Opinion
WWMCV116003345S.
11-15-2012
Joshua MEAD, Administrator of the Estate of Todd Panciera et al. v. Gene E. PANCIERA et al.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
CALMAR, J.
This action was brought by Joshua Mead, as administrator of the estate of Todd Panciera, and Debra Mead against the defendants, Gene and Donna Panciera. The plaintiff-estate claims a constructive trust on property of the defendants located at 28 Westford Drive, Ashford, Connecticut. The second count is a claim by Debra Mead for intentional infliction of emotional distress as a result of the defendants' efforts to remove her from 28 Westford Drive. The defendants filed a counterclaim seeking payment for the decedent's funeral expenses and other monies lent to him.
The matter was tried on September 25, September 27 and October 4, 2012. The plaintiff was represented by attorney Neal Murphy, Jr., and the defendants were represented by attorney Edward Muska. Post-trial memoranda were filed through November 2, 2012. The court has considered the parties' arguments, proposed findings of fact and proposed orders. In the course of the hearing, the court heard testimony from the parties and the witness and received documentary evidence.
I
FINDINGS OF FACT
Todd Panciera, the decedent, was a forty-seven-year-old alcoholic who suffered from the consequences of that disease his entire adult life. By all accounts a nice man when sober, his chronic, excessive alcohol intake and dependence affected his physical and mental health. He began suffering from alcohol misuse and abuse when he was twelve years old. At the age of fourteen, he spent three months in a psychiatric facility for substance abuse. Within two years, he dropped out of high school. In 1994, he married, had a son and purchased a home in Willington, Connecticut with a $15,000 down payment from his parents. Following his divorce, he was placed in treatment facilities on several occasions and enjoyed his only prolonged period of sobriety, approximately two and one-half years, from 1996 to 1998. A self-employed welder, he had a nonexistent work record for the last fifteen years of his life and was unable to support himself. He suffered significant credit issues and relied on the goodwill and support of family and friends. He engaged in extended binges and was incarcerated on at least five occasions for alcohol-related crimes. On October 3, 2010, the decedent, a resident of the town of Ashford, Connecticut, died intestate.
The decedent's parents, the defendants, Gene and Donna Panciera, were compelled to support their son throughout his adult life. Gene Panciera worked for the electric company for thirty-five years. Donna Panciera taught elementary and special education and ran a private school. Together, they paid for their son's basic living expenses, utilities, insurance, legal fees and various expenses for rehabilitation and treatment. While incarcerated in January 2000, the decedent learned from a visiting relative of a modest home for sale at 28 Westford Drive in Ashford, Connecticut. On May 15, 2000, the defendants purchased the home for $45,000 in order to provide their son with shelter upon his release from prison. The defendants closed on the residence with a $12,822 payment and undertook a mortgage of $33,750. In July 2000, upon his release from prison, the decedent moved into the property where he continued to live— when he was not hospitalized or incarcerated— until his death in October 2010. At all times relevant, he referred to 28 Westford Drive as his home. Pursuant to an agreement between Donna Panciera and her son, the decedent was to pay $400 every month toward the home expenses. Donna Panciera prepared and published a budget entitled " household cash flow" for the years 2000 through 2003, which reflected the expenses relating to the property, as well as other personal expenses of the decedent. Between July and November of 2000, the decedent made payments totaling $1,922. The decedent made no other payments to the defendants.
Gene Panciera and Donna Panciera are residents of Stafford Springs, Connecticut.
The decedent's erratic, self-destructive and dangerous behavior made it difficult for him to continue to live in the defendant's residence in Stafford, Connecticut.
In March 1990, the decedent and his first wife were gifted a parcel of land on RFD Road in the town of Stafford, Connecticut by his grandparents. Unable to develop the property, and aware of his financial obligations to his parents, the decedent conveyed the property to the defendants on August 31, 2001, for no monetary consideration. At the time of conveyance, the property was subject to judgment liens in the amount of $2,283, which the defendants paid. The defendants undertook to develop the parcel, obtaining a variance, utility easements and clarifying right-of-way issues. On November 5, 2003, the defendants sold the property for $79,900, netting $61,731 from the sale. On November 13, 2003, the defendants utilized some of the net proceeds to pay off the mortgage at 28 Westford Drive. In late 2003, early 2004, after the decedent expressed an interest in the proceeds from the sale of the Stafford property, the decedent's mother presented him with notes and documentation indicating that she had paid off the Ashford mortgage and allocated the remaining proceeds of the sale to the expenses they had incurred in his support dating back to 1992. She calculated by hand that she expended $17,130 on taxes, association charges and phone service for the residence at 28 Westford Drive; and $13,023 for utilities, insurance and house repairs from 2001 to 2009. She advised her son further that she had expended $13,083 on his personal expenses, including medical, legal and child support. She tendered $400 to her son. She declined to give him any more money out of the fear that he would kill himself.
At various times between 2000 and the date of trial, Donna Panciera prepared, annotated and amended multiple " accountings" which referred, inter alia, to expenses related to 28 Westford Drive, Ashford, Connecticut, to other personal expenses of the decedent, and to credits against said expenses.
The decedent met the. plaintiff, Debra Mead, in 1995 at an Alcoholics Anonymous meeting. They started dating in 1996, and began living together a year later. In 1998, both resumed drinking. Their relationship was scarred by significant violence when they drank. On one occasion, the decedent threw boiling water at Debra Mead, and hit her with a baseball bat on another. More than once, he choked her. On at least one occasion, Debra Mead stabbed the decedent. They routinely ignored at least five protective orders issued by the Connecticut Superior Court. Indeed, the protective order violations resulted in incarceration for both parties. Although their relationship was tempestuous and often violent, the two were separated only by periods of incarceration (usually the result of domestic violence between them) until the decedent's death. A functioning alcoholic, Debra Mead enjoyed more regular employment, attended to the household and used her limited earnings to pay their day-to-day expenses. On three occasions, the defendants attempted to evict Debra Mead while their son was incarcerated or out of state. As a result, the decedent and Mead married on March 2, 2010, without the defendants' knowledge. When Donna Panciera initially learned of the marriage, she was angry and wrote the decedent threatening to transfer the Ashford property to him so that she and her husband would no longer be responsible for the taxes or utilities. On reflection, she came to realize he could not care for the house alone and would not be able to retain it.
In September 2009, the decedent and Mead attempted to stop future eviction proceedings by entering into a rental agreement with one another.
The decedent's parents did not abide their son's relationship with Mead. In particular, Donna Panciera associated Mead with her son's loss of sobriety after two and one-half years, his reoccurring problems with the law and periods of incarceration.
Debra Mead left the residence on several occasions because of restraining or protective orders, arrests and incarceration, and to seek shelter in domestic violence facilities. On a number of occasions when the decedent was either out of town or incarcerated, the defendants sought to evict Mead by taking her keys from the premises in her absence and locking her out. On three occasions in 2003, 2005 and 2010, the defendants used legal process to remove Mead and regain possession of the property. In August 2003, Mead signed a stipulation which provided that she would vacate the property in two months. In 2005, after being served legal papers, Mead voluntarily vacated the property. When the decedent and Mead were both incarcerated in 2007, the defendants allowed their foster child to live in the home.
On May 21, 2009, the defendants entered into a written agreement to loan $6639 to the decedent for the purchase of a truck. The decedent made only one payment of $155.60. In June 2010, the defendants gave the decedent $1,500 to pay a bondsman. On October 13, 2010, the defendant paid the decedent's funeral bill in the amount of $5,177.60.
On October 22, 2010, less than three weeks after their son's death, the defendants published a notice to quit to Debra Mead. Subsequently, they filed a complaint for eviction in the Danielson Housing Court (entitled Gene Panciera et al. v. Debra Mead, Docket No. CV-11-17341).
II
CONSTRUCTIVE TRUST
" A constructive trust arises whenever another's property has been wrongfully appropriated and converted into a different form ... [or] when a person who holds title to property is subject to an equitable duty to convey it to another on the ground that he would be unjustly enriched if he were to retain it." Cadle Co. v.. Gabel, 69 Conn.App. 279, 288, 794 A.2d 1029 (2002) [ 31 Conn. L. Rptr. 509], quoting Jaser v. Fischer, 65 Conn.App. 349, 359, 783 A.2d 28 (2001). " A constructive trust is a flexible equitable remedy whose enforcement is subject to the equitable discretion of the trial court." Wendell Corp. Trustee v. Thurston, 239 Conn. 109, 120, 680 A.2d 1314 (1996). " The imposition of a constructive trust by equity is a remedial device designed to prevent unjust enrichment ..." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Giulletti v. Giuletti, 65 Conn.App. 813, 856, 784 A.2d 905, cert. denied, 258 Conn. 947, 788 A.2d 96 (2001). " To impose a constructive trust, there must also be a finding that the plaintiff was unjustly enriched ... Two elements must be demonstrated: that the plaintiff was benefited and that the benefit was unjust." (Internal citation omitted.) Filosi v. Hawkins, 1 Conn.App. 634, 639, 474 A.2d 1261 (1984).
The imposition of a constructive trust in connection with transfers of real estate has been consistently upheld. " Our appellate courts have upheld the imposition of a constructive trust on a defendant's interest in real property when, although the written documentation indicated that a defendant held an interest in real property, the facts and circumstances adduced by the evidence presented demonstrated that the defendant was under an equitable duty to relinquish that interest. See Cohen v. Cohen, supra, 182 Conn. at 197-98, 438 A.2d 55 (constructive trust imposed on son's half interest in property because mother purchased property and paid all expenses and son previously had agreed to reconvey his interest to mother); Schmaling v. Schmaling, 48 Conn.App. 1, 4, 17-19, 707 A.2d 339 (constructive trust imposed on son's interest in parent's property when interest was conveyed only to secure construction financing), cert. denied, 244 Conn. 929, 711 A.2d 727 (1998); Gulack v. Gulack, 30 Conn.App. 305, 313-14, 620 A.2d 181 (1993) (constructive trust imposed on property in favor of intended beneficiaries when property held by defendant widow, who took title on death of her husband, and husband had held title for beneficiaries' benefit)." Mitchell v. Redvers, 130 Conn.App. 100, 113-14, 22 A.3d 659 (2011).
Moreover, constructive trusts are appropriate when one fraudulently abuses the confidence of another. " A constructive trust arises contrary to intention and in invitum, against one who, by fraud, actual or constructive, by duress or abuse of confidence, by commission of wrong, or by any form of unconscionable conduct, artifice, concealment, or questionable means, or who in any way against equity and good conscience, either has obtained or holds the legal right to property which he ought not, in equity and good conscience, hold and enjoy ... A constructive trust arises ... when a person who holds title to property is subject to an equitable duty to convey it to another on the ground that he would be unjustly enriched if he were permitted to retain it ... The issue raised by a claim for a constructive trust is, in essence, whether a party has committed actual or constructive fraud or whether he or she has been unjustly enriched." Mitchell v. Redvers, 130 Conn.App. 100, 112-13, 22 A.3d 659 (2011), quoting Stornawaye Properties, Inc. v. O'Brien, 94 Conn.App. 170, 175-76, 891 A.2d 123 (2006).
The plaintiffs contend that the 28 Westford Drive property is, by way of a constructive trust, an asset of the estate. They argue the constructive trust was created as a result of a special and confidential relationship the decedent had with the defendants. They claim that the defendants agreed to acquire and maintain the Westford Drive property in order to insulate the decedent from creditors. Further, they contended that the acquisition of the RFD Stafford property for " no consideration" which was sold for $79,900 extinguishes any obligations of the decedent to his parents as reflected in Donna Panciera's records of expenses attributable to her son and the two properties.
It is the position of the defendants that because they supported the decedent throughout his adult life— providing him with a house to live in rent-free; paying his utility, insurance, medical and legal expenses; and paying all expenses relating to the ownership of 28 Westford Drive— their expenses exceeded any benefit they received from the conveyance of the Stafford RFD property. Accordingly, the defendants contend it would be inequitable to impose a constructive trust upon them.
The Appellate Court considered a case similar to the present one in Sullivan v. DeLisa, 101 Conn.App. 605, 923 A.2d 760, cert. denied, 283 Conn. 908, 928 A.2d 540 (2007). In that case, the plaintiffs claimed that because they had occupied a house owned by their relatives for thirty years, and had made repairs and improvements, they had a constructive trust on the property. Denying that claim, the court held that, " [o]rdinarily, where services are rendered and voluntarily accepted, the law will imply a promise upon the part of the recipient to pay for them; but where the services are rendered by members of a family, living as one household, to each other, there will be no such implication from the mere rendition of services ... The reason for this exception to the ordinary rule is that the household family relationship is presumed to be based in reciprocal acts of kindness and good-will, which tend to the mutual comfort and convenience of the members of the family, and are gratuitously performed ..." Id., at 617-18.
In this case, there is no claim that the plaintiffs made any improvements to the Westford Drive property. The estate's claim is that because the Stafford property was conveyed by the decedent, there should be a constructive trust on the Westford Drive property. This court finds that no trust can be implied from the purchase of the Westford Drive property. The defendants paid the down payment, took out the mortgage, and paid all the taxes and mortgage payments on the house. The decedent, Todd Panciera, contributed nothing to the house.
With respect to the Stafford RFD Road property, the property was originally a gift to Todd Panciera from a family member. He contributed nothing to this property, but conveyed it back to his mother and father because he could do nothing with it. It was a reciprocal act of kindness and good-will between family members. Following this, the defendants improved the property by obtaining a variance and right-of-way, eventually turning the unimproved land into a building lot. The defendants paid $15,000 towards the decedent's first house; $2,145.25 to pay off liens on the RFD Road property; $13,082.53 towards the decedent's personal expenses; $13,023.52 towards the living expenses at 28 Westford Drive; and $63,587.83 towards the ownership costs of 28 Westford Drive. These sums were paid by the defendants for the mutual comfort and convenience of a member of their family, without expectation of repayment. The RFD Road Property must be viewed in the same way.
The total of the above figures is $106,839.13.
III
INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS
To prevail on claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress, the plaintiff must establish four elements. " It must be shown: (1) that the actor intended to inflict emotional distress or that he knew or should have known that emotional distress was the likely result of his conduct; (2) that the conduct was extreme and outrageous; (3) that the defendant's conduct was the cause of the plaintiff's distress; and (4) that the emotional distress sustained by the plaintiff was severe." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Carrol v. Allstate Ins. Co., 262 Conn. 433, 442-43, 815 A.2d 119 (2003). " All four elements must be established to prevail on a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Biro v. Hirsch, 62 Conn.App. 11, 20, 771 A.2d 129, cert. denied, 256 Conn. 908, 772 A.2d 601 (2001).
" It is the intent to cause injury that is the gravamen of the tort ..." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) DeLaurentis v. New Haven, 220 Conn. 225, 267, 597 A.2d 807 (1991). " Liability has been found only where the conduct has been so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community ... Conduct on the part of the defendant that is merely insulting or displays bad manners or results in hurt feelings is insufficient to form the basis for an action based upon intentional infliction of emotional distress." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Carrol v. Allstate Ins. Co., supra, 262 Conn. at 43.
The plaintiff, Debra Mead, contends that the defendants committed intentional infliction of emotional distress because they removed or attempted to remove her from the Ashford residence on five different occasions, three of which were by way of a summary process action.
In Wilson v. Jefferson, 98 Conn.App. 147, 908 A.2d 13 (2006), the landlord brought four summary process actions against his tenant, each of which was withdrawn or resulted in a judgment in favor of the tenant. In a suit by the tenants claiming intentional infliction of emotional distress, the trial court directed a verdict for the defendant-landlord. It held, " [t]he act of filing a lawsuit, even if wrongfully motivated, does not transgress the bounds of socially tolerable behavior or make the average member of the community raise their hand and exclaim, ‘ Outrageous!’ ... Here, the only conduct of the defendant on which the plaintiff based her claims of intentional infliction of emotional distress was the defendant's individual attempts to initiate a summary process proceeding against her." (Internal citation omitted.) Id., at 161.
Liability for intentional infliction of emotional distress requires conduct that exceeds all bonds usually tolerated by decent society. Although the conduct of the defendants in this case may have caused Debra Mead some stress, their conduct was not so extreme or so outrageous as to transcend all possible bounds of decency.
IV
DEFENDANTS' COUNTERCLAIMS
The plaintiffs' first witness, Joshua Mead, administrator of the estate of Todd Panciera, testified that he is currently administering the estate in accordance with the applicable probate statutes. The applicable statutes include General Statutes § 45a-365 which states, in relevant part: " Claims, expenses and taxes in the settlement of a decedent's estate shall be entitled to preference and payment in the following order of priority: (1) Funeral expenses; (2) expenses of settling the estate; (3) claims due for the last sickness of the decedent; (4) all lawful taxes and all claims due the state of Connecticut and the United States; (5) all claims due any laborer or mechanic for personal wages for labor performed by such laborer or mechanic for the decedent within three months immediately before the decease of such person; (6) other preferred claims; and (7) all other claims allowed in proportion to their respective amounts."
The defendants have claimed funeral expenses in count one of their counterclaims and a car loan and bond expenses in count two. The court defers repayment on the car loan and reimbursement for funeral expenses to the Probate Court consistent with its factual findings.
ORDERS
Based on the foregoing:
1. The Court enters judgment in favor of the defendants and against the plaintiff, Joshua Mead, administrator on the First Count of the Complaint.
2. The Court enters judgment in favor of the defendants and against the plaintiff, Debra Mead on the second count of the complaint.
3. The court defers repayment on the car loan and reimbursement for funeral expenses to the Probate Court consistent with its factual findings and General Statutes § 45a-365.