Opinion
Civ. 3:21-CV-1396
09-15-2022
MATTHEW MCSHANE, Plaintiff, v. AGENTS OF INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, et al., Defendants.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
MARTIN C. CARLSON, MAGISTRATE JUDGE
I. Factual Background
This pro se complaint lawsuit has been marked by repeated episodes in which the plaintiff, who identifies himself as “Matthew of the clan McShane,” has ignored court orders and failed to abide by his responsibilities as a litigant. As discussed below, these cumulative failures to follow our instructions, coupled with the facial insufficiency of these claims, now combine to compel dismissal of this case.
Matthew McShane's initial pro se complaint and exhibits totaled some 88 pages in length; however, despite its prolix nature there was very little that is clear about this pleading. (Doc. 1). In this lawsuit, the plaintiff stated that he was affiliated with something ironically called the “Prisoner of Freedom Ministry Trust.” It appeared that McShane had been the subject of some sort of upset tax sale held by Monroe County Tax Claim Bureau on September 11, 2019, where his property was sold due to unpaid taxes. From this local unpaid tax dispute, McShane's complaint leapt forth with a global reach, seeking to name as defendants 17 individuals and entities; however, involvement of this array of defendants in the acts complained of by McShane in his complaint was entirely unclear.
In the first instance, only one defendant, Geoffrey Moulton, the Pennsylvania Court Administrator, acknowledged service of the complaint. (Doc. 7). On November 29, 2021, Moulton moved to dismiss the complaint, noting that it was devoid of any factual allegations relating to him and citing the quasi-judicial privilege that applies to court administrators like himself. (Doc. 12). McShane failed to timely respond to this motion, leading us to enter an order on December 16, 2021, which directed McShane to respond to the motion by December 30, 2021, or face the possible sanction of dismissal. (Doc. 15). This extended deadline then passed without any response by McShane to this defense motion. Therefore, we deemed the motion to be ripe for resolution and recommended that the complaint be dismissed with respect to Defendant Geoffrey Moulton. (Doc. 16). This recommendation was adopted by the district court. (Doc. 17).
When McShane failed to serve the remaining defendants named in this initial complaint, and the service deadline passed without any action on his part to perfect service, we recommended that these defendants also be dismissed. (Doc. 24). This recommendation was also adopted by the district court. (Doc. 25).
In the meanwhile, in response to our directive, McShane filed an amended complaint naming Monroe County, the Recorder of Deeds, Protonotary, and Tax Bureau, along with the sheriffs' office and a state constable as defendants. (Doc. 21). This amended complaint made sweeping but ill-defined claims of fraud arising out of the of upset tax sale held by Monroe County Tax Claim Bureau on September 11, 2019, where his property was sold due to unpaid taxes. (Id.) On the basis of these averments, McShane sought to void this sale. (Id.)
The defendants have filed motions to dismiss this amended complaint, (Docs. 32 and 34), asserting that this amended complaint fails as a matter of law on multiple grounds. McShane failed too respond to these motions. Accordingly, on August 30, 2022, we entered an order which provided, in clear and precise terms, as follows:
The plaintiff is directed to respond to the motions on or before September 12, 2022. Pursuant to Local Rule 7.7 the movants may then file reply briefs on or before September 26, 2022. All briefs must conform to the requirements prescribed by Local Rule 7.8. No further extensions shall be granted, absent compelling circumstances.
The plaintiff, who is proceeding pro se, is advised that Local Rule 7.6 of the Rules of this Court imposes an affirmative duty on the plaintiff to respond to motions, and provides that:
Any party opposing any motion, other than a motion for summary judgment, shall file a brief in opposition within fourteen (14) days after service of the movant's brief, or, if
a brief in support of the motion is not required under these rules, within seven (7) days after service of the motion. Any party who fails to comply with this rule shall be deemed not to oppose such motion. Nothing in this rule shall be construed to limit the authority of the court to grant any motion before expiration of the prescribed period for filing a brief in opposition. A brief in opposition to a motion for summary judgment and LR 56.1 responsive statement, together with any transcripts, affidavits or other relevant documentation, shall be filed within twenty-one (21) days after service of the movant's brief.
Local Rule 7.6 (emphasis added).
It is now well-settled that “Local Rule 7.6 can be applied to grant a motion to dismiss without analysis of the complaint's sufficiency ‘if a party fails to comply with the [R]ule after a specific direction to comply from the court.'” Williams v. Lebanon Farms Disposal, Inc., No. 091704, 2010 WL 3703808, *1 (M.D. Pa. Aug. 26, 2010) (quoting Stackhouse v. Mazurkiewicz, 951 F.2d 29, 30 (1991)). Therefore, a failure to comply with this direction may result in the motions being deemed unopposed and granted.(Doc. 36).
This deadline has now also passed without action on the plaintiff's part to respond to these motions, or otherwise litigate this case. In the absence of any response, the motions will be deemed ripe for resolution.
For the reasons set forth below, it is recommended that the motions to dismiss be granted.
II. Discussion
A. Under the Rules of This Court, These Motions Should Be Deemed Unopposed and Granted.
At the outset, under the Local Rules of this Court, the plaintiff should be deemed to concur in these motions to dismiss since the plaintiff has failed to timely oppose the motions or otherwise litigate this case. As we have stated before, these procedural defaults completely frustrate and impede efforts to resolve this case in a timely and fair fashion, and under the rules of this court warrant dismissal of this lawsuit since Local Rule 7.6 of the Rules of this Court imposes an affirmative duty on the plaintiff to respond to motions and provides that:
Any party opposing any motion, other than a motion for summary judgment, shall file a brief in opposition within fourteen (14) days after service of the movant's brief, or, if a brief in support of the motion is not required under these rules, within seven (7) days after service of the motion. Any party who fails to comply with this rule shall be deemed not to oppose such motion. Nothing in this rule shall be construed to limit the authority of the court to grant any motion before expiration of the prescribed period for filing a brief in opposition. A brief in opposition to a motion for summary judgment and LR 56.1 responsive statement, together with any transcripts, affidavits or other relevant documentation, shall be filed within twenty-one (21) days after service of the movant's brief.Local Rule 7.6 (emphasis added).
It is now well-settled that “Local Rule 7.6 can be applied to grant a motion to dismiss without analysis of the complaint's sufficiency ‘if a party fails to comply with the [R]ule after a specific direction to comply from the court.'” Williams v. Lebanon Farms Disposal, Inc., Civ. No. 09-1704, 2010 WL 3703808, *1 (M.D. Pa. Aug. 26, 2010) (quoting Stackhouse v. Mazurkiewicz, 951 F.2d 29, 30 (3d Cir. 1991)). In this case, the plaintiff has not complied with the local rules or this Court's Standing Practice Order by filing a timely response to this motion. Therefore, these procedural defaults by the plaintiff compel the court to consider:
[A] basic truth: we must remain mindful of the fact that “the Federal Rules are meant to be applied in such a way as to promote justice. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 1. Often that will mean that courts should strive to resolve cases on their merits whenever possible. However, justice also requires that the merits of a particular dispute be placed before the court in a timely fashion ....”Lease v. Fishel, 712 F.Supp.2d 359, 371 (M.D. Pa. 2010) (quoting McCurdy v. American Bd. of Plastic Surgery, 157 F.3d 191, 197 (3d Cir. 1998)).
With this basic truth in mind, we acknowledge a fundamental guiding tenet of our legal system. A failure on our part to enforce compliance with the rules, and impose the sanctions mandated by those rules when the rules are repeatedly breached, “would actually violate the dual mandate which guides this Court and motivates our system of justice: ‘that courts should strive to resolve cases on their merits whenever possible [but that] justice also requires that the merits of a particular dispute be placed before the court in a timely fashion.'” Id. Therefore, we are obliged to ensure that one party's refusal to comply with the rules does not lead to an unjustified prejudice to those parties who follow the rules.
These basic tenets of fairness apply here. In this case, the plaintiff has failed to comply with Local Rule 7.6 by filing a timely response to these motions to dismiss. This failure now compels us to apply the sanction called for under Rule 7.6 and deem the plaintiff to not oppose these motions.
B. Dismissal of this Case Is Warranted Under Rule 41.
In addition Rule 41(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure authorizes a court to dismiss a civil action for failure to prosecute, stating that: “If the plaintiff fails to prosecute or to comply with these rules or a court order, a defendant may move to dismiss the action or any claim against it.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 41(b). Decisions regarding dismissal of actions for failure to prosecute rest in the sound discretion of the Court, and will not be disturbed absent an abuse of that discretion. Emerson v. Thiel College, 296 F.3d 184, 190 (3d Cir. 2002) (citations omitted). That discretion, however, while broad, is governed by certain factors, commonly referred to as Poulis factors. As the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has noted:
To determine whether the District Court abused its discretion [in dismissing a case for failure to prosecute], we evaluate its balancing of the following factors: (1) the extent of the party's personal responsibility; (2) the prejudice to the adversary caused by the failure to meet scheduling orders and respond to discovery; (3) a history of dilatoriness; (4) whether the conduct of the party or the attorney was willful or in bad faith; (5) the effectiveness of sanctions other than dismissal, which entails an analysis of alternative sanctions; and (6) the meritoriousness of the claim or defense. Poulis v. State Farm Fire and Cas. Co., 747 F.2d 863, 868 (3d Cir.1984).Emerson, 296 F.3d at 190.
In exercising this discretion, “there is no ‘magic formula' that we apply to determine whether a District Court has abused its discretion in dismissing for failure to prosecute.” Lopez v. Cousins, 435 Fed.Appx. 113, 116 (3d Cir. 2011) (quoting Briscoe v. Klaus, 538 F.3d 252 (3d Cir. 2008)). Therefore, “[i]n balancing the Poulis factors, [courts] do not [employ] a . . . ‘mechanical calculation' to determine whether a District Court abused its discretion in dismissing a plaintiff's case.” Briscoe, 538 F.3d at 263 (quoting Mindek v. Rigatti, 964 F.2d 1369, 1373 (3d Cir. 1992)). Consistent with this view, it is well settled that “‘no single Poulis factor is dispositive,' [and it is] clear that ‘not all of the Poulis factors need be satisfied in order to dismiss a complaint.'” Id. (quoting Ware v. Rodale Press, Inc., 322 F.3d 218, 222 (3d Cir. 2003); Mindek, 964 F.2d at 1373). Moreover, recognizing the broad discretion conferred upon the district court in making judgments weighing these six factors, the Court of Appeals has frequently sustained such dismissal orders where there has been a pattern of dilatory conduct by a pro se litigant who is not amenable to any lesser sanction. See, e.g., Emerson, 296 F.3d 184; Tillio v. Mendelsohn, 256 Fed.Appx. 509 (3d Cir. 2007); Reshard v. Lankenau Hospital, 256 Fed.Appx. 506 (3d Cir. 2007); Azubuko v. Bell National Organization, 243 Fed.Appx. 728 (3d Cir. 2007).
In this case, a dispassionate assessment of the Poulis factors weighs heavily in favor of dismissing this action. At the outset, a consideration of the first Poulis factor, the extent of the party's personal responsibility, shows that the failure to respond to this motion is entirely attributable to the plaintiff, who has repeatedly failed to abide by court orders or respond to defense motions.
Similarly, the second Poulis factor— the prejudice to the adversary caused by the failure to abide by court orders—also calls for dismissal of this action. Indeed, this factor—the prejudice suffered by the party seeking sanctions—is entitled to great weight and careful consideration. As the Third Circuit has observed:
“Evidence of prejudice to an adversary would bear substantial weight in support of a dismissal or default judgment.” Adams v. Trustees of N.J. Brewery Employees' Pension Trust Fund, 29 F.3d 863, 873-74 (3d Cir. 1994) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Generally, prejudice includes “the irretrievable loss of evidence, the inevitable dimming of witnesses' memories, or the excessive and possibly irremediable burdens or costs imposed on the opposing party.” Id. at 874 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). . . . However, prejudice is not limited to “irremediable” or “irreparable” harm. Id.; see also Ware v. Rodale Press, Inc., 322 F.3d 218, 222 (3d Cir. 2003); Curtis T. Bedwell & Sons, Inc. v. Int'l Fidelity Ins. Co., 843 F.2d 683, 693-94 (3d Cir. 1988). It also includes “the burden imposed by impeding a party's ability to prepare effectively a full and complete trial strategy.” Ware, 322 F.3d at 222.Briscoe, 538 F.3d at 259-60. In this case, the plaintiff's failure to litigate this claim, respond to defense motions, or comply with court orders now wholly frustrates and delays the resolution of this action. In such instances, the defendant is plainly prejudiced by the plaintiff's continuing inaction and dismissal of the case clearly rests in the discretion of the trial judge. Tillio, 256 Fed.Appx. 509 (failure to timely serve pleadings compels dismissal); Reshard, 256 Fed.Appx. 506 (failure to comply with discovery compels dismissal); Azubuko, 243 Fed.Appx. 728 (failure to file amended complaint prejudices defense and compels dismissal).
When one considers the third Poulis factor—the history of dilatoriness on the plaintiff's part—it becomes clear that dismissal of this action is now appropriate. In this regard, it is clear that “‘[e]xtensive or repeated delay or delinquency constitutes a history of dilatoriness, such as consistent non-response . . ., or consistent tardiness in complying with court orders.'” Briscoe, 538 F.3d at 260-61 (quoting Adams, 29 F.3d at 874) (some citations omitted). Here, the plaintiff has consistently failed to comply with court orders or respond to a defense motion as directed. Thus, the plaintiff's conduct displays “[e]xtensive or repeated delay or delinquency [and conduct which] constitutes a history of dilatoriness, such as consistent non-response . . ., or consistent tardiness in complying with court orders.” Adams, 29 F.3d at 874.
The fourth Poulis factor—whether the conduct of the party or the attorney was willful or in bad faith—also cuts against the plaintiff in this case. In this setting, we must assess whether this conduct reflects mere inadvertence or willful conduct, in that it involved “strategic,” “intentional or self-serving behavior,” and not mere negligence. Adams, 29 F.3d at 875. At this juncture, when the plaintiff has failed to comply with instructions of the Court on numerous occasions, the Court is compelled to conclude that the plaintiff's actions are not isolated, accidental, or inadvertent but instead reflect an ongoing disregard for this case and the Court's instructions.
While Poulis also enjoins us to consider a fifth factor, the effectiveness of sanctions other than dismissal, cases construing Poulis agree that in a situation such as this case, where we are confronted by a pro se litigant who will not comply with the rules or court orders, lesser sanctions may not be an effective alternative. See, e.g., Briscoe, 538 F.3d at 262-63; Emerson, 296 F.3d at 191. This case presents such a situation where the plaintiff's status as a pro se litigant severely limits the ability of the court to utilize other lesser sanctions to ensure that this litigation progresses in an orderly fashion. In any event, by entering our prior orders and counseling the plaintiff on his obligations in this case, we have endeavored to use lesser sanctions, but to no avail. The plaintiff still ignores his responsibilities as a litigant. Since lesser sanctions have been tried, and have failed, only the sanction of dismissal remains available to the Court.
Finally, under Poulis, we are cautioned to consider one other factor, the meritoriousness of the plaintiff's claims. In our view, however, consideration of this factor cannot save this particular plaintiff's claims, since the plaintiff is now wholly non-compliant with the court's instructions. The plaintiff cannot refuse to comply with court orders which are necessary to allow resolution of the merits of his claims, and then assert the untested merits of these claims as grounds for denying amotion to dismiss. Furthermore, it is well settled that “‘no single Poulis factor is dispositive,' [and it is] clear that ‘not all of the Poulis factors need be satisfied in order to dismiss a complaint.'” Briscoe, 538 F.3d at 263(quoting Ware, 322 F.3d at 222; Mindek, 964 F.2d at 1373). Therefore, the untested merits of the non-compliant plaintiff's claims, standing alone, cannot prevent imposition of sanctions.
In any event, we find that the plaintiff's amended complaint is flawed in a number of profound respects. Therefore, the defendants' motions to dismiss have legal merit, yet another factor which favors dismissal of this lawsuit.
C. The Amended Complaint Fails as a Matter of Law
In any event, to the extent that McShane has filed an amended complaint naming Monroe County, the Recorder of Deeds, Protonotary, and Tax Bureau, along with the sheriffs' office and a state constable as defendants, making sweeping but ill-defined claims of fraud arising out of the of upset tax sale held by Monroe County Tax Claim Bureau on September 11, 2019, and seeking to void this sale, this amended complaint runs afoul of a series of insurmountable obstacles.
At the outset, McShane's current complaint ignores his prior forays into federal court on this precise topic. Specifically, as McShane doubtless knows, he previously and unsuccessfully attempted to litigate this exact claim, but his prior lawsuit was dismissed by this court. McShane v. Morris, No. CV 3:21-1505, 2021 WL 3929747, at *1 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 2, 2021).
Given Judge Mannion's decision dismissing a virtually identical lawsuit, we believe that the res judicata, collateral estoppel, and issue preclusion doctrines apply here and compel dismissal of any of the previously litigated and settled claims that the plaintiff attempts to bring in this amended complaint. Collateral estoppel, res judicata, and issue preclusion are doctrines which play a vital role in litigation. It has long been recognized that “[t]he doctrine [ ] of. . . collateral estoppel, now . . . termed . . . issue preclusion, ‘shar[es] the common goals of judicial economy, predictability, and freedom from harassment. . . .' Gregory v. Chehi, 843 F.2d 111, 116 (3d Cir.1988). Generally speaking, the . . . doctrine of issue preclusion, ‘precludes the relitigation of an issue that has been put in issue and directly determined adversely to the party against whom the estoppel is asserted.' Melikian v. Corradetti, 791 F.2d 274, 277 (3d Cir.1986).” Electro-Miniatures Corp. v. Wendon Co., Inc. 889 F.2d 41, 44 (3d. Cir.1989) (citations omitted).
The parameters of this doctrine, which precludes relitigation of certain issues, have been defined by the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in the following terms:
Issue preclusion, or collateral estoppel, prevents parties from relitigating an issue that has already been actually litigated. “The prerequisites for the application of issue preclusion are satisfied when: ‘(1) the issue sought to be precluded [is] the same as that involved in the prior action; (2) that issue [was] actually litigated; (3) it [was] determined by a final and valid judgment; and (4) the determination [was] essential to the prior judgment.' “ Burlington Northern Railroad Co. v. Hyundai Merch. Marine Co., 63 F.3d 1227, 1231-32 (3d Cir.1995) (quoting In re Graham, 973 F.2d 1089, 1097 (3d Cir.1992)); see also Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 326, n. 5, 99 S.Ct. 645, 58 L.Ed.2d 552 (1979). In its classic form, collateral estoppel also required “mutuality”-i.e., that the parties on both sides of the current proceeding be bound by the judgment in the prior proceeding. Parklane Hosiery, 439 U.S. at 326-27. Under the modern doctrine of non-mutual issue preclusion, however, a litigant may also be estopped from advancing a position that he or she has presented and lost in a prior proceeding against a different adversary. See Blonder- Tongue Labs., Inc. v. Univ. of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313, 324, 91 S.Ct. 1434, 28 L.Ed.2d 788 (1971); Parklane Hosiery, 439 U.S. at 329. For ... non-mutual issue preclusion [ ] to apply, the party to be precluded must have had a “full and fair” opportunity to litigate the issue in the first action. See Parklane Hosiery, 439 U.S. at 328; Blonder Tongue Labs., 402 U.S. at 331.Peloro v. United States, 488 F.3d 163, 174-5 (3d Cir.2007). Stated succinctly, principles of collateral estoppel compel a later court to honor an earlier decision of a matter that was actually litigated. Dici v. Commonwealth of Pa., 91 F.3d 542 (3d Cir.1997). This doctrine, which involves an assessment of the overlap between issues presented in separate lawsuits, raises essentially legal questions which are often amenable to resolution by courts as a matter of law. McFadden v. United States, No. 3:14-CV-1166, 2014 WL 6633251, at *5-6 (M.D. Pa. Nov. 21, 2014).
In the instant case, the validity of this upset sale was thoroughly litigated before Judge Mannion and McShane's claims were denied on their merits. Therefore, this prior ruling, which is res judicata, bars reconsideration of this claim in the guise of a new lawsuit.
Moreover, to the extent that McShane has now twice attempted to proceed to federal court, advancing claims which necessarily invite us to review, re-examine and reject state court rulings in their prior state court ordered tax upset sale, this we cannot do. Indeed, the United States Supreme Court has spoken to this issue and has announced a rule, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, which compels federal district courts to decline invitations to conduct what amounts to appellate review of state trial court decisions. As described by the Third Circuit:
That doctrine takes its name from the two Supreme Court cases that gave rise to the doctrine. Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 44 S.Ct. 149, 68 L.Ed. 362 (1923); District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 103 S.Ct. 1303, 75 L.Ed.2d 206 (1983). The doctrine is derived from 28 U.S.C. § 1257 which states that "[f]inal judgments or decrees rendered by the highest court of a state in which a decision could be had, may be reviewed by the Supreme Court....See also Desi's Pizza, Inc. v. City of Wilkes Barre, 321 F.3d 411, 419 (3d Cir.2003). "Since Congress has never conferred a similar power of review on the United States District Courts, the Supreme Court has
inferred that Congress did not intend to empower District Courts to review state court decisions.” Desi's Pizza, 321 F.3d at 419.Gary v. Braddock Cemetery, 517 F.3d 195, 200 (3d Cir. 2008).
Because federal district courts are not empowered by law to sit as reviewing courts, reexamining state court decisions, “[t]he Rooker-Feldman doctrine deprives a federal district court of jurisdiction in some circumstances to review a state court adjudication. Turner v. Crawford Square Apartments III, LLP., 449 F.3d 542, 547 (3d Cir. 2006). Cases construing this jurisdictional limit on the power of federal courts have quite appropriately:
[E]mphasized the narrow scope of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, holding that it “is confined to cases of the kind from which the doctrine acquired its name: cases brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered before the district court proceedings commenced and inviting district court review and rejection of those judgments. [Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Industries Corp.], 544 U.S. at 284, 125 S.Ct. at 1521-22; see also Lance v. Dennis, 546 U.S. 459, ___, 126 S.Ct. 1198, 1201, 163 L.Ed.2d 1059 (2006)Id.
However, even within these narrowly drawn confines, it has been consistently recognized that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine prevents federal judges from considering lawsuits “brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered before the district court proceedings commenced and inviting district court review and rejection of those judgments, particularly where those lawsuits necessarily require us to re-examine state court ordered property transfers and sales. See, e.g., Cuevas v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 643 Fed.Appx. 124, 126 (3d Cir. 2016); Moncrief v. Chase Manhattan Mortgage Corp., 275 F.App'x 149 (3d Cir. 2008) (Rooker-Feldman doctrine precludes re-litigation of state mortgage foreclosure in federal court); Ayres-Fountain v. Eastern Savings Bank, 153 F.App'x 91 (3d Cir. 2005) (same); In re Knapper, 407 F.3d 5773 (3d Cir. 2005) (same); Downey v. Perrault, No. 09-1018, 2009 WL 3030051 (D.N.J. Sept. 15, 2009) (same); Easley v. New Century Mortgage Corp., N o. 08-4283 (E.D. Pa. July 28, 2009) (same); Laychock v. Wells Fargo Home Mortgage, No. 07-4478, 2008 WL 2890962 (E.D.Pa. July 23, 2008) (same).
As this court has previously observed when it dismissed McShane's prior lawsuit:
Plaintiff claims that the state court Tax Sale proceedings were invalid and that the Monroe County Court should not have entered judgment against his property and allowed the Sheriff's sale. All the requirements for the Rooker-Feldman doctrine are satisfied pertaining to these claims, and this court, therefore, does not have subject-matter jurisdiction over the plaintiffs stated claims. See Kawh v. PHH Mortgage Corp., 2016 WL 7163086 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 2, 2016) (“[The court] may not revisit the state court determinations underlying Plaintiff's instant Complaint nor may [it] interfere with Plaintiff's pending state court appeals.”) (citing Taliaferro v. Darby Twp. Zoning Bd., 458 F.3d 181, 192-93 (3d Cir. 2006)) (“[I]f a plaintiff's claim in federal court is inextricably intertwined with a previous state court adjudication, the district court lacks jurisdiction over the claim even if it was not raised in the state court.”); Moncrief v. Chase Manhattan Mortgage Corp., 275 Fed.Appx. 149, 153 (3d Cir. 2008)
(“[T]o the extent that [Plaintiff] seeks to ‘appeal from' the state court's foreclosure judgment, the District Court correctly dismissed the claim under Rooker-Feldman.”); Reiter v. Washington Mut. Bank, 2011 WL 2670949 (E.D. Pa. July 5, 2011), affd 455 Fed.Appx. 188 (3d Cir. 2011) (“The Rooker-Feldman doctrine prevents the lower federal courts from exercising jurisdiction over cases brought by ‘state-court losers' challenging ‘state-court judgments rendered before the district court proceedings commenced.' ”) (citations omitted); Jung Yun, 2016 WL 7324554; Gangoo, 2017 WL 679972.
Thus, to the extent plaintiff is also deemed as seeking to relitigate the Tax Sale proceedings instituted against him and the subject property in Monroe County Court by alleging that it was unlawful and the judgment of possession obtained by the new owners was void based on due process violations and lack of notice, these claims may not be barred by Rooker-Feldman but they are prohibited by Pennsylvania's preclusion doctrine. See Moncrief, 275 Fed.Appx. at 153. “Federal courts are required to give state court judgments the same preclusive effect that the issuing state courts would give them.” Id. (citation omitted); Easley v. New Century Mortg. Corp., 394 Fed.Appx. 946, 948 (3d Cir. 2010) (“In Pennsylvania, res judicata bars ‘claims that were or could have been raised' ”)(citation omitted)(emphasis original).McShane, 2021 WL 3929747, at *5-6.
Further, the state court agencies and officials who are named in this complaint are cloaked in several forms of immunity. Initially “[b]eginning broadly, claims against [state court administrators] in their official capacities, which are in essence claims against the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, are barred by Eleventh Amendment immunity.” Conklin v. Anthou, 495 Fed.Appx. 257, 263 (3d Cir. 2012). On this score:
[I]t is well established that Pennsylvania has not waived this immunity from suit in federal court and that Congress, in enacting 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985, did not abrogate this immunity through its enforcement power pursuant to § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Will v. Mich. Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 66, 109 S.Ct. 2304, 105 L.Ed.2d 45 (1989); Wheeling & Lake Erie Ry. v. PUC, 141 F.3d 88, 91 (3d Cir.1998); see also 42 Pa. Cons.Stat. Ann. § 8521(b). The Judicial District and the Court of Common Pleas are also protected by the Eleventh Amendment. See Benn v. First Judicial Dist., 426 F.3d 233, 238-41(3d Cir.2005).Conklin, 495 Fed.Appx. at 263.
In addition, quasi-judicial immunity applies here and bars this claim since when a state court administrator “is attacked solely for actions taken in his role as Court Administrator ...,he is entitled to the protection of quasi-judicial immunity.” Conklin, 495 Fed.Appx. at 264. These longstanding and well-recognized immunity doctrines apply to Prothonotaries and Recorders of Deeds, and thus would bar claims against these officials as well. See Lockhart v. Hoenstine, 411 F.2d 455 (3d Cir.1969) (recognizing that a Prothonotary acting under a court's directive was entitled to judicial immunity); Boyce v. Dembe, 47 Fed.Appx. 155, 159 (3d. Cir.2002) (holding that Prothonotaries are entitled to absolute immunity); Smith v. Laster, 787 F.Supp.2d 315, 319 (D. Del. 2011). Thus, as to these defendants, McShane's amended complaint also fails as a matter of law because these public officials and agencies are cloaked with both constitutional and common law immunities from lawsuits for claims arising out of the performance of their official duties. In sum, McShane's amended complaint fails on its merits. Thus, all of the Poulis factors favor dismissal of this case with prejudice.
III. Recommendation
Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, IT IS RECOMMENDED that the Defendants' motions to dismiss (Docs. 32 and 34) be GRANTED.
The parties are further placed on notice that pursuant to Local Rule 72.3:
Any party may object to a magistrate judge's proposed findings, recommendations or report addressing a motion or matter described in 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(B) or making a recommendation for the disposition of a prisoner case or a habeas corpus petition within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy thereof. Such party shall file with the clerk of court, and serve on the magistrate judge and all parties, written objections which shall specifically identify the portions of the proposed findings, recommendations or report to which objection is made and the basis for such objections. The briefing requirements set forth in Local Rule 72.2 shall apply. A judge shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made and may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge. The judge, however, need conduct a new hearing only in his or her discretion or where required by law, and may consider the record developed before the magistrate judge, making his or her own determination on the basis of that record. The judge may also receive further evidence, recall witnesses or recommit the matter to the magistrate judge with instructions.