Opinion
Civil Action CV-20-175
11-20-2023
MAINE HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION (for the use of Patricia Sarchi) and PATRICIA SARCHI, Plaintiffs, v. UBER TECHNOLOGIES, INC. and RASIER, LLC, Defendants.
Plaintiff MHRC-Barbara Hirsch, Esq. Plaintiff Patricia Sarchi-Kristin Aiello, Esq., Walter McKee, Esq. Defendants-Sigmund Schutz, Esq., Matthew LaMourie, Esq.
Plaintiff MHRC-Barbara Hirsch, Esq.
Plaintiff Patricia Sarchi-Kristin Aiello, Esq.,
Walter McKee, Esq.
Defendants-Sigmund Schutz, Esq.,
Matthew LaMourie, Esq.
ORDER ON DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS
THOMAS R. MCKEON JUSTICE
Before the court is Defendants Uber Technologies, Inc. ("Uber") and Rasier, LLC's ("Rasier") (collectively, "Defendants") Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings. Defendants contend that Plaintiffs' Complaint must fail as a matter of law because Uber's mobile-phone application ("app") does not qualify as a "facility" under the Maine Human Rights Act's (MHRA) definition of "place of public accommodation," embodied in statute at 5 M.R.S. § 4553(8). The court held oral argument on this motion on October 13, 2023. For the reasons discussed below, Defendants' Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings is DENIED.
I. Background
The following facts are recited from the complaint and are taken as true for purposes of this motion.
Defendants provide an app service that allows users, who are members of the general public, to call a car to drive them from point A to point B for a fee. (Compl. ¶ 2.) Uber uses the app to arrange rides between passengers and its fleet of drivers in much the same way that a taxi dispatch arranges rides for customers. (Id.) At all times relevant to this matter, Uber operated its services to the public in Portland, Maine, and the surrounding area. (Id.)
Customers do not pay drivers of Uber vehicles, rather they pay Uber after being transported by a driver to the desired destination. (Compl. ¶ 19.) Uber sets the fares, based on a number of factors such as demand, and Uber keeps a percentage of each fare. (Id.) Uber then remits a portion of the fare to drivers based on the duration and distances of the trips that they provided to the app's users. (Id.) Uber collects and holds customer payments, deducts fees, and then later transfers money to drivers. (Id.)
Uber exercises control over its drivers. (Compl. ¶ 20.) Among other things, Uber sets ground rules for drivers and maintains the right to terminate drivers who do not meet them, Uber sets requirements for the type and age of vehicles that drivers use, Uber sets driver behavior standards for rides, Uber drivers must undergo thorough driving and criminal history reviews, Uber monitors drivers and can remove drivers from the app if charged with a new offense, Uber removes drivers with high cancellation rates, Uber reactivates drivers if they meet Uber's reactivation requirements, Uber provides drivers with tuni-by-tum directions for rides, Uber assists drivers in buying or leasing vehicles, and Uber collects all fares and pays drivers through Rasier. (Id.) Uber also controls who may use the app's services. (Compl. ¶ 21.) Uber reserves the right to deactivate a customer's account if they develop a below average passenger rating. (Id.) If Uber deactivates a customer's account, the customer loses access to Uber's platform. (Id.) Customers must abide by Uber's Community Guidelines to retain access to the service.
Patricia Sarchi ("Sarchi") is blind and uses a guide dog named Jeff to assist her at home and in public. (Compl. ¶¶ 22-23.) Jeff is a highly trained service animal; he received several months of specialized training with Guide Dogs of the Desert in Palm Springs, California. (Compl. ¶ 23.) Jeff helps Sarchi move around and makes it possible for her to venture into the community. (Id.)
On January 5, 2017, Sarchi went to a nail appointment at Oasis Nail and Spa at 415 Forest Avenue in Portland, Maine, accompanied by her setvice dog, Jeff. (Compl. ¶ 24.) When her nail appointment was finished, Sarchi asked her manicurist, John, to call a taxi to take her home. (Compl. ¶ 25.) John suggested that Sarchi use Uber and requested an Uber driver on her behalf. (Id.) An Uber driver accepted Sarchi's trip request. (Compl. ¶ 26.) John informed Sarchi that a Chevy Malibu would arrive to pick her up shortly and that the estimated fare would be about nine dollars. (Id.) John walked outside of the salon with Sarchi and her service animal and they waited in the parking lot. (Compl. ¶ 27.)
After a few minutes, John informed Sarchi that the Uber had arrived, and he walked with her and her service animal to the car. (Compl. ¶ 28.) When John opened the door for Sarchi, the Uber driver said, "no dogs." (Compl. ¶ 29.) John explained to the Uber driver that Sarchi's dog is a service animal and that Sarchi is blind and relies on her dog as a guide dog. (Compl. ¶ 30.) John also told the driver that he could not deny Sarchi a ride because she had her service animal with her. (Id.) The Uber driver was insistent that no dogs whatsoever were allowed in his vehicle. (Compl. ¶ 31.) The Uber driver left, leaving Sarchi and her service animal in the parking lot without a ride home. (Id.) Later, Sarchi received an email from Uber with the subject "Receipt for your Canceled Trip." (Compl. ¶ 32.) The email stated that Sarchi had been charged five dollars for her canceled trip with Uber. (Id.) Sarchi had not canceled the ride; the Uber driver had refused to provide her with a ride because she had a service animal. (Id.) She was nevertheless charged with a cancellation fee. (Id.) As a result of Uber's denial to Sarchi of a ride because of her disability, Sarchi has suffered and will suffer inconvenience, embarrassment, humiliation, emotional distress, and the indignity and stigma of discrimination. (Compl. ¶ 33.) Sarchi has a desire to use Uber as a transportation service but for the discrimination based on disability as she ventures into the community and travels from her home in Cape Elizabeth. (Compl. 37.)
Plaintiffs allege that Defendants' ridesharing company clearly caters to, or offers their goods, facilities, or services to, or solicits or accepts patronage from the general public. (Compl. ¶ 44.) Plaintiffs further allege that Defendants are owners, lessees, operators, proprietors, managers, superintendents, agents, or employees of any public conveyance. (Id.) Plaintiffs allege that Uber's drivers are agents of Defendants and Defendants' public accommodation. (Compl. ¶ 45.)
II. Standard of Review
Defendants move under M.R. Civ. P. 12(c) for judgment on the pleadings. When defendants move for judgment on the pleadings, like in a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, "'only the legal sufficiency of the complaint is tested.'" Wawenock, LLC v. Dep't of Transp., 2018 ME 83, ¶ 4, 187 A.3d 609 (quoting Cunningham v. Haza, 538 A.2d 265, 267 (Me, 1988)). The court assumes the factual allegations of the complaint are true and examines the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff to determine "'whether the complaint alleges the elements of a cause of action or facts entitling the plaintiff to relief on some legal theory.'" Id. (quoting Cunningham, 538 A.2d at 267). '"A dismissal should only occur when it appears beyond doubt that a plaintiff is entitled to no relief under any set of facts that [she] might prove in support of [her] claim.'" Oakes v. Town of Richmond, 2023 ME 65, ¶ 15, ___ A,3d ___ (quoting Moody v. State Liquor &Lottery Comm 'n, 2004 ME 20, ¶ 7, 842 A.2d 43). Because Maine is a notice-pleading state, "the level of scrutiny used to assess the sufficiency of a complaint is 'forgiving.'" Id. ¶ 16 (quoting Howe v. MMG Ins. Co., 2014 ME 78, ¶ 9, 95 A.3d 79).
III. Discussion
Under subchapter five of the MHRA, it is unlawful public accommodations discrimination
[f]or any public accommodation or any person who is the owner, lessor, lessee, proprietor, operator, manager, superintendent, agent or employee of any place of public accommodation to directly or indirectly refuse, discriminate against or in any manner withhold from or deny the full and equal enjoyment to any person, on account of. . . physical or mental disability . . . any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities, goods, services or privileges of public accommodation, or in any maimer discriminate against any person in the price, tenns or conditions upon which access to accommodations, advantages, facilities, goods, services and privileges may depend.
5 M.R.S. § 4592(1), "Public accommodation" is defined as "a public entity or private entity that owns, leases, leases to or operates a place of public accommodation." Id. § 4533(8-B). "Place of public accommodation" is defined, in relevant part, as
a facility, operated by a public entity or private entity, whose operations fall within at least one of the following categories
F. A laundromat, dry cleaner, bank, barber shop, beauty shop, travel service, shoe repair service, funeral parlor, gas station, office of an accountant or lawyer, phannacy, insurance office, professional office of a health care provider, hospital, dispensary, clinic, bathhouse or other service establishment;
G. All public conveyances operated on land or water or in the air as well as a terminal, depot or other station used for specified public transportation; and
N. Any establishment that in fact caters to, or offers its goods, facilities or services to, or solicits or accepts patronage from, the general public.
Id. § 4553(8).
Defendants argue that Plaintiffs' complaint fails as a matter of law because Uber cannot be a public accommodation within the meaning of the MHRA, Defendants contend that the use of the leading word "facility" in the statutory definition of "place of public accommodation" limits all the following illustrative examples and the catch-all provisions to physical places because a facility is a physical place. Defendants argue that because its software is not a physical place, the MHRA's prohibition on unlawful public accommodations cannot apply to them as a matter of law.
Even if the court accepted Defendants' reading of the MHRA as limiting the definition of "place of public accommodation" to physical places, the court does not find that it is "'beyond doubt that [Plaintiffs are] entitled to no relief under any set of facts [they] might prove in support of [their] claim.'" Oakes, 2023 ME 65, ¶ 15, ____ A.3d ____ (quoting Moody, 2004 ME 20, ¶ 7, 842 A.2d 43). The complaint sets forth a theory of relief where the relevant "facility" is the vehicle, which Defendants do not dispute is a physical place. Plaintiffs allege in their complaint that Defendants "cater to, or offer their goods, facilities, or services to, or solicit or accept patronage from the general public." (Compl. ¶ 44.) Plaintiffs further allege that Defendants "are owners, lessees, operators, proprietors, managers, superintendents, agents, or employees of any public conveyance." (Id.) Plaintiffs allege that Uber's drivers are agents of Defendants. (Compl. ¶ 45.) Additionally, Plaintiffs allege specific facts that, if proven, might establish that Defendants operate the facility vehicles through their agents, the Uber drivers. For example, the complaint states that "Uber sets ground rules for drivers and maintains the right to terminate drivers who do not meet them;. . . Uber sets driver behavior standards for rides;. . . Uber removes drivers with high cancellation rates; . . . Uber provides drivers with tum-by-tum directions for rides." (Compl. ¶ 20.)
The complaint, therefore, alleges facts and the elements of unlawful public accommodations discrimination on at least one legal theory. Plaintiffs allege that Uber operates its vehicles as a public conveyance that operates on land. (Compl. ¶ 19, 20, 44, 45.) If proven, these allegations could establish that Defendants are a "public accommodation" within the meaning of the MHRA. See 5 M.R.S. § 4553(8), (8-B). By the Uber driver refusing to transport Sarchi and her service dog. Plaintiffs have alleged that Defendants
directly refused ... on account of . . . physical. . . disability . .. any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities, goods, services or privileges of public accommodation, or in any manner discriminate[d] against any person in the price, terms or conditions upon which access to accommodations, advantages, facilities, goods, services and privileges may depend.
5 M.R.S. § 4592(1). Thus, even if the court was to interpret the MHRA as requiring a public accommodation to occupy a physical space to fall under the MHRA's definition of "place of public accommodation," Plaintiffs have alleged facts that would entitle them to relief under the legal theory that Defendants operate the drivers' vehicles as a public conveyance.
Defendants claim that Plaintiffs cannot allege that the driver's vehicle is a public accommodation because Plaintiffs describe Uber as a transportation network company, which has a statutory definition in the Maine Insurance Code limiting the term's application to services wherein the driver uses their "personal vehicle." See 24-A M.R.S. § 7302(5). According to Defendants, the transportation network company cannot own or operate the drivers' personal vehicles as a matter of law.
The court does not, and cannot under the relevant standard of review, read the complaint so narrowly. The relevant allegation in the complaint does not invoke the statutory definition from the Insurance Code, (see Compl. ¶ 18,) and it is not clear to the court that the Insurance Code's definition of transportation network company is intended to bear on the application of the MHRA in any way. See 24-A M.R.S. § 7302 ("As used in this chapter ... the following terms have the following meanings.") (emphasis added). Further, Plaintiffs are pennitted to plead in the alternative, which would leave them free to pursue Uber's liability as a transportation network company within the meaning of the statute while also advancing other theories of liability. Examining the complaint in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs, the court does not view Plaintiffs' use of the descriptive term "transportation network company" as foreclosing on their ability to proceed on the legal theory that the vehicle is a public accommodation.
At this early stage and without a developed record, the court cannot say that it is "'beyond doubt that [Plaintiffs are] entitled to no relief under any set of facts [they] might prove in support of [their] claim.'" Oakes, 2023 ME 65, ¶ 15, ____ A.3d ____ (quoting Moody, 2004 ME 20, ¶ 7, 842 A.2d 43). This is not to suggest that Plaintiffs cannot pursue or prove other theories of liability under the MHRA. With the benefit of a factual record, Plaintiffs may be able to prove other ways in which Defendants could be held liable for violations of the MHRA beyond the public conveyance theory.
Uber's remaining arguments are unavailing at this early stage. Uber argues that it cannot be held liable under the Maine Human Rights Commission's newly revised definition of "public accommodation" in the Commission's Rules because the new Rule is invalid and cannot be applied retroactively. The complaint, however, was filed before the effective date of the new definition and the court does not read the complaint as resting on a regulatory definition that did not exist at the time of its filing. See 94-348 C.M.R. Ch. 7, § 7.01 (effective Dec. 10, 2022); (Compl. (docketed June 25, 2020)).
IV. Order
For the reasons discussed above, Defendants' Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings is DENIED.
The Clerk is requested to enter this Order on the docket for this case by incorporating it by reference. M.R. Civ. P. 79(a).