from an examination of the allegations and the proof we reach the same conclusion. Some allegations in the petition possess some elements of an action for deceit based on fraud, such as the representations by the defendant that the lease to Bowman and Crosby was not binding on the plaintiff and that the defendant had an option for a new lease or renewal, but the petition is clearly lacking in other indispensable allegations to constitute such a case, among others being the lack of an allegation that the alleged statements of the defendant were false or the allegations of facts showing the same to be false. The allegation that it was intended that the provision for indemnity was to be incorporated in the written lease, and that if it was left out it was omitted by the defendant, and proof to that effect did not constitute actionable fraud, inasmuch as the evidence shows that the plaintiff is a woman of fair education and can read. Guthrie W. R. Co. v. Rhodes, 19 Okla. 21, 91 P. 1119; McNinch v. Northwest Thresher Co., 23 Okla. 386, 100 P. 524; Colonial Jewelry Co. v. Bridges, 43 Okla. 813, 144 P. 577; White Sewing Machine Co. v. McCarty Furniture Co., 58 Okla. 545, 160 P. 495; Ozark States Trust Co. v. Winkler, 84 Okla. 7, 202 P. 12. We consider these features of the petition and the evidence in that respect only for the purpose of determining what is plaintiff's cause of action, inasmuch as there was some evidence of fraud, and plaintiff's counsel in their brief at times touch on fraud, but we see nothing in it but a case for breach of express contract, and will consider and determine the rights of the parties in such a case.

The rule applicable to the situation presented by the facts in the instant case has been many times stated by this court in clear and unmistakable language. In McNinch v. Northwestern Thresher Co., 23 Okla. 386, 100 P. 524, it is said: "The execution of a contract in writing supersedes all the oral negotiations or stipulations concerning its terms and subject-matter which preceded or accompanied the execution of the instrument, in the absence of accident, fraud, or mistake of fact; and any representation made prior to or contemporaneous with the execution of the written contract is inadmissible to contradict, change, or add to the terms plainly incorporated into and made a part of the written contract."

Hence an agreement, alleged to have been a part of the transaction that the obligation should not be used as binding or enforceable can never be permitted to be shown, for the writing necessarily determines that very subject to the contrary; in the ordinary phrase, it is necessarily inconsistent with the writing." See, also, McNinch v. Northwest Thresher Co., 23 Okla. 386, 100 P. 524, 138 Am. St. Rep. 803. We are not unmindful of the numerous conflicting authorities upon the question of admissibility of parol testimony with relation to written instruments, many of which have gone very far in holding parol evidence competent for the purpose of showing that the delivery of the instrument was conditional, or that it never took effect at all.

The execution of a contract in writing supersedes all the oral negotiations or stipulations concerning its terms and subject-matter which preceded or accompanied the execution of the instrument, in the absence of accident, fraud, or mistake of fact; and any representation made prior to, or contemporaneous with the execution of the written contract is inadmissible to contradict, change, or add to the terms plainly incorporated into and made a part of the written contract. (McNinch v. Northwest Thresher Co., 23 Okla. 386, 100 P. 524.) 3. Same — Sales — Oral Warranty.

Counsel cites many authorities in support of his contention under this assignment, and we have examined them and find that some are not in point, but that those that are in point, instead of supporting his contention, directly and squarely oppose it. He relies upon McNinch v. Northwest Thresher Co., 23 Okla. 386, 100 P. 524, 138 Am. St. Rep. 803, and Guthrie Western Ry. Co. v. Rhodes, 19 Okla. 21, 91 P. 1119, 21 L.R.A. (N.S.) 490. But there is a clear distinction between the facts pleaded in each of these cases and the case at bar.

This paper may in effect be considered as a memorandum of an agreement, under the terms of which the plaintiff agreed to subordinate his lien to any lien the defendant might acquire for the storage of the property; and so regarding the document the law would require the plaintiff to exercise the care and diligence of a prudent business man; and as such, not being able to read the document, it was his duty to procure some reliable person to read it to him before he signed it, and not having done so he is bound by its terms. ( Hawkins v. Hawkins, 50 Cal. 558; McNinch v. Northwestern T. Co., 23 Okl. 386, [138 Am. St. Rep. 803, 100 P. 524]; Bostwick v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 116 Wis. 392, [67 L. R. A. 705, 89 N.W. 538, 92 N.W. 246]; Chicago, etc. Ry. Co. v. Belliwith, 83 Fed. 437, [28 C. C. A. 358]; Muller v. Kelly, 116 Fed. 545). The plaintiff was present when the property was removed from its location on Folsom Street, and consented tacitly at least to its removal.

1985).McNinch v. Northwest Thresher Co., 23 Okla. 386, 392, 100 P. 524, 526 (1909) (emphasis added) (dictum in third syllabus "overruled" in Miller v. Troy Laundry Machinery Co., 178 Okla. 313, 316, 62 P.2d 975, 979) (1936). But see Lefors v. Miami Building Loan Ass'n., 183 Okla. 410, 412, 82 P.2d 1029, 1031 (1938) and McCubbins v. Simpson, 186 Okla. 417, 422, 98 P.2d 49 (1939).

In Burk v. Walton, 337 Mo. 781, 789, 86 S.W.2d 92, 96, the court said: "While recitals in a written instrument as to the consideration therefor amounting to statements of fact, and not rising to the status of being contractual in their nature, are subject to contradiction [citations], extrinsic evidence, in the absence of fraud, accident, or mistake, is not competent to vary or contradict provisions of a contractual nature set forth therein where the parties to the document, or their privies, are the contesting litigants." To the same effect the court in Clarke v. Clarke, 194 Okla. 455, 152 P.2d 908, 910, stated: "And where, in a note or other written contract, the statement of the consideration is a mere recital amounting to a receipt and is not contractual in form (McNinch v. Northwest Thresher Co., 23 Okla. 386, 100 P. 524, 138 Am.St.Rep. 803; 20 Am.Jur. 975; 10 R.C.L. 1044; 22 C.J. 1171; 32 C.J.S., Evidence, § 1569, p. 889), parol evidence is admissible to prove the true consideration." The subject of "contractual" consideration as regards the parol evidence rule is discussed in 20 Am.Jur., Evidence § 1112, and in Annot., 100 A.L.R. 17.

That this cannot be done is clear from the statute and the adjudicated cases. Keokuk Falls Imp. Co. v. Kingsland, etc., Mfg. Co., 5 Okla. 32, 47 P. 484; Liverpool, etc., Ins. Co. v. T.M. Richardson Lumber Co., 11 Okla. 585, 69 P. 938; Moorehead v. Davis, 13 Okla. 166, 73 P. 1103; Neverman et al. v. Bank of Cass County, 14 Okla. 417, 78 P. 382; Guthrie Western R. Co. v. Rhodes, 19 Okla. 21, 91 P. 1119, 21 L.R.A., N.S., 490; McNinch v. Northwest Thresher Co., 23 Okla. 386, 100 P. 524, 138 Am. St.Rep. 803."

First Nat. Bank v. Hendrick, 135 Okla. 260, 275 P. 314; Erwin v. Breese, 188 Okla. 391, 109 P.2d 507. See, also, 36 Am. Jur. 919. And where, in a note or other written contract, the statement of the consideration is a mere recital amounting to a receipt and is not contractual in form (McNinch v. Northwest Thresher Co., 23 Okla. 386, 100 P. 524, 138 Am. St. Rep. 803; 20 Am. Jur. 975; 10 R. C. L. 1044; 22 C. J. 1171; 32 C.J.S. 889), parol evidence is admissible to prove the true consideration. Roberts v. Boydston, 186 Okla. 336, 97 P.2d 898; Bank of Commerce v. Webster, 70 Okla. 68, 172 P. 943; 10 R. C. L. 1042; 8 Am. Jur. 656; 20 Am. Jur. 973; 22 C. J. 1164; 11 C.J.S. 125; 32 C.J.S. 878.