"As a general rule, the question of whether a published statement is defamatory is a question for the jury." Mead v. True Citizen, Inc., 417 S.E.2d 16, 17 (Ga. Ct. App. 1992); see also Wolf v. Ramsey, 253 F. Supp. 2d 1323, 1349 (N.D. Ga. 2003). A court faced with a motion for summary judgment must determine whether a statement is "not defamatory, that it is defamatory, or that it is ambiguous and the question is one for a jury."

(Citations and punctuation omitted.) Mead v. True Citizen, Inc., 203 Ga. App. 361, 362 ( 417 S.E.2d 16) (1992). "[T]he courts will not hunt for a strained construction in order to hold the words used as being defamatory."

An essential element of libel is a published defamatory statement. Mead v. True Citizen, Inc., 203 Ga.App. 361, 362, 417 S.E.2d 16 (1992). In determining whether a statement is defamatory, a court should read and construe the publication as a whole, id., and in the sense in which the readers to whom it is addressed would understand it. Ledger-Enquirer Co. v. Brown, 214 Ga. 422, 424, 105 S.E.2d 229 (1958); Mead, 203 Ga.App. at 362, 417 S.E.2d 16.

Generally, whether a published statement is defamatory is a question for the jury. Wolf, 253 F. Supp. 2d at 1349 (citing Mead v. True Citizen, Inc., 203 Ga. App. 361, 362 (1992)). However, the court may determine that a statement is or is not defamatory as a matter of law.

As a general rule, the question of whether a published statement is defamatory is a question for the jury. Mead v. True Citizen, Inc., 203 Ga. App. 361, 362, 417 S.E.2d 16, 17 (1992) (citations omitted). Nevertheless, when faced with a summary judgment motion in a defamation action, the "[t]rial judge should read and construe the publication as a whole, and thereafter may find that it is not defamatory, that it is defamatory, or that it is ambiguous and the question is [truly] one for a jury.

"In considering whether a writing is defamatory as a matter of law, we look at what construction would be placed upon it by the average reader." Webster v. Wilkins, 217 Ga. App. 194, 195 (1995) (quoting Mead v. True Citizen, Inc., 203 Ga. App. 361, 362 (1992)). Thus, what the Plaintiff understood or the Defendants intended is irrelevant.

However, if the statement is not ambiguous and can reasonably have but one interpretation, the question is one of law. . . .' [Cit.] `In considering whether a writing is defamatory as a matter of law, we look at what construction would be placed upon it by the average reader.' [Cit.]" Mead v. True Citizen, 203 Ga. App. 361, 362 ( 417 S.E.2d 16) (1992). After careful consideration of the articles on which the suit is based, we cannot agree with the Court of Appeals that a jury question is presented in this case.

As with the emotional distress claim, however, without the defamation claim, Lewis has no separate cause of action for "negligence." Mead v. True Citizen, 203 Ga. App. 361, 362 ( 417 SE2d 16) (1992). 5. Finally, Lewis contends that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment against him on his punitive damages claim.

Because its ruling was based on GCSS's alleged filing of a false verification under the anti-SLAPP statute, we confine our opinion to that issue, as well. See Mead v. True Citizen, 203 Ga. App. 361, 362 ( 417 SE2d 16) (1992) (whether a statement is libelous is usually a jury question). We note that a motion to dismiss for failure to comply with the anti-SLAPP statement is not a summary judgment motion, and therefore is not the appropriate vehicle for resolving Berryhill's argument that GCSS cannot prove a common law libel claim.

"Libel per se consists of a charge that one is guilty of a crime, dishonesty, or immorality. . . . Whether or not words, which are untrue in fact, are actionable depends upon whether the covert meaning attributable to them is understood by the reader in the covert sense" (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Morrison v. Hayes, 176 Ga. App. 128, 129 (1) ( 335 S.E.2d 596) (1985); see also Mead v. True Citizen, Inc., 203 Ga. App. 361, 362 ( 417 S.E.2d 16) (1992);Grayson v. Savannah Free-Press, Inc., 110 Ga. App. 561 ( 139 S.E.2d 347) (1964). Thus, making a comparison of a professional ethics violation and criminal conduct may be construed from the entire article by reasonable jurors as imputing criminal conduct to Nix as one of two possible meanings, i.e., the conduct was only unethical, or the conduct was both criminal as well as unethical.