Opinion
Case No. 2D18-2250
04-15-2020
Michael Joseph MCVETY, Appellant, v. Terri Lynn MCVETY, Appellee.
Cynthia L. Greene of Young, Berman, Karpf & Gonzalez, P.A., Miami; and Linda H. Fried, Ft. Myers, for Appellant. Terri Lynn McVety, pro se.
Cynthia L. Greene of Young, Berman, Karpf & Gonzalez, P.A., Miami; and Linda H. Fried, Ft. Myers, for Appellant.
Terri Lynn McVety, pro se.
MORRIS, Judge.
Michael Joseph McVety, the former husband, appeals a final order granting a motion by Terri Lynn McVety, the former wife, for attorneys' fees and costs incurred in their dissolution of marriage proceedings. The order directs the former husband to pay the former wife's fees and costs in the amount of $181,735.70. We find merit to one of the former husband's arguments on appeal and reverse on that limited issue.
The former husband argues that the trial court erred in ordering the former husband to pay the former wife's accounting costs in the amount of $45,401.50 when it was clear at the hearing that the former wife and the former husband stipulated that $28,000 in costs was reasonable for that witness. We agree.
At the beginning of the February 2, 2017, hearing, the former wife's counsel stated that he had "stipulated with [the former husband's counsel] that, as to [the accountant's] requested fees, they have agreed that $28,000 of the $45,000 is reasonable ... should the court deem those to be included as part of the award." During the accountant's testimony at the hearing, the former wife's counsel asked the accountant about his affidavit of accounting fees and costs, and the former husband's counsel objected on the basis that they had "a stipulation as to the reasonableness of his fees, ... so we wouldn't go into all of this at this point in time." The former wife's counsel asserted that he was "not trying to prove anything different" but that he needed to "establish that [the accountant] did this work." The former husband's counsel stipulated that the accountant did his work and agreed to the former wife's counsel admitting the accountant's affidavit, engagement agreement, and invoice.
It is clear from the transcript of the February 2017 hearing that the parties stipulated to $28,000 in accounting costs for the former wife. Thus, it was error for the trial court to disregard that stipulation and order the former husband to pay $45,401.50 in accounting costs. See Johnson v. Johnson, 663 So. 2d 663, 665 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995) (holding that a stipulation that has been properly entered into should be enforced by the courts and recognizing "the value which stipulations bring to the legal system in terms of simplifying issues, limiting or shortening litigation, saving costs to the parties, and preserving judicial economy and resources" (citing Dunscombe v. Smith, 139 Fla. 497, 190 So. 796 (Fla. 1939) )); Lift v. Lift, 1 So. 3d 259, 261 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009) ("Because appropriately made stipulations entered into by the parties are generally binding on the court as well as on the parties, the court erred in failing to follow them.").
Accordingly, we reverse the order with directions for the trial court to reduce the accounting costs as stipulated to by the parties. We affirm the remainder of the order without comment.
The former wife's exhibit 13 is an invoice that reflects accounting fees and costs in the amount of $28,743.75. Presumably, this was the amount referenced by the parties' stipulation.
Affirmed in part; reversed in part; remanded.
NORTHCUTT and SLEET, JJ., Concur.