Opinion
No. M2004-02742-CCA-R3-CO.
Assigned on Briefs May 17, 2005.
Filed July 29, 2005.
Appeal from the Criminal Court for Davidson County; No. 97-D-2569; J. Randall Wyatt, Jr., Judge.
Judgment of the Trial Court is Affirmed.
Darrell McQuiddy, Pro Se, Memphis, Tennessee.
Paul G. Summers, Attorney General Reporter; Brent C. Cherry, Assistant Attorney General; Victor S. Smith, District Attorney General; Kathy Morante, Assistant District Attorneys General, for the appellee, State of Tennessee.
Jerry L. Smith, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which David G. Hayes and Thomas T. Woodall, JJ., joined.
OPINION
The petitioner, Darrell McQuiddy, filed a petition for writ of error coram nobis. The trial court dismissed the petition without a hearing. On appeal, the petitioner argues that the trial court erred by dismissing the petition. For the following reasons, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Factual Background
The petitioner filed a petition for writ of error coram nobis on October 7, 2004. In that petition, the petitioner states that he is presently in federal custody, but that he was sentenced in case number 98E5000 to a term of fifteen (15) years by a Davidson County court on February 4, 1999. The petition does not specifically state the offense(s) that the petitioner was convicted of or charged with in Davidson County. However, the petition quotes language "of the indictment which was drafted by the state" which defines the charge as premeditated first degree murder under Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-13-202. The record also includes a copy of nine (9) counts of an indictment charging the petitioner with premeditated murder, felony murder, attempted murder, five (5) counts of reckless endangerment, and one (1) count of solicitation to commit murder.
According to an order filed by the trial court on October 28, 2004, the petitioner pled guilty to facilitation of first degree murder, which was an amended charge of the indicted offense of first degree murder. The petitioner was ordered to serve the fifteen (15) year sentence concurrently to an unspecified federal sentence.
In the petition, the petitioner argues that his guilty plea was not knowingly and intelligently made, that his counsel's performance was deficient and that the indictment to which he pled guilty was defective. The trial court dismissed the petition without a hearing because the trial court determined that the petition was untimely and did not contain allegations that constituted "newly discovered evidence" for which relief under a writ of error coram nobis would be appropriate. The petitioner filed a timely notice of appeal. On appeal, the petitioner argues that: (1) the trial court lacked jurisdiction to impose the petitioner's conviction and sentence because the indictment was defective; (2) the petitioner's plea was not knowingly and intelligently made due to counsel's deficient performance; and (3) retroactivity applies to a jurisdictional claim because of the decision in Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. ___, 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004).
Analysis Writ of Error Coram Nobis
The petitioner filed a petition styled a "Motion to Petition the Court for a Writ of Error Coram Nobis," but failed to state exactly what relief was sought. On appeal, he challenges the trial court's dismissal of the petition. The State argues that the petitioner failed to state a proper claim for relief.
Relief by petition for writ of error coram nobis is provided for in Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-26-105. That statute provides, in pertinent part:
The relief obtainable by this proceeding shall be confined to errors dehors the record and to matters that were not or could not have been litigated on the trial of the case, on a motion for a new trial, on appeal in the nature of a writ of error, on writ of error, or in a habeas corpus proceeding. Upon a showing by the defendant that the defendant was without fault in failing to present certain evidence at the proper time, a writ of error coram nobis will lie for subsequently or newly discovered evidence relating to matters which were litigated at the trial if the judge determines that such evidence may have resulted in a different judgment, had it been presented at the trial. The issue shall be tried by the court without the intervention of a jury, and if the decision be in favor of the petitioner, the judgment complained of shall be set aside and the defendant shall be granted a new trial in that cause.
Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-26-105. The writ of error coram nobis is an "extraordinary procedural remedy," filling only a "slight gap into which few cases fall." State v. Mixon, 983 S.W.2d 661, 672 (Tenn. 1999). The "purpose of this remedy `is to bring to the attention of the court some fact unknown to the court which if known would have resulted in a different judgment.'" State v. Hart, 911 S.W.2d 371, 374 (Tenn.Crim.App. 1995) (quotingState ex rel. Carlson v. State, 219 Tenn. 80, 407 S.W.2d 165, 167 (1966)). The decision to grant or deny a petition for writ of error coram nobis rests within the sound discretion of the trial court. Teague v. State, 772 S.W.2d 915, 921 (Tenn.Crim.App. 1988), overruled on other grounds by Mixon, 983 S.W.2d at 671 n. 3.
A petition for writ of error coram nobis must relate: (1) the grounds and the nature of the newly discovered evidence; (2) why the admissibility of the newly discovered evidence may have resulted in a different judgment had the evidence been admitted at the previous trial; (3) that the petitioner was without fault in failing to present the newly-discovered evidence at the appropriate time; and (4) the relief sought by the petitioner.Hart, 911 S.W.2d at 374-75. A petition for writ of error coram nobis must usually be filed within one (1) year after the judgment becomes final. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 27-7-103;Mixon, 983 S.W.2d at 670. It has been determined that a judgment becomes final, for purposes of coram nobis relief, thirty (30) days after the entry of the judgment in the trial court if no post-trial motion is filed, or upon entry of an order disposing of a timely-filed, post-trial motion. Mixon, 983 S.W.2d at 670. The parties do not dispute that the petition for writ of error coram nobis in the case herein was filed outside of the applicable statute of limitations.
The grounds for seeking a petition for writ of error coram nobis are not limited to specific categories, as are the grounds for reopening a post-conviction petition. Coram nobis claims may be based upon any "newly discovered evidence relating to matters litigated at the trial" so long as the petitioner also establishes that the petitioner was "without fault" in failing to present the evidence at the proper time. Coram nobis claims therefore are singularly fact-intensive. Unlike motions to reopen, coram nobis claims are not easily resolved on the face of the petition and often require a hearing. The coram nobis statute also does not contain provisions for summary disposition or expedited appeals. . . . Although coram nobis claims also are governed by a one-year statute of limitations, the State bears the burden of raising the bar of the statute of limitations as an affirmative defense. See Sands v. State, 903 S.W.2d 297, 299 (Tenn. 1995).
Harris v. State, 102 S.W.3d 587, 592-93 (Tenn. 2003).
In the case herein, the trial court summarily dismissed the petition on the basis that it was filed outside the statute of limitations and that the allegations contained in the petition did not "constitute newly discovered evidence for which relief under the writ of error coram nobis is appropriate." We agree. The petition was filed over five and one-half (5½) years after the judgment of conviction became final and fails to allege that newly discovered evidence exists that would warrant relief under a writ of error coram nobis.
However, it is well settled that a trial court is not bound by the title of the pleading, but has the discretion to treat the pleading according to the relief sought. Fallin v. Knox Co. Board of Comm'rs, 656 S.W.2d 338, 342 (Tenn. 1983). In his brief, the petitioner argues that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to impose his conviction and sentence because the indictment was defective, thus the petitioner urges this Court to treat his motion as one seeking habeas corpus relief.
However, even if we treat the petition as a petition for writ of habeas corpus, the petitioner is still not entitled to relief. The grounds upon which a writ of habeas corpus may be issued are very narrow. McLaney v. Bell, 59 S.W.3d 90, 92 (Tenn. 2001). A writ of habeas corpus is available only when it appears on the face of the judgment or the record that the convicting court was without jurisdiction to convict or sentence the defendant or that the defendant is still imprisoned despite the expiration of his sentence. Archer v. State, 851 S.W.2d 157, 164 (Tenn. 1993);Potts v. State, 833 S.W.2d 60, 62 (Tenn. 1992).
A habeas petitioner can only attack a judgment that is void on its face and not one that is merely voidable. State v. Ritchie, 20 S.W.3d 624, 630 (Tenn. 2000). "A void judgment is one in which the judgment is facially invalid because the court lacked jurisdiction or authority to render the judgment or because the defendant's sentence has expired." Taylor v. State, 995 S.W.2d 78, 83 (Tenn. 1999). A petitioner has the burden of establishing by a preponderance of the evidence that the judgment he attacks is void or that his term of imprisonment has expired. State ex rel. Kuntz v. Bomar, 381 S.W.2d 290, 291 (Tenn. 1964). If a petitioner fails to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that his conviction is void or his term of imprisonment has expired, he is not entitled to immediate release. Passarella v. State, 891 S.W.2d 619, 627-28 (Tenn.Crim.App. 1994),superceded by statute as stated in State v. Steven S. Newman, No. 02C01-9707-CC-00266, 1998 WL 104492, at *1 n. 2 (Tenn.Crim.App., at Jackson, Mar. 11, 1998).
Further, a petition for writ of habeas corpus must state:
(1) That the person in whose behalf the writ is sought, is illegally restrained of liberty, and the person by whom and place where restrained, mentioning the name of such person, if known, and, if unknown, describing the person with as much particularity as practicable;
(2) The cause or pretense of such restraint according to the best information of the applicant, and if it be by virtue of any legal process, a copy thereof shall be annexed, or a satisfactory reason given for its absence;
(3) That the legality of the restraint has not already been adjudicated upon a prior proceeding of the same character, to the best of the applicant's knowledge and belief; and
(4) That it is the first application for the writ, or if a previous application has been made, a copy of the petition and proceedings thereon shall be produced, or satisfactory reasons be given for the failure to do so.
Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-21-107(b).
In his pleadings, the petitioner fails to provide the proper information for consideration of his case as a habeas corpus matter. The petitioner mentions federal charges of conspiracy and money laundering under the federal Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-68. Any federal charges on which the petitioner seeks relief are clearly outside the jurisdiction of this Court. The petitioner's argument seems to be that there is a jurisdictional defect in the indictments, but the petitioner fails to identify the nature of the jurisdictional defect other than to state that the indictments failed to charge an offense. From the brief submitted to this Court, it appears that the petitioner addresses his "jurisdictional defect" claim to charges of money laundering, unlawful financial transactions and conspiracy to commit racketeering activity. The record does not contain a copy of these indictments. It is the duty of the appellant to prepare a record that conveys a fair, accurate, and complete account of what transpired in the trial court with respect to the issues that form the basis of the appeal. Tenn. R. App. P. 24(b); State v. Taylor, 992 S.W.2d 941, 944 (Tenn. 1999). Generally, this Court is precluded from addressing an issue on appeal when the record fails to include relevant documents. See Tenn. R. App. P. 24; State v. Bennett, 798 S.W.2d 783 (Tenn.Crim.App. 1990). Further, the petitioner seems to be challenging federal convictions. Again, this Court has no jurisdiction over those claims. This issue is without merit.
The petitioner also claims that his guilty plea was not knowingly and voluntarily entered because his trial counsel was ineffective. At the most, the petitioner's allegations would form the basis for a petition for post-conviction relief. However, if we were to treat the petition as a petition for post-conviction relief, the petitioner would still be unsuccessful as his petition was not filed within the one (1) year statute of limitations for filing a petition for post-conviction relief and does not allege facts that would fulfill the requirements to allow the claim to be filed outside the statute of limitations.See Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-30-102.
Finally, in a "Brief to Amend or Supplement Authority" the petitioner claims that "under Blakely [v. Washington, 542 U.S. ___, 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004)] the state statute of limitation [sic] cannot procedural default jurisdictional claims when an indictment omit [sic] an essential element because a claim based on jurisdiction is made retroactive by-way [sic]] of a crucial element being omitted." The State does not address this claim.
We do not understand the petitioner's argument. Further, we fail to see how Blakely could possibly apply to the case herein. Blakely addressed the issue of whether particular sentencing procedures of the State of Washington allowing judges to enhance sentences beyond the statutorily-provided range violated the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial. The petitioner herein makes no challenge to his sentence. Besides, the Tennessee Supreme Court recently determined that Blakely did not announce a new rule of law and that "the Tennessee Criminal Sentencing Reform Act does not authorize a sentencing procedure which violated the Sixth Amendment right to jury trial." State v. Gomez, ___ S.W.3d ___, No. M2002-01209-SC-R11-CD, 2005 WL 856848, at *17 n. 16 (Tenn. Apr. 15, 2005). This issue is without merit.
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.