Summary
ruling that Section 21 applied to a declaratory judgment seeking determination that transfer of deed was null and void
Summary of this case from Emigrant Residential LLC v. PintiOpinion
15-P-500
03-04-2016
MECHELLE MCWILLIAM v. BONNEY MCWILLIAM.
NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to its rule 1:28, as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 (2009), are primarily directed to the parties and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case. A summary decision pursuant to rule 1:28 issued after February 25, 2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260 n.4 (2008).
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 1:28
Bonney McWilliam, the mother, appeals from a judgment of the Land Court declaring the deed from her daughter, Mechelle, conveying the daughter's one-half interest in their home to her mother null and void. On appeal, the mother contends that (1) her daughter failed to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that she (the daughter) had not been competent to execute the deed, and (2) the suit was untimely. We affirm.
The mother's father had deeded the home in equal parts to the mother and her daughter.
Discussion. 1. Competence. The daughter sustained her burden of proof regarding her lack of competence to sign the deed if for no other reason than she was sixteen years old at the time the deed was executed. See G. L. c. 231, § 85P; President, Directors, and Co., of Boston Bank v. Chamberlin, 15 Mass. 220 (1818); Tracy v. Brown, 265 Mass. 163, 165 (1928); Slaney v. Westwood Auto, Inc., 366 Mass. 688, 692 (1975). On this basis alone, the judge's ruling may be affirmed.
The judge also found, based on the daughter's youth, medical conditions, fractured relationship with her mother, and history of emotional upheaval and substance abuse, that she lacked any understanding that by signing the documents she was giving up her entire right to the property forever, and therefore lacked competence in this regard as well. See Sparrow v. Demonico, 461 Mass. 322, 330-331 (2012). Finally, the judge concluded that both the mother and her attorney exercised undue influence over the daughter, who was a minor and was not represented by independent counsel. See id. at 330 & n.12.
The judge summarized his findings and conclusions as follows:
"I have reviewed the opinions of both expert witnesses in detail, and weighed them against the testimony of the witnesses at trial and my review of the exhibits admitted into evidence. I find the conclusions reached by [the daughter's neuropsychological forensic expert] are consistent with my assessment of the witnesses and other evidence at trial. Based on the circumstances surrounding the transaction — [the daughter's] age and substance abuse, the presence of [the mother's] attorney, the lack of any independent representation for [the daughter], the highly fraught relationship between mother and daughter, and [the daughter's] susceptibility to [the mother's] influence — I find and conclude that [the daughter] lacked the capacity to understand the transaction and the permanent consequences it would have for her. Even if [the daughter] could have understood the consequences of signing the deed, under the volitional test for competency, I find that it was the act of an emotionally troubled teenager whose will was overcome by two prominent figures of authority in her life — her mother and her mother's attorney."At trial, the attorney testified that he had been unaware that the daughter was a minor.
With respect to the latter findings and conclusions, the mother questions the basis of the daughter's expert's opinion upon which the judge relied. This challenge is based on alleged gaps in the expert's investigation. However, each of the alleged gaps was addressed by testimony at trial, and the judge made findings consistent with those of the expert, based on the judge's assessment of the trial testimony. See note 2, supra. The mother's argument on appeal reduces to a challenge to the weight to be accorded the expert's opinion, and the judge's assessment of the daughter's credibility. Credibility and weight are matters for the trial judge. Goodman v. Atwood, 78 Mass. App. Ct. 655, 657-658 (2011). See New England Canteen Serv., Inc. v. Ashley, 372 Mass. 671, 675 (1977).
For example, the expert did not interview the mother, but concluded that she was an unreliable reporter. The mother testified at trial.
The expert opined:
"It is my current forensic neuropsychiatric opinion, which I hold to a reasonable degree of forensic neuropsychiatric certainty, that [the daughter] lacked the requisite capacity to execute the deed in question. This incapacity was a function of a confluence of factors, including the immaturity of the adolescent brain with respect to capacities such as judgment and decision making, the effects of serious chronic illnesses beginning in childhood, reported substance abuse at the time the deed was executed, and a heavily enmeshed mother-daughter relationship in which boundaries were blurred and dependency fostered. For these reasons, [the daughter] not only is exceedingly unlikely to have been competent to deed her share of ownership of the family home to her mother, but rather is likely to have been unusually vulnerable to undue parental influence and unlikely to have understood the irrevocable nature of what she was, in effect, signing away."
2. Timeliness. The mother contends that the daughter's law suit was barred by the three-year statute of limitations applicable to tort claims under G. L. c. 260, § 2A. The daughter's complaint was not brought as an action in tort, but as a declaratory judgment action seeking equitable relief. If this case is governed by a limitations period in G. L. c. 260, the more closely analogous limitations period would be the twenty-year statute of limitations found in G. L. c. 260, § 21. The judge found that the daughter was unaware that the property had been transferred until 2007. This action was filed in 2012, less than twenty years from the date of discovery. See Silva v. Lewis, 25 Mass. App. Ct. 907 (1987).
The mother does not contest the applicability of the discovery rule to the daughter's amended complaint.
Alternatively, if G. L. c. 260 does not apply, the pertinent question is whether the action was brought within a "reasonable time having regard to all the circumstances." Welch v. King, 279 Mass. 445, 450 (1932). As previously noted, the daughter was unaware of the deed until 2007. A contract with a minor is not void, but voidable. See Tracy v. Brown, 265 Mass. at 164-165. The "privilege of disaffirmance" must be exercised within a reasonable period. Welch v. King, supra.
Upon learning of the deed in 2007, the daughter stated her objection to the mother, and protested to the registrar of deeds and Attorney Hillman within a year. The daughter sought reconciliation with the mother up until 2011, but the mother rebuffed her efforts. The daughter filed suit after a period of therapy in which the therapist's efforts to broker a reconciliation had failed. In light of these "attendant circumstances," and the judge's factual finding that the daughter filed suit only when she was emotionally able to do so, the judge did not err in concluding that the delay of five years in filing suit was reasonable. See ibid.
The judge found, and the record supports the finding, that the mother had unsuccessfully sought custody of the daughter's son in Probate and Family Court in 2006, and, in 2007, the daughter obtained a restraining order against the mother to avoid her further contact with the daughter's son. It was during these proceedings in 2007 that the daughter learned she did not have a right to enter the house to retrieve her belongings because the mother claimed sole ownership of the home.
Judgment affirmed.
By the Court (Halon, Sullivan & Maldonado, JJ.),
The panelists are listed in order of seniority. --------
/s/
Clerk Entered: March 4, 2016.