton County, Pennsylvania, a third-class county subject to the Consolidated County Assessment Law (Law). In 2012, the School District initiated three appeals with the County of Northampton Revenue Appeals Board (Board) claiming that each parcel's fair-market value exceeds its assessment. Following a hearing, the Board dismissed the School District's appeals for failure to submit appraisals and resolved to retain the same assessments.
Taxpayer then filed an appeal pursuant to 53 Pa. C.S. §8854(a)(9)(i), arguing that the assessments "are unlawfully excessive, improperly determined and non-uniform with respect to other assessed real estate in Northampton County." (Reproduced Record [R.R.] at 13a.) The County and School District intervened, and the School District also filed its own fair-market value appeals under 53 Pa. C.S. §8854(a)(2), which the trial court consolidated with Taxpayer's appeals pursuant to the parties' joint request.
Section 8854(a)(9)(i) of the Law provides, "Nothing in this subsection shall...[p]revent an appellant from appealing a base-year valuation without reference to ratio." 53 Pa. C.S. §8854(a)(9)(i). Section 8802 of the Law defines "base year" as:
[t]he year upon which real property market values are based for the most recent countywide revision of assessment of real property or other prior year upon which the market value of all real property of the county is based for assessment purposes. Real property market values shall be equalized within the county and any changes by the board shall be expressed in terms of base-year values.53 Pa. C.S. §8802.
Section 8854(a)(1)-(2) of the Law further states, "Any appellant, property owner or affected taxing district may appeal the board's decision to the court of common pleas," challenging the property's market value or the applicable common-level ratio. 53 Pa. C.S. §8854(a)(1)-(2).
The School District moved to quash Taxpayer's appeal on the basis that Taxpayer improperly filed one appeal from three different judgments regarding each of its tax parcels. The trial court provided Taxpayer 20 days, and during that time, Taxpayer filed an amended assessment appeal, appealing each of the Board's orders.
The School District filed a motion in limine in which the County joined, seeking to preclude the introduction of common-level ratio evidence by excluding base-year valuation evidence at trial. The trial court granted the motion, finding that Taxpayer did not assert its base-year valuation appeal before the Board "and therefore seeks to attack an issue never presented to the [Board] and/or a decision that was never made because it was not perfected and/or presented to the Board." (Trial Court Opinion, Mar. 28, 2014, at 4.) Further, the trial court found that Taxpayer did not have standing to pursue an appeal because it was not aggrieved by the Board's decision denying the School District's attempt to raise its property taxes because its taxes were not raised. Nonetheless, the trial court stated, "Now, [Taxpayer] [seeks] to directly by-pass the Revenue Appeals Board by filing an original action couched as 'an appeal' to obtain relief that is in the nature of a new action, seeking to reduce an existing assessment." (Id. at 5.) Emphasizing that the School District is the "appellant" for purposes of 53 Pa. C.S. §8854(a)(9)(i) because it is the party that originally appealed to the Board, the trial court held that only the School District had the right to initiate a base-year value appeal as per 53 Pa. C.S. §8844(c). Regarding Taxpayer's claim that because its appeal was de novo it was entitled to bring a challenge seeking a base-year valuation assessment for the first time, the trial court explained that the only claims permitted in the trial are those originally perfected before the Board. This appeal followed.
Section 8844(c) of the Law provides:
(c) Annual appeal deadline.--53 Pa. C.S. §8844(c).
(1) Any person aggrieved by any assessment, whether or not the value thereof shall have been changed since the preceding annual assessment, or any taxing district having an interest in the assessment, may appeal to the board for relief. Any person or taxing district desiring to make an appeal shall, on or before September 1 or the date designated by the county commissioners if the option under paragraph (3) is exercised, file with the board an appeal in writing, identifying the following:
(i) Appellant.
(ii) Property location.
(iii) Owner.
(iv) Assessment or assessments by which the person is aggrieved.
(v) Address to which notice of the time and place for a hearing shall be mailed.
This Court's review in tax-assessment appeals is limited to determining whether the trial court abused its discretion, committed an error of law or reached a determination not supported by substantial evidence. Herzog v. McKean County Board of Assessment Appeals, 14 A.3d 193, 199 n.15 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2011).
II.
We directed the parties to address whether the trial court's order granting the School District's motion in limine constitutes an appealable order under the Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure.
The question of whether an appeal is interlocutory is germane to our jurisdiction and may be raised sua sponte. Abington School District v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 456 A.2d 1152, 1154 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1983).
Generally, our jurisdiction regarding appeals from courts of common pleas is limited to "final orders." 42 Pa. C.S. §762(a); Pa. R.A.P. 341(a). Taxpayer contends that the subject order is final because it is tantamount to a dismissal of Taxpayer's appeal. While acknowledging that the parties' appeals were consolidated, Taxpayer argues that the dismissal effectively ends the consolidation and renders the subject order final. While couched as an evidentiary ruling, the order has the practical effect of dismissing Taxpayer's appeal on the basis that Taxpayer could not appeal the Board's decision because Taxpayer did not appeal its assessment to the Board and was not aggrieved by the School District's appeal.
However, while Taxpayer's appeal was dismissed, the dismissal was not final because it did not resolve all of the claims of all of the parties involving the same order of the Board that Taxpayer sought to challenge. Pa. R.A.P. 341(b)(1)—(3) (defining a "final order" as an order which: "(1) disposes of all claims and of all parties; or (2) is expressly defined as a final order by statute; or (3) is entered as a final order pursuant to subdivision (c) of this rule."). In this instance, even if the trial court's order adjudicated Taxpayer's appeals, it did not resolve the School District's appeals regarding the property's value, an issue on which Taxpayer can offer evidence that the value placed on the property is excessive.
The order in question does not satisfy the criteria for a final order under Rule 341(c), which provides a mechanism through which a trial court may enter a final order "as to one or more but fewer than all of the claims and parties only upon an express determination that an immediate appeal would facilitate resolution of the entire case." Pa. R.A.P. 341(c). Here, Taxpayer did not seek, and the trial court did not provide, a certification pursuant to Rule 341(c).
Nonetheless, Taxpayer contends that even if interlocutory, the subject order is appealable as a collateral order pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 313. Rule 313 permits appeals from trial courts' collateral orders and defines a "collateral order" as "an order separable from and collateral to the main cause of action where the right involved is too important to be denied review and the question presented is such that if review is postponed until final judgment in the case, the claim will be irreparably lost." Pa. R.A.P. 313(b). Rule 313's mandates "must be interpreted narrowly, and the requirements for an appealable collateral order remain stringent.... To that end, each prong of the collateral order doctrine must be clearly present before an order may be considered collateral." Melvin v. Doe, 836 A.2d 42, 47 (Pa. 2003).
Regarding the first prong of the test, our Supreme Court noted:
[A] claim is sufficiently separate from the underlying issues for purposes of collateral order review if it "is conceptually distinct from the merits of plaintiff's
claim," that is, where, even if "practically intertwined with the merits, [it] nonetheless raises a question that is significantly different from the questions underlying plaintiff's claim on the merits."Pridgen v. Parker Hannifin Corp., 905 A.2d 422, 433 (Pa. 2006) (quoting Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S. 304, 314, 115 S. Ct. 2151, 2157 (1995)), adhered to on reargument, 916 A.2d 619 (Pa. 2007).
In this regard, the issue underlying both parties' appeals is the proper valuation of Taxpayer's property. Because the trial court's order did not differ conceptually from this subject as it limited the type of valuation evidence which could be presented at trial and, therefore, did not raise a significantly different question from that raised in the underlying appeals, the first prong of the doctrine cannot be satisfied.
Because we have determined that the subject order is not separable from and collateral to the main cause of action, we need not analyze the remaining elements of the collateral order doctrine. See Melvin, 836 A.2d at 47. --------
Moreover, the uniformity claim will not be irreparably lost if review of the trial court's order is postponed until final judgment because Taxpayer can challenge the trial court's failure to allow evidence of non-uniformity which will be the proper subject of review at that time.
Accordingly, because the order from which Taxpayer appeals is neither a final order pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 341 nor a collateral order pursuant to Rule 313, we quash the appeal as an impermissible interlocutory appeal.
/s/_________
DAN PELLEGRINI, President Judge ORDER
AND NOW, this 6th day of January, 2015, The Meadows at Lehigh Valley, L.P.'s appeal from the order of the Court of Common Pleas of Northampton County dated March 28, 2014, in the above-captioned matter, is hereby quashed.
Jurisdiction is relinquished.
/s/_________
DAN PELLEGRINI, President Judge