The addition of the semicolons as shown resolves any possible ambiguity. See McVay v. Anderson, 221 Ga. 381, 385 ( 144 SE2d 741) (1965) ("The cardinal rule of construction is the ascertainment and effectuation of the intent and this must be done even if it requires transposing words and sentences to the point of ignoring minor clauses."); Ardis v. Printup, 39 Ga. 648, 653 (1869) ("[I]f we substitute the word or for the words and also, . . . all difficulty is removed, and the intention of the parties, as we gather it from the whole instrument, is carried into effect."). (c) Azzouz contends the scope of the restrictions is unreasonably broad in that he cannot be prohibited from certain forms of advertising in the prohibited area, namely mailings to Prime's patients within the prohibited area or listing his name in the white pages or on the internet.

Irvin v. Laxmi, Inc., 266 Ga. 204, 205 ( 467 S.E.2d 510) (1996); Northen v. Tobin, 262 Ga. App. 339, 342 ( 585 S.E.2d 681) (2003). OCGA § 13-2-3; McVay v. Anderson, 221 Ga. 381, 385 ( 144 S.E.2d 741) (1965); Hull v. Lewis, 180 Ga. 721, 724 ( 180 SE 599) (1935). See Paul v. Paul, 235 Ga. 382, 384 ( 219 S.E.2d 736) (1975) ("that construction will be favored which gives meaning and effect to all of the terms of the contract over that which nullifies and renders meaningless a part of the language therein contained").

Cagle v. Justus, 196 Ga. 826, 832 (1) ( 28 S.E.2d 255) (1943). See also McVay v. Anderson, 221 Ga. 381, 382 ( 144 S.E.2d 741) (1965); Mitchell v. Mitchell, 191 Ga. App. 139, 140 (1) ( 381 S.E.2d 84) (1989). "It is well settled that agreements among the heirs at law to distribute or divide property devised under a will, in lieu of that manner provided by the will, are valid and enforceable.

In trust law, the cardinal rule is that the trustor-settlor's intention be followed. Love v. Fulton Nat. Bank, 213 Ga. 887, 891 ( 102 S.E.2d 488) (1958); McVay v. Anderson, 221 Ga. 381, 385 ( 144 S.E.2d 741) (1965). By giving First National the discretion (1) to encroach upon either trust for Mrs. Griffith's support, (2) to determine the size of the encroachments, and (3) to determine the frequency of the encroachments, it is reasonable to conclude that Mr. Griffith intended the trustee to have the corollary power of deciding which trust should bear the burden of the encroachments.

Mayor c. of Savannah v. Savannah Elec. c. Co., 205 Ga. 429 ( 54 S.E.2d 260) held that an ordinance fixing a tax specifically stating that the tax was on total operations of the street railway company excluded tax on buses operated in the city, as the first provision encompassed busses of the street railway company. McVay v. Anderson, 221 Ga. 381, 383 ( 144 S.E.2d 741), citing all the above cases, merely held that under two indentures made in 1935 and 1937, specific provision was made as to whom the property should go. The ruling in each of those cases is entirely consistent with our view that the statement first made in Torrance v. McDougald, 12 Ga. 526, supra, that general and unlimited terms are restrained and limited by particular recitals is not applicable in this case, and the cases of Jordan v. Orr, 209 Ga. 161 ( 71 S.E.2d 206); Randall v. Atlanta Advertising Service, 159 Ga. 217 ( 125 S.E. 462); and David v. Bowen, 191 Ga. 467 ( 12 S.E.2d 873), relied upon by appellant, do not apply the rule in Torrance v. McDougald, supra.

The assignment of the call rights to Besser's member interest does not constitute the sale of all or substantially all of the company's assets where unanimous agreement was required and did not come within any of the three categories requiring unanimous action of all voters. Such language is clear and unambiguous so that the trial court did not need to construe the operating agreement but only to follow the intent of the parties. McVay v. Anderson, 221 Ga. 381, 385 ( 144 S.E.2d 741) (1965) ("The cardinal rule of construction is the ascertainment and effectuation of the intent [of the parties]"). The entire contract must be examined to determine the intent in Article 8.4(a).

"It is also settled law that [beneficiaries] by their agreement bind themselves thereto as well as those claiming under them." McVay v. Anderson, 221 Ga. 381, 382 ( 144 S.E.2d 741) (1965). "Such agreements have as their consideration the termination of family controversies . . . [and] are supported by the public policy of furthering family harmony and avoiding lengthy litigation.

In the construction of a contract, the cardinal rule is to ascertain the intention of the parties. McVay v. Anderson, 221 Ga. 381, 385 ( 144 S.E.2d 741) (1965). "The construction of a contract is a question of law for the court.

The cardinal rule in contract interpretation is to ascertain the intent of the parties, and to give the contract that meaning which will best effectuate that intent. McVay v. Anderson, 221 Ga. 381 ( 144 S.E.2d 741); Brooke v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 113 Ga. App. 742 ( 149 S.E.2d 511). To effectuate the parties' intent, the court must take the whole instrument together and consider it in light of the surrounding circumstance.

The cardinal rule of construction is to ascertain the parties' intent. McVay v.Anderson, 221 Ga. 381 ( 144 S.E.2d 741) (1965); Crawford v. Crawford, 158 Ga. App. 187 ( 279 S.E.2d 486) (1981). In the construction of a contract "[w]ords generally bear their usual and common signification . . ."