La.Civ. Code Ann. art. 3449 (West.Supp. 1988). See, e.g., McPherson v. Roy, 390 So.2d 543, 551 (La.Ct.App. 1980), writ denied, 396 So.2d 910 (1981); Corsey v. State, Through Dept. of Corrections, 366 So.2d 964, 967 (La.Ct.App.), rev'd on other grounds, 375 So.2d 1319 (La. 1979). La.Civ. Code Ann. art. 3450 (West Supp. 1988).

A renunciation of accrued prescription to be effective must be unequivocal and takes place only when the intent to renounce is clear, direct and absolute. McPherson v. Roy, 390 So.2d 543, 551 (La. App. 3rd Cir. 1980) writ denied, 396 So.2d 910 (La. 1981).DISCUSSION OF FACTS AND APPLICATION OF LAW

Id. art. 3450. Bordelon's, Inc. v. Littell, 490 So. 2d 779, 781 (La. App. 3 Cir. 1986) (citing McPherson v. Roy, 390 So. 2d 543 (La. App. 3 Cir. 1980)). Id.

Our courts have consistently held that renunciation must be "clear, direct, and absolute and manifested by words or actions of the party in whose favor prescription has run." Queen v. W W Clarklift, Inc., 537 So.2d 1214 (La.App. 4th Cir. 1989); Bordelon's Inc. v. Littell, 490 So.2d 779 (La.App. 3rd Cir. 1986); McPherson v. Roy, 390 So.2d 543 (La.App. 3rd Cir. 1980), writ denied, 396 So.2d 910 (La. 1981). According to civil tradition, renunciation is a unilateral act requiring neither acceptance by the other party, nor requiring any formality.

Our courts have consistently held that renunciation must be "clear, direct, and absolute and manifested by words or actions of the party in whose favor prescription has run." Queen v. W. W. Clarklift, Inc., 537 So.2d 1214 (La.App. 4th Cir. 1989); Bordelon's, Inc. v. Littell, 490 So.2d 779 (La.App. 3rd Cir. 1986); McPherson v. Roy, 390 So.2d 543 (La.App. 3rd Cir. 1980), writ denied, 396 So.2d 910 (La. 1981). According to civil tradition, renunciation is a unilateral act requiring neither acceptance by the other party, nor requiring any formality. Official Comment (d) to LSA-C.C. Art. 3449. According to the Louisiana jurisprudence, renunciation requires a new promise to pay the debt, as "[a] new obligation binding on the debtor is created when a promise to pay is made after prescription has accrued."

Lima, 595 So.2d at 631 ( quoting Queen v. WW Clarklift, Inc., 537 So.2d 1214 (La.App. 4 Cir. 1989)); Bordelon's, Inc. v. Littell, 490 So.2d 779, 781 (La.App. 3 Cir. 1986); and McPherson v. Roy, 390 So.2d 543, 551 (La.App. 3 Cir. 1980), writ denied, 396 So.2d 910 (La. 1981). Renunciation requires a new promise to pay the debt; a new obligation binding on the debtor is created when a promise to pay is made after prescription has accrued.

For purposes of acquisitive prescription without title, possession extends only to that which has been actually possessed. The owner acquires the benefit of another's corporeal possession of a thing only if it can be established that the possessor actually intended, at the moment he assumed possession of the thing, to hold such for the former and not for himself. McPherson v. Roy, 390 So.2d 543 (La.App. 3rd Cir. 1980), writ denied, 396 So.2d 910 (La. 1981). Since the above cited Civil Code articles clearly permit a lessee to possess property on behalf of his lessor, the initial corporeal possession may be exercised by the tenant on behalf of the alleged owner to whom he pays rent. Once possession through the lessee has begun corporeally it may, for purposes of acquisitive prescription, be preserved by external and public signs which evidence to the public the possessor's intent to maintain his possession.

Assuming that these actions have been cumulated, any right the defendants may have had to question the cumulation has been waived as a result of the defendants' failure to timely raise it. McPherson v. Roy, 390 So.2d 543, 546-547 (La.App. 3rd Cir. 1980), writ denied, 396 So.2d 910 (1981). The defendants also raise for the first time in this appeal the trial court's failure to follow Rule III of the Local Rules of the Nineteenth Judicial District.

For purposes of determining whether the plaintiffs have acquired ownership by ten year prescription, we must look first to those acts of corporeal possession that took place after the plaintiffs acquired just title to the property in 1956 and 1957. Since the plaintiffs are seeking to prove acquisitive prescription through the acts of Ascension and Livingston Parishes, they must show (1) that servitudes were granted and (2) that they, as grantees, exercised corporeal possession of the property. See, McPherson v. Roy, 390 So.2d 543 (La.App. 3d Cir. 1980), writ denied, 396 So.2d 910 (La. 1981). The plaintiffs have shown that their predecessors granted rights of way to the parishes of Ascension and Livingston in 1956 following the recordation of the first correction deed.

C.C. Art. 3449 provides that prescription may be renounced only after it has accrued; and art. 3450 provides for tacit renunciation resulting from circumstances that give rise to a presumption that the advantages of prescription have been abandoned. Renunciation of accrued prescription, to be effective, must be unequivocal and takes place only when the intent to renounce is clear, direct, absolute and manifested by words or actions of the party in whose favor prescription has run. Bordelon" Inc. v. Littell, 490 So.2d 779 (La.App. 3rd Cir. 1986); McPherson v. Roy, 390 So.2d 543 (La.App. 3rd Cir. 1980) writ denied 396 So.2d 910 (La. 1981). In his letter of July 1, 1985 plaintiff's attorney Brown told Bily that the petition was filed. From that time until shortly before December, 1987 Bily first and then his attorneys were relying on this misstatement when they attempted to negotiate a settlement, unaware that the suit was not timely filed.