Likewise not controlling here are cases in which this Court has held that a sentence imposed under the Split Sentence Act that results in a total period of confinement exceeding the maximum as stated in § 15–18–8(a)(1) is illegal. See, e.g., Gray v. State, 939 So.2d 962 (Ala.Crim.App.2006); Phillips v. State, 932 So.2d 165 (Ala.Crim.App.2005); Dixon v. State, 912 So.2d 292 (Ala.Crim.App.2005); Moore v. State, 871 So.2d 106 (Ala.Crim.App.2003); Austin v. State, 864 So.2d 1115 (Ala.Crim.App.2003); and McQueen v. State, 829 So.2d 783 (Ala.Crim.App.2002). These cases are distinguishable because they involve either (1) a sentence imposed on only one conviction (Gray,Moore,Austin,McQueen ) or (2) multiple concurrent sentences (Phillips,Dixon ) that were imposed at the same time and that, because the trial court had expressly ordered that they be served concurrently, were in practical effect only one sentence.
Likewise not controlling here are cases in which this Court has held that a sentence imposed under the Split Sentence Act that results in a total period of confinement exceeding the maximum as stated in § 15-18-8(a)(1) is illegal. See, e.g., Gray v. State, 939 So. 2d 962 (Ala. Crim. App. 2006); Phillips v. State, 932 So. 2d 165 (Ala. Crim. App. 2005); Dixon v. State, 912 So. 2d 292 (Ala. Crim. App. 2005); Moore v. State, 871 So. 2d 106 (Ala. Crim. App. 2003); Austin v. State, 864 So. 2d 1115 (Ala. Crim. App. 2003); and McQueen v. State, 829 So. 2d 783 (Ala. Crim. App. 2002). These cases are distinguishable because they involve either (1) a sentence imposed on only one conviction (Gray, Moore, Austin, McQueen) or (2) multiple concurrent sentences (Phillips, Dixon) that were imposed at the same time and that, because the trial court had expressly ordered that they be served concurrently, were in practical effect only one sentence.