In light of this training and Mr. Booker's limp appearance, a reasonable jury could conclude the Defendants inferred that Mr. Booker was unconscious and needed immediate medical attention. If a jury concludes the Defendants made this inference, then it could also conclude they were deliberately indifferent in failing to respond sooner. See Lemire v. California Dep't of Corr. and Rehabilitation, 726 F.3d 1062, 1083 (9th Cir.2013) (“While the failure to provide CPR to a prisoner in need does not create an automatic basis for liability in all circumstances, a trier of fact could conclude that, looking at the full context of the situation, officers trained to administer CPR who nonetheless did not do so despite an obvious need demonstrated the deliberate indifference required for an Eighth Amendment claim.”); McRaven v. Sanders, 577 F.3d 974, 983 (8th Cir.2009) (“An officer trained in CPR, who fails to perform it on a prisoner manifestly in need of such assistance, is liable under § 1983 for deliberate indifference.”). The Defendants' attempt to avoid liability by conceding they failed to check Mr. Booker's vitals or even look at his face after the incident is therefore misplaced.
Donna maintains that it would be unreasonable for the defendants to rely on the nurse's assessment of Amos. In support she cites McRaven v. Sanders , 577 F.3d 974 (8th Cir. 2009), where we rejected an officer's attempt to rely on a nurse's assessment of an inmate. See id. at 981.
Guse seeks damages for the alleged violations of her procedural and substantive due process rights and retaliation for exercising her First Amendment rights from Dean Olmstead, Dr. Bellis, and Professor Johnson in their individual and official capacities and from USD under § 1983. Section 1983 provides a civil cause of action against any person who, under color of state law, causes a deprivation of rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States. 42 U.S.C. § 1983; McRaven v. Sanders, 577 F.3d 974, 979 (8th Cir. 2009). A. Individual Capacity Claims
Although a court analyzes a civilly committed person's § 1983 claim under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment rather than the Eighth Amendment, "`[t]his makes little difference as a practical matter.'" McRaven v. Sanders, 577 F.3d 974, 979 (8th Cir. 2009) (quoting Kahle v. Leonard, 477 F.3d 544, 550 (8th Cir. 2007)). This is so because "`[p]retrial detainees [and civilly committed individuals] are entitled to the same protection under the Fourteenth Amendment as imprisoned convicts receive under the Eighth Amendment.'"
See Vaughn v. Gray, 557 F.3d 904, 909 (8th Cir.2009) (denying qualified immunity to officers who claimed that they thought a prisoner's vomiting “was caused by the ingestion of shampoo”); see also McRaven v. Sanders, 577 F.3d 974, 981 (8th Cir.2009) (denying qualified immunity where an inmate exhibited symptoms of severe intoxication and circumstances suggested that the inmate had overdosed on prescription medications); Grayson, 454 F.3d at 809 (granting qualified immunity where an arrestee was under the influence of methamphetamines, but “sat calmly in the back of the patrol car, followed directions, answered questions posed, and remained quiet and seated on a bench inside the jail”).
b. Other Defendants Plaintiff argues the other Defendants were deliberately indifferent because they failed to attempt CPR on Mr. White for over seven minutes until Nurse Thomas arrived at the scene. “An officer trained in CPR, who fails to perform it on a prisoner manifestly in need of such assistance, is liable under § 1983 for deliberate indifference.” McRaven v. Sanders, 577 F.3d 974, 983 (8th Cir. 2009). The Court first addresses whether Defendants were trained to perform CPR.
In the context of an Eighth/Fourteenth Amendment case alleging deliberate indifference to a serious medical need, a plaintiff may demonstrate a clearly established right at a less specific level than required to demonstrate the clear establishment of a Fourth Amendment right. See McRaven v. Sanders, 577 F.3d 974, 981-82 (8th Cir. 2009) (defining a pretrial detainee plaintiff's clearly established right simply as “[a] detainee's right to medical treatment”).
Where, as here, the inmate was a pretrial detainee as opposed to a convicted offender, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals analyzes the inmate's Section 1983 claim under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, not under the Eighth Amendment. McRaven v. Sanders, 577 F.3d 974, 979 (8th Cir. 2009) (citing Kahle v. Leonard, 477 F.3d 544, 550 (8th Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 552 U.S. 826 (2007)). "This makes little difference as a practical matter, though: Pretrial detainees are entitled to the same protection under the Fourteenth Amendment as imprisoned convicts receive under the Eighth Amendment."
V. DISCUSSION Section 1983 provides a civil cause of action against any person who, under color of state law, causes a deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States. 42 U.S.C. § 1983; McRaven v. Sanders, 577 F.3d 974, 979 (8th Cir. 2009). A. Failure to Protect
V. DISCUSSION Section 1983 provides a civil action against any individual, who under color of state law, causes a deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States. 42 U.S.C. § 1983; McRaven v. Sanders, 577 F.3d 974, 979 (8th Cir. 2009). Official Capacity