Opinion
June 9, 1995
Appeal from the Supreme Court, Monroe County, Rosenbloom, J.
Present — Denman, P.J., Pine, Wesley, Balio and Davis, JJ.
Order unanimously modified on the law and as modified affirmed without costs in accordance with the following Memorandum: Supreme Court properly granted defendant's motion for summary judgment dismissing the Labor Law § 240 (1) cause of action. The injury allegedly sustained by Joseph H. McSweeney (plaintiff) did not result from "the extraordinary elevation risks envisioned by Labor Law § 240 (1)" (Rodriguez v. Tietz Ctr. for Nursing Care, 84 N.Y.2d 841, 843; see, Smith v. New York State Elec. Gas Corp., 82 N.Y.2d 781, 783; Ross v. Curtis-Palmer Hydro-Elec. Co., 81 N.Y.2d 494, 500-501; Rocovich v. Consolidated Edison Co., 78 N.Y.2d 509, 512-514). Additionally, the court properly granted defendant's motion for summary judgment dismissing the Labor Law § 241 (6) cause of action because "[Occupational Safety and Health Administration] regulations cannot provide the basis for a Labor Law § 241 (6) cause of action" (Landry v. General Motors Corp., 210 A.D.2d 898; see, McGrath v. Lake Tree Vil. Assocs., 216 A.D.2d 877 [decided herewith]; see, e.g., Pellescki v. City of Rochester, 198 A.D.2d 762, lv denied 83 N.Y.2d 752).
The court erred, however, in failing to dismiss the Labor Law § 200 and common-law negligence causes of action. The alleged defect or dangerous condition arose from the methods and procedures of plaintiff's employer. Defendant, the owner, exercised no supervisory control over the work that resulted in plaintiff's alleged injuries (see, Comes v. New York State Elec. Gas Corp., 82 N.Y.2d 876, 877; Lombardi v. Stout, 80 N.Y.2d 290, 295; Durfee v. Eastman Kodak Co., 212 A.D.2d 972; Mamo v Rochester Gas Elec. Corp., 209 A.D.2d 948, 949).
We, therefore, modify the order on appeal by granting defendant's motion for summary judgment dismissing the Labor Law § 200 and common-law negligence causes of action.