State ex inf. v. Bellflower, 129 Mo. App. 145; State ex rel. v. Campbell, 120 Mo. 402. It is the province of a Superior Court in reviewing the action of a county court in incorporating a municipal body to examine into and determine the facts upon which the jurisdiction, if any, of the county court is founded. State ex inf. v. Woods, 233 Mo. 357; State ex rel. v. Coffee, 59 Mo. 59; State ex rel. v. McReynolds, 61 Mo. 203; State ex inf. v. Bellflower, 129 Mo. App. 138; State ex rel. v. Flemming, 147 Mo. 1. A petition for incorporation of a town or village must, if it alleges existence of commons, describe the same, and is fatally defective if it fails so to do, and the court acquires no jurisdiction; or, if there be no commons, it should so state, else it is fatally defective and no jurisdiction is acquired. Sec. 7091, R.S. 1929; State v. Hyde. 2 S.W.2d 219; State ex inf. v. Gooch, 175 Mo. App. 270; State ex inf. v. Woods, 233 Mo. 357; State ex inf. v. Huffman, 248 S.W. 985; State ex rel. v. Buerman, 186 Mo. App. 699.

This case would be really no authority either way, it being an original proceeding in this court. But in State ex rel. v. McReynolds, 61 Mo. 203, we have a case in quo warranto wherein the respondents were the trustees of the town of Butler. On appeal this court heard and determined the case.

The town is a proper party under certain circumstances discussed by the books, but this case is not of that class. [See authorities infra, State ex rel. v. Coffee, 59 Mo. 59; (Vide p. 67 et seq.); State ex rel. v. McReynolds, 61 Mo. 203, p. 212; State ex inf. v. Fleming, 147 Mo. 1 (pp. 8, 9); s.c., 158 Mo. 551 (pp. 567-8); State ex inf. v. McClain, 187 Mo. 409 (p. 414); State ex rel. v. Gravel Road, 116 Mo. App. 175 (pp. 193 et seq.); State ex rel. v. Small, 131 Mo. App. 470 (pp. 478 et seq).]" Relevant to the foregoing the case of State ex inf. v. Kansas City, 233 Mo. 162, may be mentioned. The nature of the proceeding, quo warranto, is thus stated at page 171: "The purpose and object of the suit, as shown by the prayer of the information, is that this court may adjudge illegal and void an alleged amendment to the charter of Kansas City, seeking to include within the limits of the municipality a large body of contiguous territory, and that the respondent be ousted of all power, rights and jurisdiction in and over the territory attempted to be annexed by the said pretended extension of its limits."

State ex rel. Manion v. Dawson, 225 S.W. 97. (4) The judgment of the circuit court of August 12, 1918, extending the boundary lines of respondent drainage district so as to add relators' lands and other lands, being an exercise of legislative power by an administrative agent, was not res adjudicata. State ex inf. v. Fleming, 147 Mo. 2, 11; State ex rel. White v. Small, 131 Mo. App. 470; State ex inf. v. Calbert, 273 Mo. 198; State ex rel. v. Wilson, 216 Mo. 215, 275; Kayser v. Trustees of Bremen, 16 Mo. 88; Woods v. Henry, 55 Mo. 560; State ex rel. v. McReynolds, 61 Mo. 203; State ex inf. v. Woods, 233 Mo. 357. (5) The Circuit Court of Carroll County, in rendering its decree extending the boundary lines of the drainage district, was not a court possessed of general common-law jurisdiction, but was an inferior court or tribunal, possessed of no power except what was expressly conferred upon it by statute, and all facts conferring upon it power to extend the boundaries must affirmatively appear upon the face of the proceedings. Zeibold v. Foster, 118 Mo. 349; Ry. Co. v. Campbell, 62 Mo. 585; State v. Metzger, 26 Mo. 65; Edmonston v. Kite, 43 Mo. 176; Schell v. Leland, 45 Mo. 289; Iba v. II. St. J. Railroad, 45 Mo. 469; Haggard v. Att. Pac. Railroad, 63 Mo. 302; Fisher v. Davis, 27 Mo. App. 321; State ex rel. v. St. Louis, 1 Mo. App. 503; Michael v. St. Louis, 112 Mo. 610; Cunningham v. Pac. Railroad, 61 Mo. 33; Jefferson Co. v. Cowan, 54 Mo. 234; Woods v. Boots, 60 Mo. 546.

State ex rel. Manion v. Dawson, 284 Mo. 490, 225 S.W. 97. (4) The judgment of the circuit court extending the boundary lines of the drainage district so as to annex relators' land and other lands, being an exercise of legislative power by an administrative agent, was not res adjudicata. State ex inf. v. Fleming, 147 Mo. 2, 11; State ex rel. White v. Small, 131 Mo. App. 470; State ex inf. v. Calbert, 273 Mo. 198; State ex rel. v. Wilson, 216 Mo. 215, 275; Kayser v. Trustees of Bremen, 16 Mo. 88; Woods v. Henry, 55 Mo. 560; State ex rel. v. McReynolds, 61 Mo. 203; State ex inf. v. Woods, 233 Mo. 357. (5) All the sections of the Act of 1913, Laws 1913, pp. 232 to 267, should be considered together, in order to arrive at the meaning of Section 40. In order to prevent one section of a statute from conflicting with the entire scope of legislative action, it is sometimes necessary to depart from a literal construction, and adopt the one that removes the conflict and produces harmony.

The doctrine is accepted that when in a quo warranto proceeding, or one in the nature of quo warranto, the existence of a municipality is denied, the proper respondents are the usurping officials who wield municipal powers, and to make the town a party is illogical, because thereby its existence would be implied, which is the very fact denied. This proposition was decided in State ex rel. v. Coffee, 59 Mo. 59, 67; State ex rel. v. McReynolds, 61 Mo. 203, 212; State ex inf. v. Fleming, 147 Mo. 1, 9 (44 S.W. 758); Id., 158 Mo. 558, 567 (59 S.W. 118); State ex inf. v. McClain, 187 Mo. 409, 412, 86 S.W. 135; State ex rel. v. Gravel Road Co., 116 Mo. App. 175, 193, 92 S.W. 153; 17 Enc. Pl. Pr. 437.

ANALYSIS A. LIQUIDATION AND THE LIQUIDATOR'S ROLE In 1991, the Tennessee General Assembly created a comprehensive procedure for the liquidation of insolvent or otherwise destitute insurance companies with the enactment of the Insurers Rehabilitation and Liquidation Act. Tenn. Code Ann. § 56-9-101; State ex rel. McReynolds v. United Physicians Ins. Risk Retention Group, 914 S.W.2d 491, 494 (Tenn.Ct.App. 1995). The stated purpose of the Act was to protect the interests of insureds, claimants, creditors and the public generally by providing a comprehensive scheme for the rehabilitation and liquidation of insurance companies.

State ex inf. v. Fleming, 158 Mo. 568. (7) Courts will avoid the incorporation of a municipal corporation where it encloses, within the limits of the town, large tracts of land devoted exclusively to agricultural purposes. State ex rel. v. McReynolds, 61 Mo. 203; State ex inf. v. Bellflower, 129 Mo. App. 138; State ex rel. v. Small, 131 Mo. App. 470. (8) A city may reasonably extend its limits and take in contiguous property when: First. They are platted and held for sale or use as town lots. Second. Whether platted or not, if they are held to be brought on the market and sold as town property when they reach a value corresponding with the views of the owner.