¶ 63 For an expert witness to give standard-of-care testimony about another medical practitioner, the proffered expert must first be scientifically or medically qualified, which means the expert must meet two foundational requirements. McWilliams v. Dettore, 387 Ill. App. 3d 833, 843, 901 N.E.2d 1023, 1030 (2009). The first requirement is licensure, meaning the expert must be a licensed member of the school of medicine about which the expert proposes to opine.

These are " 'foundational requirements and form a threshold determination.' " McWilliams v. Dettore, 387 Ill. App. 3d 833, 843 (2009) (quoting Alm v. Loyola University Medical Center, 373 Ill. App. 3d 1, 5 (2007), citing Sullivan, 209 Ill. 2d at 115). ¶ 49 " 'First, the physician must be a licensed member of the school of medicine about which he [or she] proposes to testify.

"Thus, Illinois courts 'have stated that the foundational requirements of an expert's qualifications are reviewed as a matter of law de novo.' Ittersagen v. Advocate Health & Hosp[itals] Corp., 2020 IL App (1st) 190778, ¶ 70 (citing Roach v. Union [Pacific] R.R., 2014 IL App (1st) 132015, ¶ 51 and McWilliams [v. Dettore], 387 Ill. App. 3d [833,] 844[, 901 N.E.2d 1023, 1031 (2009)])."

Having done so, we note that defendant's challenge to Dr. Goldstein's ability to testify as to the standard of care for placing implants is limited to Dr. Goldstein's satisfaction of these two foundational requirements and conclude that the circuit court did not err in denying defendant's motion to bar Dr. Goldstein from testifying. ¶ 34 In reaching that conclusion, we have considered McWilliams v. Dettore, 387 Ill. App. 3d 833 (2009), Hubbard v. Sherman Hospital, 292 Ill. App. 3d 148 (1997), and Northern Trust Co. v. Upjohn Co., 213 Ill. App. 3d 390 (1991), cited by defendant, and determine that they are distinguishable from this case. In McWilliams, 387 Ill. App. 3d at 847-50, this court held that the plaintiff's proposed expert witness, an oncologist, was not qualified to testify as to whether the defendant, a surgeon, should have performed a biopsy on the plaintiff following the discovery of two abnormal lymph nodes because the decision of whether to perform a biopsy rested with the surgeon and the proposed witness had never performed a biopsy and held no surgical privileges.

In that event, the plaintiff has no right to present her allegations of medical negligence to a jury. See McWilliams v. Dettore, 387 Ill.App.3d 833, 845, 327 Ill.Dec. 290, 901 N.E.2d 1023 (2009) (“Before a medical negligence case * * * can reach a jury, a plaintiff must [establish] the standard of care against which the conduct of the defendant doctor may be measured.” (citing Walski v. Tiesenga, 72 Ill.2d 249, 255, 21 Ill.Dec. 201, 381 N.E.2d 279 (1978))).

An expert witness helps the finder of fact make sense of medical evidence and determine the defendant physician's negligence or lack of skill. See McWilliams v. Dettore, 387 Ill.App.3d 833, 845 (2009); Walski v. Tiesenga, 72 Ill.2d 249, 256 (1978).

Whether the plaintiff's medical "expert is qualified to testify is not dependent on whether he is a member of the same specialty or subspecialty as the defendant, but, rather, whether the allegations of negligence concern matters within his knowledge and observation." Jones v. O'Young, 154 Ill. 2d 39, 43 (1992). ¶ 70 While our courts have stated that the foundational requirements of an expert's qualifications are reviewed as a matter of law de novo (see Roach v. Union Pacific R.R., 2014 IL App (1st) 132015, ¶ 51; McWilliams v. Dettore, 387 Ill. App. 3d 833, 844 (2009)), it has also been said that a trial court's determination regarding whether someone is qualified to testify as a medical expert is ultimately reviewed for an abuse of discretion (see Gill, 157 Ill. 2d at 317; Ayala v. Murad, 367 Ill. App. 3d 591, 597 (2006)). An abuse of discretion occurs only when the trial court's ruling is arbitrary, fanciful, unreasonable, or when no reasonable person would adopt the trial court's view.

The motion, brought pursuant to section 2-619(a)(9) of the Code of Civil Procedure (Code) (735 ILCS 5/2-619(a)(9) (West 2014)), argued that the court's orders granting motions in limine 9, 10, and 11 "create affirmative matter that completely negate Doctor's claims that he suffered damages." ¶ 22 The court granted this motion to dismiss, relying heavily on McWilliams v. Dettore, 387 Ill. App. 3d 833 (2009) and Ceres Terminals v. Chicago City Bank and Trust Company, 259 Ill. App. 3d 836 (1994). The court explained:

One of them, Gary Schoener, is not a medical doctor and is not qualified to testify against Dr. Lamont for malpractice. See Smith v. Pavlovitch, 394 Ill. App. 3d 458, 462 (2009) (observing that a practitioner of one school of medicine may not testify as an expert in an action against a practitioner of a different school of medicine); McWilliams v. Dettore, 387 Ill. App. 3d 833, 843 (2009). In addition, there are suggestions in the deposition testimony of Dr. Finley Brown that Dr. Lamont should have referred plaintiff to a mental health professional, but there is absolutely no factual or medical proof that anything Dr. Lamont did, independent of the admittedly improper and potentially harmful sexual relationship, caused or contributed to any damages.

¶ 22 The sales projection theory was predicated on the idea that had Sustainable Solutions actually owned the '179 patent, plaintiffs would have obtained profits from the operations of Sustainable Solutions. Plaintiffs claim that they should have at least been able to present evidence of their internally projected profits from the investment or of the projections for the proposed venture with SEM that deteriorated as a result of Sustainable Solutions not owning the patent. ¶ 23 Because the trial court ruled that plaintiffs could not recover under this theory as a matter of law, we review its decision de novo.McWilliams v. Dettore, 387 Ill.App.3d 833, 844, 327 Ill.Dec. 290, 901 N.E.2d 1023 (2009). The trial court essentially relied on the “new business rule” to conclude that plaintiffs were not entitled to lost profits under this theory.