Opinion
No. CV02-00817446 S
May 20, 2004
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION ON PETITIONER'S AND RESPONDENT'S MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
The petitioner, Harold W. Mead, filed a pro se petition for a writ of habeas corpus on June 3, 2002, and was thereafter amended twice. The operative complaint, captioned "Corrected Amended Petition" (hereinafter "amended petition"), was filed with the court on January 15, 2004. The amended petition raises the sole claim that the petitioner's confinement is illegal due to the respondent's misinterpretation of C.G.S. § 53a-35b that has resulted in the respondent miscalculating and misapplying various statutory good time credits. The return denies petitioner's claim and asserts the defense that since C.G.S. § 53a-35b does not apply to this petitioner's sentence, the respondent has, therefore, correctly calculated petitioner's sentences.
On March 4, 2004, both the petitioner and the respondent filed motions for summary judgment, which were argued before this court on March 9, 2004. Both parties do not dispute the basic facts at issue. Consequently, the resolution of the motions for summary judgment depends on this court's interpretation of C.G.S. § 53a-35b and application of such interpretation to the agreed-upon facts. For the reasons stated more fully below, petitioner's motion for summary judgment shall be denied and respondent's motion for summary judgment shall be granted.
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. The petitioner was indicted on March 8, 1971 by a New Haven County grand jury on three counts of murder in the first degree, in violation of C.G.S. Statutes § 53-9 (repealed, 1969, P.A. 828 § 214, eff. Oct. 1, 1971). The underlying offenses were committed on or about August 12, 1970.
The underlying facts, which need not be restated for the purposes of this habeas corpus petition, are summarized at Meade v. Warden, 184 Conn. 597, 599-600, 440 A.2d 246 (1981).
2. On April 6, 1972, the petitioner changed his pleas of not guilty as to the three counts of murder in the first degree to guilty of three counts of second-degree murder.
3. The petitioner currently is a sentenced prisoner confined to the custody of the Commissioner of Correction pursuant to a mittimus issued on April 11, 1972. On said date, the petitioner was sentenced in docket number 17267 by the Superior Court, New Haven, to three concurrent life sentences as a result of being convicted on three counts of murder in the second degree in violation of C.G.S. § 53-9.
4. The respondent has calculated petitioner's life sentence in accordance with C.G.S. § 53a-35. Thus, the respondent has calculated the sentence as being an indeterminate sentence with a minimum term of twenty-five years and a maximum term of life.
C.G.S. § 53a-35 in relevant part states that:
(a) For any felony committed prior to July 1, 1981, the sentence of imprisonment shall be an indeterminate sentence, except as provided in subsection (d). When such a sentence is imposed the court shall impose a maximum term in accordance with the provisions of subsection (b) and the minimum term shall be as provided in subsection (c) or (d).
(b) The maximum term of an indeterminate sentence shall be fixed by the court and specified in the sentence as follows: (1) For a Class A felony, life imprisonment; . . . (6) for a capital felony, life imprisonment unless a sentence of death is imposed in accordance with section 53a-46a.
(c) Except as provided in subsection (d) the minimum term of an indeterminate sentence shall be fixed by the court and specified in the sentence as follows: (1) For a class A felony, the minimum term shall not be less than ten nor more than twenty-five years[.]
5. The petitioner has earned a variety of credits, to include jail credit, statutory good time credit, 7-day job credit and Outstanding Meritorious credit on the minimum, i.e., twenty-five year, portion of his indeterminate sentence.
6. The respondent has not credited the petitioner with any sentence credits on the maximum, i.e., life, portion of the indeterminate sentence.
7. The petitioner went before the Board of Parole upon expiration of the minimum portion of his indeterminate sentence, i.e., twenty-five years. Parole was denied at that time.
8. The petitioner last went before the Board of Parole in 2001, at which time he was given a new parole hearing date of 2011.
9. Public Acts 1980, No. 80-442, § 11, was enacted and later codified at C.G.S. § 53a-35b. A life sentence, in accordance with § 53a-35b, is a definite sentence of sixty years.
C.G.S. § 53a-35b states that: "A sentence of imprisonment for life shall mean a definite sentence of sixty years, unless the sentence is life imprisonment without the possibility of release, imposed pursuant to subsection (g) of section 53a-46a, in which case the sentence shall be imprisonment for the remainder of the defendant's natural life."
10. The respondent does not calculate petitioner's life sentence as a sixty-year sentence.
ISSUES RAISED BY THE MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
The core of the petitioner's argument in his memorandum in support of the motion for summary judgment is that "[t]he language of C.G.S. section 53a-35b does not limit the application of that statute to sentences imposed on or after the effective date of 53a-35b." Pet'r Mem., at 9. The petitioner also argues that "[t]he legislative history demonstrates that the drafters of P.A. 80-442 intended to end indeterminate sentences . . . Nothing in the legislative history supports an intent to prevent the language of 53a-35b from applying to Mr. Mead's sentence." Id. The petitioner posits that "[t]he refusal to apply the definition of a life sentence as a definite sentence of sixty years to petitioner's sentence places § 53a-35b in constitutional jeopardy, in violation of both the state and federal constitutional grounds of equal protection and due process of law." Id.
Another argument raised by the petitioner is that "[a]n examination of the text of § 53a-35b and its relationship to other related statutes demonstrates that there is no inconsistency in applying the definition of life imprisonment contained therein to Mr. Mead's sentence." Id., at 12. "The definition of life as sixty years is not a retroactive application because, although the sentence of life imprisonment had been imposed prior to the adoption of H.B. 6021, petitioner had not yet served the portion of the sentence that would render him eligible for parole consideration, much less the portion that would be effected by 53a-35b's definition." Id., at 13. The petitioner then goes on to argue that "[n]ot only is 53a-35b a remedial statute designed to remedy any inconsistency between life sentences, it is also a penal statute" that must "be construed strictly against the state and in favor of the accused[.]" Id., at 14. Consequently, "if the language of 53a-35b is found to be ambiguous in light of other statutes, any doubt concerning its application to petitioner must be resolved in petitioner's favor." Id., at 15. The petitioner also argues that because "no contrary intent is expressed [as to 53a-35b being a procedural statute], 53a-35b must be interpreted to apply to petitioner's case." Id.
As to the claim of a violation of the right to equal protection under the law, the petitioner argues that "[i]ndividuals convicted of capital felony but not sentenced to death were, prior to 1981, sentenced to a parole eligible sentence composed of a minimum term of ten to 25 years, and a maximum term of (undefined) life." Petitioner, who was convicted of second-degree murder, not a capital offense, was required to serve a greater term prior to being parole eligible. Further, in 1985 individuals convicted of capital felony but not sentenced to death were sentenced to a sentence in the range of 25 to 60 years, whereas if 53a-35b is interpreted not to apply to him, petitioner is required to serve a sentence without any discharge date, despite the fact that second-degree murder is clearly less culpable than capital felony." Id., at 17.
This court disagrees with the petitioner's use of the phrase "(undefined)." In the absence of a statute such as C.G.S. § 53a-35b, a sentence of "life" meant life. Stated differently, the term defined itself and did not need defining. See, e.g., State v. Delgado, 161 Conn. 536, 551-52, 290 A.2d 338 (1971) ("The prescribed statutory penalty for murder in the second degree is life imprisonment; General Statutes 53-11; and there is no alternative sentence which could be imposed by the court and, hence, no exercise of judgment or discretion which could be subject to review").
And as to the due process violation claim, the petitioner argues that "[t]he detention and punishment of the petitioner as serving a non-dischargeable sentence of natural life, contrary to the language [of] § 53a-35b is not `clearly warranted by law.' This court should hold that the definition of life imprisonment contained in § 53a-35b applied to petitioner in order to avoid placing § 53a-35b in constitutional jeopardy." (Internal citations omitted.) Id., at 17-18.
Again, this court disagrees with petitioner's attempt to somehow define "life" as undefined. See infra page 5 note 4. The discharge from a life sentence occurs at the expiration of the individual's life. The fact that the date upon which sentence will be concluded is unknown does not also mean that it cannot be fully discharged.
Turning to respondent's motion for summary judgment, "[p]etitioner has served the minimum portion of his indeterminate sentence and has been before the Board of Parole several times. Petitioner has been denied parole each time. His next parole eligibility date is 2011. Petitioner is now serving the life portion of his sentence. Under petitioner's sentencing scheme, life equals natural life. Therefore, petitioner will be released from jail only if granted parole by the Board of Parole." Resp't Mem., at 5.
The Board of Parole has the discretion, in accordance with its statutory authority under C.G.S. § 54-129, to discharge paroled inmates with indeterminate sentences from their sentences. According to respondent's memorandum, "[for those sentenced to life imprisonment under [C.G.S. § 53a-35(b)], the legal reality is that they will remain in the custody of or under supervision by the State of Connecticut for the rest of their lives, subject only to being allowed to `go at large on parole.'" Id., at 7. "The practical reality, however, is that some prisoners will be released from confinement by the Board of Parole at some point and that such release will constitute their maximum term of confinement assuming compliance with their parole provisions and agreement." Id., at 8.
The respondent additionally argues that "the legislature was silent as to whether [C.G.S. § 53a-35b] applied retroactively or only to persons sentenced on or after that date." Id., at 12.
Whether one applies current rules of statutory construction or looks to the legislative history of General Statutes § 53a-35b, the result is, according to the respondent, that the petitioner's sentence remains unaffected.
Relying on Williams v. Bronson, 24 Conn. App. 612, 621-22, 590 A.2d 984, cert. denied, 219 Conn. 913, 593 A.2d 138 (1991), in which the Appellate Court concluded that there was a rational basis for the distinctions made by the legislature in enacting P.A. 80-442, the respondent contends that the petitioner cannot claim an equal protection violation. Lastly, as to the due process claim, the respondent, again relying on Williams v. Bronson, disputes petitioner's due process claim.
DISCUSSION OF LAW
"A directed verdict may be rendered only where, on the evidence viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmovant, the trier of fact could not reasonably reach any other conclusion than that embodied in the verdict as directed." (Emphasis in original.) Miller v. United Technologies Corp., 233 Conn. 732, 752 (1995). "[T]he genuine issue aspect of summary judgment procedure requires the parties to bring forward before trial evidentiary facts, or substantial evidence outside the pleadings, from which the material facts alleged in the pleadings can warrantably be inferred." United Oil Co. v. Urban Development Commission, 158 Conn. 364, 378-79 (1969). "Although the party seeking summary judgment has the burden of showing the nonexistence of material fact, . . . a party opposing summary judgment must substantiate its adverse claim by showing that there is a genuine issue of material fact together with the evidence disclosing the existence of such a dispute issue." Maffuci v. Royal Park Ltd. Partnership, 243 Conn. 552, 554 (1998).
In the instant matter, the parties do not disagree regarding the facts at issue, although there is a disagreement as to how C.G.S. § 53a-35b is to be interpreted and applied to those facts. Each party is both a movant as well as a non-movant. Consequently, this court will apply current rules of statutory interpretation and then apply C.G.S. § 53a-35b to the facts not in dispute and render summary judgment.
Effective October 1, 2003, Public Acts 2003, No. 03-154, § 1, provides: "The meaning of a statute shall, in the first instance, be ascertained from the text of the statute itself and its relationship to other statutes. If, after examining such text and considering such relationship, the meaning of such text is plain and unambiguous and does not yield absurd or unworkable results, extratextual evidence of the meaning of the statute shall not be considered." This means that this court must first ascertain the meaning of C.G.S. § 53a-35b from the text of the statute itself and its relationship to other statutes.
Public Acts 1980, No. 80-442, § 11, which took effect July 1, 1981, initially provided that: "A sentence of imprisonment for life shall mean a definite sentence of sixty years." Section 11 of P.A. 80-442 was codified as C.G.S. § 53a-35b. The original language has since been amended twice, by Public Acts 1985, No. 85-366 and Public Acts 1995, No. 95-19, and now provides that: "A sentence of imprisonment for life shall mean a definite sentence of sixty years, unless the sentence is life imprisonment without the possibility of release, imposed pursuant to subsection (g) of section 53a-46a, in which case the sentence shall be imprisonment for the remainder of the defendant's natural life." Because the petitioner in this matter was not sentenced pursuant to C.G.S. § 53a-46a, the only portion relevant to the instant case is the first clause.
C.G.S. § 53-46a governs the imposition of sentences for capital felony convictions.
While P.A. 80-442 was approved May 30, 1980, and for the most part took effect on July 1, 1981, C.G.S. § 53a-35b itself does not specify whether or not it is to be applied retroactively. "Whether to apply an act retroactively or prospectively depends upon the intent of the legislature. There is a presumption of legislative intent that statutes affecting substantive rights shall apply prospectively only. This presumption in favor of prospective applicability, however, may be rebutted when the legislature clearly and unequivocally expresses its intent that the legislation shall apply retrospectively. We generally look to the statutory language and the pertinent legislative history to ascertain whether the legislature intended that the amendment be given retrospective effect." State v. Nowell, 262 Conn. 686, 702, 817 A.2d 76 (2003), quoting Johnson v. Commissioner of Correction, 258 Conn. 804, 819-20, 786 A.2d 1091 (2002).
Public Act 80-442 entailed twenty-eight sections. Sections 26 and 27 took effect from the date of passage. The remaining sections, i.e., sections 1 through 25, took effect July 1, 1981.
"The rule of presumed legislative intent is not, however, applied to legislation that is general in its terms, affects only matters of procedure and does not impose new obligations or affect the substantive rights of the parties. While there is no precise definition of either substantive or procedural law, it is generally agreed that a substantive law creates, defines and regulates rights while a procedural law prescribes the methods of enforcing such rights or obtaining redress. Where the amendment is not substantive, i.e., not directed to the right itself, but rather to the remedy, it is generally considered a distinctly procedural matter." (Citations and quotation marks omitted.) Davis v. Forman School, 54 Conn. App. 841, 854-55, 738 A.2d 697 (1999).
The Davis court further noted that "[p]rocedural statutes have been traditionally viewed as affecting remedies, not substantive rights, and therefore leaving the preexisting scheme intact. Procedural statutes generally will be applied retroactively absent contrary legislative intent. This rule, however, is not purely mechanical in its application. Absent an express legislative intent, a statute will not be applied retroactively, even if it is procedural, when considerations of good sense and justice dictate that it not be so applied. These aids to legislative interpretation apply with equal force to amendatory acts which effectuate changes in existing statutes." (Citations and quotation marks omitted.) Id., at 856.
"Prior to 1981, defendants were subjected to an `indeterminate' sentencing scheme. See General Statutes § 53a-35. The indeterminate sentencing scheme used allowed the court to set both the minimum and maximum portion of the sentence parole eligibility was established at the minimum less any good time used to reduce that minimum term. The minimum and maximum portions of the sentence were a fixed number of years except for a class A felony where the maximum was life imprisonment, unless for a capital felony where a sentence of death could be imposed. This scheme was subsequently abolished and replaced by the current scheme of definite sentencing applicable to crimes committed on or after July 1, 1981. See General Statutes § 53a-35a. Under this system, sentencing courts impose a flat or exact term of years of imprisonment without a minimum or maximum; that term can be reduced by various statutory credits. The legislature's purpose, therefore, in using the label definite sentence is to differentiate the type of sentence it denotes from the historical, indeterminate sentence, and not to indicate any `definite' amount of time that a defendant will be incarcerated. Furthermore, because of the availability of statutory credits as well as the operation of probation, the precise time that a defendant will serve in prison cannot be predicted with exact certainty." State v. Adam H., 54 Conn. App. 387, 393, CT Page 8259 735 A.2d 839, cert. denied, 251 Conn. 905, 738 A.2d 1091 (1999), citing and quoting Williams v. Bronson, supra, 24 Conn. App. 618.
As the Appellate Court noted in Williams v. Bronson, supra, at 622, "[b]y enacting Public Acts 1980, No. 80-442, the legislature comprehensively revised this state's sentencing structure by abolishing indeterminate and creating definite sentences[.]" (Emphasis added.) A comprehensive revision of this state's sentencing structure is, by definition, not merely an implementation of technical or procedural changes. Quite clearly, P.A. 80-442 had substantial substantive import. This is no more evident than from Section 11 of P.A. 80-442, which created the definition of a "life sentence" and quantified it by specifying a definite, as opposed to an indeterminate, period of time. This court concludes that P.A. 80-442, § 11, codified at C.G.S. § 53a-35b, altered substantive and not procedural rights. The result of this conclusion is that there is a presumption that § 53a-35b applies prospectively only, unless this presumption is rebutted by a clear and unequivocal expression by the legislature that it intended for § 53a-35b to apply retrospectively. State v. Nowell, supra, 262 Conn. 702.
As already indicated, however, the language of § 53a-35b itself is silent as to whether the legislature intended it to be applied retrospectively. While some statutes are enacted in relative isolation, P.A. 80-442 comprehensively revised Connecticut's sentencing structure. Because P.A. 03-154 requires that this court consider the text of § 53a-35b and its relationship to other statutes, this court will look to § 53a-35b's relationship to other statutes to see if such relationship clearly and unequivocally rebuts presumption that § 53a-35b applies prospectively. Consequently, this court will examine how other statutes enacted or amended by P.A. 80-442 relate to § 53a-35b to ascertain whether such relationship provides a clear and unequivocal legislative expression that § 53a-35b applies retrospectively.
Public Act 80-442 added subsection (b) to C.G.S. § 18-7a. The amendment of § 18-7a, which previous had only governed sentences imposed on or after October 1, 1976, put in place the date of July 1, 1981 as the date after which sentenced prisoners earn good conduct credit. Notably, § 18-7a(b) does not contain a reference to definite, indefinite or indeterminate sentences, though § 18-7a(a) contains such references.
C.G.S. § 18-7a(b) provides in relevant part that: "Except as provided in subsection (c), any person sentenced to a term of imprisonment for an offense committed on or after July 1, 1981, may, while held in default of bond or while serving such sentence, by good conduct and obedience to the rules which have been established for the service of his sentence, earn a reduction of his sentence . . . [.]" (Emphasis added.)
C.G.S. § 53a-35(a) also was amended by P.A. 80-442. Subsection (a) was changed to limit § 53a-35's application to felonies committed prior to July 1, 1981, said change taking effect on July 1, 1981. More significantly, P.A. 80-442 enacted, effective July 1, 1981, C.G.S. § 53a-35a. For felonies committed on or after July 1, 1981, C.G.S. § 53a-35a established a sentencing scheme based on definite sentences. One such definite sentence that could be imposed in accordance with § 53a-35a(b) was a life sentence, which subsequent to P.A. 80-442, § 11 taking effect on July 1, 1981, meant a sentence of sixty years. Thus, the function and import of § 53a-35b is that it defined the one remaining indeterminate aspect of the now definite sentencing scheme in § 53a-35a, namely a life sentence with the possibility of release.
General Statutes § 53a-35(a) provides in relevant part that: "For any felony committed prior to July 1, 1981, the sentence of imprisonment shall be an indeterminate sentence . . . [.]" (Emphasis added.)
General Statutes § 53a-35a provides in relevant part that: "For any felony committed on or after July 1, 1981, the sentence of imprisonment shall be a definite sentence and the term shall be fixed by the court as follows: . . . (2) for the class A felony of murder, a term not less than twenty-five years nor more than life[.]" (Emphasis added.)
As distinguished from C.G.S. § 53a-35a(1), which requires that a sentence imposed for a capital felony be "a term of life imprisonment without the possibility of release unless a sentence of death is imposed . . . [.]"
Public Act 80-442 also amended the statutes governing the Board of Parole. C.G.S. § 54-125 was amended by P.A. 80-442 by deleting the provision allowing a reduction of the minimum sentence by not more than five years. Under § 54-125, the petitioner is eligible for parole release. His initial parole eligibility date was determined by reducing the minimum term imposed (i.e., twenty-five years) by statutory good time earned in accordance with § 18-7. The maximum term (life, meaning natural life) is an indeterminate time period and does not allow good time applications. Inmates sentenced for offenses committed on or after July 1, 1981 are not, however, parole eligible under C.G.S. § 54-125a(b)(1). What the petitioner is seeking — parole eligibility as well as having the maximum sentence reduced by statutory good time — finds no support in the carefully constructed and internally consistent statutory regime.
C.G.S. § 54-125 provides in relevant part that: "Any person confined for an indeterminate sentence, after having been in confinement under such sentence for not less than the minimum term, or, if sentenced for life, after having been in confinement under such sentence for not less than the minimum term imposed by the court, less such time as may have been earned under the provisions of section 18-7, may be allowed to go at large on parole in the discretion of the panel of the Board of Parole[.] . . . [Such person shall] remain, while on parole, in the legal custody and control of the board until the expiration of the maximum term or terms for which he was sentenced . . ."
C.G.S. § 54-129, which was last amended in 1972, states that "If it appears to the appropriate panel of the Board of Parole that any convict or inmate on parole or eligible for parole will lead an orderly life, said panel, by a unanimous vote of all the members present at any regular meeting thereof, may declare such convict or inmate discharged from the custody of the Commissioner of Correction and shall thereupon deliver to him a written certificate to the effect under the seal of the Board of Parole and signed by its chairman and the commissioner."
General Statutes § 54-125a(b)(1), which was enacted by Public Acts 1990, No. 90-261, states in relevant part that: "No person convicted of any of the following offenses, which was committed on or after July 1, 1981, shall be eligible for parole under subsection (a) of this section: . . . murder, as defined in section 53a-54a." (Emphasis added.)
Notable again is the legislature's use of July 1, 1981 as cut-off date for which sentences are impacted. Because someone convicted under § 53a-54a must be sentenced in accordance with § 53a-35a(2), the latter statute governing sentences imposed for offenses committed on or after July 1, 1981, the maximum sentence possible under § 53a-35a(2) is life. Such a life sentence would be, in accordance with § 53a-35b, a definite sentence of sixty years. A result of having a definite maximum portion is that statutory good time can be earned, computed and applied, whereas such adjustments are impossible with indeterminate life sentences. Another consequence of these legislative changes was, however, that individuals sentenced to definite life sentences are no longer parole eligible if the underlying offense occurred on or after July 1, 1981.
Particularly relevant to this court's examination of whether there is a clear and unequivocal legislative expression that § 53a-35b applies retrospectively is the following discussion in the Williams case. "The petitioners' last claim [on appeal] is that the habeas court's failure to apply the statutory credits to the maximum portion of their life sentences violates their fundamental right to liberty under the sentence reduction statutes. They claim, because it is impossible to apply the earned sentence reduction credits to their maximum sentences because there is no numerical value assigned to life imprisonment under General Statutes 53a-35(b)(1), that being sentenced under that statute impinges on their fundamental right to liberty under the sentence reduction statutes without any showing of a compelling state interest.
"As previously discussed, the petitioners were sentenced under General Statutes 53a-35(b)(1), the statutory scheme in place on the date of the respective commission of their crimes. They were sentenced to a maximum of life imprisonment and may be released or discharged only through parole. Their claim of a violation of a fundamental right to liberty is without merit since they are not entitled to the benefits of the sentence reduction statutes to the maximum portion of their sentences under that statutory scheme." Williams v. Bronson, supra, 24 Conn. App. 623. See also Glenn v. Commissioner of Correction, 80 Conn. App. 273, 274 n. 1 (2003) (per curiam) (§ 53a-35b does not apply to prisoners sentenced prior to that statute taking effect).
Based upon the foregoing analysis and discussion of § 53a-35b, as well as the comparison of that statute to related statutes, this court concludes that the meaning of § 53a-35b can be ascertained. Examining the text of § 53a-35b and considering its relationship to other statutes, the meaning of § 53a-35b is plain and unambiguous and does not yield an absurd or unworkable result. The presumption that § 53a-35b applies prospectively has not been rebutted by a showing that the legislature clearly and unequivocally expressed an intention for § 53a-35b to have retrospective effect. State v. Newell, supra, 262 Conn. 702. Additionally, relevant case law has consistently interpreted § 53a-35b to not have retroactive application. This court cannot, applying the foregoing interpretation of the law to the facts presented, reasonably reach any other conclusion than that § 53a-35b does not apply to the petitioner's current controlling sentence.
As to the petitioner's motion for summary judgment, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the respondent, a directed verdict cannot enter in favor of the petitioner. As to respondent's motion for summary judgment, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to petitioner, a directed verdict shall enter in favor of the respondent.
Petitioner's motion for summary judgment is denied. Respondent's motion for summary judgment is granted. Judgment is entered denying the petition for a writ of habeas corpus.
S.T. FUGER, JR., JUDGE