Opinion
20194
March 29, 1976.
Messrs. Thomas E. McCutchen, and Jeter E. Rhodes, Jr., of Whaley, McCutchen Blanton, Columbia, for Appellants, cite: As to an employment contract for a duration of years, which is not supported by any consideration other than the obligation of service to be performed on the one hand and wages to be paid on the other, being terminable at the pleasure of either party and not enforceable: 227 S.C. 200, 87 S.E.2d 486. As to members of the Council of the South Carolina Medical Association not being liable to the Plaintiff for the interference with a contractual relation between the Plaintiff and the South Carolina Medical Association when the members acted within their scope of authority, in their official capacity on behalf of the Association: 180 S.E.2d 625; 34 S.E.2d 482; 128 S.E.2d 112; 242 S.C. 310, 130 S.E.2d 845; 45 Am. Jur. 2d, Interference, § 54; 43 Cornell Law Quarterly 55; 100 Ga. App. 68, 110 S.E.2d 128; 262 N.C. 121, 136 S.E.2d 569; 108 Misc. Rep. 20, 178 N.Y.S. 8; 171 Misc. Rep. 151, 11 N.Y.S.2d 912; 259 App. Div. 317, 19 N.Y.S.2d 239; 36 F. Supp. 1002; 112 F. Supp. 37; 160 F. Supp. 666; 189 Kan. 525, 370 P.2d 388; 300 P.2d 159; 63 N.Y.S.2d 54; 360 N.Y.S.2d 912.
Messrs. Wright, Scott, Blackwell Powers, of Florence, and Medlock Davis, of Columbia, for Respondent, cite: As to this appeal being dismissed since the Defendants are appealing from an order in their favor which dismissed the complaint of the Plaintiff: 4 Am. Jur.2d 616, Appeal and Error, § 101; 4 C.J.S. 328, Appeal and Error, § 116(6); § 15-123, Code of Laws of South Carolina, 1962; 74 S.C. 13, 53 S.E. 1001; 216 S.C. 188, 57 S.E.2d 249; 201 S.C. 32, 21 S.E.2d 209. As to the employment contract for a duration of years, in this case, being enforceable. 227 S.C. 200, 87 S.E.2d 486. As to members of the Council of the South Carolina Medical Association being liable to the Plaintiff for the interference with a contractual relation between the Plaintiff and the South Carolina Medical Association: 45 Am. Jur.2d 327, Interference, § 54.
Messrs. Thomas E. McCutchen and Jeter E. Rhodes, Jr., of Whaley, McCutchen Blanton, Columbia, for Appellants, in Reply, cite: As to this appeal not being dismissed: 215 S.C. 103, 54 S.E.2d 529.
March 29, 1976.
This appeal is from an order of the trial judge overruling identical demurrers, both on the ground that the two causes of action alleged in the complaint did not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. We affirm the lower court.
Suit was commenced by service of the Summons and Complaint on all appellants alleging a first cause of action against the South Carolina Medical Association for breach of employment contract and a second cause of action against the individually named appellants for intentional interference with the employment contract.
The appellants, South Carolina Medical Association, Dr. John Hawk and Dr. Donald Kilgore, served a demurrer alleging that each alleged cause of action failed to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action and that the two causes of action were improperly united. Appellant Dr. Ernest Lathem served an identical demurrer.
The court overruled the grounds of the demurrers that the complaint failed to state the two causes of action but sustained the ground of the demurrers that the two causes of action were improperly united and dismissed the complaint without prejudice. This appeal lies only from that portion of the lower court's order which overruled the demurrers. They do not appeal from the dismissal without prejudice.
The trial judge dismissed without prejudice to respondent's right to replead his case in a new complaint. Respondent's brief asserts that the records of the Court of Common Pleas for Richland County will reveal that a subsequent action has been filed against the South Carolina Medical Association similar in form but not identical to the complaint in the first action.
Section 15-123 of the 1962 Code of Laws as amended provides for our review of any intermediate order or decree in a law case involving the merits in actions commenced in the court of common pleas. Since appellants do not appeal the dismissal, the appeal of the order overruling the demurrers constitutes an intermediate order within the meaning of the code section. An order overruling a demurrer on the ground that it fails to state a cause of action is one "involving the merits".
On appeal from overruling a demurrer to a complaint this Court is required to assume the allegations of the complaint are true. Lewis v. Lewis, 199 S.C. 490, 20 S.E.2d 107 (1942). Respondent in his complaint has alleged a contract of employment for a duration of years between himself and the South Carolina Medical Association which he alleges the Association has breached causing him loss of employment. In the second cause of action he alleges that Dr. John Hawk, Dr. Donald Kilgore and Dr. Ernest Lathem unjustifiably, intentionally and maliciously interfered with the employment contract inducing its breach by the Association. When such allegations are accepted as true they state facts sufficient against demurrer.
Affirmed.
LEWIS, C.J., and LITTLEJOHN, NESS and RHODES, JJ., concur.