Opinion
Case No. 03-2338-JWL
January 5, 2004
MEMORANDUM ORDER
Plaintiff Michael McQueeny brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) seeking judicial review of the decision of defendant, the Commissioner of Social Security, to deny his application for a period of disability and disability insurance benefits under Title II of the Social Security Act. According to plaintiff, defendant erred in concluding that plaintiffs mental impairments did not satisfy the severity requirements at step two of the sequential evaluation process; failed to assess properly plaintiffs subjective complaints of pain; inaccurately assessed plaintiffs residual functional capacity; and failed to establish that plaintiff could perform other jobs despite his limitations. As explained in more detail below, the court rejects each of plaintiff's arguments and affirms defendant's decision.
I. Procedural Background
On April 28, 2000, plaintiff filed his application for a period of disability and disability insurance benefits, claiming disability since June 1, 1999 due to asthma, hypertension, gastroesophageal reflux disease (GERD), sleep apnea, anxiety, depression and memory problems. The application was denied both initially and upon reconsideration. At plaintiffs request, an administrative law judge ("ALP') held a hearing on August 23, 2002, at which both plaintiff and his counsel were present. On September 25, 2002, the ALJ rendered a decision in which he determined that plaintiff was not under a "disability" as defined by the Social Security Act and, thus, denied all benefits to plaintiff After the ALJ's unfavorable decision, plaintiff requested review by the Appeals Council. The Appeals Council denied plaintiffs request for review on May 21, 2003, rendering the ALJ's decision the final decision of defendant.
II. Standard of Review
Judicial review under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) is limited to whether defendant's decision is supported by substantial evidence in the record as a whole and whether defendant applied the correct legal standards. See White v. Massanari, 271 F.3d 1256, 1257 (10th Cir. 2001) (citing Castellano v. Sec'y of Health Human Servs., 26 F.3d 1027, 1029 (10th Cir. 1994)). The Tenth Circuit has defined "substantial evidence" as "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Id. (quoting Castellano, 26 F.3d at 1028). In the course of its review, the court may not reweigh the evidence or substitute its judgment for that of defendant. Id.
III. Relevant Framework for Analyzing Claim of Disability and the ALJ's Findings
"Disability" is defined in the Social Security Act as the "inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment. . . ." Williams v. Bowen, 844 F.2d 748, 750 (10th Cir. 1988) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A), 1382c(a)(3)(A) (1982)). The Social Security Act further provides that an individual "shall be determined to be under a disability only if his physical or mental impairment or impairments are of such severity that he is not only unable to do his previous work but cannot, considering his age, education, and work experience, engage in any other kind of substantial gainful work which exists in the national economy. . . ." Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(A), 1382c(a)(3)(B) (1982 Supp. III 1985)).
The Social Security Administration has established a five-step sequential evaluation process for determining whether a claimant is disabled, see id. (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520, 416.920 (1986)), and the ALJ in this case followed the five-step process. If a determination can be made at any of the steps that a claimant is or is not disabled, evaluation under a subsequent step is not necessary. Id. Step one determines whether the claimant is presently engaged in substantial gainful activity. Id. If he is, disability benefits are denied. Id. If he is not, the decision maker must proceed to the second step. Id. Here, the ALJ determined that plaintiff was not engaged in substantial gainful activity and, thus, properly proceeded to the second step.
The second step of the evaluation process involves a determination of whether "the claimant has a medically severe impairment or combination of impairments." Id. (quoting Bowen v. Yuckert, 107 S.Ct. 2287, 2291 (1987)). This determination is governed by certain "severity regulations," is based on medical factors alone, and, consequently, does not include consideration of such vocational factors as age, education, and work experience. Id. (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(c), 416.920(c) (1986)). Pursuant to the severity regulations, the claimant must make a threshold showing that his medically determinable impairment or combination of impairments significantly limits his ability to do basic work activities. Id. at 750-51 (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1521(b), 416.921(b) (1986)). If the claimant is unable to show that his impairments would have more than a minimal effect on his ability to do basic work activities, he is not eligible for disability benefits. Id. at 751. If, on the other hand, the claimant presents medical evidence and makes the de minimis showing of medical severity, the decision maker proceeds to step three. Id. The ALJ in this case concluded that plaintiff's asthma and gastroesophageal reflux disease were "severe" within the meaning of the regulations and, thus, the ALJ proceeded to step three. The ALJ also concluded that plaintiff's hypertension, anxiety, depression, sleep apnea did not impose any significant limitation on plaintiff's ability to perform basic work-related activities and, thus, were not severe impairments under the regulations.
In step three, the ALJ "determines whether the impairment is equivalent to one of a number of listed impairments that the Secretary acknowledges are so severe as to preclude substantial gainful activity." Id. (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(d), 416.920(d) (1986); Bowen v. Yuckert, 107 S.Ct. at 2291). If the impairment is listed and thus conclusively presumed to be disabling, the claimant is entitled to benefits. Id. If not, the evaluation proceeds to the fourth step, where the claimant must show that the "impairment prevents [the claimant] from performing work he has performed in the past." Id. (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(e), 416.920(e) (1986); Bowen v. Yuckert, 107 S.Ct. at 2291). If the claimant is able to perform his or her previous work, the claimant is not disabled. Id. With respect to the third step of the process in this case, the ALJ determined that plaintiffs impairments were not listed or medically equivalent to those listed in the relevant regulations. At the fourth step, the ALJ concluded that plaintiff was unable to perform past relevant work.
Thus, the ALJ proceeded to the fifth and final step of the sequential evaluation process-determining whether the claimant has the residual functional capacity (RFC) "to perform other work in the national economy in view of [the claimant's] age, education, and work experience." See id. (quoting Bowen v. Yuckert, 107 S.Ct. at 2291). At that point, the ALJ properly shifted the burden of proof to defendant to establish that plaintiff retains the capacity "to perform an alternative work activity and that this specific type of job exists in the national economy." See id. (citations omitted); accord White, 271 F.3d at 1258 (at fifth step, burden of proof shifts to Commissioner to show that claimant retains the functional capacity to do specific jobs). At this step, the ALJ concluded that plaintiff was not disabled, a conclusion that rested on a finding that plaintiff, despite possessing certain limitations, nonetheless could perform a significant number of jobs in the state and national economies, including performing work as a sedentary cashier, telephone solicitor, or security monitor.
IV. Analysis of Plaintiff's Specific Arguments
In his motion, plaintiff contends that the ALJ made four errors in reaching his decision-defendant erred in concluding that plaintiffs mental impairments did not satisfy the severity requirements at step two of the sequential evaluation process; failed to assess properly plaintiffs subjective complaints of pain; inaccurately assessed plaintiffs residual functional capacity; and failed to establish that plaintiff could perform other jobs despite his limitations. The court addresses each of these arguments in turn.
A. Assessing the Severity of Plaintiff's Mental Impairments
Plaintiff first asserts that the ALJ erred in failing to conclude that plaintiff's mental impairments, including anxiety and depression, were severe. In that regard, the ALJ concluded that plaintiff's anxiety and depression resulted in only mild functional limitations, including a mild restriction of activities of daily living mild difficulties in maintaining social functioning; and mild difficulties in maintaining concentration, persistence or pace. In assessing plaintiff's residual functional capacity, the ALJ determined that plaintiff's mental impairments "result in no more than mild functional limitations and he is at least capable of performing simple, routine, repetitive job tasks."
According to plaintiff, the ALJ should have determined that plaintiff's anxiety is severe because he has received ongoing treatment for the condition and because his anxiety is closely tied to his asthma, which the ALJ did conclude was severe. While the record may reflect that plaintiff received ongoing treatment for anxiety, the record similarly reflects, as noted by the ALJ, that plaintiff's anxiety was well controlled with medication even if his anxiety was related, to some extent, to his asthma. There is simply no evidence in the record suggesting that plaintiff's anxiety imposed a significant limitation on his work-related activities and, as such, the ALJ's conclusion in this regard was entirely appropriate.
Plaintiff also challenges the ALJ's conclusion that his depression was not severe because it is well controlled with medication. According to plaintiff, there is no evidence in the record that his depression is well controlled with medication. To the contrary, plaintiffs treating psychiatrist, Rita M. Desai, M.D., reported that plaintiffs depression was improved on Prozac and her notes indicate that plaintiff reported improved depressive symptoms. In addition, Dr. Desai's treatment notes indicate that plaintiff, after only two weeks, voluntarily discontinued the use of Serzone-a medication that Dr. Desai had prescribed to further treat plaintiffs depression-because his depression was "not that bad." Thus, the ALJ's conclusion that plaintiffs depression was not severe is supported by substantial evidence.
While plaintiff asserts that his depression improved only in 2001 and that from the time of his alleged onset in June 1999 through 2001 his medication was continually adjusted with no significant response, plaintiff directs the court to no medical records or other evidence in the record concerning plaintiffs depression prior to 2001 and the court, after its own review of the record, can find nothing indicating that plaintiff was treated for depression prior to 2001.
Finally, plaintiff urges that he has more than "mild" limitations in his daily activities, social functioning and ability to maintain concentration, persistence and pace. In support of his argument that his daily activities and social functioning are severely limited by his anxiety and depression, plaintiff highlights his own testimony that he does very few chores and spends most of his time silting on the couch watching television. There is no suggestion in the record, however, that plaintiffs activities were limited as a result of his anxiety or depression. In fact, even plaintiff testified that he spent most of the day sitting on the couch in an effort to stay calm and avoid an asthma attack. Similarly, he testified that he did very few chores around the house so as to minimize his exposure to irritants that might cause an asthma attack
With respect to his concentration, plaintiff contends that every doctor who has commented on his ability to concentrate has indicated that it is significantly impaired. The court, however, can find in the record evidence of only one doctor who opined that plaintiff's concentration was such that he would "likely have difficulty sustaining concentration over an 8-hour day" and that he "would likely have difficulty retaining information." This assessment was made by Avner Stem, Ph.D., a consultative psychological examiner. The ALJ expressly discounted Dr. Stern's opinion concerning the limitations on plaintiff's ability to concentrate because Dr. Stern specifically reported that although plaintiff demonstrated some difficulty focusing on difficult tasks during testing, he was otherwise able to concentrate and was capable of performing and understanding simple tasks.
The ALJ further noted that he was attaching greater weight to the clinical findings and diagnostic impressions provided by plaintiffs treating physicians regarding the limitations imposed by plaintiffs mental impairments as those physicians had numerous encounters with plaintiff over an extended period of time, had a longstanding treatment relationship with plaintiff, and their opinions were far more consistent with the evidence in the record as a whole. The ALJ's conclusions regarding Dr. Stern's opinion were entirely appropriate. See Riddle v. Halter, 2001 WL 282344, at *1 (10th Cir. Mar. 22, 2001) (ALJ's determination was supported by substantial evidence despite the fact that it may have been inconsistent with findings in report by consultative physician where contents of consultative physician's report were inconsistent with other medical reports in the record, including those of the claimant's treating physicians); Reid v. Chater, 71 F.3d 372, 374 (10th Cir. 1995) (a treating physician's opinion regarding the severity of a claimant's impairments is generally favored over that of a consulting physician).
In sum, the ALJ's conclusions regarding the severity of plaintiffs mental impairments are supported by substantial evidence.
B. Plaintiffs Subjective Complaints
Plaintiff asserts that the ALJ committed error by failing to assess properly his credibility in accordance with the Tenth Circuit's opinion in Luna v. Bowen, 834 F.2d 161 (10th Cir. 1987). Under Luna, the ALJ must decide whether a claimant's subjective claims of pain are credible, considering such factors as a claimant's persistent attempts to find relief for his or her pain and his or her willingness to try any treatment prescribed, regular use of crutches or a cane, regular contact with a doctor, the claimant's daily activities, and the dosage, effectiveness, and side effects of medication. Barnett v. Apfel, 231 F.3d 687, 690 (10th Cir. 2000) (citing Luna, 834 F.2d at 165-66). Moreover, the ALJ must give specific reasons why he or she rejects a claimant's subjective complaints of pain. White v. Massanari, 271 F.3d 1256, 1261 (10th Cir. 2001) (citing Kepler v. Chater, 68 F.3d 387, 390-91 (10th Cir. 1995)). Ultimately, credibility determinations "are peculiarly the province of the finder of fact," and should not be upset if supported by substantial evidence. Id. (citing Kepler, 68 F.3d at 390-91).
According to plaintiff, the ALJ's decision in this case is at odds with Luna because the ALJ discredited plaintiffs subjective complaints concerning the severity of his limitations based solely on a comparison of plaintiffs complaints with the medical evidence. See Luna, 834 F.2d at 165 (the absence of an objective medical basis for the degree of severity of pain may affect the weight to be given to the claimant's subjective allegations of pain, but a lack of objective corroboration of the pain's severity cannot justify disregarding those allegations). A review of the ALJ's decision in this case, however, reveals that he complied with Luna in assessing plaintiffs credibility and that plaintiffs contentions to the contrary lack merit. In that regard, the ALJ did not rely solely on the objective medical evidence in discrediting plaintiffs complaints concerning the severity of his limitations. Rather, the ALJ's conclusion regarding plaintiffs credibility was based on several factors including, most significantly, plaintiffs own reports to his physicians concerning his limitations. Specifically, while plaintiff testified at the hearing that his reflux symptoms had returned since having surgery and that his current medication did not help improve those symptoms, there is ample evidence in the record that plaintiff advised his treating physician that his reflux condition was greatly improved and that his medication was helping. Moreover, there is no evidence in the record that plaintiff ever reported to his physician that his medication was not helping his reflux. Similarly, while plaintiff alleges that his anxiety and depression are severe, he voluntarily ceased taking certain prescription medication-against his doctor's orders-based on his own assessment that his depressive symptoms were improved. Moreover, while plaintiff testified at the hearing that he needed to use his nebulizer between one and four times per day, the record shows that he reported to his treating physician that he was able to go extended periods (as much as two weeks) without the use of a nebulizer. Finally, while plaintiff testified that he was unable to perform household chores, he reported to his physician that he was able to perform a wide range of household chores and that he had commenced walking for exercise. Plaintiff has not shown how this assessment was in error.
In short, the ALJ set forth the specific evidence he relied upon, applied the correct legal standards in evaluating plaintiffs subjective allegations of pain, and his determination on this matter is supported by substantial evidence in the record. C. Residual Functional Capacity
Plaintiff highlights that the Veterans Administration has determined that plaintiff has a 100% service-connected disability and that, at a minimum, this determination constitutes evidence supporting plaintiff's complaints concerning the severity of his limitations. Of course, disability determinations are not binding on the Commissioner. See Musgrave v. Sullivan, 966 F.2d 1371, 1375 (10th Cir. 1992). While a disability determination by the VA might be entitled to consideration, the ALJ in this case explained at some length why he was not according any weight to the VA's determination.
Plaintiff contends that the ALJ inaccurately assessed plaintiffs residual functional capacity. RFC is an administrative finding of what an individual can still do despite his or her limitations. Spicer v. Barnhart, 2003 WL 21000999, *2 (10th Cir. May 5, 2003) (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(a)). It assesses the extent to which an individual's "impairments), and any related symptoms, such as pain, may cause physical and mental limitations that affect what [an individual] can do in a work setting." Id. (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(a)).
In his decision, the ALJ concluded that plaintiff had the RFC to perform a significant range of sedentary work. In so concluding, the ALJ found that plaintiff was able to lift and carry up to 3 pounds frequently and 10 pounds occasionally; that plaintiff required the option to alternate sitting and standing during the work day; that plaintiff needed to work in an air-conditioned and climate-controlled environment due to his respiratory problems; and that plaintiff could perform simple, routine and repetitive job tasks.
Plaintiff complains that the ALJ's RFC determination failed to take into account all of plaintiffs limitations. See Winfrey v. Chater, 92 F.3d 1017, 1024 (10th Cir. 1996) (RFC determination must accurately reflect the plaintiffs limitations). Specifically, plaintiff contends that the ALJ erred by failing to address the "documented deficits" in plaintiffs memory and concentration; by failing to consider plaintiffs need for a low stress environment; by failing to consider the fatigue that plaintiff experiences as a side-effect of his medications and as a direct result of his sleep apnea; by failing to address plaintiffs use of his nebulizer, which takes 30 minutes to use and during which time plaintiff would be unable to engage in work activities; by failing to address plaintiffs need to have immediate access to a restroom and the freedom to take breaks as needed to accommodate his persistent gastrointestinal distress. The court will address each of plaintiff s concerns in turn.
Plaintiff contends that the ALJ failed to include in his RFC assessment any limitation plaintiff has a result of his mental impairments, including his memory and concentration problems. Contrary to plaintiffs suggestion, the ALJ's RFC assessment expressly reflected that plaintiffs mental impairments resulted in "mild functional limitations" and that as result of those limitations, plaintiff was able to carry out only simple, routine, and repetitive job tasks. Moreover, while plaintiff complains that the ALJ rejected Dr. Stern's conclusion that plaintiff would have difficulty maintaining concentration for an 8-hour work day, the ALJ properly disregarded this portion of Dr. Stern's opinion, as discussed above. While plaintiff claims that Dr. Stein's assessment of plaintiffs ability to concentrate is consistent with two of plaintiffs treating physicians, the record does not bear out this contention. Plaintiff refers the court to treatment notes from Dr. Steven Broxterman in May 2000, but Dr. Broxterman simply notes plaintiff's subjective complaint that he has had "difficulty concentrating lately." Dr. Broxterman makes no assessment of plaintiff's ability to concentrate. Similarly, plaintiff directs the court to a letter from Dr. Scott Frankel to "whom it may concern" which simply states that the "severe nature of [plaintiff's] lung symptoms" could "perhaps" interfere with his ability to concentrate. Dr. Frankel, then, does not make an assessment of plaintiffs ability to concentrate; he simply notes that plaintiff's asthma could conceivably have some affect on plaintiff's ability to concentrate. In short, the ALJ's RFC assessment adequately reflected plaintiff's limitations with respect to memory and concentration.
Plaintiff next asserts that the ALJ did not consider plaintiff's need for a "low stress environment" due to his health problems. Plaintiff has not shown or even alleged, however, that the jobs that the ALJ concluded plaintiff was capable of performing are not "low stress" jobs. Stated another way, there is no basis for the court to conclude that the ALJ's ultimate conclusion in this case-that plaintiff could perform a significant range of sedentary work-would have been any different had he expressly determined that plaintiff was limited to work in a low stress environment. Several cases in this context recognize that jobs such as those identified by the vocational expert in this case are "low stress" jobs. See, e.g., Liessmann v. Barnhart, 2002 WL 31450793, at *3 (10th Cir. Nov. 4, 2002) (affirming decision of Commissioner where ALJ concluded that plaintiff was limited to work in a low stress environment and found that plaintiff could perform the job of surveillance monitor); King v. Chater, 1997 WL 3303838, at *1 (9th Cir. Apr. 11, 1997) (affirming decision of Commissioner where ALJ concluded that plaintiff was limited to work in a low stress environment and found that plaintiff could perform the job of security system monitor and cashier). Plaintiff, then, has not shown any error in this regard.
With respect to his assertion that the ALJ failed to consider plaintiff's fatigue in assessing plaintiff's RFC, there is no indication in the record that plaintiff ever complained to the ALJ or to any physicians about any fatigue either as a result of his medications or as a result of his sleep apnea. In fact, the ALJ expressly notes in his order that plaintiff alleged no specific limitation as a result of his sleep apnea and that, in any event, plaintiff's sleep had greatly improved since commencing the use of a C-PAP machine to treat his sleep apnea. Again, the court can find no evidence in the record that plaintiff ever complained to his physicians that his medications were causing fatigue. In these circumstances, the court cannot conclude that the ALJ erred by failing to factor any alleged fatigue problems into his RFC assessment.
Plaintiff also complains that the ALJ's RFC assessment fails to take into account plaintiff's use of a nebulizer to treat his asthma. In that regard, plaintiff testified that he used a nebulizer 1 to 4 times per day to treat his symptoms, that each use lasted about 30 minutes in duration and that he could not pursue other activities during that time. A review of the ALJ's written decision, however, reflects that the ALJ found that plaintiffs testimony concerning the severity of his asthma and the frequency of his use of a nebulizer was not credible. This assessment is supported by substantial evidence. In July 1999, for example, plaintiff reported to his treating physician that his asthma was markedly improved since he began taking Singulair. Thereafter, he reported that his symptoms further improved after a pet cat was removed from plaintiff's home. In addition, in October 1999, plaintiff reported a two-week period when he did not require the use of his nebulizer at all. In April 2000, plaintiff reported to his physician that he had just returned from an 8-day vacation and had rarely needed to use his inhaler during that time. During this same time period, plaintiff reported to his physician that his asthma attacks had decreased in frequency to only two to three times per week. The ALJ, then, did not err in rejecting plaintiff's assertion that he required the use of a nebulizer anywhere from 1 to 4 times each day and the ALJ was not required to include this condition in his RFC assessment.
The fact that plaintiff did not need to use his inhaler is significant because plaintiff testified that he used a nebulizer only on those occasions when an inhaler did not resolve his symptoms. Obviously, then, plaintiff was not using a nebulizer during this time period either.
Finally, the ALJ did not err in failing to include in his RFC assessment plaintiffs alleged need for immediate access to a restroom and the freedom to take restroom breaks as needed to relieve his persistent gastrointestinal distress. For while plaintiff testified that surgery and medications did not improve his reflux condition, the ALJ's written order indicates that he found this testimony incredible and entirely inconsistent with the medical records-records that indicates that plaintiff experienced only occasional reflux, constipation and diarrhea and that these conditions were reasonably controlled with medication and diet. In other words, the record does not support plaintiffs assertion that he needs immediate access to a restroom and the freedom to take restroom breaks as needed.
For the foregoing reasons, then, the court rejects plaintiffs contention that the ALJ erred by failing to include in his RFC assessment all of plaintiff's limitations.
D. Burden of Proving that Plaintiff Can Perform Other Jobs in the National Economy
Plaintiffs final argument is that the ALJ's hypothetical question eliciting the vocational expert's (VE) testimony that there were jobs existing in the national economy that plaintiff remained capable of performing failed to include all of plaintiffs limitations and, thus, the VE's testimony fails to constitute substantial evidence supporting the denial of benefits. A vocational expert's testimony can provide a proper basis for an ALJ's determination where the claimant's impairments are reflected adequately in the hypothetical inquiries to the expert. Gay v. Sullivan, 986 F.2d 1336, 1341 (10th Cir. 1993). The ALJ, however, is required to accept and include in the hypothetical question only those limitations supported by the record. Shepherd v. Apfel, 184 F.3d 1196, 1203 (10th Cir. 1999).
According to plaintiff, the ALJ's hypothetical question omitted several of plaintiffs limitations, most notably his alleged concentration and memory problems. As explained above, however, the ALJ's RFC assessment adequately reflected plaintiffs limitations with respect to memory and concentration and, thus, he was not required to include additional limitations in his hypothetical question to the VE. Moreover, plaintiff has not shown that the ALJ's hypothetical question to the VE omitted any other limitations that were supported by the evidence. Thus, because the ALJ included in his hypothetical questions all of the limitations supported by the record, see Decker v. Chater, 86 F.3d 953, 955 (10th Cir. 1996), the VE's testimony elicited by those hypothetical questions provided substantial evidence to support the denial of benefits.
Plaintiff's counsel asked the VE whether plaintiff would be able to perform other jobs in the state and national economies if he had significant problems with concentration, memory, fatigue, and interacting appropriately with coworkers, supervisors or the public. The VE testified that such limitations would prevent work activity. While plaintiff attaches some significance to this testimony, the ALJ did not err in rejecting this opinion as he ultimately decided that plaintiff'.s testimony concerning such limitations was not credible. See Barnett v. Apfel, 231 F.3d 687, 690 (10th Cir. 2000) (ALJ did not err in rejecting the vocational expert's opinion that plaintiff would be totally disabled if her testimony at the hearing were believed completely, as the record did not establish the limitations described by plaintiff) (citing Gay v. Sullivan, 986 F.2d 1336, 1341 (10th Cir. 1993) (approving ALJ's disregard of expert's favorable response to claimant's attorney's hypothetical which required expert to assume unestablished facts)).
In sum, having carefully reviewed the record in this case and having considered plaintiff's arguments in light of the record, the court concludes that substantial evidence supports defendant's decision to deny Mr. McQueeny's application for disability benefits and that no deviation from established legal standards occurred
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED BY THE COURT THAT plaintiff's motion for judgment (doc. #4) is denied and defendant's decision denying plaintiff disability benefits is affirmed.
IT IS SO ORDERED.