" Kane v. Kane, 118 Conn. 291, 294, 172 A. 84. As stated in Meriden v. Rogers, supra, 118, one of the essential conditions for the granting of such a motion is that the evidence which the party seeks to offer could not have been known and with reasonable diligence produced at the trial. See also Keller v. Carone, 138 Conn. 405, 407, 85 A.2d 489; McPartland v. Beaumart, Inc., 124 Conn. 539, 542, 200 A. 1018. The record does not disclose compliance with this indispensable requisite of prior due diligence. "If a party upon the filing of a decision unfavorable to him upon an issue which has been litigated at the trial has a right to have the judgment reopened to enable him to offer further testimony upon that issue, which might equally well have been offered at the trial, litigation would be prolonged beyond the requirements of a sound public policy.

The referee, to whom the case was referred, increased the amount of the damages, and judgment accepting the report was rendered on May 3, 1963. Barring an appeal to this court, the reassessment was final and conclusive. Ibid. Nevertheless, the trial court on April 21, 1964, granted a motion to open the judgment and referred the matter back to the same referee for the purpose of taking further evidence. The plaintiff in his brief states that the motion to open had to be determined precisely as a petition for a new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence would have been. If we assume, without deciding, that that contention is so, the motion was fatally defective in that it did not set forth who the witnesses were and what their testimony would be. McPartland v. Beaumart, Inc., 124 Conn. 539, 542, 200 A. 1018; Kane v. Kane, 118 Conn. 291, 294, 172 A. 84. Later on, after the second referral, the parties stipulated as to what the plaintiff claimed he intended to offer evidence to prove.

Under these circumstances the court exercised a proper discretion in denying the motion. McPartland v. Beaumart, Inc., 124 Conn. 539, 542, 200 A. 1018. Furthermore, the defendant had no right to an accounting. An owner in possession is entitled to the rents and profits; if the mortgagee is in possession, it is his duty to apply them on the debt, should the owner seek redemption, and the owner may require him to account for them. Desiderio v. Iadonisi, 115 Conn. 652, 654, 163 A. 254; Dime Savings Bank of Hartford v. Bragaw, 125 Conn. 281, 284, 4 A.2d 924. While as between a junior and a senior mortgagee the former, on redeeming, can ordinarily require the latter to account for the rents and profits, the sound rule is that as there is no contractual relationship between them the junior mortgagee's rights must be worked out through the mortgagor, and if the mortgagor has lost the right the junior mortgagee cannot assert it.

A reasonable exercise of discretion requires a denial of the motion. McPartland v. Beaumart, Inc., 124 Conn. 539, 542.