We agree with employer. In the first place, this court has implicitly held, in McNett v. Roy-Ladd Const. Co., 46 Or. App. 601, 613 P.2d 47, rev den 289 Or. 588 (1980) (knowledge exception inapplicable because knowledge acquired after 180-day deadline for giving notice of claim did not prejudice employer), that knowledge gained after the initial notice period does not satisfy the exception. Secondly, an analysis of the statute under the template of PGE v. Bureau of Labor and Industries, 317 Or. 606, 859 P.2d 1143 (1993), confirms our interpretation.

Further, to bar a claim, the prejudice must have occurred after the period of time in which a worker is statutorily entitled to file a claim. McNett v. Roy-Ladd Const. Co., 46 Or. App. 601, 605, 613 P.2d 47, rev den 289 Or. 588 (1980). We agree with claimant that employer was not prejudiced by its inability to investigate the accident scene.

To bar a claim, that prejudice must have occurred after the 180 days to which a worker is statutorily entitled. McNett v. Roy-Ladd Const. Co., 46 Or. App. 601, 605, 613 P.2d 47, rev den 289 Or. 588 (1980). In this case, SAIF's claim of prejudice is that, because the employer was bankrupt and out of business by the time claimant filed her claim, it had no opportunity to perform chemical density tests at the alleged exposure site to compare to nonemployment related exposures or "to otherwise adequately investigate the claim."