Opinion
Civil Action 21-cv-70J
03-29-2023
JAMIE MCVICKER, Plaintiff, v. DR. RITA COMACHO and DANIEL C. VITTONE, Defendants.
Honorable Stephanie L. Haines, United States District Judge
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION, RE: ECF NOS. 54 AND 57
MAUREEN P. KELLY UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
I. RECOMMENDATION
Plaintiff Jamie McVicker (“Plaintiff'), an inmate presently incarcerated at the State Correctional Institution at Houtzdale (“SCI-Houtzdale”), filed this pro se action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 arising out of allegations that he did not receive adequate medical care following a sudden onset of blurry vision. ECF No. 12.
Presently before the Court is a Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Plaintiff. ECF No. 54. Also before the Court is a Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Defendant Rita Camacho (“Dr. Camacho”). ECF No. 57. For the reasons below, it is respectfully recommended that Dr. Camacho's Motion for Summary Judgment be granted, and that Plaintiff s Motion for Summary Judgment be denied.
Plaintiff refers to this Defendant as Dr. Rita Comacho in his pleadings. Based on the materials provided, it appears the correct spelling is Dr. Camacho.
II. REPORT
A. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Plaintiffs claims arise out of medical care that he received at the Somerset County Jail, where he was incarcerated from February 27, 2017 to August 1, 2018. Plaintiff originally was confined at Somerset County Jail as a pre-trial detainee. He became a convicted prisoner on May 24,2018. ECF No. 37atl.
During the relevant time, Dr. Camacho was the Medical Director of the Somerset County Jail. ECF No. 68 ¶ 1. As the Medical Director, she was responsible for clinically supervising the medical department and its employees, and she also provided medical care to patients at Somerset County Jail. Id.; ECF No. 59-6 at 15.
1. Vision Care
a. Initial medical visits for blurry vision in June 2017
On June 19, 2017, Plaintiff sought medical care at Somerset County Jail for blurry vision in his left eye. ECF No. 59 ¶ 20. He was seen by a nurse, Angela Beal (“Beal”). Id. ¶ 22. Beal notified the on-call provider, physician assistant Jennifer Mroz (“Mroz”), of Plaintiff s symptoms. Id. ¶ 25. Mroz ordered Plaintiff to be checked again the next day, and he was directed to report any worsening symptoms. Id. ¶ 27. Beal also scheduled Plaintiff to be evaluated the next time a provider was on site. Id. ¶ 28.
Plaintiffs vision problems continued, and medical records indicate that he was evaluated by Mroz on June 21, 2017. Id. ¶ 30. His vision was documented as 20/50 in his right eye and 20/200 in his left. Id. ¶ 33. Mroz referred Plaintiff for an ophthalmology consultation on an urgent basis. Id. ¶ 35.
Plaintiff denies that Mroz evaluated him as reflected in his medical records. ECF No. 68 ¶¶ 15-16.
Dr. Camacho was not notified of Plaintiff s medical complaints on June 19,2017. She was not working at Somerset County Jail during his evaluation on June 21, 2017. Id. ¶¶ 26, 31.
b. Referral to ophthalmologist
On June 27, 2017, Plaintiff was examined at Formica Optical. Id. ¶ 36. Formica Optical referred Plaintiff to an ophthalmologist, Dr. Daniel C. Vittone (“Dr. Vittone”), for further evaluation. Id. ¶ 37. Dr. Vittone examined Plaintiff on the same date. Id. ¶ 38.
Dr. Vittone diagnosed Plaintiff with optic neuritis and ordered an MRI. Id. ¶ 40. The MRI was completed on July 13, 2017, and it showed unremarkable pre-contrast and post-contrast enhanced MRI of the brain and orbits. Id. ¶¶ 41-42. Dr. Vittone examined Plaintiff again on July 31, 2017, and he prescribed aspirin. Id. ¶¶ 43-44.
Plaintiff subsequently returned to Dr. Vittone for medical visits on September 12, 2017, October 14, 2017, January 19, 2018, and April 10, 2018. ECF No. 59 ¶ 51-53; ECF No. 59-10 at 8-11. Dr. Vittone documented Plaintiffs vision in his left eye as 20/200 on the first visit, with some improvement to 20/140 on the following visits. Id. ¶ 52; ECF No. 59-10 at 8-9. He continued Plaintiffs treatment plan of aspirin. ECF No. 59 ¶ 53.
c. August 2017 medical visits with Dr. Camacho
After Plaintiffs first visit with Dr. Vittone, he saw Dr. Camacho at Somerset County Jail on August 9, 2017. Id. ¶ 45. She noted that he was under the care of an ophthalmologist for his vision issues, planned for labs to be scheduled, and continued Dr. Vittone's treatment plan of aspirin/Tylenol. Id. ¶¶ 47-48.
Dr. Camacho evaluated Plaintiff again on August 30, 2017. She noted that Plaintiff s labs revealed an abnormal ANA level and referred Plaintiff for a rheumatology consultation. Id. ¶ 50.
d. Referral to rheumatologist
Regarding his abnormal ANA levels, Plaintiff was evaluated by Dr. Alan Kivitz (“Dr. Kivitz”) at the Altoona Arthritis and Osteoporosis Center on January 3,2018. Id. ¶ 56. Dr. Kivitz noted that Plaintiff had a prior MRI indicating no evidence of multiple sclerosis (“MS”), and there were not “any other obvious features that would suggest autoimmune disease but the ANA is such a high titer that it must be addressed.” ECF No. 59-11 at 4.
Dr. Kivitz's indicated his “[p]lan today will be to update a variety of auto antibody testing and rechecking in-house ANA to see if there is any evidence that I can determine of autoimmune disease. I am also going to request a copy of the MRI of the brain from Somerset Hospital. If not yet seen by neurology that might also be helpful.” Id. at 5; ECF No. 59 ¶ 60. Additional testing was completed. ECF No. 59-11 at 8.
e. Further evaluations by Dr. Camacho
Plaintiff saw Dr. Camacho again on January 24, 2018, March 1, 2018, and July 12, 2018, before he was discharged from Somerset County Jail on August 1, 2018. ECF No. 59 ¶¶ 64, 66, 68, and 72-73. On March 1, 2018, she noted that Plaintiff had been evaluated by rheumatology with no follow-up needed. ECF No. 59-5 at 20.
At his July 12, 2018 appointment with Dr. Camacho, Plaintiff raised concerns about whether he had MS. ECF No. 59 ¶ 69. In his Amended Complaint, Plaintiff claims that he asked Dr. Camacho about seeing a neurologist at this appointment, and she told him that he should see a neurologist “ASAP” upon being released from Somerset County Jail. ECF No. 37 ¶ 61. He also claims that Dr. Camacho told him that his vision loss was “probably permanent” because it had been over a year. Id. And, while optic neuritis is a precursor to MS, proper diagnosis was difficult, expensive, and would require travel to Pittsburgh. Id. Based on this, Plaintiff understood that Dr. Camacho would not refer him to a neurologist for diagnostic testing because of the cost. Id.
Dr. Camacho claims that she discussed with Plaintiff whether to refer him to a neurologist, but Plaintiff told her that it would be handled after he was transferred to a facility up-state. ECF No. 59 ¶ 71. In the record for this visit, she noted under “assessment,” a chronic vision deficit with no changes, outpatient follow up with neurology, and to call if new neurological symptoms developed. ECF No. 59-5 at 25.
f. Transfer to state correctional facilities and continued treatment
Plaintiff was transferred to the State Correctional Institution at Greene (“SCI-Greene”) on August 1, 2018. He was transferred again to SCI-Camp Hill, followed by SCI-Houtzdale, between August and October 2018. See ECF No. 11-12 at 2, ECF No. 37 ¶ 6. Plaintiff claims that his medical records from Somerset County Jail were not transferred when he was, and that he had to submit multiple requests to obtain those records. ECF No. 37 ¶¶ 103-112.
These materials suggest that Plaintiff was at SCI-Camp Hill by August 16,2018, and that he was at SCI-Houtzdale by October 30, 2018. However, his exact transfer dates are not clear.
Upon arriving at SCI-Houtzdale, Plaintiff received continued medical care for his eye-related issues. Plaintiff was evaluated by medical professionals at SCI-Houtzdale on October 30 and November 1, 2018, who referred him to an ophthalmologist in State College, Pennsylvania, Dr. Adam Marcovitch. Id. ¶¶ 67-68.
Plaintiff saw Dr. Marcovitch on November 30, 2018 and February 15, 2019. ECF No. 52 at 2. On his initial visit, Dr. Marcovitch noted Plaintiffs vision as 20/20 in his right eye and 20/80 in his left. Id. He suspected that Plaintiff had suffered a “vascular event” in his left eye, possibly related to his history of lymphoma, and he referred him to a retina specialist. Id.; ECF No. 11-14 at 2. As a result, Plaintiff saw Dr. Chris Cessna at the Geisinger retina clinic, who diagnosed Plaintiff with a non-arteritic ischemic optic neuropathy. ECF No. 52 at 2. Dr. Marcovitch reported that while Plaintiff had normal vision in his right eye, this condition was likely permanent as to his left eye. Id. at 3; ECF No. 11-14 at 2.
On July 12, 2019, Plaintiff had an appointment with Dr. Nagi at SCI-Houtzdale. ECF No. 11-19. Dr. Nagi noted that he “explained to [Plaintiff]... all ophthalmology consults” during this visit. Id. Plaintiff claims that Dr. Nagi informed him during this visit that no follow-up treatment had been ordered, and that there were no corrective measures for his vision loss. ECF No. 37 ¶ 87.
On October 25,2019, Plaintiff was seen by physician assistant Patrick Nagle (“Nagle”) for continued issues with his vision. ECF No. 11-21. Plaintiff requested a neurology consult because the cause of his optic neuritis had never been determined. Id.
Shortly thereafter, Plaintiff had an eye exam with Dr. Brandon Housler on November 8, 2019. ECF No. 59¶81. His unaided visual acuity was 20/40 in the right eye and 20/70 in the left. Id. ¶ 83. Dr. Housler diagnosed him with myopia and ordered glasses for Plaintiff. Id. ¶¶ 84-85.
Plaintiff later received a follow-up visit for his vision care on January 20, 2020 with physician assistant Deanna Della. Id. ¶ 86. Plaintiff again requested to see a neurologist. Id. ¶ 89. It was noted, however, that his MRI showed no evidence of MS, he was under the care of other specialists, and his symptoms had not progressed since 2017. Id. ¶¶ 87-90. Plaintiff was informed that his previous request for a neurology consult was submitted in October 2019, and it was denied. Id. ¶ 91. Because he had no new symptoms, a renewed request would not be submitted. Id. ¶ 92.
On February 5, 2020, Plaintiff saw Nagle to discuss his history of optic neuritis and worsening headaches, which increased in severity after he began taking classes and doing more reading. ECF No. 59-6 at 30. There were no new vision changes. He received additional doses of the Excedrin that he was taking. Id.
2. Cancer-related medical care
Plaintiff arrived at Somerset County Jail with a history of non-Hodgkin's lymphoma. He previously completed cancer treatments in December 2013. ECF No. 59 ¶ 15. As of 2015, there was no evidence of active disease. Id. ¶ 16. Before his incarceration, Plaintiff was following up with Dr. Ibrahim Sbeitan (“Dr. Sbeitan”) for continued observation. Id. ¶ 14. At his most recent appointment with Dr. Sbeitan on February 26,2016, Dr. Sbeitan noted that Plaintiff should follow up in six months for bloodwork. ECF No. 52-7 at 2.
Plaintiff disclosed his history of cancer to medical staff at Somerset County Jail. ECF No. 59-5 at 12. According to Dr. Camacho, she requested Plaintiffs medical records from Dr. Sbeitan but never received them while Plaintiff was incarcerated at the Somerset County Jail. ECF No. 59 ¶ 13. Plaintiff did not see Dr. Sbeitan for follow-up care while he was detained at the Somerset County Jail.
After Plaintiff was transferred to SCI-Houtzdale, he received follow-up care for his prior diagnosis of non-Hodgkin's lymphoma. Id. ¶ 74. He received a PET/CT scan on January 22,2019 that was ordered by Dr. Matthew Miceli, which showed no evidence of any reoccurring disease. Id. ¶¶ 75-76. On February 18, 2019, he attended a tele-med oncology appointment. Id. ¶ 77. Plaintiff was informed that it had been 5 years since his diagnosis and treatment. With his negative PET scan and bloodwork, he was considered to be cured. Id. ¶¶ 78-79. Dr. Miceli informed Plaintiff that he was not aware of any relationship between optic neuritis and non-Hodgkin's lymphoma, and that he had never seen it. Id. ¶¶ 104-05.
B. RELEVANT PROCEDURAL HISTORY/CLAIMS
1. Prior lawsuit
Plaintiff previously filed a lawsuit against Dr. Camacho and PrimeCare Medical, Inc. (“PrimeCare”) in the Court of Common Pleas of Somerset County, Pennsylvania on January 3, 2020. Id. ¶ 2. He claimed that he received deficient medical care during his incarceration at Somerset County Jail. Id. ¶ 4. Plaintiff voluntarily dismissed his state court action on January 25, 2021. M¶S.
2. Instant lawsuit
Plaintiff began this action by filing a Motion for Leave to Proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP Motion”) on April 16, 2021, together with a proposed Complaint. ECF No. 1. After Plaintiff cured certain fling deficiencies, the Court granted Plaintiff s IFP Motion on July 27, 2021, and his Complaint was filed on the same date. ECF Nos. 10 and 12. Plaintiff originally brought claims against Defendants Dr. Camacho and Prime Care.
Dr. Camacho and PrimeCare filed their Answer to Plaintiffs Complaint on October 18, 2021. ECF No. 22. The Court then entered a Case Management Order, scheduling fact discovery to conclude by February 1, 2022. ECF No. 23.
Plaintiff moved for leave to amend his Complaint, which the Court granted. ECF Nos. 33 and 34. He filed his First Amended Complaint on December 30, 2021, in which he eliminated claims against PrimeCare and added Dr. Vittone as a defendant. ECF No. 37.
In his Amended Complaint, Plaintiff asserts eight claims under the Eighth and/or Fourteenth Amendments against Dr. Camacho based on her alleged failure to provide adequate medical care: Failure to Provide Adequate Emergency Medical Care (Count I); Failure to Administer Adequate Medical Care During Sick Call (Count II); Failure to Provide Adequate Care for the Plaintiffs Medical History (Count III); Failure to Provide Adequate Medical Care by Failing to Follow Recommendations of a Specialist (Count IV); Failure to Provide Adequate Medical Care by Failing to Diagnose the Underlying Cause of the Plaintiff s Medical Condition (Count V); Failure to Provide Adequate Care Because of Budget Reasons (Count VI); Failure to Administer Adequate Medical Care by Persisting in an “Ineffective Treatment Plan” (Count VII); and Failure to Provide Adequate Medical Care by Denying and Delaying the Plaintiff Access to his Medical Records (Count VIII). ECF No. 37 ¶¶ 120-135.
Plaintiff claims that he has suffered a permanent loss of vision and emotional distress, along with headaches, nausea, and vertigo related to the documented difference in the visual acuity between his left and right eyes. Id. ¶ 127; ECF No. 51 ¶ 2.
Dr. Camacho filed an Answer to the Amended Complaint. ECF No. 38.
Plaintiff moved to extend the discovery deadline, which the Court granted. ECF Nos. 32 and 35. Under the Amended Case Management Order, fact discovery concluded on May 2,2022. ECF No. 36.
On July 11, 2022, Plaintiff moved for default judgment against Dr. Vittone based on his failure to file a responsive pleading. ECF No. 63. Attorney Michael C. Hamilton entered an appearance on behalf of Dr. Vittone, and he filed a response in opposition to the Motion for Default Judgment indicating that Dr. Vittone was deceased. ECF Nos. 64 and 66. The undersigned a pending Report and Recommendation, recommending that the Motion for Default Judgment be denied. ECF No. 71. On October 18, 2022, District Judge Stephanie L. Haines entered an Order adopting Report and Recommendation, as supplemented, and denying the Motion for Default Judgment. ECF No. 72.
3. Motions for Summary Judgment
Plaintiff filed the instant Motion for Summary Judgment on May 31,2022, together with a brief and exhibits in support. ECF Nos. 51,52,53 and 54. Dr. Camacho filed a Brief in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment on June 30, 2022. ECF No. 60.
Dr. Camacho separately filed a Motion for Summary Judgment and Brief in Support on June 30, 2022, together with a Concise Statement of Material Facts and Appendix. ECF Nos. 57, 58 and 59.
On July 27, 2022, Plaintiff filed a response in opposition to Dr. Camacho's Motion for Summary Judgment. ECF No. 67. He also filed a “Statement of Undisputed Facts of Jamie McVicker in Support of his Response to the Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment.” ECF No. 68.
Dr. Camacho filed a Reply Brief in support of her Motion for Summary Judgment and a Response to Plaintiffs Statement of Undisputed Facts on August 5, 2022. ECF Nos. 69 and 70.
The Motions for Summary Judgment are now ripe for consideration.
C. LEGAL STANDARD
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, “[t]he court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). An issue of material fact is in genuine dispute if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986); Doe v. Abington Friends Sch., 480 F.3d 252, 256 (3d Cir. 2007) (“A genuine issue is present when a reasonable trier of fact, viewing all of the record evidence, could rationally find in favor of the non-moving party in light of his burden of proof'). Thus, summary judgment is warranted where, “after adequate time for discovery and upon motion ... a party . . . fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.” Marten v. Godwin, 499 F.3d 290, 295 (3d Cir. 2007) (quoting Celotex Corp, v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986)).
The moving party bears the initial burden of demonstrating to the Court that there is an absence of evidence to support the non-moving party's case. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322; Conoshenti v. Pub. Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 364 F.3d 135, 140 (3d Cir. 2004). “[W]hen the moving party has carried its burden under Rule 56(c), its opponent must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts ... Where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is no ‘genuine issue for trial.'” Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007) (quoting Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574,586-87(1986)).
In deciding a summary judgment motion, a court must view the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and must draw all reasonable inferences, and resolve all doubts in favor of the nonmoving party. Matreale v. N.J. Dep't of Mil. & Veterans Affairs, 487 F.3d 150, 152 (3d Cir. 2007); Woodside v. Sch. Dist. of Phila. Bd. of Educ., 248 F.3d 129, 130 (3d Cir. 2001).
D. DISCUSSION
1. Dr. Camacho's Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 57)
Plaintiff brings claims for deliberate indifference to a serious medical need under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. Dr. Camacho moves for summary judgment as to all claims, arguing that (1) Plaintiff's claims fail on the merits because the evidence does not demonstrate that she acted with deliberate indifference and/or she was not personally involved in the events at issue; and (2) Plaintiffs claims are barred by the statute of limitations.
a. Substantive deficiency
First, the Court must consider whether there is any genuine issue of material fact relative to Plaintiffs claims under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. In order to establish a violation of Plaintiffs constitutional right to adequate medical care, the evidence must show: (1) a serious medical need; and (2) acts or omissions by Dr. Camacho that indicate a deliberate indifference to that need. Natale v. Camden Cnty. Corr. Fac., 318 F.3d 575, 582 (3d Cir. 2003).
Plaintiffs claims arise under the Fourteenth Amendment when he was a pre-trial detainee at Somerset County Jail (from February 27, 2017 to May 27,2018) and under the Eighth Amendment for the period of time after which he became a convicted prisoner (May 28, 2018 to August 1,2018). See Natale v. Camden Cnty. Corr. Facility, 318 F.3d 575, 581 (3d Cir. 2003). Because the United States Com! of Appeals for the Third Circuit has held that the same standard applies under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, the Court does not separately analyze these two claims. Id. at 581-82.
Deliberate indifference to a serious medical need involves the “unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103 (1976) (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173(1976)). “Deliberate indifference may be manifested by an intentional refusal to provide care, delayed medical treatment for non-medical reasons, denial of prescribed medical treatment, a denial of reasonable requests for treatment that results in suffering or risk of injury,. . . or ‘persistent conduct in the face of resultant pain and risk of permanent injury.'” Josey v. Beard, No. 06-265,2009 WL 1858250, at *6 (W.D. Pa. June 29,2009) (citing Durmer v. O'Carroll, 991 F.2d 64, 68 (3d Cir. 1993); White v. Napoleon, 897 F.2d 103, 109 (3d Cir. 1990) (internal citations omitted)).
“Mere misdiagnosis or negligent treatment is not actionable under § 1983 as an Eighth Amendment claim because medical malpractice is not a constitutional violation.” Id. (citing Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106). “The deliberate indifference ‘test affords considerable latitude to prison medical authorities in the diagnosis and treatment of the medical problems of inmate patients.'” Beckett v. Pa. Dep't of Corr., 597 Fed.Appx. 665, 668 (3d Cir. 2015) (quoting Inmates of Allegheny Cnty. Jail v. Pierce, 612 F.2d 754, 762 (3d Cir. 1979)). “[W]here a prisoner has received some medical attention and the dispute is over the adequacy of the treatment, federal courts are generally reluctant to second guess medical judgments and to constitutionalize claims which sound in state tort law.” Williams v. Fedarko, 807 Fed.Appx. 177, 180 (3d Cir. 2020) (quoting United States ex rel. Walker v. Fayette Cnty., 599 F.2d 573, 575 n.2 (3d Cir. 1979)). Thus, “deliberate indifference is generally not found when some level of medical care has been offered to the inmate.” Josey, 2009 WL 1858250, at *6 (citing Clark v. Doe, No. 99-5616, 2000 WL 1522855, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 13, 2000) (“[C]ourts have consistently rejected Eighth Amendment claims where an inmate has received some level of medical care.”)).
In a civil rights claim, as here, individual government defendants must have personal involvement in the alleged wrongdoing and “may not be held liable for the unconstitutional conduct of their subordinates under a theory of respondeat superior.” Barkes v. First Corr. Med., Inc., 766 F.3d 307, 316 (3d Cir. 2014), rev'd on other grounds, Taylor v. Barkes, 135 S.Ct. 2042 (2015) (quoting Bistrian v. Levi, 696 F.3d 352, 366 (3d Cir. 2012)); see also Millbrook v. United States, 8 F.Supp.3d 601, 613 (M.D. Pa. 2014). “Rather, state actors are liable only for their own unconstitutional conduct.” Barkes, 766 F.3d at 316.
Although supervisors cannot be held liable pursuant to a theory of respondeat superior, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has identified “two general ways in which a supervisor-defendant may be liable for unconstitutional acts undertaken by subordinates.” Id. First, a supervisor may be personally liable under § 1983 if she ‘“participated in violating the plaintiff's rights, directed others to violate them, or, as the person in charge, had knowledge of and acquiesced' in the subordinate's unconstitutional conduct.” Id. (quoting Baker v. Monroe Twp., 50 F.3d 1186, 1190-91 (3d Cir. 1995)). Second, a supervisor-defendant is liable if she “with deliberate indifference to the consequences, established and maintained a policy, practice or custom which directly caused [the] constitutional harm.” Id. (quoting A.M. ex rel. J.M.K. Luzerne Cnty. Juvenile Det. Ctr., 372 F.3d 572, 586 (3d Cir. 2004)).
Against this backdrop, the Court considers each of the specific claims at issue relative to Dr. Camacho.
(1) Counts I and II
Counts I and II arise out of the medical care that Plaintiff received between June 19 and 26, 2017 when his blurry vision began. In Count I, Plaintiff claims that Dr. Camacho was deliberately indifferent by failing to provide adequate emergency care to him from June 19, 2017 through June 26, 2017. ECF No. 37 ¶¶ 120-121. In Count II, he claims that Dr. Camacho refused to provide adequate medical care during his sick call visit on June 21, 2017. Id. ¶¶ 122-23.
In support of the Motion for Summary Judgment, Dr. Camacho argues that summary judgment should be granted because she was not involved with Plaintiffs care at this time. ECF No. 58 at 16-17. She argues that she was not deliberately indifferent to his medical needs, given that she was not aware of his condition and was not even working at Somerset County Jail at the time. Id.
In response, Plaintiff argues that Dr. Camacho allowed cursory sick calls to be provided by the Medical Department in her role as supervisor, and that she maintained a custom or practice that resulted in delays in Plaintiff receiving adequate care. ECF No. 67 at 3.
Upon review, summary judgment should be granted in Dr. Camacho's favor as to Counts I and II. Dr. Camacho was not personally involved in Plaintiff s medical care during this limited time period, and there is no evidence she had any knowledge of his condition. To the extent Plaintiff argues that Dr. Camacho maintained a custom or practice that resulted in inadequate care during his initial sick call visits, there is no evidence provided to support this finding. Accordingly, Dr. Camacho's Motion for Summary Judgment should be granted as to Counts I and II.
(2) Count III
Count III relates to Plaintiffs cancer-related care. Plaintiff claims that Dr. Camacho failed to provide appropriate care considering his medical history based on her failure to provide follow up oncology visits with Dr. Sbeitan or a PET scan to monitor for possible reoccurrence of active disease. ECF No. 37 ¶¶ 124-25.
In support of the Motion for Summary Judgment, Dr. Camacho argues there is no evidence of deliberate indifference relative to Plaintiffs cancer history because Plaintiff was not actively treating with Dr. Sbeitan at the time of his intake at Somerset County Jail, and he had not seen Dr. Sbeitan in over a year or scheduled any further testing. ECF No. 58 at 18. She also argues that Plaintiff did not notify her of any ongoing treatment, and that Dr. Sbeitan did not provide any records. Dr. Camacho also argues that Plaintiffs cancer did not reoccur. Id.
In response, Plaintiff argues that Dr. Sbeitan clearly documented the need for continued monitoring to ensure that his cancer was cured or in remission. ECF No. 67 at 6-7. Plaintiff also argues that Dr. Camacho was not qualified to provide oncology care; there was no basis for her to conclude that he was “cured” while he was incarcerated at the Somerset County Jail or to know whether his eye condition was, as Dr. Marcovitch later suggested, potentially related to his history of lymphoma. Id.
Upon review, summary judgment should also be granted as to Count III. There is no evidence that Plaintiff informed Dr. Camacho of any need for continued monitoring related to his cancer history, or that she was otherwise placed on notice of this fact. As such, the evidence does not reflect that she was deliberately indifferent to a serious medical need by failing to order testing or schedule additional visits with Dr. Sbeitan.
Moreover, “a delay in providing medical treatment . . . does not rise to the level of a constitutional violation unless in results in substantial harm.” Laurensau v. Pluck, No. 12-623, 2014 WL 6774125, at *4 (W.D. Pa. Dec. 1, 2014) (quoting Phillips v. Rustin, No. 06-1338, 2009 WL 1688466, at *6 (W.D. Pa. June 17, 2009) (citing, e.g., Mendoza v. Lynaugh, 989 F.2d 191, 195 (5th Cir. 1993); Laughlin v. Schriro, 430 F.3d 927, 929 (8th Cir. 2005) (claim based on delay of medical treatment cannot succeed absent medical evidence showing detrimental impact of delay); Shapley v. Nev. Bd. of State Prison Comm'rs, 766 F.2d 404, 407 (9th Cir. 1985) (same); Brooks v. Kyler, 204 F.3d 102,105 n.4 (3d Cir. 2000) (Fourteenth Amendment claim failed where prisoner-plaintiff “presented no evidence of any harm resulting from a delay in medical treatment.”).
Here, Plaintiff has presented no evidence of any harm because he did not receive cancer-related monitoring while incarcerated at Somerset County Jail. Subsequent testing revealed that Plaintiff had no reoccurrence of his cancer, and he was deemed cured after five years without active disease. Based on this, the Court should grant Dr. Camacho's Motion for Summary Judgment as to Count III.
(3) Counts IV, V, VI and VII
Counts IV, V, VI and VII arise out of the quality of Dr. Camacho's medical care. In Count V, Plaintiff claims that Dr. Camacho failed to properly diagnose what caused his medical condition. ECF No. 37 ¶¶ 128-29. In Count VII, he claims that Dr. Camacho acted with deliberate indifference by continuing a course of treatment that was ineffective. Id. ¶¶ 132-33.
Counts IV and VI concern Dr. Camacho's alleged failure to refer him to a neurologist. In Count IV, he claims that Dr. Camacho did not follow the recommendations of Dr. Kivitz by failing to refer him to a neurologist. Id. ¶¶ 126-27. And in Count VI he claims that she did not do so simply because of cost. Id. ¶¶ 130-31.
In support of the Motion for Summary Judgment, Dr. Camacho argues that she did not deny Plaintiff access to medical care or qualified medical personnel. ECF No. 58 at 18. Rather, she argues, Plaintiff was evaluated by two different eye specialists, received diagnostic testing, was evaluated by a rheumatologist, and received regular examinations at Somerset County Jail. Id. As for Plaintiffs treatment plan, she argues, it was formulated by specialist Dr. Vittone and cannot be considered ineffective given that Plaintiffs vision ultimately improved from 20/200 to 20/70 by November 2019. Id. at 20-21. Dr. Camacho disputes that Dr. Kivitz ordered a neurology consult (merely indicating it “might” be helpful), and she notes that Plaintiff had no neurological symptoms or changes to his condition. Id. at 19.
In response, Plaintiff argues that Dr. Camacho knew that his aspirin regimen was ineffective in the early stages of his treatment, and she continued it despite knowing he would suffer permanent nerve damage to his left eye. ECF No. 67 at 4. As Medical Director, he argues, she had the ability to consult with Dr. Vittone or to send him to a different specialist. Id. He also argues that he specifically requested a neurology consult while at Somerset County Jail, and it was warranted based on Dr. Kivitz's recommendation and his bloodwork. Id. at 4-5. He argues that finding the cause of his optic neuritis would have informed his treatment plan, and he refers the Court to materials indicating that optic neuritis can be associated with auto-immune disorders, including MS. ECF No. 51 ¶ 39; ECF No. 51-10.
Upon review, it is evident from the record that Plaintiff received ongoing medical care for his optic neuritis from both Dr. Camacho and various specialists. Of note, Dr. Camacho evaluated Plaintiff repeatedly during his incarceration at Somerset County Jail. He also was seen regularly by Dr. Vittone, an ophthalmologist, who evaluated the results of Plaintiff s MRI and prescribed a treatment plan based on his expertise. Dr. Camacho noted that Plaintiff was under the care of a specialist, and she implemented his treatment plan. She also ordered further diagnostic testing and based on the results, she referred Plaintiff to a rheumatologist, Dr. Kivitz, for further evaluation.
While Plaintiffs claims convey his dissatisfaction with the outcome of that care, the record reflects that Dr. Camacho's decisions were based on the exercise of professional judgment. As such, it is not the Court's role to second-guess those decisions. Inmates v. Allegheny Cnty. Jail v. Pierce, 612 F.2d 754, 762 (3d Cir. 1979) (The deliberate indifference test “affords considerable latitude to prison medical authorities in the diagnosis and treatment of the medical problems of inmate patients. Courts will ‘disavow any attempt to second-guess the propriety or adequacy of a particular course of treatment. . . (which) remains a question of sound professional judgment.'”) (quoting Bowring v. Godwin, 551 F.2d 44, 48 (4th Cir. 1977)). Plaintiffs allegations that he was provided with inadequate medical care, or that Dr. Camacho refused to “summon the medical specialist of the inmate's choice” fail to establish a constitutional claim. See Taylor v. Visinky, 422 Fed.Appx. 76, 78 (3d Cir. 2011); Maqbool v. Univ. Hosp, of Med. & Dentistry of N.J., No. 114592, 2012 WL 2374689, at *9 (D.N.J. June 13, 2012) (citing White v. Napoleon, 897 F.2d 103 (3d Cir. 1990)). Accordingly, the Court should grant the Motion for Summary Judgment as to Counts IV, V, VI and VII.
(4) Count VIII
In Count VIII, Plaintiff claims that Dr. Camacho acted with deliberate indifference by refusing to provide his medical records to SCI-Houtzdale, which delayed appropriate medical care. ECF No. 37 ¶¶ 134-35.
In support of the Motion for Summary Judgment, Dr. Camacho argues that she had no role in responding to medical records requests at Somerset County Jail, and that Plaintiff proffers no evidence to the contrary. ECF No. 59 at 21. She also argues there is no evidence that any delay resulted in harm; rather, the records show that Plaintiff's vision improved despite some permanent vision loss, and that he had no auto-immune disease or reoccurrence of his cancer. Id.
In response, Plaintiff argues that Dr. Camacho was responsible for medical records given her role as the Medical Director. ECF No. 67 at 7. He also argues that medical records are necessary to ensure the continuity of care and to avoid any delays in receiving urgent medical care, and that Dr. Camacho indicated he needed to see a neurologist as soon as possible. Id. He argues that she recklessly disregarded his health and safety by delaying access to his medical records. Id.
Upon review, the record does not support Plaintiff s claim in Count VIII. As Dr. Camacho points out, there is no evidence she was personally involved in addressing requests for medical records at Somerset County Jail. There is also no evidence in the record that any alleged failings by Dr. Camacho were the result of her deliberate indifference to Plaintiff s serious medical needs. In addition, Plaintiff does not point to any evidence that any delay in sending Plaintiffs medical records for Somerset County Jail interfered with his medical treatment. Based on the record, Plaintiff received ongoing care. Therefore, Dr. Camacho's Motion for Summary Judgment should be granted as to Count VIII.
b. Statute of limitations
In further support of the Motion for Summary Judgment, Dr. Camacho also argues that Plaintiffs claims are barred by the statute of limitations. She asserts that a two-year statute of limitations applies. Because Plaintiff brought this claim more than two years after Dr. Camacho last treated him, and he knew the treatment allegedly was ineffective at that time, she contends that his claims are time barred. ECF No. 58 at 9-12; ECF No. 69 at 1-2.
In response, Plaintiff argues that Dr. Camacho did not confirm his vision loss was permanent while he was treating with her. ECF No. 67 at 9. He did not learn the extent of his injury, and that it was permanent and non-correctable, until after he transferred to SCI-Houtzdale and received additional care by specialists. Id. Plaintiff also argues in support of his Motion for Summary Judgment that his claims are timely under the continuing violations doctrine. ECF No. 51 at 26.
Plaintiff brings his claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. For Section 1983 claims based on conduct that occurred in Pennsylvania, as here, the statute of limitations is two years from the date the claim accrued. Beckett v. Pa. Dep't of Corr., 597 Fed.Appx. 665, 667 (3d Cir. 2015). “A claim accrues ‘when the plaintiff knew or should have known of the injury upon which [his] action is based.'” Id. (quoting Kach v. Hose, 589 F.3d 626, 634 (3d Cir. 2009)). “A plaintiffs ignorance regarding the full extent of his injury is irrelevant to the discovery rule's application, so long as the plaintiff discovers or should have discovered that he was injured.” Stephens v. Clash, 796 F.3d 281, 288 (3d Cir. 2015).
Upon review, the Court should find that summary judgment is also proper on this alternative basis for Counts I through VIL Counts I through VII arise out of care that Plaintiff received while at Somerset County Jail. Based on the record, he last treated with Dr. Camacho on July 12, 2018, and he left Somerset County Jail on August 1, 2018. Therefore, any alleged misconduct related to Dr. Camacho's care occurred no later than August 1, 2018.
Dr. Camacho requests summary judgment on this basis as to all claims. However, she limits her discussion to claims arising out of medical care that Plaintiff received at Somerset County Jail. Those claims are covered by Counts I through VII. Count VIII relates to Dr. Camacho's alleged failure to provide medical records following Plaintiffs transfer. Accordingly, the Court limits this analysis to Counts I through VII.
By this time, Plaintiff was on notice of his alleged injury and full extent of everything Dr. Camacho did (or did not) do to treat him. Plaintiff knew that he suffered a “chronic vision deficit with no changes” over a year after his symptoms began, and that this loss was “probably permanent.” ECF No. 59 ¶ 20; ECF No. 59-5 at 25; ECF No. 37 ¶ 61. Plaintiff also was aware that he had not received follow-up oncology care during his incarceration at Somerset County Jail. For these reasons, his claims accrued no later than August 1, 2018.
Plaintiff did not bring this action until well over two years later, however, on April 15, 2021. Accordingly, Counts I through VII are time barred.
“Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a pleading is filed when it is delivered to a clerk or to a judge who agrees to accept it for filing.” Moody v. Conroy, 762 Fed.Appx. 71, 73 (3d Cir. 2019) (citing Fed.R.Civ.P. 5(d)(2)). As for prisoners, however, “under ‘[t]he federal prisoner mailbox rule[,] ... a document is deemed filed on the date it is given to prison officials for mailing.” Id. (quoting Pabon v. Mahonoy, 654 F.3d 385, 391 n. 8 (3d Cir. 2011)). Plaintiff mailed his initial complaint and IFP Motion on April 15, 2021. ECF Nos. 1 and 3. While the Court did not grant Plaintiffs IFP Motion and direct the Court to file his Complaint until July 27, 2021, the statute of limitations is tolled while the Court considers an IFP motion. Fields v. Schaffer, No. Civ. A. 03-2150,2005 WL 78928, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 12, 2005). Therefore, the Court considers April 15, 2021 as the operative date that Plaintiff brought this action.
To the extent Plaintiff relies on the continuing violations doctrine, this is unavailing. Under this doctrine, “when a defendant's conduct is part of a continuing practice, an action is timely so long as the last act evidencing the continuing practice falls within the limitations period; in such instance, the court will grant relief for the earlier acts that would otherwise be time barred.” Bumbarger v. New Enterprise Stone & Lime Co., Inc., 170 F.Supp.3d 801, 825 (W.D. Pa. 2016). Dr. Camacho's medical care ceased by August 1, 2018, and therefore no acts fall within the two-year limitations period. Accordingly, this doctrine does not apply. For these reasons, the Court should grant the Motion for Summary Judgment on this basis as to Counts I, II, III, IV, V, VI and VII.
The Court notes that Plaintiff claims Dr. Camacho refused to send his medical records to SCI-Houtzdale at times after his transfer. However, this claim is unsupported by the record for the reasons discussed.
2. Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 54)
Plaintiff filed a Motion for Summary Judgment, ECF No. 54, and a Brief in Support, ECF No. 51, along with an Appendix, ECF No. 54-1. The gist of Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment is that Defendants owed him a duty of care as an incarcerated person and that Defendants owed him a heightened duty of care because he was an inmate known to “have a rare condition requiring special treatment.” ECF No. 54 at 2-3. Plaintiff claims that he was denied the care that he needed. Id. at 3.
Upon review of Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment and the materials he has provided, for the reasons discussed above, his Motion for Summary Judgment should be denied.
E. CONCLUSION
For these reasons, it is respectfully recommended that Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment, ECF No. 54, be denied and Dr. Camacho's Motion for Summary Judgment, ECF No. 57, be granted.
In accordance with the Magistrate Judges Act, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), and Rule 72.C.2 of the Local Rules of Court, the parties are allowed fourteen (14) days from the date of this Order to file an appeal to the District Judge which includes the basis for objection to this Order. Any appeal is to be submitted to the Clerk of Court, United States District Court, 700 Grant Street, Room 3110, Pittsburgh, PA 15219. Failure to file a timely appeal will constitute a waiver of any appellate rights.