Opinion
C.A. No. 01A-08-008
Submitted: January 25, 2002
Decided: March 21, 2002
On Appeal of the Decision of the Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board.
Decision AFFIRMED.
ORDER
Upon consideration of the briefs of the parties and the record in this case, it appears to the Court that:
1. Appellant Alfred L. Meacham ("Meacham") appeals from a decision of the Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board (the "Board") affirming the Referee's dismissal for failure to prosecute. The Board found that Meacham's appeal of a decision by the Claims Deputy, filed June 25, 2001, was untimely pursuant to Del. C. ANN. tit. 19 Del. C. § 3318(b) (1995).
2. The record indicates that Meacham was employed as a millwright by E. I. DuPont Nemours Company from January 1994 until May 23, 2001 when he was discharged from his employment.
3. On May 31, 2001 the Claims Deputy issued a determination that Meacham was disqualified from receiving unemployment benefits. This determination was mailed to Meacham at his address on 1619 W. Diamond Street, Philadelphia, PA. The deadline to appeal the decision was June 10, 2001. Meacham did not file his appeal until June 25, 2001. The Appeals Referee declined to waive the statutory timeliness requirements because there was no evidence of any administrative error by the Department of Labor and denied the appeal as untimely. Accordingly, the Referee determined the Board did not have jurisdiction because Meacham failed to file a timely appeal.
4. Meacham filed a timely appeal of the Referee's decision to the Board and the Board held a hearing on July 12, 2001 solely on the issue of timeliness. At that hearing, a representative of the Department of Labor, Carol Heady, testified that Meacham was disqualified from receiving unemployment compensation benefits on May 31, 2001 and a copy of that determination was mailed to him at his Philadelphia address. The notice was never returned as undeliverable by the United States Postal Service. She further testified that the determination became final as of June 10, 2001, meaning Meacham had until that date to appeal the decision. Meachem never filed an appeal until June 25, 2001. These facts were corroborated by Meacham, who admitted that he received the Claims Deputy's decision but filed his appeal late because he did not notice the date by which he was required had to file the appeal. The Board affirmed the Referee's decision and denied Meacham's request for a further hearing. It found that there was no evidence of error on the part of the Department which might have delayed Meacham's response to the May 31, 2001 decision and found that that the last day to appeal was clearly noted on the decision. This appeal followed.
5. In reviewing a decision on appeal from the Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board, this Court must determine if the decision is supported by substantial evidence and is free from legal error. Substantial evidence means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. The Court must also determine whether the Board abused its discretion by failing to exercise, sua sponte, its power, under Del. C. ANN. tit. 19 Del. C. § 3320 (1995), to review the record "after the ten-day appeal period where no valid appeal has been filed by the parties." This authority is reserved for those occasions in which the Department of Labor committed an administrative error that eliminated the opportunity to file a timely appeal or "where the interests of justice would not be served by inaction." Absent an abuse of discretion, this Court must uphold the Board's decision.
K-Mart v. Bowles, 1995 WL 269872 (Del.Super.).
Oceanport Ind. V. Wilmington Stevedores, 636 A.2d 892 (Del.Super. 1994).
Funk v. Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board, 591 A.2d 222 (Del. 1991).
Id. at 224.
Id.
6. The Board's decision that the appeal was late is supported by substantial evidence and is free from legal error. The record contains no evidence of an administrative error that deprived Meacham of an opportunity to file a timely appeal. The Chief Appeals Referee, Rudolph J. Antonini, Jr., held a hearing on the issue of timeliness on July 12, 2001. In attendance were Meacham, Ray Biliski ("Biliski"), the president of Pace International Local 2-786 Edgemoor Union, and Carol Heady ("Heady"), a Claims Deputy with the Department of Labor. Heady testified that the decision to disqualify Meacham was mailed to him on May 31, 2001. The appeal deadline was clearly noted on the determination. Meacham did not dispute timely receipt. Nor did he dispute his appeal was filed late. Rather, he attributed the untimely filing to inadvertence, personal stress, although he did not specify the reason for this stress, and his unfamiliarity with Delaware procedures for unemployment benefits. Biliski explained that Meacham was under significant pressure at the time he was terminated from his job and sought reconsideration of the decision to disqualify him for benefits due to the "mental anguish he [Meacham] has been going through." The Referee and the Board correctly noted that the late appeal constituted a jurisdictional bar to further proceedings in the matter under 19 Del. C. § 3318(b). That provision states as follows:
Brown v. City of Wilmington, 1995 WL 653460 at *2 (Del.Supr.).
Tr. Unemployment Insurance App. Hr'g. at 4.
Id. at 11.
Id. at 12.
Id. at 9, 11, 12.
Id. at 8.
Unless a claimant or a last employer who has submitted a timely and completed separation notice in accordance with § 3317 of this title files an appeal within 10 calendar days after such Claims Deputy's determination was mailed to the last known addresses of the claimant and the last employer, the Claims Deputy's determination shall be final and benefits shall be paid or denied in accordance therewith.
The Delaware Supreme Court has construed this provision to mean that an individual has ten days to appeal from an adverse decision of a Claims Deputy in the case where notice is received through the mail. The ten day period begins to run on the day notice is mailed.
Dorn v. Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board, 520 A.2d 669 (Del. 1986).
7. The Board did not abuse its discretion by not exercising, sua sponte, its power to review the record for an injustice despite the untimely appeal. A decision by an administrative agency is not an abuse of discretion "unless it is based on clearly unreasonable or capricious grounds," or the agency "exceeds the bounds of reason in view of the circumstances and has ignored recognized rules of law or practice so as to produce injustice." In the case of Funk v. Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board the Delaware Supreme Court affirmed the Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board's refusal to consider the substance of an appeal because it was untimely filed. The facts in that case were even more compelling than here, in that the decision affirming the denial of benefits in Funk, although properly addressed, was nevertheless misdelivered to the home of Funk's parents who lived on the same road. It was mailed to Funk on April 10, 1989, but he did not receive it until April 24, 1989. Although Funk promptly filed his appeal of the decision the next day, it was filed five days late and, thus, time-barred. The Board in Funk refused to consider the substance of the appeal and the Supreme Court found no abuse of discretion. In this case, it was Meacham's own conduct that caused the delay in his filing of the appeal. The record contains no evidence of an administrative error that deprived Meacham of an opportunity to file a timely appeal. The Board's determination, after considering Meacham's proffered reasons for the untimely filing, that the interests of justice would not be affected by inaction, is not an abuse of discretion.
K-Mart, Inc. v. Bowles, 1995 WL 269872 (Del.Supr.).
591 A.2d 222 (Del. 1991).
Brown v. City of Wilmington, 1995 WL 653460 (Del.Supr.) at *2.
See Funk v. Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board, 591 A.2d 222, 225 (Del. 1991), Rosembert v. Perdue, Del. Super., 1996 WL 662988 (Del.Super.).
For the reasons stated above, the decision of the Board is supported by substantial evidence, is free from legal error, and is not an abuse of discretion.
The decision of the Board is hereby AFFIRMED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.